This research is significant not only because no empirical studies have been conducted on the topic in thc occupied Palestinian territories, but also because its findings may contribute to the existing limited empirical knowledge regarding identity and interethnic contact in colonial and post-colonial societies.

In addition, the research is significant because it examines the effect of an important event in Palestinian history, that is the start of implementing the DOP in Spring 1994, on Palestinians' identity and readiness for interethnic contact.

The collection of data before and after that event allows us to study its effect on Palestinians' identity and readiness.

Identity Formation and Development

A widely accepted definition of identity is that of Miller (1963, 1983), who defined it as a pattern of observable and inferable attributes which identifies a person to himself and others. Viewing identity as a social object frequently reevaluated by the person and others, Miller distinguished between objective public identity (the person as viewed by others), subjective public identity (the person's perception how others view him) and self-identity (the person as viewed by the self). In this paper we adopt Miller's definition of self-identity, and focus on the self-identity, or more precisely the self-collective identity, of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In most contemporary societies self-identity is formed of several components(or sub-identities), representing several group (such as clan, ethnic, religious and national) memberships. The importance given to these components may vary from one period to another due to social and historical factors such as state policy, social change, wars and interracial contact. Self-identity, as such, is multidimensional, socially constructed and varies from time to time. For example, American Indian ethnic identity has been renewed in recent decades due to Federal Indian policy, American ethnic politics, and American Indian political activism (Negel, 1995). And American black ethnic identity, which also intensified in the last decades, has been negatively affected by childhood interracial contact (Harris, 1995).

Similarly, the self-identity of Palestinians is formed of several components representing several group memberships. Besides being Palestinian, sharing a common historical experience and struggling for independence, the Palestinians are: 1) Arab, sharing a common language, history and culture with the Arab world; 2) predominantly Muslim, with a small minority of Christians; and 3)members of narrow traditional groups, such as localities (towns, villages or refugee camps) and clans. The importance given to these components has varied from one period to another due to social and historical factors. Following is a brief description of the development of Palestinians self-identity in the last century.

Palestine, under late Ottoman rule, known as "Southern Syria" was not one administrative unit, but rather was divided between two or three administrative units (sanjaks). Most of the Muslim Arabs of Palestine, as well as those of the Ottoman Empire, identified themselves at that time as Arabs, Muslims and Ottomans (Al-Budairi, 1995: 7-8). While Arab identity was based on common language, history and culture, and Muslim identity on a common religion,Ottoman identity was based on membership in the "community of believers,"that is on citizenship in the Muslim Empire.

In response to the Young Turks' Revolution of 1909, which brought to power a nationalist movement stressing Turkish rather than Islamic sentiment and tradition (Berger, 1964: 318), the pan-Arab movement emerged, stressing Arab unity, based, as mentioned, on common language, history and culture (Brand,1988:318). At the same time, a semi-organized Palestinian political opposition to Zionist colonization, especially to Jewish immigration and Jews' purchase of land, which had begun in the 1880s, was carried out primarily by the nascent Arabic press (Mi'ari, 1983: 59).

During the First World War, and primarily when the Ottoman Empire broke up at the end of that war, Arab identity overcame its two competitors, the Ottoman and the traditional Muslim identities, and gained widespread public support. Arab unity, or Palestine's unity with Syria, was considered the only way to prevent the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine (Porat,1975: 121-122).

After the First World War, Palestine was separated from Syria and put underthe British Mandate. The borders of mandatory Palestine were designed by the British and French colonial powers. In response to British rule between 1917and 1948 and to the intensified Zionist settlement in Palestine. a Palestinian Arab national movement emerged, aiming to establish an independent Palestinian state in which Muslims, Christians and Jews live with equal rights.Accompanied with this development was the gradual growth of Palestiniannational identity, that is, the sense of belonging to Palestine as separate fromSyria (Brand, 1988: 14).

During the Mandate period, the Palestinian national movement and Palestinian identity were weakened among Palestine's Arabs by traditional and parochial, especially clan, identities. The rivalries between the Husseini and Nashashibi families provide the most dramatic example of the decisive effect of these parochial identities (Nashif, 1977: 120). It seems also that strong local identities, that is identification with the place of residence (town or village), had weakened Palestinian identity. As such, Arab and religious (Muslim or Christian) identities remained stronger than Palestinian identity, so that the "neighboring Arab states, since the mid-thirties, became the decision maker regarding issues of Palestine's Arabs" (Al-Budairi, 1995: 16).

Palestinian Arabs' dependence on Arab states to resist the Zionist danger did not yield the anticipated results. As a result of the Arab-Jewish war of 1948, the Arabs were defeated, and the state of Israel was established in one part of Palestine. Another part, the Gaza Strip, was administered by Egypt, and a third part, the West Bank, was annexed by Jordan. By the end of the war there were about 700,000 Palestinian Arab refugees dispersed in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and in neighbouring Arab countries, especially in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Today only about a half of the Palestinian Arabs live in their native land. Israeli of ficial statistics estimate that by the end of 1994 there were 1,011,300 Palestinian Arabs in Israel, including annexed East Jerusalem, 1,122,900 in the West Bank, and 748,400 in the Gaza Strip (Israel, 1995: 43, 756).

