Interview conducted by Samih Mohsen

(Translated by Samir Rantissi)

Q: Mr. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), secretary general of the PLO, How do you assess the results of recent Palestinian - Israeli negotiations in Washington, especially that it was said that it is merely brainstorming sessions?

A: Correct, the last session, which took place, was a brainstorming session. in other words, each party says whatever it wishes to say and any ideas without being committed to it, and without writing or taking minutes, without anything official, only to examine ideas, maybe at the end, both parties reach at some agreement points which could be in the future or at the next session be recorded.  In my opinion, until now both parties have not reached to any common point in all issues discussed Jerusalem, Settlements, Borders, and Refugees.  Also there were rounds of talks in regard to the third phase of redeployment within the interim agreement, and also in this regard, they have not reached any agreement.

In my opinion, until now, both parties have not reached any common ground

Q. It was said that chief Palestinian negotiator Dr. Saeb Erekat, asked that the third phase of redeployment include 57% of the Palestinian territory, Do you want to comment on this?

A: Let me clarify something in regard to Redeployment, Redeployment as it came in the fourth article of the Oslo agreement: " The council (meaning the PA's council) assumes its authority over the territory of the West Bank and Gaza except for permanent status issues". And as also came in the agreement, these issues are Jerusalem, Borders, Settlements, and Refugees.  Until today, the Israelis still reject these issues, despite the fact that it is a clear issue in the Oslo agreement, and in the interim agreements, which followed.  In the initiative submitted by American Peace envoy Dennis Ross, we then agreed upon the following: That a bilateral committee, Israeli- Palestinian be established to study these articles, implement them, and submits a report to the American side.  At Wye Plantation, the Israelis tried to refuse their implementation, so we yet agreed again that within four months they get implemented, still, these articles are not being implemented.  At the same time, the Israelis keep talking about percentages, we refused the percentages in the past, and we still refuse them today.  The question is “which areas are not to be included in the permanent negotiations”?  We are in need of satellite imagery which any country can come up with, America, Russia, or even Israel, and then we have no problem with even the Israelis designating the boundaries of Jerusalem, the boundaries of the settlements, and the specified military locations and not the military areas, since they consider -as an example- the Jordan valley as a military area.  After that, they can give us the rest, regardless of its percentage. We think that the area to be given to us then would be around 90% of the land, still, we are not asking for percentages, and we did not talk about percentages.

The Israelis keep talking about percentages, we refused percentages in the past, and we still refuse them today


Q: Do you think that the negotiations will result in a permanent solution, as happened with neighboring Arab countries, or will it lead to a temporary solution in light of Israeli intentions towards the Palestinian homeland, in other words "are we heading towards a new interim agreement"?

A: We categorically refuse any interim agreement on permanent status issues; Meaning, we refuse to be given partial issues, or some issues, and others to be left for later, such as, to be given for example part of the borders, and then say “we will discuss the full borders later, or say, we will resolve the issues of borders, settlements, and water, and will leave the Refugees and Jerusalem for later”.  Such a solution is an incomplete solution, or a new interim agreement, and we categorically reject it.  We have to be alert, and careful, especially that most of the Palestinian forces are present, and even those who were hesitant at the beginning, and some were even opposing have now joined the institutions, and they have to have a say too.  There is no one who was all along part of the PLO anymore away from the issues.  It is no longer up to Fatah, and the People's party to decide, as it was during the early stage of the political process.  The future is no more an issue, which concerns one Palestinian party; it concerns all of us.  In my opinion, any incomplete solution is simply not a solution.

The future is no more an issue, which concerns one Palestinian party; it concerns all of us

Q: After the failure of the American - Syrian summit in Geneva, what are the expectations on the Palestinian track?

