Rebellion of the Petite Bourgeoisie

SHOPKEEPERS, PEDDLERS AND URBAN RESISTANCE
IN THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING

Fifty years separate the two prolonged commercial strikes that consolidated the two great Palestinian rebellions of our century, the 1936 Revolt and the Uprising of 1987-89. In both cases the participation of merchants in the national movement endowed the rebellion with a social weight and an urban character which would otherwise have diluted and fragmented its overall thrust. As in l936 the urban general strike in l987 preceded and set the tone for the spread of the uprising to the countryside. Then, as during the intifada, the primary objective of the colonial authorities in the initial stages of the rebellion was the dissolution of the General Strike. But there are significant differences between the two movements: Merchants' participation in the 1936 rebellion involved a substantial degree of coercion, while the 87-88 strike was, basically--as I hope to show below--a voluntarist act. Moreover the Palestinian political elite which stood at the leadership of the '36 rebellion--a combination of urban notables and the coastal commercial bourgeoisie--had been destroyed as a class by the war of l948. That class has no hegemonic equivalent in the contemporary social structure of the West Bank and Gaza, its remnants having been dispersed among the professional and business strata of Jordan and the Gulf states. The current uprising was (and is) led by a strategic coalition of forces and social groupings which bear little resemblance to the elitist and semi-feudal character of the Higher Arab Committee of the 1930s.

In what follows I will examine the part played by the Palestinian urban merchants, as the only social grouping which appears to have acted cohesively in the consolidation of the current Uprising in its earlier phase (spring of l988). In its later development, what is usually referred to as the "institutionalization of the Uprising", merchants' association determined the contours of the 'economic war' between Israel and the resistance movement. The crucial features of this confrontation were: the successful boycott of Israeli com- modities, the non-payment of taxes, the pressure for the resignation of tax collectors and customs officials, and--to a lesser extent--the creation of an 'alternative economy', based mainly on cottage industries. Back to top

SHOPKEEPERS, PEDDLERS AND SMALL TOWNS

Excluding the district of Gaza (which is not the focus of our analysis here) the urban sector of the Palestinian occupied territories (47% of the total population) is distributed into 11 townships, the average size of which is 43,000 inhabitants (l987 data). The economy of these townships is dominated by small trade, and small workshops. The manufacturing sector is minuscule with the average employment per establishment amounting to 4.28 persons. In a typical township like Ramallah the ratio of commercial establishments (i.e. retail shops) to workshops and artisanal enterprises is 84:16, with an average of 38.6 retail shops for each one thousand inhabitants. Virtually all the eleven Palestinian cities constitute regional markets, administrative and service centres for their rural hinterland in the manner described by Blake in his typology of Levantine small towns.

Two features distinguish these townships from other urban centres in neighboring Middle Eastern states: the absence of one dominant urban centre in the country, and--more significantly--the almost even growth rates in the size of rural and urban population. The first feature can be attributed to the absence of a state (and a bureaucratic state apparatus); to the absence of any substantial manufacturing sector; as well as to the willful policy on the part of the Israeli military government of reinforcing regional dependency, in various district centres in the West Bank and Gaza, on markets and services in Israel's metropolitan areas.

The second feature, the even demographic growth rates in urban and rural areas, can be explained by the low internal migration trends caused by the physical proximity of outlying villages to their district centres and the relatively good transport system that connects these villages to their townships. The result has been that these centres evolved not only as work and service centres for a rural population that continued to reside in the their villages of birth, but also as locations of commercial investments and real estate transactions for rural entrepreneurs and potentates. Although there is scant empirical data on this subject, we know from chamber of commerce records for towns like Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron, that between 20 to 25% of all commercial establishments are owned by villagers from the district, and that the commuting daily population that uses the facilities of these townships exceed the size of urban population in each town.