The process of " pan-Arabization" of the Arab struggle in Palestine was only intensified by the defeat of 1948 and the consequent fragmentation of the Palestinian Arab people (Porat, 1975: 125). The leaderless and fragmented Palestinian Arabs committed their cause, the liberation of the Israeli-occupied land, to Arab regimes, especially to Egypt's Nasser who led the pan-Arab movement in the fifties and sixties. As such, Arab national, or pan-Arab, identity remained salient among Palestinian Arabs during the first two decades following the disaster (an-nakba) of 1948.

Palestinian identity, which was not actively encouraged by Arab regimes, remained weak until the establishment of the Palestine Liberation organization (PLO) in 1964. It remained weak especially among the Palestinians in Jordan, including the West Bank, where the Jordanian government took active steps to undermine it (Al-Budairi, 1995: 17-18). Palestinian identity remained weak also among the Palestinians in Israel, who tended to accept the new political reality, and identified themselves as Israeli Arabs (Mitari, 1986).

The establishment of the PLO in the mid-sixties indicates a turn toward self- dependence among Palestinians. This tendency intensified after the June War. During that war, Israel occupied the remaining parts of Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Social contact and interaction, consequently, increased among Palestinians' living under Israeli control. The Palestinians also learned from Arab defeats that they must rely on themselves.

Palestinian identity has been further intensified since the early seventies as a result of several developments, the most important of which were:

1. The widespread international recognition accorded to the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of that people. This recognition was reflected by the acceptance of the PLO as an observer in the UN General Assembly and as a member in the Arab League and in conferences of Non-Aligned and Muslim countries.
2. The Israeli iron-fist policy applied against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. This policy, which consisted of repressive measures such as mass arrests, shootings, the imposition of curfews, house demolitions, deportations and media censorship, was toughened up during the uprising which broke out in December 1987 and continued until the early nineties.
3. Israel's repeated military attacks on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, the climax of which was reached during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
4. The weakening of Arab solidarity with the Palestinian people, reflected by Egypt's separate peace agreement with Israel signed in 1978 and by a number of massacres committed against Palestinians, the ugliest of which were Black September of 1970 in Jordan, and Tel el-Za'atar of 1976 and Sabra and Shatila of 1982 in Lebanon.

These developments, together, strengthened Palestinian identity among most Palestinians, that is, the feeling of belonging to the Palestinian people (Sayigh, 1979). Many studies have shown that Palestinian identity has intensified since the mid-seventies also among Palestinians in Israel (e.g., Mi'ari, 1986; Mi'ari, 1992; Rouhana, 1984; Smooha, 1989). While no such studies have been conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the outbreak of the uprising may indicate intensified Palestinian identity in these areas.

In September 1993, the Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to set up a transitional self-rule system in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The implementation of the agreement has begun, and Palestinian authority already operates in parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and is expected to extend to the remaining parts of these areas.

Previous Studies on Readiness

While no studies have been conducted on the readiness of West Bank and (Gaza Strip Palestinians to make contact with Jews, several studies have investigated the readiness of Palestinian citizens of Israel to make contact with Jewish Israelis. These studies show that Palestinians in Israel are readier to enter into social relations with Israeli Jews than are Israeli Jews with Arabs and Palestinians like themselves (Hofman, 1972, 1982; Peres,1971; Smooha, 1984; Smooha and Hofman, 1976/77; Yuchtman-Yaar and Inbar, 1986). It seems that this asymmetry is not unique to Palestinians and Jews in Israel, but may characteAze minority-majority group relations in general, where minority members may enjoy, or feel that they may enjoy, greater rewards from interethnic contact.(Mi'ari, 1989: 239).

It appears that the great readiness of Palestinians in Israel to contact Israeli Jews does not apply to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza StAp. Knowing that they will remain within the state of Israel, Israeli Palestinians struggle for achieving equal Aghts with Jewish citizens, since in their view their contact with Jews will help them to integrate in Israeli society. In contrast, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip are recognized, even by the Israelis, as an occupied people struggling for independence. Their resistance to Israeli military occupation, met by repressive measures such as mass arrests and house demolitions, may weaken their readiness to interact socially with Jews.

A few studies have investigated the relationship between the self-identity of Palestinians in Israel and their readiness for social relations with Jews. Studying a sample of Arab high school seniors and college students, Hofman (1982: 737) reported that the more strongly the young Arab feels about Israeli citizenship, and the less strongly about Palestinian identity, the readier s/he will be for social relations with Jews. The Palestinian national identity (feeling Palestinian) and Israeli civic identity (feeling Israeli citizen), concluded Hofman, have opposite effects on Arab citizens' readiness for social relations with Jews. Similarly, Yogev, Ben-Yehoshua and Alper (1991), in their study of seventh grade Arab students in Israel, found that Arab citizens' self-identity is related to readiness, by affecting Arabs' perceptions of Jews and their feeling of deprivation. Arab citizens' Israeli identity leads to positive images of Jews and to lower feelings of deprivation and, thus, increases their readiness to associate with Israeli Jews.