A: First, let's determine whether the summit has failed or succeeded? We don't know if it has actually succeeded, or if it has actually failed; declared indications say that they have not agreed, but undeclared indications say also that the doors are still open and have not been closed.    Yet, despite some American statements, which say "the ball is now in the Syrian court", still as long as the doors have not been completely shut, that means they are still open.  Whether there are secret channels or there aren't, this is what we really don't know.  If the Syrian track fails, this is unfortunate for us.  We really want success for the Syrian track, also for the Lebanese track, whoever says that such successes will have a negative impact on our track, he is simply wrong, why? Because the Palestinian problem is the core of all problems.   It is the core of problems in the Middle East, and without its resolve, there will be no peace in the Middle East, this what we know, and what the Israelis and the Americans also know, and the whole world knows.  Therefore we are fully confident, because if the Syrian problem is solved, and the Lebanese problem is also solved, then the Arab effort will be invested on the Palestinian track.

If the Syrian and Lebanese problems are solved, then it is in our interest, because Arab effort will be invested on our track

Q:  Don't you think that there is a possibility that Israel will escalate its play with the two tracks, the Israeli and the Palestinian?

A:  Let us not use the word play, but rather say they prefer not to proceed on two tracks at the same time, exploiting the pretext that they are unable to carry two melons in one hand.  Of course this is not true, and such Israeli reasoning lacks logic.   The Israelis claim that they cannot indulge in dialogue, talks, and negotiations with more than one party at the same time.  This is not true, and the proof is that back in Madrid and in Washington, they entered into talks with the Jordanians, the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Lebanese at the same time. They've negotiated then with everyone, so why is it that they must negotiate now at the Syrian track first, and after that at the Palestinian, or vise versa.  Or if the Syrian track has failed, then we should accelerate progress on the Palestinian track.  This is only fiction, maybe caused by a lack of seriousness on the part of the Israelis to reach real agreements.  

Back in Madrid, and also in Washington, the Israelis were able to negotiate on all Arab tracks at the same time, their claim today that they are unable to negotiate on more than one track is only a pretext.

Q: It is clear that after concluding agreements with neighboring Arab states we will be left out without partners in our conflict with the Israeli occupation.  Do you think that the Arab world will proceed with normalizing relations with Israel, or do you think that the level of solidarity with the Palestinian cause will increase, since it is at the core of the conflict?

A: The Arab world knows very well that the Palestinian problem is the basic problem, and when they boycotted Israel, they did not boycott her because of Sinai, or the Palestinian lands occupied since 1967, or because of the Golan, or South Lebanon.  They've boycotted Israel because of the Palestinian issue, which is the core of the conflict.   We must not forget that the Palestinian problem still existed even prior to 1967, before the occupations, therefore, the Arabs know very well that unless our issue is resolved, they cannot establish normal relations with Israel.

We must not forget that the Palestinian problem still existed even prior to 1967, meaning even before the Israeli occupations

Q:  If the Israeli objective in achieving a framework agreement is to rid themselves for good from the international reference to the negotiations with the Palestinians.   Then are we going to continue adhering to this reference, taking into consideration that the implementation of U.N resolutions 242 & 338 on other Arab fronts set positive precedents which, play in our interest, especially, in regard to the explanation of their texts and contents, and in calling for full withdrawal?

A: We adhere fully to international legitimacy, therefore we entered into the peace process, and also this is why our national council accepted in 1988 U.N resolutions 242 & 338.  This was a historic step undertaken by our people in order to comply with international legitimacy.  Afterwards, we also accepted Bush's four points, which start with implementing 242 & 338, land for peace, security and peace for Israel, and legitimate rights for the Palestinian people.  Then we entered into Madrid and Washington, and in Oslo, the most important article spoke of the negotiations being established on implementing resolutions 242 & 338, and not being based upon these two resolutions.   The issue of implementation and commitment to international legitimacy and sticking to this legitimacy must be included in the framework agreement, otherwise we might as well tell the Israelis “good bye!”  Our starting point is “to implement international legitimacy”, the second point is that other Arab countries have had international legitimacy resolutions implemented, and there are precedents with Egypt, Jordan, and currently -as we know- the problem (which exists) with Syria is about borders, i.e., where are the international borders? are they the 1923 borders? Or the borders of pre- June 4th, 1967? So, we have precedents, which were set ahead of us, to which we adhere, and arbitrated precedents are usually treated as laws; therefore there is already a law, and there are already precedents set.  Whether in the framework agreement or in any other agreement, we fully adhere to international legitimacy.  If Israel wants to back down from implementing international legitimacy, as what Barak did already once, when he said that 242 does not apply to the Palestinians, Our answer was very clear, we have said then, “If 242 does not apply, then let’s go back to U.N resolution 181.  On the next day, he backed down from his previous statement.”

