Jerusalem

“Israel's struggle for hegemony over Jerusalem is fought out not just at the military, economic, and political levels, but also at the ideological and cultural levels within the institutions of civil society. It is waged at the level of electric plants, water systems, roads, housing projects, police stations, and army checkpoints; but also at the level of schools and school textbooks, religious institutions, NGOs, the media, and government propaganda. In sum, Israel rules by force but also aspires to win consent, both locally and internationally.”

25.6.67: East Jerusalem subjected to Israeli Law for “administrative reasons”, de facto Annexation

• Jordanian Law repealed
• no Arab banks allowed
• Israeli Identity Cards delivered (“permanent residents”) according to the “Law of Access” (1952); Palestinians can apply for Israeli citizenship 30.July 1980: “Basic Law on Jerusalem”
• Jerusalem united and eternal capital of Israel

28.6.67: Israel annexes ca. 70 000 dunum (70 km²) to the municipal boundaries (land from 28 Palestinian towns and villages)

• 38.1 km² pre 1967 to 108 km² post 1967 (since 1990: 123 km²)
• City boundary embraces 10% of West Bank
• To ensure Jewish majority in the city, populated Palestinian areas were excluded, Palestinian villages and neighborhoods divided
• “annexed” Palestinian population: 71 000

Settlement Belts
3 Settlement belts were built to integrate East Jerusalem to West Jerusalem neighborhoods and separate East Jerusalem form Palestinian villages and rest of West Bank

1. Belt: 1967 and beyond

• Maghreb Quarter (135 houses) destroyed in order to create a plaza in front of the Wailing Wall
• Jewish Quarter: 5 dunum 130 dunum
• 3345 dunum confiscated from Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi Joz, Ard as-Sammar
• 490 dunum from al-Bayad and al-Haram for: Givat Hamaftar and Ramot Eshkol
• 307 dunum from Sheikh Jarrah for: Ma’alot Difna (closing the western and northern rout from Jerusalem to West Bank and connecting the Hebrew University with West Jerusalem)

2. Belt: 1970 and beyond

• 11 780 dunum for Neve Ya’aqub (north east of Jerusalem)
• 6840 dunum for Ramot (north; settlers: 39 000)
• 2240 dunum for East Talpiyot (south east; settlers: 15 000)
• 2700 dunum for Gilo (south; settlers: 30 000)
• 9000 dunum from Beit Jala, Sharfat and Beit Safafa

3. Belt: 1971 and beyond

• Building settlements outside the new city borders (Ma’ale Adumim, Giv’at Ze’ev; “Greater Jerusalem” Plan)

There are now 28 settlements in and around Jerusalem
1998: Settlement activities increased by 13 - 15 %
12% of housing units remain uninhabited
1999: 114 billion US-Dollar budget for settlements

“Beautification”

In March 1996 the area became the site of the first Israeli police station in East Jerusalem outside the Old City. One year later the municipality began tearing up the sidewalks on Salah ad-Din and Zahra Streets. The object was to replace the large, handcut colorful grained flagstones with a pallid, machine- cut pavement. At issue for Palestinian Jerusalemites was the authoritative displacement of their storical sense of the city with that of the Israeli municipality's. The old stones had been laid by the Jordanian municipality in 1954, but their shape and texture resembles older urban architectural traditions going back to Salah ad-Din and earlier. The community later learned that the municipality's renovation was part of a larger project, titled the Salah ad-Din Project, to construct an urban infrastructure that mirrors that of downtown West Jerusalem. It is this struggle over place and space that the municipality's brochure re-represents as part and parcel of a dominant modernist aesthetics of “clean streets.”