It is not my purpose in this essay to discuss the consequences of this 'ruralization' of Palestinian urban centres. I shall only point out here that a sizeable proportion of shopkeepers and artisans do not live in the urban community where they work, and that in some townships like Ramallah, Tulkarem, Jericho, and Gaza city, the majority of local merchants do not originate from the town itself but are war refugees from the coastal cities whose population was expelled in the war of l948. In each of those townships the local chamber of commerce (and in few cases the 'Chamber of Commerce and Industry') constitutes the framework that brings together refugee and 'native' merchants. Under the impact of the Uprising, and in part as a consequence of Jordan's dissociation of its historical links with the West Bank in l988, representatives from eight Palestinian cities (including Gaza) established, in August l989, the Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. This became the only corporate body representing, on a national scale, the interests of Palestinian businessmen and shopkeepers. Back to top

Nevertheless the persistent divisions in each township in within the middle classes along sources of origin (i.e. between refugees and 'indigenous' citizens) continued to plague local political alliances. Those were particularly evident in municipal and chamber of commerce elections where refugee and 'native' candidates had to be balanced delicately in each competing slate. They were (and are) reinforced in marriage strategies between extended families, where refugee status continues to be as important as class background, in the search for eligible spouses. Despite significant integration (and intermarriage) since the war of l967, those divisions continue to be a primary obstacle in the social homogeneity of the middle strata in Palestinian urban society and contributed significantly to the relative withdrawal of town merchants from active participation in the national movement until the eruption of the uprising in December l987. One outstanding achievement of the uprising has been a noticeable decline in the social impact of these divisions, evidenced by new intermarriage patterns and the willingness to waive 'family rights' in case of local feuds.

Finally a distinction should be introduced here between shopkeepers and peddlers. While retail trade expanded considerably as a result of rural business ventures in the district centres--shopkeepers continue in the main to come from urban roots, both refugee and local. Peddlers on the other hand, are overwhelmingly of peasant origin. They predominate as street vendors of vegetable produce (mostly rural women who bypass kiosk rentals in the vegetable markets) and trinket salesmen on pavements. During the uprising the number of street peddlers increased several folds as unemployed workers, pauperized refugee camp dwellers, and tax evading shopkeepers joined the ranks of peasant street vendors to eke out a living. They posed, as we shall see, a formidable impediment for the ability of the national movement in directing the discipline of the commercial strike.

BACKGROUND: THE PASSIVE AGENTS OF RESISTANCE
Merchants and shopkeepers have always constituted the passive side of resistance to the military authorities. Commercial strikes have been a primary weapon of protest by the national movement since l967. However those have been usually one-day affairs, in observance of nationalist memorials or in response to acts committed by the military government, such as the deportation of national figures or the punitive demolition of houses. They also were accomplished, in most cases, with a considerable degree of persuasion--to put it mildly--on the part of activists from the national movement.

The turning point was the imposition, in l976, of the value-added tax (VAT) on all merchandise and services in the occupied territories as a means of financing the budget of the Israeli Military Government. In addition to being illegal by the terms of the Geneva Convention ("the occupier may not institute new taxes in the territory under its control"), this tax was resented because merchants and manufacturers bore the brunt of its imposition. With the onset of the Uprising merchants readily responded to UNLU calls for a total commercial strike and the non-payment of taxes. Faced with a move for total civil disobedience, and a sharp drop in revenue for its Civil Administration, the Israeli authorities responded quickly: ...the granting of permits and licenses of any kind as made contingent on payment of taxes, among other required criteria (including obtaining a certificate of "good conduct" from the internal intelligence services, the Shin Bet). Such permits include, among others, drivers' licenses, travel permits, identity cards, birth certificates, permits to visit relatives detained [in detention centres], construction permits and import and export licenses. Back to top

The forceful collection of taxes was used as both a means of revenue and as a method of subduing the rebellious population. The Jerusalem Arabic press daily reported the incursions of the "tax brigades". The following items were reported for an average day covering events for November 23, l988: "Last Wednesday the customs and tax bureau staff, accompanied by soldiers, raided the tailoring shop of Yusef Abdallah Shafiq and seized seven sewing machines whose value was estimated at 4,000 dinars [$8,000], for non-payment of taxes. A l982 Renault belonging to Nasim Odeh was appropriated for the same reasons. A physician from Yatta [Hebron], Dr. Nayef Mahanbeh had his car seized; the condition for reclaiming it was the payment of 1300 dinars in back taxes. Tens of merchants in Khan Yunis were raided and their IDs confiscated. They were directed to reclaim them from the Military Government after paying the taxes imposed on them." The latter practice, of confiscating citizens IDs for non- payment of taxes, was later declared illegal by the High Court; nevertheless the practice continued.