Palestinian identity, on the other hand, leads to negative stereotypes of Jews and to stronger feelings of deprivation and weakens, therefore, their readiness for interethnic contact (Yogev, Ben-Yehoshua and Alper, 1991: 558-559).

Other studies on the relationship between the self-identity of Arab citizens in Israel and their readiness to associate with Jews have found different results Studying this relationship in 1976 from a sample of Arab university graduates in Israel, the author of this paper found that respondents who identify as Israeli and those who identify as Palestinian do not differ significantly in their readiness for contact with Jews (actually in their position on a factor scale computed from readiness to make Jewish friends, to work in the same of fice with Jews and to live in a mixed Arab-Jewish neighbourhood). The most important variables in predicting readiness to associate with Jews were experience with Jewish friends and traditional (religious, local, and clan) identities (Mi'ari, 1983:188-i99). In another study conducted in 1988 on a sample of Arab high school students in Israel, the author also found that>Paiestinian-identified and Israeli-identified Arabs do not differ significantly in their readiness (or rejection) to enter into intimate relations with Jews (marrying a Jew and living in a mixed Arab-Jewish neighbourhood). These two categories of Arabs, however, tend to differ in their readiness to make less intimate relations. Palestinian-identified respondents are less ready to make fAends and work in the same office with Jews than Israeli-identified respondents (Mi'ari, 1989: 244). These different findings may indicate the necessity for further studies on the relationship between self-identity and readiness for interethnic contact

Students' Role in Society

About three decades ago, Lewis Feuer noted that students in developing countries see themselves as the elite anointed and appointed by history to guide their backward peoples. They view themselves as the voices of their voiceless peoples, as its political class and as its benevolent rulers (Feuer, 1969: 178). It seems that this description applies to some extent to Palestinian students, who have played a leading political role in their society under Israeli occupation.

Since the mid-seventies seven Palestinian universities have been established in the West Bank (Birzeit, al-Najah, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Jerusalem Universities) and Gaza Strip (Islamic University and al-Azhar). In 1993/94, the total number of students in these universities was about 20,000. Besides, there were in the same year about 5,000 students in the Open University of Jerusalem, the College of Education, and the College of Educational Sciences in al-Tire (Council of Higher Education, 1994: 21-22). The student population was highly politicized and participated actively in the Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation. A survey conducted on political behaviour in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1984 revealed that students were more politically active than non-students, although the two groups did not differ significantly in their preferred solutions to the Palestinian problem (Shadid and Seltzer, 1989: 454).

The Palestinian student population was and has remained the most active force in resisting Israeli occupation. Its political activities, which took the forms of strikes, demonstrations and violent confrontations with Israeli forces, overshadowed those of trade unions, professional associations, women's groups and other organizations (Sahliyeh, 1988: 134). Student political activism reached its climax in the uprising. Between 1988 and 1991, students formed about 18% of Palestinian administrative detainees and about 23% of Palestinians expelled from their homeland by Israeli authorities (Mi'ari, 1994: 70-72).

In addition to their political activities, students launched and participated in voluntary work programs, such as reclaiming land, planting trees, paving roads, picking crops and cleaning streets. They also sponsored art shows, poetry contests, local industry exhibitions and folk dancing groups (Sahliych, 1988: 124). The students probably undertook these activities to supplement their political activities. Their desire to preserve, or to strengthen, Palestinian national identity was behind their social and cultural activities.

Method

Hypotheses

1. We hypothesize that the start of implementing th:DOP (or Israeli Palestinian agreement) would intensify Palestinian identity, by giving legitimacy to Palestinian rights and symbols (such as the flag, national anthem and police). We hypothesize also that, by ending the uprising, including confrontations with Israeli forces, the implementation of the DOP would increase Palestinians' readiness to associate socially with Jews.
2. The less strongly young Palestinians identify with their traditional parochial groups (especially locality and clan), the more strongly will they identify with the Palestinian people. The expected negative relationship is explained by the conflicting orientations of these identities. Local and clan identities are, by definition, particularistic and narrow, while Palestinian identity is more universalistic and general.
3. Palestinian-identified respondents are readier to associate socially with Israeli Jews than Muslim-identified and Arab-identified respondents. This hypothesis is explained by the assumption that the former, by feeling belonging to the Palestinian people, are more conscious of the complex socio-political reality in Palestine (including Israel, of course), where Arabs and Jews are destined to live together. These Palestinians may feel that contact with Israeli Jews may help them to realize some of their personal interests or demands, such as work in Israel and getting permits to go to Jerusalem. On the other hand, the latter, those who feel belonging to the Muslim nation or to the Arab patron, are less conscious of that reality and continue claiming for the establishment of a Muslim state or an Arab state in all of Palestine.