27.May 1997: Knesset adopts new projects for “Greater Jerusalem/Metropolitan Jerusalem”, expanding the borders of the city, incorporating Israeli Settlements outside the city borders, maintaining the Jewish majority of Jerusalem and further separating the city from the West Bank

• Metropolitan Jerusalem will cover 40% of the West Bank (440 Sq. km)
• building an umbrella municipality of local councils
• Eastern Belt: Expanding Neve Ya’acov (est. 1970; settlers: 18 000), connecting it with Adam colony. Expanding Pisgat Ze’ev and Pisgat Omer (both est. 1985; together: 29 000 settlers) eastwards to land of Hizma, Anata, southwards to Shua’fat Camp, westwards to Beit Hanina. Expanding Eastern Gate Colony to the hills of Ra’s Shehade and Ra’s Khamis, linking it with French Hill (south) and Pisgat Omer (north). Planing schemes include housing for 2 000 settlers, industrial zones, parks and swimming pools. Expanding also Almon by confiscating land from Anata and Ma’ale Adumim (est. 1975; settlers: 25 000).

• Northwestern Belt: Expanding Giv’at Ze’ev (total of 14 200 new housing  units) and connecting it with Ramot Allon (also expanding) through the new established settlement Neve Samuel (est. 1994). Expanding also: Har Adar B (est. 1986) and Jerusalem Airport

• Southern Belt: Expanding East Talpiyot (1 300 housing units) westwards, linking it with West Jerusalem, and eastwards to Jabel al-Mukabber. Construction of the new settlement Giv’at Ha Arba (3 000 housing units), which finally separates Bethlehem from Jerusalem. Construction of Har Homa (planned for 30 000 settlers), and Gani Bitar (west of Gilo), and expanding Gilo, and Giv’at Ha Matos (est. 1992) on land belonging to Beit Jala, and Beit Safafa, closing the southern belt around Jerusalem.

• Bypass Road # 45: Separating Abu Diss, al-Izzariyah, Anata, Hizma, al- Ziayem, al-Sawahra, and Beit Safafa from East Jerusalem, connecting the surrounding settlements (Har Homa – Ma’ale Adumim – Pisgat Ze’ev); 45 km long, with 3 tunnels (each 1.8 km)

• Bypass Road # 70: Connecting Almon and Kfar Adumin, cutting through the land of Anata and Hizma (3 200 dunum confiscated)

 21. Jan 1999: National Master Plan No. 35

• create a stretch of “unbroken city” from the north (Jerusalem – Tel-Aviv Highway) to the south (Tzur Hadassah)
• Raise the Jewish population from 426 000 (1998) to 758 000 (2020)
• Construct some 75 000 new housing units

As the Israeli Government encouraged Jews to settle in East Jerusalem, settlers in East Jerusalem comprise an estimated 76% of the total increase in Jerusalem’s Jewish population since 1967.

Settlement Population Growth: 154 000 (1993)             180 000 (1998)

Decrease in new settlers: + 9 000 (1994)        + 4 700 (1995)          + 2600 (1996)

63 700 Israelis left Jerusalem between 1992 - 1995

Since the 1970s Jerusalem has witnessed an overall slow-down of population growth, with more Jews leaving the city than settling there.

Jewish settler Groups in the Old City – Ateret Cohanim, Elad, Amana, Hay VeKayam – are a permanent threat to the Palestinian population, a source of constant tension and the attempts of entering the Aqsa-Mosque frequently led to clashes. Providing private security guards for this settlers amounts to 20 Mio. NIS annually.

Jewish Jerusalem is top-heavy with housing and lacks an adequate economic base to provide jobs for all the residents who have been encouraged to settle there for demographic purposes (thus the efforts of the Jerusalem Development Authority since the 1980s to develop high-tech industry in Jerusalem). This fact, combined with the growing municipal expense of the increasing ultra-orthodox population, has caused the city to run a $120 million annual deficit, although it receives hefty subsidies from the national government. As the numbers of the ultra-orthodox population grow, they gain increasing influence over city politics and claim a disproportionate share of public resources for their community (the results of the recent November 1998 municipal elections demonstrate their growing political influence).

The Israeli public overwhelmingly opposes ever dividing Jerusalem again or ceding Israeli control over any part of the city. According to one recent poll, while 68 percent of the Israeli public (excluding Israeli Arabs) favor further land concessions on the West Bank, 84 percent oppose any Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem.[1] In light of this consensus, politicians have calculated that by conjuring up the threat of Jerusalem's re-division—construed as a return to pre-1967 barbed wire fences, snipers, and no man's lands—they can galvanize public support for whichever "strong leader" can portray himself as the city's true defender.