The human rights organization, al-Haq, reported in its annual report the manner in which the army was used for these exactions: Typically, a curfew would be imposed, and the army would enter homes impounding property or summon property owners to makeshift tax offices (usually schools) to present proof of payment for taxes. Al-Haq has documented confiscations of jewelry, vehicles and (occasionally exhorbitant) sums of money, for example in the town of Beit Sahour at the beginning of July l988. In addition, Palestinians have been stopped at roadblocks by police or army carrying lists; if their name appeared on the list, their car would be seized and returned only after the person had paid all out standing taxes, as estimated by the authorities. In other instances, identity cards were confiscated and returned only after taxes had been paid.

By the beginning of l988 it became clear to the Israeli authorities that the December Uprising was not limited in character or duration, as was the case in earlier outbursts. Defense minister Rabin, who was quick to condemn the initial upheaval as the work of PLO inciters from the outside, announced a month later that "the disturbances reflect the tension that was building in the administered territories over 20 years and are not the result of Palestinian organizations' call to violence." The Chief of Staff, Dan Shomron, boasted on a tour of Gaza on December l987 that "under no circumstances will we allow a small minority of inciters to rule over the vast majority--a majority which is, in general, pragmatic and wants to live quietly." A few months later he made an about-turn, "...there is no such thing as eradicating the intifada because in its essence it expresses the struggle of nationalism...the participation of large number of civilians in violence has created what physicists call 'a critical mass'."

The repressive measures listed above were thus levelled ac- cordingly, not only to contain and isolate activists and in- citers associated with the underground movement, but also to intimidate whole segments of the civilian population,including groups that had been--so far--immune. Mayors, mukhtars, heads of chambers of commerce, and leading businessmen and manufacturers had to spend hours under the sweltering heat, rubbing shoulders with youngsters summoned from refugee camps, and peasants from curfewed villages asking for special permits to harvest their crops. Throughout l987 and l988 several prominent businessmen from Nablus and Ramallah were held and incarcerated for non-payment of taxes, a move unprecedented so far. The army developed a special preference for comman- deering the Volvos, Audis, and Mercedeses of the rich [bearing blue West Bank licenses] to mount night raids against rebellious villages. They were often observed taking the vehicles afterwards for joyrides and returning them to their owners damaged and in need of major repairs. Special yellow passes issued in the early eighties for dignitaries and businessmen to spare them the humiliations of excessive searches over border crossings were now abolished. The Israeli satirist Philip Gillon encapsulated the situation succinctly: "they treat the Arabs like dogs, and they treat dogs like Arabs."

In short the Intifada witnessed the dethronement of the Palestinian bourgeoisie from the relatively sheltered niche they had managed to occupy over the last two decades. Thus a combination of increasing tax pressures, and a shift in the perception of the urban middle classes on the part of the military government becoming a part of a hostile subject population and not a part of a "pragmatic majority that wants to live quietly" (a shift which was itself brought about by the ascendancy to power, and the staffing of the military government, by extreme right wing elements) engendered a self- fulfilling prophecy. It hastened the process of involving the shopkeepers as willful activists in the uprising. Back to top

"TOWERS" OF THE INTIFADA

The victory of shopowners in the battle over the commercial strike marked a turning point in the formative phase of the uprising. It witnessed the ascendancy of the urban middle classes as leading elements in the confrontations with the Israeli army, and resolved for the first time during the two decades of Israeli rule the ability of the national movement to control the streets, and sustain that control, through the mobilization of the most self-conscious and individualistic sector of the urban population. The "war of the shops", in the view of a Palestinian historian, "brought the bourgeoisie into the fold, participating very fully and effectively in the uprising." This occurred, in the analysis of one of the factions in the UNLU, when the uprising brought home the conclusion "to those segments of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia that it is impossible to continue coexisting with a 'liberal' occupation".