Data

The data were collected on two systematic random samples of students at Birzeit University, a Palestinian institution in the West Bank. The first one included 226 students (about 12% of all University students in the first semester of the academic year 1993/94). The data from this sample were collected in January 1994. The second sample included 270 students (about 11% of University students in the second semester of the same academic year). The data on the second sample were collected in June 1994.

Initially, the research was designed to be conducted on the first sample only. But an important development had occurred in May and June 1994, that is the start of implementing the Israel-Palestinian agreement, including the entrance of Palestinian police forces to the region of Palestinian self-rule, Gaza and Jericho. In order to examine the effect of implementing the agreement on Palestinians' attitudes and perceptions, we decided to collect data, by using the same questionnaire, on the second sample.

The two systematic random samples were selected by computer from the Registrar's Office at the University. The samples are, thus, representative of Birzeit University students, and the results may shed light on attitudes of the student population in West Bank Palestinian Universities.

Finally, the sample members were interviewed individually through a structured questionnaire composed of questions measuring several background variables, self-identity, readiness for interethnic contact, images of thc self and the other, attitudes toward the Israeli- Palestinian agreement, and political behaviour. The data were collected by students in a sociological methodology course, which the author taught at Birzeit University in 1993/94. Two other papers were written based on this data.

Description of the Sample

Following is a brief description of the sample by several background variables: 63% of the respondents are males and 37% females. As for religion, 87% are Muslims, 12% Christians, and 1% defined themselves as Other.

The respondents come from families which have a higher socio-economic status than the rest of the population: 34% of their fathers work in white collar occupations, 24% in commerce, 21% are workers, 19% farmers, and 2% other.

A sizeable part of the fathers are relatively highly educated (mean = 10 years of schooling). And family income is also relatively high (mean = 463 Jordanian dinars per month). In addition, 49% of the respondents come from cities or towns, 40% from villages and 10% from refugee camps.

The distribution of the sample by geographic region shows that the central region, where Birzeit University is located, is over-represented, while the other regions are under-represented: 54% of the respondents come from the central region (including Ramallah, Jerusalem and Bethlehem), 25% from the northern region (including Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarem), 10% from the southern region (Hebron area) and 11 % from the Gaza Strip.

The above description indicates that the distribution of the sample by age is quite similar to the distribution of the total West Bank student population. And the distribution by place of residence is similar to that of the West Bank total population. Meanwhile, in the central area of the West Bank, where Birzeit University is located, Christian Arabs and parents belonging to middle and upper-middle classes are over-represented in the sample as well as in the Birzeit University student population.

Despite the fact that certain strata are over-represented and others under- represented in the sample, we assume, as mentioned, that the data shed light on political attitudes and perceptions of the total West Bank student population. Analysis

In order to examine the first hypothesis, dealing with the effect of the partial implementation of the DOP on Palestinians' attitudes and perceptions, we will compare the frequency distributions of the questions measuring self-identity and readiness to contact Jews between the two samples of January and June 1994. But for further analysis the two samples will be combined. The lack of significant differences, as will be mentioned, between the frequency distributions of the two samples allows for combination.

In the present analysis we control for several background variables: gender, father's schooling and occupation, family income, religion, religiosity, place of residence, party support and political activism.

We examine the other two hypotheses by employing two models of multiple regression. One model estimates the importance of traditional identities, as well as the control variables, for explaining variation in Palestinian national identity.

The second model estimates the effect of the various identities, with the control variables, on readiness to associate with Jews.

The multiple regression analysis will be preceded by some univariate analysis (frequency distributions) in order to have a better understanding of the respondents' self-identity and readiness for social relations with Jews.

Measurement

The main variables in this paper are national identity, traditional identities, and readiness to make contact with Israeli Jews. The various identities (or sub-identities) were measured by the following questions:

• To what extent do you feel Palestinian?
• To what extent do you feel Arab?
• To what extent do you feel Muslim or Christian?
• To what extent do you feel that you belong to your clan (hamula)?
• To what extent do you feel that you belong to your place of residence (town, village or refugee camp)?

The first question measures Palestinian national identity, the second measures Arab national (or pan-Arab) identity, and the last three questions measure traditional (religious, clan and local) identities. The answers to all these questions ranged in five categories: to a very little extent, to a little extent, to a moderate extent, to a great extent and to a very great extent.

Since the respondents can identify at the same time with different groups, it is important to know the main, or the most important, group with which they identify. As such, besides the ordinal measures of self-identity, the respondents were asked If you were requested to define your self-identity in one word, what would you say? The categories to this nominal question were Muslim or Christian, Arab, Palestinian, and other.

Readiness to make contact with Jews was measured by the following questions:

• Are you ready to work in the same office with Jews?
• Are you ready to make friends with Jews?
• Are you ready to live in the same neighbourhood with Jews?
• Are you ready to marry a Jew?

The answers to these questions ranged in five categories: definitely not ready, not ready, somewhat ready, ready and definitely ready. Since these items were measured in the same metric, one score was computed by summing up the scores of the items and dividing by four (the number of the items).

The background (control) variables were measured as follows:

Gender: Females were recoded "0" and males "1."