From the early 1980s to 1992, there was a covert government action, not officially sanctioned. Certain government agencies, positions, authorities acting in concert with settler groups, using legal, quasi - legal and illegal means to take over Palestinian properties, especially in Silwan and the Muslim quarter. This involved the illegal allocation of tens of millions of government dollars. Private contributions were a pittance, for instance such as those from Ateret Cohanim and Elad. It involved systematic abuse of the absentee property law, properties were declared absentees properties on the basis of questionable and false documents. It involved conflict of interests, where people from the settler groups sat on committees handing out money to themselves. Illegal loans etc… There was illegal allocation of funds and government properties to settler groups without tenders, bids or criteria. There were strong hints of misappropriation of funds.

No overall development plan for East Jerusalem has ever been approved or published

No published assessment of housing needs for Palestinians

Palestinian urban development since 1973 was subjected to a “quota”, which until 1993 never has been revealed in public. This quota based on the “demographic balance of Jews and Arabs”, which ought not to exceed the level it had been at the end of 1972, this meant: 26.5% Palestinians to 73.5% Jews (East and West Jerusalem combined). In order to keep the quota, the Israeli Government / Jerusalem Municipality adopted a very restrictive policy towards the Palestinian population of Jerusalem (e.g. expulsion, house demolition, see below).

Separate plans are issued for settlements and Palestinian neighborhoods

• Allows different standards and procedures to be adopted for the different parts of the city
• Palestinian plans are geographically restrictive, have insufficient capacity, procedures are unsatisfactory
• Plans establish a “blue line” boundary around the neighborhoods, allowing “infill” development, but denying any expansion / development

According to ai only 9% (B’tselem: 7%) of East Jerusalem has been approved for Palestinian housing, the very great majority is already developed

• Land outside the “blue line” is zoned for shetah nof patuah / green areas (open landscape area)
• Now development allowed
• Most of the resent and current land confiscation is “green area”
• Zoning as “green area” has been frequently used to sterilize land for later confiscation for settlements (e.g. Gabal Abu Ghneim)

• Development restricted to low permitted densities
• Average plot ratio (floor space divided by plot area): 60% (Jews: 150 – 200%)
• Building Height: 2 floors (Jews: 8 floors)
• Ownership patterns are not taken into account while formulating the plans
• No local decision making to Palestinian neighborhoods
• Outline plans often need a “detailed plan” to be approved
• Any plot of more than 0.1 hectare need a “parcellation plan” to be approved

• Building permits are seldom given (1967 – 1999: 2 950)

• 43 000 homes for Jews, 28 000 for Palestinians (East Jerusalem)
• Out of 19 927 new built houses (1990 – 1997), only 1 484 are Palestinian homes
• housing shortage for Palestinians: 20 000
• overcrowding average person/household: Palestinian: 5.8 Israeli: 3.5 more than 3 persons/room: Palestinian: 23.1% Israeli: 2 %

4. Land Confiscation

 Confiscation based on:

• Land of “absentees”; “State Land” (not officially registered ownership; not under continuous cultivation)
• “Public Purpose”, Mandatory Law, 1943 (Land is than used to built private houses/settlements; not a single house has been built for Palestinians)
• Green Areas

After being confiscated, land is transferred to Israel Land Authority, which by an administrative procedure defines Palestinians as “alien person”, who is prohibited from building or renting “state land”

 Results

• 66% of today’s Jerusalem is territory seized by force
• 44% “Green Areas”, 34% “Public Purpose”, 9% “Settlement Expansion”, 13% Arab Neighborhoods

• general procedure for granting permission complex, lengthy, costly
• most application are refused because of zoning plans or land owned by “absentee”, even for land with joint ownership (e.g. West Bank resident status)

2 950 building permits were issued since 1967 (10%)
Majority of houses is built without permits, yet subjected to demolition orders
Only 4 400 houses, built since 1967 are not threatened with demolition (16%)