This achievement would not have been possible without two essential ingredients: the willful involvement of the merchants in the uprising after a brief period of hesitation and intimidation; and secondly, a decision on the part of the national movement--and the UNLU in particular--to give priority to the demands of merchants (and manufacturers) within the tasks of the movement as a whole. Concerning the first factor, there is no doubt that the imposition of taxes, the manner in which they were collected, and the generalized contempt displayed by the Israeli army and civil administration towards the middle classes since the early 1980s (as discussed above) hastened the process of their revolt. This created the fertile atmosphere for the involvement of the merchants in the commercial strike. The shift in the attitude of the UNLU towards the merchants from one of patronizing exhortation, and on a number of occasions actual intimidation in the streets, to direct involvement, was realized through the establishment of the merchants' commit- tees--which became the instruments of incorporating shop- keepers and small businessmen as direct participants in the uprising. These changes can be clearly monitored from the regional communiques of the national committees of the UNLU.

In an early political circular distributed by Fateh on Feb- ruary 20, l988 ["second month of the peoples great rebellion"] merchants were already identified as occupying "the paramount position [makan al-sadara] in support of the uprising" since the commercial sector has the power and the ability to paralyze the economy in a general strike." Merchants are targeted for mobilization in the following manner: 1. Merchants should be organized around the non-payment of taxes as a matter of self interest. Otherwise a prolonged strike cannot be sustained. 2. Merchants should be assured that their stores will be protected against looting in case the army opened their shutters forcefully. The national movement should repair damaged shops, and provide guard duties [at night]. 3. Striking merchants should be supported and non-striking merchants should be punished severely. 4. The strength of the general strike lies in its implemenation. Hence the duration of the strike should be restricted and coordinated with all the regions through the national communiques.

This circular is remarkable for several reasons. First it reflects the political weight accorded to the merchants by the largest of the political factions in the UNLU, identifying them as the primary mass base of the rebellion, before workers and farmers. Second, unlike the communiques issued by the UNLU for mass distribution, the bayanat of the uprising, it is completely lacking in any sentimental jargon; the political idiom used is concrete and straightforward, almost cynical. Finally the circular reveals the pragmatic positions that guided the leadership of the uprising, from the onset, in determining the timing and extent of its directives in a manner which clearly distinguishes it from the leadership of the 1936 general strike. In the actual carrying out of these directives, however, considerable pressure was used, depending on the region and the issues involved. In the first phase of the commercial strike (lasting from January to April, l988) the main issue was the boycott of taxes, and the regularization of strike hours. Back to top

In the second phase (beginning June l988 and intensifying in March l989) the main issue became the boycott of Israeli goods and the expansion of the home market for native products. A circular addressed to the merchants of Qalqiliah [a market town west of Nablus] by the "Qalqilyah Peoples Committee of the Uprising" (January 24, l988) is typical of the patronizing stance which characterized UNLU circulars towards merchants in the first phase. After ad- dressing shopkeepers to "assume your share in the national struggle, and to be with the people rather than above the people", it then proceeds to warn retailers who raise the prices of basic commodities of dire retributions: first the spoilage of their wares, and then the burning of their stores. This balancing of exaltation with intimidation also characterizes the first three national communiques of the United Leadership, albeit with considerably more astuteness and sophistication. In communique #1 (January 8, l988) reference is made to "our commitment to protect the interests of honest merchants from any attacks by the autho- rities...[while] we notify those weak souls from the repercussion of being seduced by collaborators". Communique #3 (January l8, l988) elevated merchants to prominence: "we salute you and salute your leading role in the making of our people's uprising", but the language is still condescending. (This is just before the period, at the end of January, when the United Leadership intervened in the prolonged Jerusalem strike by making allowances for limited opening hours in the morning).