Father's schooling: This variable was measured by grouped categories of years of schooling, and recoded by assigning the midpoints of these categories.

Family income: This variable also was measured by grouped categories of income, and recoded by assigning the midpoints of the categories.

Religion: Muslims were recoded "0" and Christians "1."

Religiosity: This ordinal measure ranged in five categories from " not religious at all" to " very religious."

Political activism: This variable was measured by two questions, "have you been arrested during the uprising?" and " have you been injured by Israeli forces?". Thus, a three-item scale was counted: 0 = not arrested nor injured, 1 = arrested or injured, and 2 = arrested and injured.

Place of residence: From this nominal variable three dummy variables were created, by treating each category as a separate dich.otomous variable and assigning "1" or "0" for all cases depending upon their presence or absence in the category. The three dummy variables which were created represented the following categories: village, refugee camp, and town, with category "town" serving a reference category.

Father's occupation: In the same way, four dummy variables were created representing the following categories: farmer, employee, merchant, and worker, with category "worker" serving as the reference category.

Party support: Also, from this nominal variable four dummy variables were created, representing the following categories: Islamic organizations, Marxist organizations, Fatah (the ruling party), and independent candidates, with category Fatah serving as the reference category.

Results

A. Univariate Analysis

Self-identity

As mentioned, the various identities (or sub-identities) of West Bank Palestinian Arabs were measured by several questions about the extent to which they feel they belong to their clans and their places of residence, and the extent to which they feel Muslim or Christian, Arab, and Palestinian. Table 1 presents the percentages of respondents who feel (to a very great extent or to a great extent) about each identity.

The results show that Palestinian national identity is the most frequent, followed, in order, by local identity (of place of residence), Arab identity, religious identity and lastly clan identity.

While the greatest portion of the respondents identify at the same time as Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim or Christian, the results show that Palestinian identity is the main, or the most important, identity. In response to the question

If you were asked to define your identity in one word, what would you say?, most of the respondents answered Palestinian. (see Table 2).

Tables 1 and 2 show, unexpectedly, that self-identity did not change significantly between January and June 1994. The order of identities remained the same, and Palestinian identity remained the strongest among West Bank Palestinians. It seems, therefore, that the start of the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement in Gaza and Jericho has not affected identity.

Readiness for Interethnic Contact

As mentioned, readiness for social relations with Jews was measured by four questions about readiness to work in the same office, to make friends, to live in the same neighbourhood and, finally, readiness to marry a Jew. Table 3 presents the percentages of respondents who answered definitely ready or ready.

The table shows that only a small minority of respondents are ready to make contact with Jews. It is clear that, unlike the Palestinians in Israel who desire close social relations with Jews (Mitari, 1989), the Palestinians in the West Bank prefer to keep a social distance. Applying the resource-dependency analysis approach suggested by Yuchtman-Yaar and Inbar (1986) according to which the dependent group tends to reduce its social distance from the other group, this difference in readiness could be explained by the fact that Palestinians in Israel are more dependent on Jews, especially in work opportunities, than Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As such, the former may benefit more than the latter from interethnic contact.

Table 1. Subidentities of Birzeit University Students, January and June 1994 (percentages of respondents who answered to a very great extent or to a great extent) *

Variables	P	January %     N	June %     N	Total %     N
Feels Palestinian	.2871	92.0   208	89.2   240	90.5   448
Feels Arab	.8780	63.3   143	63.9   172	63.6   315
Feels Muslim or Christian	.6211	55.8   126	53.5   144	54.5   270
Feels belong to his place of residence	.9733	71.2   161	71.4   192	71.3   353
Feels belonging to his clan("hamula")	.5231	47.1   106	44.2   119	45.6   225
Total (lowest N of cases)		225	269	494

The rest of the respondents answered "to a moderate extent," "to a little extent," or "to a very little extent."

Table 2. Main Identity of Birzeit University Students, Janaury and June 1994 (percentages)

Main Identity*	January %    N %	June    % N	Total %    N
Muslim or Christian**	21.6    45	16.5    37	19.0    82
Arab	11.5    24	13.4    30	12.5    54
Palestinian	66.9    139	70.1    157	68.5    296
Total	100.0    208	100.0    224	100.0    432

* Cateory Other was excluded from the table.
** Only one Christian student identified himself mainly as "Christian."

Table 3 shows also that the greatest readiness is to woi-k in the same office, followed by readiness to make friends and readiness'~to live in the same neighbourhood, and that readiness to get married to Jews is the lowest. It is worthwhile indicating that Palestinians in Israel have shown in a previous study the same tendency (Mitari, 1989). It seems that the lower the intimacy involved in contact, the readier ethnic groups will be for that contact.

Table 3. Readiness of Birzeit University Students for Interethnic Contact, January and June 1994 (percentages of respondents who answered def nitely ready or ready)*

Variables	P	January %     N	June %     N	Total %     N
Ready to work in same office with Jews.	.0625	12.8    29	19.0    51	16.2    80
Ready to make friends with Jews .	.1917	10.6    24	14.6    39	12.8    63
Ready to live in same neighbourhood with Jews	.8273	10.2    23	10.8    29	10.5    52
Ready to get married to a Jew	.4109	4.0    9	5.6    15	4.8    24
Total Lowest N of cases		226	268	494

* The rest of the respondents answered somewhat ready, not ready or definitely not ready.