• issued by Jerusalem Municipality or Ministry of Interior
• order is either administrative or judicial
• 80% of orders are judicial; house owner has to pay a fine (average: $6 380)
• no real “demolition plans”; randomly selected as warning for others
• pattern noticeable: 1. Houses rebuilt after demolition 2. Houses near projected Jewish development

	1987 – 1999: 284 houses have been demolished
	Okt.1999: 5 000 buildings, containing around 12 000 houses are subject to demolition order (43%)
	1/3 of Palestinian Jerusalemites live under threat of having their houses demolished
	Number of houses threatened with demolition is four times as the number of houses which has been given building permits since 1967
	The fines, being collected after demolition amount $1.1 million in Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem (1999)
	Even though the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 105 houses in West Jerusalem received demolition orders, out of which 51 has been carried out (1992 – 1997), no single house has been demolished. When action is been taken this means that a small part of the structure (e.g. the porch, or access arrangements) must be altered. A demolition order issued for a Palestinian house means the total destruction of a home.
	the number of housing units in the Jewish sector grew by approximately 123%, while the number of housing units in the Arab sector grew by approximately 83%.

Residency (blue identity cards) is given according to census following the occupation

• Only Palestinians counted in this census and their descendants are allowed to live in Jerusalem
• Normal migration denied (rural – urban)
• According to “Law of Access” (1952) and regulations pursuant to this law, a Palestinian loose his residency in three cases: 1. Staying outside Israel for at least 7 years 2. Acquiring a permanent residence in another country 3. Acquiring another nationality

1967 – 1999: 6 174 IDs confiscated (does not include dependent children)

Dec. 1995: “Center of Life” Regulation

• Palestinians has to submit to the Ministry of Interior: lease on the apartment, tax, water bills, electricity bills, and school registration to assure, Jerusalem is “Center of Life”
• With the change of the residency policy, the confiscation of IDs increased:

• Reasons: living abroad (foreign countries, West Bank)
• Before receiving medical service, the National Insurance Institute conducts an investigation. A lot of Palestinians lost their health insurance as well as social welfare benefits because they couldn’t proof, that Jerusalem is the “Center of Life”

Family Reunification

Non-resident spouses must apply for family reunification in order to live legally in Jerusalem. Most applications are turned down, with no need to justify. Female applicants were rejected until 1994 on the grounds that an Arab woman should live with her husband’s family. A lot of couples are living “illegally” in Jerusalem.

TOTAL (1967 – 1995): 25,636

The total number of applications for family reunification pending annually at the Israeli Interior Ministry is 10,000.

Only when the father holds a valid ID children can be registered. Approximately 4 000 Palestinian children are unregistered, thus having no access to insurance, health service, schools.

7. Service and Infrastructure

Jerusalem Development Budget (1999)

Palestinians receive less than 10% of the budget
City invests seven times as much on a Jewish resident than on a Palestinian resident

Service

Gap in infrastructure between East and West Jerusalem is currently estimated at $ 10 billion

According to a secret Israeli report (1998), schools in East Jerusalem are below acceptable pedagogic standard, with outdated teaching material, considerable lack of resources and assistance services. 30% of all elementary school students are illiterate, 40% of high school students are dropping out of school. 38 Mio. NIS are needed to improve the situation.

Jerusalem has the highest percentage of tenants in the West Bank with 27.4%, due in part to poverty and the restriction on building. Within the Old City, where 40% of houses are severely substandard, about half of all residents rent their homes from owners, or are given rent-free housing as social welfare cases by the churches or the Awqaf.

A high number of Jerusalem residents by birth migrate to other areas of the West Bank for housing and work (8.2%), a dramatic demonstration of the social and economic pressures of life in East Jerusalem, especially housing shortages.