The most important article in the Oslo agreement is the one, which stated that the negotiations are to be established, for the objective of implementing U.N resolutions 242 & 338, and not for these negotiations to be based on these two resolutions.

Q:  A short while ago, you have mentioned that there might be secret channels of negotiations on the Syrian track, is it also possible that there are similar secret channels on the Palestinian track, especially that the Oslo experience is still alive in our memory?

A:  There were harsh criticism directed against us when Oslo was announced.   There is a difference between secret negotiations and secret pacts.  Oslo was not a secret pact, at Oslo there were secret negotiations, but when the outcome of these negotiations was announced, it was only announced after it was approved by the different Palestinian references, the PLO’s executive committee, the Central Council, and all the different leaderships.  As for the opposition in Damascus, it still opposes the agreement until today.  So, what I mean is that all legitimate Palestinian institutions approved the Oslo agreement, and it was possible that the executive committee or the Central council reject the accord, and I say has the Central Council said no to the accord, today we would have no accord.  Maybe there are secret negotiations, which exist.  This is not surprising, for example, in Washington, we may have ongoing negotiations, and two people representing the two parties sit to talk, and they might agree on something specific, this might be built upon, yet still, if they reach an agreement, then this agreement must be publicized.  Still, just to assure you, today there are no secret channels of negotiations between the Israelis and us.              

Just to assure you, today there are no secret channels of negotiations between the Israelis and us

Q:  As for the Israeli peace forces, don’t you think that the time became ripe today for achieving some sort of qualitative development in regard to cooperation and joint work with them?

A:  Definitely, ...definitely, there has to be contacts with the peace forces, and also with the other Israeli forces.  I have an opinion, which I have been adopting since thirty years, and that is “the meeting with the other party must not only be restricted to the segment which supports you, but also with the segment which does not support you, in order to allow for an indulging in a dialogue with that party too.   In the past, we’ve said that we do not meet with anyone other than Israeli communist party, it turned out that this party speaks on our behalf much better than what we then spoke of ourselves.  Therefore, we must look to the extremists amongst the other party, those who have an opinion against us, and who publicly oppose us, the right wing, and those who still cling to expansionist dreams.  We have to convince all of them to be realistic, and to accept international legitimacy, and simply accept us.   Therefore, I say that talking to all these forces, not only the peace forces, but also rather all Israeli forces has become a necessity.

For the past thirty years, I’ve always held the opinion, and also called for dialogue with those segments of the Israeli society who do not support us

Q:  I did not mean only dialogues, I also meant coordinating positions, or conducting joint activities?

A:  I am for a full coordination between us and them, we have the “people to people program”, which basically means that social, political, economic, and cultural segments have to meet with each other to coordinate their joint positions, and come up with results.  The peace movement is expanding and is flourishing on daily basis; we must meet with them, yet still what I am saying is that the dialogue must be conducted with all of the segments, which make up the Israeli society, with all Israeli political parties, without any exception.

Q:  Is it not possible that such calls to hold a dialogue with all Israeli parties without any exception be regarded as part of the effort aiming at normalizing relations with Israel?