As is the case with identity, readiness for contact with Jews did not change significantly between January and June 1994. It seems that the start in implementing the Israeli-Palestinian agreement has not affected Palestinians' readiness to associate socially with Jews. This unexpected result refutes our first hypothesis.

Brief Description of Independent Variables

Before turning to the analysis of the effects of several variables on Palestinian national identity and on readiness for interethnic contact, we describe briefly the frequency distributions of these variables. Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of these variables. As clarified in the " description of the sample," the majority of the respondents are males, Muslims, and belong to families of a relatively high socio-economic status (the fathers are relatively highly educated, work in white-collar occupations or in trade and earn a relatively high monthly income). About half of them come from cities or towns and the other half come from villages or refugee camps.

As for party affiliation, 41% of the respondents support the Fatah organiza-tion headed by Yasir Arafat, 15% support Islamic organizations (Hamas or Jihad), 25% support Marxist organizations (especially the Popular Front,Democratic Front and People's Party), and about 19% support independent candidates. Finally, a large minority of the respondents are politically active(mean = .45 in a three-item scale from 0 to 2). The last result is better clarified by the following distribution: 65% are not politically active (neither arrested nor injured by Israeli forces), 25% are "moderately" active (either arrested or injured), and 10% are highly active (arrested and injured).

Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations for Two Models of Political Identity and of Readiness for Interethnic Contact, 1993*

Variables	Mean	N	Standard Deviation
Gender (0=female, 1=male)	.630	494	.483
Father's schooling (in years)		9.963	496	4.855
Family income in Jordanian diners		462.831	491	259.096
Religion (0=Moslem, I=Christian)**		.118	491	.323
Religiosity (a five-item scale from not religious at all to very religious)	2.806	494	1.142
Place of residence: City or Town Village Refugee Camp	.488 .403 .109	242 200 54	.500 .491 .312
Father's Occupation:** Worker Farmer Employee Merchant	.213 .195 .345 .247	102 93 165 118	.410 .396 .476 .432
Party Support:** Fatah Islamic Organizations Marxist Organizations Independent		.413 .154 .247 .186	164 61 98 74	.493 .361 .432 .390
Political activism (a three-item scale: 0= not arrested nor injured, 1= arrested or injured, 2= arrested and injured)		.448	496	.668
Feels Muslim or Christian (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to "very great extent"		3.315	495	1.357
Feels belonging to his clan (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to "very great extent"		3.269	494	1.287
Feels belonging to his place of residence (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to "very great extent"		3.960	495	1.123
Feels Arab (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to "very great extent"	3.762	495	1.195
Feels Palestinian (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to 'very great extent"		4.616	495	.841

* Missing data deleted pairwise, and lowest number of cases is 383.
** The distributions of religion and of father's occupation differ little from those mentioned in the description of the sample because category "other" is excluded from this table.

B. Multiple Analysis
Factors Affecting Palestinian Identity

Table 5 presents multiple regression coefficients or a model of Palestinian identity and another model of readiness for interethnic contact. This section focuses on the first model and the second analyzes the second model. Referring to significance at 0.05 Ievel, the table shows that three variables are significantly related to Palestinian identity: local identity, Arab identity, and party support.

Table 5. Multiple Regression Coefficients of two Models of Palestinian Identity and of Readiness for Interethnic Contact for Palestinian Students, 1994a <3.2665

Variables	Palestinian Identity	Readiness for interethnic contact
Gender (0=female 1=male)	-.1471 (.0968)	.3807*** (.1084)
Father's schooling	-.0097 (.0092)	-.0012 (.0103)
Family income	.0000 (.0002)	-.0006** (.0002)
Religion (0=Moslem, I=Christian)**	-.1008 (.1306)	-.4614*** (.1459)
Religiosity (a five-item scale from not religious at all to very religious)	-.0594 (.0512)	-.0651 (.0573)
Place of residence: Village Refugee Camp	-.0357 (.1020) .0242 (.1463)	-.0756 (.1139) -.1369 (.1633)
Father's Occupation:(omitted category=worker) Farmer Employee Merchant	.0061 (.1380) -.0932 (.1204) -0.579 (.1249)	-.1113 (.1541) .0203 (.1345) -3.626** (1.395)
Party Support:(omitted category= Fatah) Islamic Organizations Marxist Organizations Independent	-.3.608** (/1266) ,1199 (.1209) -2.818** (.1115)	-.4523*** (.1430) -.4512*** (.1352) -.0926 (.1256)
Political activism (a three-item scale: 0= not arrested nor injured, 1= arrested or injured, 2= arrested and injured)	.1147 (.0669)	-.1.076 (.0750)
Feels Muslim or Christian (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to "very great extent"		.0018 (.0454)	-.0511 (.0507)
Feels belonging to his clan (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to "very great extent"	-.0915 (.0365)	-.0459 (.0408)
Feels belonging to his place of residence (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to "very great extent"	.1871*** (.0378)	.0161 (.0436)
Feels Arab (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to "very great extent"	.2080*** (.0343)	-.0765 (0.402)
Feels Palestinian (a five-item scale from "very little extent" to 'very great extent"		-.0912 (.0585)
Constant	2.8807
R2	.2437	.1964

a The N for each variable is indicated in table 4 .
b Standard errors are in parentheses
*P <= .O5** P <= .Ol *** P<=.OOI

