Published October 25, 2000 at http://www.jmcc.org/media/reportonline
by the Palestine Report
Special Report by Saleh Abdel Jawad, head of the Department of Political Science at Birzeit University.
WHAT ARE the crucial lessons to be learned from the recent confrontations? The emotive aspect of the Intifada and the jargon of heroism and sacrifice have been efficiently covered in the Palestinian press, but this article is the other - and no less important - half of the picture.
Heroism and strategic shortcomings
In spite of their unprecedented heroism and sacrifices, the current
confrontations have proven that the Palestinian side (the Palestinian
Authority, its opposition and society in general) is not prepared for a
military face-off. This is due not only to the enormous gap in
capabilities
between the two sides, but also to our lack of preparedness. This is so
despite all previous statements by the Palestinian leadership -
political
and military - on preparations for possible confrontation imposed by
the
occupier in case of a declaration of statehood or a failure to adhere
to its
desired settlement.
On October 8, I visited a Palestinian military outpost at one entrance to Ramallah. There were only five people at the outpost. More importantly, the outpost showed no signs of trenches, fortifications or even one sandbag.
More examples are not necessary, as the shortcomings are clear. A talk with any given officer or member of the national security forces leads one to a similar conclusion. This points to the political decision-maker's lack of seriousness and knowledge of his foe. It also explains Israel's indifference to the Palestinian side and its perception that any disturbance will only be a passing outburst of rage. Israeli preparations, on the other hand, have proven to be under development since the tunnel incidents of 1996.
In addition to a gap in capabilities, shortcomings in preparation have manifested several spontaneous and erroneous tactics on the ground. The events have somersaulted into a strategic method that can only lead to disaster.
The participation of "armed" Palestinian elements in popular demonstrations and shootings at soldiers and settlers must end, even though we know that it occurs within a context of self- defense. These shootings take place from a distance, and frankly speaking, are fruitless. While these people do not lack faith or the willingness to sacrifice, they do suffer from a lack of appropriate weapons, a shortage of ammunition and more importantly, a severe lack of experience, training and knowledge. They also lack discipline and a central leadership.
The participation of these elements are nothing more than symbolic, giving a false sense of safety and security. Instead, they offer Israel the excuse to use tanks, Cobra helicopters and rockets to quell an uprising that is popular in essence. For the first time since 1967, the enemy has had reason to shell and destroy neighborhoods. If this situation intensifies, it will also allow the temporary or permanent expulsion of people from their neighborhoods, villages or even cities, creating a Palestinian strategic threat.
I suggest that there be extensive national debate over this issue. Perhaps in anticipation of this moment, a blind eye has been turned to the weapons that have trickled over the past few years from the Israeli market into the hands of these elements. But this tactic has proven its ultimate failure, causing unjustified losses in the ranks of both those armed and those demonstrating.
That some say that the evacuation of Joseph's Tomb in Nablus is evidence of this tactic's success shows an inability to extract lessons and standards from our experience. We cannot apply this site's particular circumstances to the remaining military outposts and settlements. This tiny location, planted in the midst of a large Palestinian population, was guarded by only 13 Israeli soldiers who were able to hold their position for over 10 days despite dozens of attacks. During those attacks, one Israel died in exchange for the deaths of seven Palestinians and the injury of at least 75.
I believe that if this site had not sat in the middle of a residential area, Israel would not have evacuated it. Therefore, attacking fortified Israeli military outposts or settlements surrounded by empty areas does nothing (as we have seen in different confrontations) but result in tremendous Palestinian human loss, not to mention strategic harm. If we are to learn anything from the 1948 War, it is that attacks on well-fortified Israeli positions only lead, except in rare cases, to losses on the Palestinian and Arab side. In those days, the gap in capabilities was not nearly as broad as it is today.
In the long run, attacks on settlements and fortified outposts exhausted the Arab forces and broke them. History has shown that when the Palestinian side did not launch these attacks, the Jewish fighters or Hagana did, using special agents or local collaborators. And when they could not find collaborators, they sent settlers to open fire to provoke public opinion in those settlements that had good relations with their Arab neighbors, creating a sense of responsibility among the Arab population. This, in the end, served to facilitate the expulsion of Arab villages (One must only examine the confession of Iyal Ofek of Kibbutz Hazori on the expulsion of the residents of Qira and Abu Zreiq villages in the Haifa area to see that this holds true).
Currently, it is sufficient to point to the losses on both sides to prove these tactics fruitless. While the Palestinians lost over 80 martyrs during the tunnel confrontations in exchange for 16 Israeli soldiers (a ratio of 1 to 5) the Palestinians have lost 80 martyrs to two Israeli solders (a ratio of 1 to 40) in the current confrontations. It is my belief that the gap in this ratio will only get wider if we fall into the trap of a total armed confrontation, one where the Israelis will be the initiators and we are on the defensive.