The Palestinian labor force in Jerusalem is marked by low skilled employment, low female participation and job insecurity due to competition with foreign workers. About 28% of the 31,800 registered non-Jewish employed persons in Jerusalem were unskilled workers in 1995, compared to only 5.6% of Jewish unskilled workers. 35.5% were industrial, construction, or agricultural workers compared to just 13% of Jewish workers. Female labor force participation rate is 12-19% for Palestinian women, but 52% for Israeli women in the city. The employment of women accounts for much higher “family income” among Jews in Jerualem, where the average net income per household was NIS 7,583 in 1996. The average family income is more than twice as high among Jews as non-Jews and individual incomes are three times as high. In terms of per capita GNI, the rate is seven times as high.

Israeli statistics show the poverty rate in Jerusalem as 27.4% of residents (21% of families) and attribute the high rate to the large proportion of non-Jews and Jewish ultra-Orthodox in the city. Israel’s latest statistical report on Jerusalem notes that the poverty index is calculated by the National Insurance Institute and includes “almost no Arab inhabitants,” so that the actual rate is much greater. If the Israeli poverty line of 50% of the median disposable income (which includes government assistance) is applied to Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, an estimated 45-60% of the population would fall into the category of “poor.”

The balance between taxation and social benefits and its relationship to potential political resistance has been well understood by Israeli policy-makers. They have chosen to apply taxes gradually but steadily on East Jerusalem residents, at the same time extending social insurance, and have been flexible in reconsidering tax policies which have proved too controversial. After the first decade of rule in Palestinian Jerusalem, however, Israel was applying taxes and expecting payments at the same rate as applied in Jewish West Jerusalem despite measurable differences in per capita income between the two population groups and the lack of recognition by Palestinians of Israeli political authority.

New taxes: Immediately after its occupation in 1967 of those parts of Jerusalem previously under Jordanian administration, Israel applied a number of new taxes on its 70,000 Palestinian residents: income tax, taxes to cover absorption loans, and a civil defense levy.

Only an estimated 3.3 percent of the eligible Arab East Jerusalem voters turned out on November 1998 for municipality election, making this the lowest participation rate since 1967.

As for Palestinian institutions in the city, while Palestinians failed in 1967 to preserve an independent East Jerusalem Municipal Government, they did keep Israel from taking over the East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, the Jerusalem Electric Corporation, the Moqassed Hospital, and the curriculum of Palestinian schools. They also preserved the independence of a range of professional associations, and, under Jordanian sponsorship, re-established the Supreme Muslim Council. These battles involved legal struggle, public appeals at the United Nations and other international forums, and civil disobedience, including strikes.

In a recent analytical piece in the Jerusalem Times, Said Ghazali observed that "Palestinians currently lack a strategic master plan. Construction of new houses in the Old City is limited, and the millions of dollars collected abroad is not efficiently used." Further analysis of the sort we have ventured here might explore what institutional structures in Palestinian society have blocked the development of such a unified, intersectoral strategy in the city. In particular, we might ask why there has not been a more unified opposition to the policy of closure, which is having such a broad and destructive impact on Palestinians. Such understanding of the shortcomings of current strategies must inform future efforts to preserve Arab Jerusalem. In developing such strategies, however, Palestinians should not invest Israel with omnipotence. As we have seen, the best-laid schemes of Israeli social engineering often go awry. Nor should we underestimate the role that Palestinians themselves have played in shaping the city. They have left a long record of active intervention, from whose failures and successes they can learn for the future.

Economy

By comparison, Palestinians have less successfully resisted Israel's ongoing strangulation of the Arab economy. Since March 1993 Israel has closed Jerusalem to residents of the West Bank under the pretext of security. The real aim has been to sever economic ties between Arab Jerusalem and the West Bank and to divide the West Bank itself into isolated Northern and Southern regions. To this end Israel has also banned the sale of certain West Bank products in the city. The closure has meant an enormous loss of business. It has also forced 80 percent of Palestinian NGOs to move to areas outside the checkpoints to be accessible to staff and c festival. Because of the continuing closure, however, the success of this year's two-week shopping festival (from July 12th to the 24th) depended on Palestinians from within the "green line," meaning it had little positive effect.

60% of Palestinian Christians is living outside Palestine, 40% inside (in accordance with the general distribution of Palestinians living in exile)

42.1% of Christians in Jerusalem district Old City want to emigrate

30.5% of Christians in the Old City want to emigrate