Contrary to expectations, Table 5 shows that Palestinian identity is not significantly correlated to clan and religious identities, but is positively correlated to local identity. This result refutes the second hypothesis, suggesting a negative relationship between traditional parochial identities and Palestinian identity. The expansion of Palestinian identity during the uprising among almost all Palestinians, traditional and non-traditional, may explain this unexpected result. As for the positive correlation with local identity, it seems that identification with place of residence, especially under military occupation, indicates a strong attachment to the land, which is a major component of national identity. It is not surprising, therefore, that many Palestinian refugees still identify themselves by the names of their towns and villages which they or their parents left or were expelled from during the Arab-Jewish war of 1948.

Table 5 shows also that Arab identity, as expected, is positively correlated to Palestinian identity. That is, respondents who identify as Arab are more likely to identify also as Palestinian. This positive relationship, reported also in other studies conducted on Palestinians in Israel (Mi'ari, 1990: 523-524), may indicate that Arab and Palestinian identities coexist in conformity.

As for Party support, Table 5 shows that supporters of Fatah and of Marxist organizations identify themselves as Palestinian more than supporters of political Islamic organizations and of independents. Fatah and Marxist organizations are represented in the PLO, while the Islamic organizations and the independents are not. The Islamists, represented by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, opposed the PLO, primarily its representation of the Palestinian people and its objective of establishing an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. The independents, on the other hand, are not politically a homogeneous group. Because some of them are apathetic and some others are Jordanian supporters, many of the independents were either PLO non-supporters or opponents. It seems that support for the PLO, which emphasizes Palestinian independence, explains the result that supporters of Fatah and of Marxist organizations, represented in the PLO, identify with the Palestinian people more than the Islamists and the independents, not represented in the PLO.

From the previous discussion, local identity, Arab identity and Party support are significantly important in explaining Palestinian identity. In order of relative importance, Arab identity is more important in predicting Palestinian identity(Beta = .2958) than the other two variables.

Factors Affecting Readiness

Refuting the third hypothesis, the results show that readiness for interethnic contact is not significantly correlated to Muslim identity. This means that Muslim-identified Palestinians do not differ significantly from other Palestinians in their readiness to associate socially with Jews. Meanwhile, readiness is correlated, as Table 5 shows, to gender, religion, father's occupation, family income, and Party support. As for gender, it is clear that male students are readier to contact Jews than female students. The social limitations put on women's behaviour in Arab society, especially limitations on movement and association with men, may explain this finding. Similarly, Christians are readier to contact Jews than Muslims. The residence of almost all Christian Palestinians in the centre area of the West Bank (Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem) has exposed them to greater contact with Jews, and, thus, increased their readiness for interethnic contact.

Father's occupation was also found to affect readiness. As Table 5 shows, sons of merchants are less ready to contact Jews than others, especially sons of workers. This relationship may be explained by father's contact or benefit from contact with Jews. The merchants, by boycotting Israeli products and as a result of being boycotted by Israelis during the uprising, have hardly experienced contact with Israeli Jews. Workers, on the other hand, many of whom continued to work in Israel, have experienced a higher degree of interethnic contact.

Besides, workers benefit more than merchants from contact with Israelis (the contact may help them in finding work in Israel or getting work permits from Israeli authorities). Fathers' contact or benefit from contact with Jews, it seems increases sons' readiness. As for family income, controlling for father's occupation, Table 5 shows that the higher the respondent's family income within each occupational category, the readier s/he will be for social relations with Jews. This finding may also be explained by the greater contact with Jews in Israeli cities (in work, trips, supermarkets, etc.) that respondents of higher family income may have experienced.

The last variable affecting readiness is Party support. Table 5 shows that supporters of Islamic organizations and of Marxist organizations are less ready to contact Jews than supporters of Fatah and of independents. The former have rejected the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, while the latter have approved it. An unusual coalition between Islamists and Palestinian Marxists against the DOP has been recently formed at Birzeit University as well as in many other institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The opposition to the DOP may explain the lower readiness of the Islamists and of Marxists to contact Jews.

We have shown in this section that gender, religion, family income, father's occupation and Party support significantly affect readiness for interethnic contact. In order of relative importance, the standardized coefficients in Table 5 show that gender is the most important of the variables measured in predicting readiness (Beta = .2024).

Discussion

In this paper we studied the self-identity of young Palestinians in the West Bank and their readiness for social relations with Jews. As for identity, the results show that Palestinian national identity is the strongest, followed, in order, by local identity, Arab identity, religious identity, and lastly clan (hamula) identity.