The turning point occurred in communique #5 (beginning of February, l988). This is the only national communique that is almost entirely devoted to merchants and businessmen. More significantly, its formulation clearly reflects the elevation of merchants to a decision making position within the leadership of the revolt. In its preamble it calls on "Merchants...towers of the intifadah...its guardians, the bearers of its message and continuity. Salute to your principal role as vanguards of the struggle." This formulation corresponded to the formation of merchants committees in Ramallah, Nablus, and Jerusalem whose task was "the escalation and coordination of the commercial strike within each city [i.e. through the UNLU] and the protection of striking merchants from retribution".

Immediately after the success of the commercial strike the committees began to push for a tax boycott, and--in the words of a merchant activist from al-Bireh--"there is no doubt that the tax campaign was spearheaded vigorously by the merchants committees, acting on the basis of their self-interest". At the institutional level, the merchants' committees were expected to replace the disintegrating chambers of commerce as the organizational framework for representing their concerns, but this attempt apparently failed. The chambers of commerce (and in the case of the Nablus region, of industry and commerce) had acted over the last two decades as the bodies for representing the grievances of the small merchant with the tax bureaus, and, with the dissolution of the nationalist town councils after l981, as the main conduit between urban citizens and the military government. In the eighties they also assumed the task of validating official papers for the Jordanian government (such as passport papers, birth certificates, etc.). For this reason the chambers acquired the reputation of a embodying a conciliatory, pro- Jordanian (but not collaborationist) leadership for the urban middle classes. Their demise ushered, therefore, the collapse of these linkages with both Jordan and the military government. The failure of the merchants' committees to supplant them can be seen in this context not only a failure of class representation, but also the limitations inherent in any organs of the national movement performing an autonomous political function. Back to top

MERCHANTS IN RETREAT?

In August l988 the Palestinian Uprising entered into an organizational crisis. While on the ground street confrontations were continuing unabated with the army, and while the commercial strike provided the backdrop for the 'routinization' of the uprising, the institutional development of the intifada was not galvanizing around the popular committees, as anticipated by the United Leadership. "The danger of this period," wrote Rib'i al-Madhoun, "lies in the possible loss by the uprising of one of its distinctive features--namely, its mass character. It marks the regression of the movement to pre-intifada days when revolutionary action was concentrated in the hands of students and rebellious youth in specified regions." Two main institutional failures which can be mentioned here were the inability of the 'popular education committees' to create a sustained alternative network to formal schooling (with the closing of most schools and universities in the West Bank); and the failure of the 'agricultural committees' and the 'domestic production commit- tees' in creating the much heralded system of home production, based on cottage industries.

These issues reflected the general political malaise in the uprising itself. As the tempo of the movement was routinized and the popular committees were in retreat, the United Leadership sought to resolve the crisis by 'heating up' street action confrontations. At the root of the problem was the shift in the political strategy of the PLO after the declaration of independence in November l988, when the lead- ership was seen as 'investing' the political momentum created by the uprising in the search for sovereignty through a negotiated territorial settlement. Although this 'investment' was acceptable in principle by the five factions of the United Leadership--as evidenced by Communique no. 29 (November 20, l988)--it nevertheless created considerable controversy on how to proceed inside the territories.

Briefly stated the controversy was highlighted in the internal debate about the nature of the campaign for civil disobedience (isyan madadni)---generally seen by all political factions as the main instrument of mobilization as well as the strategic means of achieving total disengagement with Israel's political control over the West Bank and Gaza. Commercial strikes, tax-boycotts, the mass resignation of police and tax- collectors, were all seen as steps towards a cataclysmic moment of separation when the system of colonial control would disintegrate. A necessary condition for this objective was that civil resistance exclude armed activities (to avoid brutal liquidation by the army) and that mass participation be sustained through the organizational work of the popular committees. As the uprising escalated its momentum it would enter into a new advanced plateau when these [popular] organizational networks would constitute an alterative power base to Israel's colonial administration. It was the inability of the popular committees to create this alternative power base that was now seen as the essence of the crisis in the leadership of the uprising. In effect the diplomatic initiatives the PLO to enter into a negotiated territorial settlement were seen as the new alternative strategy which would circumvent, rather than supplement, the political gains of the uprising.