It is understandable that young men publicly carry arms as a recognizable symbol of a brave resistance for a people subject to the ugliest kinds of oppression. In our present circumstance, however, this hands Israel the excuse for crushing this resistance on a silver platter.
The use of arms in popular confrontations is political and military suicide. Therefore it must be separated from the popular dimension of the struggle and action should be taken towards stripping the enemy, as was the case in the Intifada, of its overwhelming military superiority. This does not have to mean a return to the Intifada and all of its specifics, but that we learn from its strengths such as popular committees, popular and societal forms of struggle, social solidarity, economic boycotting and an emphasis on public opinion. We must also develop a new discourse that includes studied military action.
The school of thought that advocates a total military confrontation or armed popular struggle against the occupation is fraught with danger. This thinking springs from the desire to defend the people, but it falls directly into the trap that Israel has planned since the tunnel incidents. The trap will become more dangerous and plausible in light of talk of an emergency national unity government including Likud leader Ariel Sharon.
The Israeli strategy
The creation of a Palestinian strategy to confront Israeli tactics
requires
us to first understand their planning, and then to try and frustrate
it. The
Israeli strategy, developed since the tunnel incident and amended
slightly
to confront a unilateral declaration of statehood, has three levels:
political-diplomatic, socioeconomic and finally, military.
Israel's political strategy is divided into two parts. The first is internal and focuses on uniting Israel's political street behind its leadership and transforming the conflict into an ethno-religious conflict. It gives the illusion of total war that puts to use all the society's resources because the fight against the Palestinians is a declaration of war on the existence of the state of Israel. The revolution of Palestinians inside the Green Line will be used as evidence of this. Hence, Barak will call on the majority to form a national unity government. The second part is external and is aimed at winning the battle for international public opinion, particularly that of Americans and Europeans, by portraying Palestinians as the aggressor.
The economic level of the plan aims to weaken Palestinians financially and exhaust their societal structure. The idea of weakening the Palestinians by waging an economic war is not new; it was hatched and implemented during the Intifada. Researcher Arieh Shalev from the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, a general reservist and a Labor Party supporter, as well as military governor in the West Bank in the early seventies, proposed a number of economic weapons, the most important being imposition of long periods of curfew, perhaps extending for months on end; imposition of a siege on villages and cities and the severing of transportation between them; prohibition of Palestinian labor in Israel; as well as strikes on production sectors.
Today, we can assume that other measures will be employed born out of the circumstances created by the Oslo Accords, one being the partial dissolution of the Palestinian presence at international crossings, including the Gaza Airport. In addition, crucial monthly financial transfers from Israel to the Palestinian Authority of tax and customs revenues will be brought to a halt.
Most importantly, militarily Israel wants to engage the Authority in a decisive battle, without necessarily entering Palestinian cities (at least in beginning stages). It might be more concerned with striking the leadership's positions and major military compounds, like governates and so on through "surgical bombing." This could also mean the occupation of villages in Area B or the imposition of a siege of terror in which settlers would play a major role. As the situation develops, cities may eventually be reoccupied.
The Israeli military strategy is based on lessons in combat theory developed by the Americans after the Vietnam War. American militarists, namely Collin Powell, developed the "hammer theory" that states that the main reason for the Vietnam defeat was that American military intervention was not decisive from its outset. The use of gradual force allowed the enemies of the north Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to also gradually build up strength, thus prohibiting an American victory. Also, American involvement in direct combat led to great loss in human life.
Hence, before any military confrontation, the American military strategy in its preliminary stages is to mobilize a huge military force that has been readied through the gathering of intelligence information and preparing the public for a confrontation.
In practice, the enemy is then struck with one blow that disorients it and disperses its forces without giving the chance for a response. It also does not leave any opportunity for international intervention to end the conflict. This strategy avoids entering into direct military confrontation with the enemy, which results in huge human loss that enflames local public opinion. Instead, it tries as much as possible to lessen the chances of hitting civilians from the enemy camp, thus provoking world opinion. Finally, this method does its best to isolate the battlefield and its atrocities from the eyes of the public.
The United States has applied this combat theory repeatedly with great success in its strikes in Grenada, Panama, Iraq and Kosovo.
The Israeli government has adopted this combat theory and partially implemented it in Lebanon in 1994. The second time it was used was in 1996 in Operation Grapes of Wrath. There, however, the results were less than satisfactory due to the nature and tactics of the Lebanese resistance, which did not allow Israel to destroy Hezballah's combat force, which differs from that of conventional armies. It also failed to win the public opinion battle, particularly in the massacre at Qana refugee camp and an inability to prevent the media from reporting. The Israeli army was not able to fully implement this strategy in the 1996 tunnel incidents because it was not prepared. Now, however, we have ample reason to believe that Israel is following this strategy in trying to trap Palestinians into confrontation. It is in our interest to frustrate this Israeli plan and avoid a decisive battle. -Published 25/10/00
Ed.'s Note - The above was submitted to a Palestinian newspaper on the week of October 10, but rejected for publication.