As such, Palestinian identity, which started to crystallize primarily after the First World War in response to intensified Jewish settlement and to the British Mandate in Palestine, gradually developed and reached its peak in the last decade, with the explosion of the uprising in December-1987. The salience of Palestinian identity may indicate that Palestinian society is more integrated than many other developing and Arab societies, where traditional and parochial (such as religious, local or tribal) identities are dominant (Al-Faisal, 1988; Baghdadi 1993; Mo'awwad, 1986).

As mentioned in the introduction, several factors have intensified Palestinian identity under Israeli occupation, the most important of which were: the widespread international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; Egypt's signing of a separate peace agreement with Israel; Israel's intensified repressive measures against the Palestinians in the occupied territories and escalated attacks against the Palestinians in Lebanon; several massacres committed by Arabs against Palestinians; and, finally, the inability of Arab regimes to stop these massacres and attacks. These developments have weakened Palestinians' dependence on Arabs to " liberate" their land and have increased their reliance upon themselves.

Based on a previous finding reached in a survey of Arab university graduates in Israel, conducted in 1976 (Mi'ari, 1987), we hypothesized that Palestinian identity is negatively correlated to traditional and parochial (religious, local and clan) identities. Refuting this hypothesis (the second hypothesis), the present findings indicate that Palestinian identity is not correlated to religious and clan identities, and is positively correlated to local identity. This finding is similar to a previous finding reached in a survey of Arab high school students in Israel carried out in 1988 (Mi'ari, 1990). The lack of negative correlation between traditional identities and Palestinian identity is explained by the intensification of Palestinian identity, which has expanded during the uprising among almost all Palestinians, traditional and non-traditional.

The expansion of Palestinian identity among Muslims and Christians, and among secular and religious people may also explain the result that Palestinian identity is not correlated to religion, religiosity and religious identity. This explanation is consistent with the observation that the Palestinian uprising has been successful in joining together the young and the old, men and women, city dwellers and villagers, Muslims and Christians, the poor and the rich, and all political currents to form a genuine people's movement (Farsoun and Landis, 1991: 16).

The positive correlation between local identity and Palestinian identity means that the more strongly young Palestinians under Israeli occupation identify with their place of residence, the more likely will they be to identify with the Palestinian people. It seems that local identity indicates a strong attachment to the land, especially for people under military occupation, where land expropriation is commonly practiced by the occupier. It is not surprising therefore, to hear many Palestinian refugees who left their villages or towns during the 1948 war still identifying themselves with those villages or towns.

The present analysis suggests that Palestinian identity is not associated to religion, religiosity or to religious identity, but is associated to party support. Supporters of Fatah and Marxist organizations identify themselves as Palestinian more than supporters of political Islamic organizations and of independents.

The former were represented in the PLO, while the latter were not. It seems, therefore, that membership or representation in the PLO, which contributed to intensifying Palestinian identity through the emphasis on Palestinian independence, explains this result.

As for readiness for interethnic contact, the results show that, in contrast to Palestinians in Israel, only a small minority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is ready to make contact with Jews. We explained this difference by the fact that the former, being Israeli citizens, are more dependent on Israeli Jews, especially in work opportunities, and benefit more from contact with them than the latter. Israeli Palestinians' contact with Jews may also help them to integrate in Israeli society. As for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip their struggle for independence and Israel's repressive measures used against them weaken their readiness to contact Jews. The findings also suggest that readiness for interethnic contact differs according to the intimacy involved in that contact. The lower the intimacy involved, the readier ethnic groups will be for interethnic contact.

Our findings also refute the third hypothesis that Palestinian-identified respondents are readier to associate socially with Jews than Muslim-identified and Arab-identified respondents. Multiple regression analysis has shown that religious, Arab, and Palestinian identities are not significantly correlated to readiness for interethnic contact. This finding is similar to a previous finding in our previous survey of Arab university graduates in Israel (Mi'ari, 1983: 190-192). This means that respondents who identify with the Palestinian people, respondents who identify with the Muslim nation, and those who identify with the Arab nation do not differ significantly in their readiness to associate socially with Jews. It seems that they also do not differ in their consciousness of the complex socio-political reality in Palestine, where Arabs and Jews are "destined" to live together.

While readiness in the present study is not correlated significantly to religious identity, it is correlated to party support. Supporters of Fatah (the ruling party) are readier to contact Jews than supporters of Islamic and Marxist organizations. The former have supported the Israeli Palestinian agreement while the latter have opposed it. These findings suggest that the readiness of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for social relations with Jews is affected by their stand toward the peace process carried out between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Finally, our findings also refute the first hypothesis, and suggest that the start in implementing the Israeli Palestinian agreement, as reflected by the entrance of Palestinian police in Gaza and Jericho in Spring 1994, has neither affected self-identity nor readiness for interethnic contact. It seems that identity and readiness to associate with the other, two psychologically deep-rooted phenomena, do not change in a short period of time, such as that between January and June 1994 when our data were collected.

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