A:  Here there is no normalizing, we eat from what they produce, we live with them, we enter into Israel, for us all of the this is not normalizing, it is a desire to live with the other party in peace forever.  Yet, in order to do so, we must reach a common understanding.  That means, they understand me, and I understand them, they understand my problems and my conditions.  Without this common understanding of each other’s interests, common interests, and fears, peace simply cannot be achieved.   These meetings we are talking about must have some positive influence, even if it produces 5%, or 10 % positive influence, that means it must continue.  I am not embarrassed to meet with any Israeli, from the chief rabbi to any regular person. A meeting as such can help in explaining our problem, exactly as I explain it to any other person.  If he is able to understand my problems and me this is an achievement, if he fails to do so, then it is his problem, and not mines.  I’ve heard from some Israeli politicians with whom I’ve met in the past, comments such as, “I’ve never met with a Palestinian before”. For example, one of the previous heads of the Israeli Knesset told me once that “his first lifelong meeting with a Palestinian happened to be with me, when I’ve met with him at the time.”  We must enter this door, in order for them to get to know us, and for us to get to know them.  Some of them still think that we are some kind of “..beasts”.  No, we are human, educated, and cultured.  We do not want to throw them in the sea.  Not even one single Palestinian ever said that he wanted to do so, and even when it was claimed that the late Ahmad Shuqueiri has said so.   I can really assure you that this was an unfair accusation against Mr. Shuqueiri, since it was absolutely never proven that he has said such a thing.

We eat from what they produce, we live with them, we enter into Israel, for us, all of this is not normalizing

Q:  In regard to the framework agreement, and after the expiration of the time ceiling, which was set by Barak himself as a target date to reach a framework agreement.   Now that they’ve set a new target date, which is may, and we have already accepted this new target date.  Still, what is the understanding of the Israeli side of this framework agreement to which they insist on achieving, and what is our understanding?

A:  The framework agreement is an understanding without details, this understanding is based on international legitimacy and the legal basis.  If we say that it is a framework agreement, then it must be affirmed that it is based on international legitimacy resolutions, 242, 338, 194.  It is also based on Bush’s initiative, and the Oslo agreement.  After that, we can talk about the seven issues, which are subject to discussion with a sense of summarizing, and in an understanding, which is already agreed upon.  If a framework agreement is unattainable within this understanding, then we are going to reject it, since anyway, we were against the idea of a framework from the beginning, and our desire was to go directly into negotiations on the permanent status.   Unfortunately, now we are wasting efforts twice, once when we are concentrating all of our efforts in order to come up with a framework on the concepts of issues. And after we conclude this  and by the way it is possible that we are not going to be able even to conclude that, God only knows! - Then we are going to go back to discussing details.

We were against the idea of a framework agreement from the beginning, and our desire was to go directly into negotiations on the permanent status.

Q:  So what does it really mean to reach a framework agreement?  This might result in a redundancy of the Oslo experience, where we entered into renegotiating the principles, which were already agreed upon?

A:  The Oslo agreement anticipated two stages. The first being the interim; the other being the permanent.  The interim was dispersed, it started in Jericho and Gaza, and then it was extended to other towns.  Then it came to the second phase of redeployment which, we have just completed, and after that, the third phase of redeployment.  Still, as these take place, we were supposed to be allowed to construct a port, an airport, a safe passage, and a full basket of economic steps.   Then it was supposed that at May, 5, 1996 we start negotiations on permanent status which is to last only for a period of three years as a maximum target.  But, the Israeli government started playing around, and stalled the talks.  So, it is to be concluded from all of the above mentioned, that the problem is not with the agreement which was signed, rather with the party who has no desire to honor it.

Q:  Are we afraid that even after reaching a framework agreement with the Israelis, they will again drag us into negotiating the smallest details?

A:  This is possible, and this is why, that right from the beginning we were rejecting the idea of a framework agreement.  We wanted to go directly to the permanent status negotiations, and even when we passed the February 13^th deadline, which was set by Barak, we further said there, is no need anymore for a framework agreement.  Still, we went back to the negotiations; sometimes we have to coexist with certain situations.

Q: What if we don’t reach an agreement also by May?

A: Everything is expected.

Q: Do I understand from what you are saying that we are not in agreement amongst each other in regard to the concept of a framework agreement?

A:  No of course, each has his own viewpoint, therefore we are in disagreement from now.

Q:  We were correct, and we also committed some mistakes since the beginning of our experience in Madrid, then Oslo, and even in agreements, which followed.  In your opinion, where is it that we were right, and where is it that we committed mistakes, and how can we improve our correct performance and get rid of mistakes?