In the ranks of the merchant community this crisis was ex- emplified in three issues: (l) the retreat in the campaign for the non-payment of taxes, after some success; (2) the manner in which the boycott of Israeli commodities was carried out; and (3) the emergence of differences in the ranks of manufacturers, shopkeepers, and street peddlers (bastat owners).

The initial success of the tax campaign was no doubt connected to the resignation of tax-collectors and Arab police officers in response to calls (and later threats) by the UNLU in March l988. In subsequent months, however, Israeli moves to take drastic measures against tax delinquents, and the forceful collection of taxes (described above) eroded the resistance of the business community. Factory owners and other manufacturers in Ramallah and Nablus received "special dispensation"--according to a prominent Ramallah accountant--from the United Leadership at the end of March, l988, to pay their taxes in order to keep their factories opened and receive import licenses for raw materials. The move was generally seen as necessary to sustain local industries, and expand the employment of workers laid off by Israeli firms. It nevertheless helped to a create a schism ("and considerable resentment") between manufacturers and shopkeepers, and ultimately contributed to the collapse of the tax campaign. Since big merchants and manufacturers paid the bulk of the aggregate taxes the result was to minimize the losses for the Israeli treasury. By July 1988, it is estimated that 25% of the business establishments in Bireh-Ramallah region (out of a total of 4520 establishments) had broken ranks and paid their taxes, amounting to 80% of the total Israeli tax levy. An even higher payment rate was reported in Hebron, Bethlehem, Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nablus--the latter often referred to as the 'citadel of merchants'. Back to top

The second issue which confronted the merchant community in this phase was the boycott Israeli commodities. The boycott campaign was already addressed in some detail in the early communiques of the uprising. The Fateh clandestine directive (February 20, l988), quoted above, laid down the conditions for boycott as follows: (a) Palestinian manufacturers should improve the quality of their products, to be on par with equivalent Israeli items; (b) Arab products should not be priced higher than similar Israeli products; (c) local products should be diversified so as to cover the maximum possible replacement for Israeli goods. "Strike forces" were directed in a number of UNLU communiques to enforce the demand for boycott. This was usually understood to mean spoilage of Israeli commodities after initial warning to the storeowners, but only if there was a local substitute for the item. The spoilage campaign was accelerated in the spring of l989 and reached its zenith in March, when masked squads of the strike forces raided hundreds of shops in several towns and held public 'bonfires' of the offending items. In Nablus excesses were widespread and often no distinction was made between commodities that have Arab substitutes and those that do not (such as Tnuva milk cartons); at least one shoe-store was reportedly burnt down.

The 'bonfire campaign' elicited widespread protests by merchants and the public at large and occasioned a reprimand of the strike forces by the United Leadership. In a rare directive issued by the UNLU to local committees the roughing up of Nablus merchants was severely criticized, and they were commanded to treat violating shopowners in a more careful manner in future encounters. The third feature of the crisis was related to the uneven burden borne by shopkeepers in the conduct of the general strike, in contrast to the situation of manufacturers and street peddlers. There is now concrete evidence that Palestinian manufacturers, especially those who invested in food processing, soft drinks, sweets, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, cleaning solutions and other items involved in the boycott campaign, benefitted considerably during the uprising. Increased demand for Arab products, despite a substantial drop in the public standard of living, allowed many Palestinian manufacturers to have a virtual monopoly on the local market. For this they received a special dispensation from the United Leadership to extend their working hours, and even--as mentioned--to pay taxes, to the chagrin of many storekeepers who demanded, through their merchants' committees, that a more even-handed policy be applied.

The problem with street peddlers was more acute. In the earlier days of the commercial strike petty street vendors, falafel stands, and small vegetable traders were allowed to sell their wares beyond strike hours in order to avail the public of emergency shopping facilities. It was also an economic safety valve which permitted an increasingly pauperized urban population a supplementary source of income in the form of 'alley stores'. As the uprising entered its second year, however, these enterprises mushroomed all over the country, blotting the urban landscape and diminishing considerably the already curtailed incomes of strike-bound merchants. More significantly these peddlers threatened the integrity and the discipline of the general strike itself. It was in response to this last consideration, and under pressure from merchants committees, that directives were issued calling for the regulation, then curtailment, of street peddling, charging 'strike forces' with the task of enforcing this directive. But the number of peddlers involved was apparently too large to control and this measure could only be enforced during general strike days. Subsequently the friction with street vendors continued to be a matter of contention among storekeepers.

CONCLUSION:

The focus in this essay attempts to redress a certain imbalance in the current literature on the intifada which has, so far, neglected its urban and class (bourgeois) dimensions. In this analysis the Palestinian Uprising marks the entry of the urban merchant community (and its stormtroopers: the shopkeepers) as active participants in the national movement. Until then this conservative community was used by the movement, with considerable reluctance on its part, in limited strikes to mark national days of protest and expressions of grievances. The use of taxes by the Israelis as a form of punishment, and the general humiliation of the urban middle classes, leading to their dethronement from their relative privileges, brought the merchant community to the forefront of confrontations with the army. They realized, in the words of a leading member in the Chamber of Commerce, that "co- existence with the Israeli presence was no longer feasible". And this was not a mere figure of speech. In the first four months of the uprising, shopkeepers were the single most deci- sive element in paralyzing the urban economy, and in consolidating the populist character of the insurrection.

On its part, the clandestine movement leading the uprising became aware of the limitations inherent in relying excessively on volatile street demonstrations and stone throwing as instruments for the realization of its political objectives. The leadership also realized that it was incapable of organizing Palestinian workers to desist from working in Israel since the home industries could not sustain alternative employment for them. The commercial strike was seen. therefore. as an essential component for adding 'class weight' as well as durability and urban depth to the uprising. The leadership's incorporation of the merchant community into the leadership of the revolt, through merchants' committees, received the blessings of both 'left' and 'right' factions of the UNLU.

A setback to this incorporation occurred as a result of the mishandling of the tax-boycott campaign and giving special dispensation to manufacturers and big businessmen to pay taxes while pushing the shopkeepers to take the heat. But the main obstacle leading to the retreat of merchants (as well as other organized groups in the uprising) from the forefront of events was political and not tactical. It had to do with the inability of the 'popular committees' engendered by the intifada to create an alternative power (and in some sectors economic) base to Israeli rule. This shortcoming was enhanced and fed by PLO political initiatives abroad which were often seen (rightly or wrongly) as the culmination of political struggles in the occupied territories, rather than a supplement to them.

While the battle of the merchants constitutes part of the ebb and flow of the movement as a whole, it is a part that was decisive in the success of the uprising in its formative phase. Although merchants continue to exercise a visible role in the routinized features of the urban revolt, there is no doubt that the initiative is now located outside their hands.

This kind of analysis invites also comparison with contemporary cases of urban rebellion in the Middle East. The two cases that come immediately to mind are the roles of the Bazaari merchants in the Iranian revolutionary movement, and the contrasting behaviour of what Batatu calls 'the traditional urban petty bourgeoisie' in Syria and Egypt in fuelling urban discontent. It is intriguing in this context to note that while in both Iran and Syria an organic connection developed between urban petty traders and the militant Islamic movement (the 'ulama and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively), elsewhere in the Middle East (including in Algeria, Morrocco and Egypt) fundamentalism seems to have grown into amorphous, populist, and diversified currents--but always finding fertile grounds in the ranks of urban artisans, traders and the lower ranks of professionals. Such parallels cannot be established for their Palestinian counterparts. The bulk of shopkeepers, tradesmen, and peddlers we have been discussing have adopted, so far, an ideology of secular nationalism (and to a lesser extent, of leftest nationalism). To the extent that a social base can be discerned for the urban fundementalist movement in Palestine, it seems to be rooted among university students and the salaried lower middle classes Back to top