A:  We’ve learned from this experience many things.  In the past we had an experience in war and fighting, and no experience in negotiations.  Still, I can only say that as long as we are dealing with interim arrangements, then mistakes committed are not of that importance.  But, in regard to mistakes which may be committed in the permanent status, and here I also say that any such mistake is the first and last, it is the same kind of mistake which an explosive expert may commit, therefore we have undertaken all precautions.  We have now a whole team of legal advisors and experts, nearly of all nationalities, provided also, that we concentrated in our selection on the Arab element.  Now it is not possible for any minister or official to sit down with the Israelis without having a legal advisor on his side.  Why? Because we do not want any mistake to be committed which, we will regret in the future.  During the interim, if there was something plus or minus, it did not mean that we’ve compromised anything.
Let me give you an example, during the second phase of redeployment, we asked for 30% redeployment, and at Wye Plantation we agreed to 13% redeployment, still, we did not compromise anything, because the issue of borders is still present on the permanent status agenda.  Whatever I can get during the interim period, I will take, it does not mean that I’ve compromised the rest.  Here there are negotiations taking place, and mistakes can happen.  I will give you another example on one of the mistakes, which were committed; “ recently, they’ve said: “Here, this is 6% or 7%, come and get it”.  Yet, after we took it, we found out that there were 25 squared kilometers missing, we immediately sent letters saying that a mistake on their part was committed, and they responded with a denial of any mistake being committed.  Every time they’ve handed land back to us, their calculations were less than ours were, the reason is that they calculate the area of the West Bank without including Jerusalem, the Latroun area, and the Dead Sea, and after this deduction, they give us the rest.   Therefore, the least we can do is to record this fact.  This used to happen in the past, and we were not paying attention to it, but recently we started paying close attention to it.  Still, I say that at the end, we know that Jerusalem, Latroun, the Dead Sea, and borders will be given back to us.  This does not mean that we have compromised.

Any mistake committed by us in the permanent status is the first and last, it is the same mistake that an explosive expert might commit, therefore we took all precautions, we have now a full team of legal advisors and experts who accompany negotiators on each session held

Q:  It seems this time that there will be no delay in declaring the sovereignty of an independent Palestinian state as has been announced, by the 13^th of September?

A:  Brother Abu Ammar says that it is our right after exhausting all means to have our say in the issue of declaring statehood, or even other different issues.  His reasoning is that when he had met with all world leaders last year to discuss the issue of statehood, they all told him: “give the Israelis a chance for another year, and if we became convinced that Israel is not interested, and is not serious about the negotiations, then it is your right to say your word“.  Still, I say let us leave the decision on this issue for history.  There are more senior references, which can take a decision in this regard.

Q: If there was a unilateral declaration of an independent State, and without agreement with the Israeli side, Israel might implement measures to undermine this declaration, Do the Palestinians have any plans to confront such a scenario?

A:  Whoever decides to declare Statehood must have taken in consideration all the different scenarios.  It is possible that they might resort to impose a siege around us, or shut the doors.  Still, I say, that when I want to take a decision, I must examine all options and possibilities, and ask myself: “What are the negatives, and what are the positives behind taking this decision?  What are the precautions, and what are the benefits?  What are the dangers and the gains?” And in light of studying all of the above, I make my decision.  If I find out that I will win, then I shall continue, and if I find out that I will lose, I must look for another solution.


Yet, what I want to say is that after all, we exist on our land.  It is true that part of our people, are still outside, and we are currently discussing the issue of the displaced, which is part of the interim stage.  Hopefully we will reach an agreement on this issue soon, it is an extremely important issue, and we view its importance the same way we view the importance of the third phase of redeployment.  Even in this issue, the issue of the displaced, the Israelis tried to limit it to figures, provided that even the Oslo agreement stated very clearly that the displaced are “those who were still registered by the eve of the fourth of June 1967, whether they existed at the time inside the West Bank and Gaza or outside these territories.  It is to be understood that what we adhere to is the principle, and not the figures.

Q:  Last Question: What is the most precious pressure card that still exists in the hand of the Palestinian negotiator?

A:  I say that we have a paper called the “Peace Treaty”.  This is a very precious Card.  We won’t place it on the table before we take all elements to be included in what we view as a final peace. A peace, which ends the conflict and replaces it with a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace.