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The Palestinian Authority and
Citizenship in the Palestinian Territories
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Historical Background
III. Palestinian Citizenship
IV. Rights and Obligations of Citizens
V. Citizen Participation
VI. Conclusion
Endnotes
Select Bibliography
I. Introduction
The concept of citizenship was developed by the ancient
Greeks and Romans, replacing the earlier concepts of tribalism (strong group loyalty) and
kinship (relative bondship) as the basis for community. The term citizen
may be defined as "a native or naturalized person who owes allegiance to a state and
is entitled to protection by the state."(1) However, in the Palestinian context, as
no such state exist, one may adopt a much more general definition such as "a member
in full standing of a political community."(2) The term citizenship
refers to "an abstract form of political association in which the individuals in a
community relate to each other through common relationships to the overarching entity, the
state."(3)
As a citizen a person owes the state allegiance, that is, the obligation of fidelity, the duty of compulsory military service and the faithful performance of such other duties as the state imposes upon its members. Some prerequisites of citizenship are the rights to vote, fair trial and free speech. Under international law, the state is regarded as responsible for safeguarding the rights of its citizens.
The concept of good citizenship is defined "differently by different
governments."(4) As Aristotle observes in The Politics, the excellence
of a citizen is relative to the political order under which he lives.(5) In essence good
citizenship means placing the public interest over the personal interest and that when
sacrifice is necessary to maintain the values of one's society, a citizen must make
whatever sacrifices a responsible leadership indicates are necessary without hesitation or
fear.
In these pages, I will seek to reveal from a Palestinian perspective the mature and challenges of being a citizen in today's Palestinian Territories. Included in this paper are my candid views on the problems plagunig Palestinian citizenship. Also, I have expressed my concerns about the direction in which Palestinian citizenship is heading, particulary for Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem. From the ashes of the 1967 June defeat, there emerged what Palestinian President Yasser Arafat coined as the "Old Number" in the Middle East political equation - namely the Palestinian aspiration for independence and statehood.
II. Historical Background
Palestine was under Ottoman occupation from 1516-1918. In 1922, the British
Mandate was put in effect. It lasted until 15 May 1948 when British troops were withdrawn
and the State of Israel was declared. At the time, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were
left without a strong centralized Palestinian authority. Eventually, the Gaza Strip was
dominated by Egypt while the West Bank opted, in 1950, for unity with Jordan. In June
1967, the West Bank and Gaza Strip came under Israeli occupation. Jordan kept its
constitutional ties with the West Bank until 31 July 1988 when King Hussein severed
administrative and legal ties in order to reaffirm the Palestinian entity.
The West Bank and Gaza Strip have a combined land area of about 6,000 square kilometers with a population of around 2.3 million, a GNP of US$ 2.9 billion and a per capita GNP of US$1,715 (see Annex 1). The Palestinian Diaspora is estimated at 3.5 million people. The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is predominantly service-oriented. Services accounted for 49% of GDP in 1993, agriculture comprise 28%, industry 8% and construction 15%. Private sector activity comprise 85% of Palestinian GDP. The economy is heavily dependent on Israel: over 85% of trade is with Israel. Moreover, about one third of the labor force worked in Israel until the institution of the closure policy by Israel; earnings from these workers amounted to more than one quarter of the income of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Remittances from Palestinians working in the Gulf countries have been another important component of disposable income, although this source of revenue has been substantially diminished since the Gulf War in 1991.
The Camp David Accords signed in Washington on 17 September, 1978, by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and witnessed by U.S. President Jimmy Carter, started the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). According to this agreement, Palestinians residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were to be given full autonomy under a Self Governing Authority (SGA). However, negotiations on the implementation of this part of the agreement reached a dead end, and by 1981 the peace process that was initiated by the Camp David Accords came to a halt.
In April 1992 and following lengthy secret talks masterminded by Norwegian Foreign
Minister Johan Jorgan Holst, the Oslo Accord was finally hammered out in Oslo,
Norway on 13 August 1993, between the PLO and Israel. It called for an Israeli withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho which would then fall under the
civilian control of a Palestinian autonomous authority. This historic step was followed by
the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed by Israel and the PLO in Washington at
the White House on 13 September 1993. It stipulated mutual recognition between Israel and
the PLO and a commitment by the Palestinian side to end terrorism and delete calls for the
destruction of the State of Israel from the Palestinian Charter.
The DoP called for a transitional period of no more than five years, during which final
status arrangements for a lasting and comprehensive peace settlement will be negotiated.
Article I of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) stipulated the establishment of a "Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority" for the Palestinian people in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, "for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a
permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." Major issues
such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements borders and foreign
relations and cooperation with other neighbors were deferred to "final status"
negotiations to begin two years later. The DoP was ambiguous on other issues such as:
1. Definition of the territory of the Jericho autonomous zone;
2. Release of the Palestinian prisoners;
3. The nature of Israeli military withdrawals or redeployments;
4. Acts of violence by extremists on both sides.
There is lack of clarity in the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles (DoP) pertaining to the rights of refugees and the displaced Palestinians. The DoP does not link the resolution of the refugee problem to international law. It stipulates the following:
* Agreement was reached to postpone discussions on the subject of refugees until the final status of negotiations. {Article 5, Paragraph 3}.
* Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of
Jordan and Egypt on the other, agreed to decide within the framework of a quadripartite
committee on how to allow people from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip displaced in 1967
to return to their homes in accordance with the necessary measures that would prevent
chaos and disorder. { Article 12)
The Declaration of Principles has a fundamental feature impacts the Palestinian public administration system: its declared aims at establishing interim arrangements which shall lead to "a Permanent Settlement".
On 4 February 1994 the Cairo Accord, a three-page document on principles of self-rule, was initialed in Cairo by PLO ChairmanYasser Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Added to it was an eight-page document that included details and maps of the control of border crossings and security arrangements for Jewish settlers in Gaza. The agreement called for shared responsibility at border crossings but gave Israel the ultimate power of veto. Joint Israeli-Palestinian forces led by Israel would patrol Gaza roads leading from Jewish settlements to Israel. The boundaries of Jericho were not covered in the Agreement.
The Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994 stipulated that the Palestinian Authority shall establish "a strong police force, the Palestinian Police."
The Palestinian Authority Political Program (PAPP) declared on 28 May 1994, led
to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) "as an extenuation of
the PLO." The PAPP maintained that the PA was "a temporary interim authority
implementing its tasks until general democratic elections in the Palestinian land takes
place." The PA was authorized to execute the interim programs during the interim
phase in order to achieve a program for connecting the interim period to the final
solution. The PA was authorized to "temporarily exercise its executive and
legislative mandate until the general elections". Among the main tasks designated to
the PA were:
1. Preparing for legislative and municipal elections and ensuring their free nature and legitimacy.
2. Planning and formulating an active local governmental structure which included a new framework for local, municipal, and village councils.
3. Drafting laws and decrees especially for the Palestinian Authority's institutions.
4. Coordinating with international institutions and donors in development programs.
5. Reconstruction of the judiciary system.
6. Preparation of modern, efficient monetary system.
7. Complementing and structuring primary institutions such as a treasury, development bank, employees bureau, accounting bureau, administrative monitor, economic council, and statistic bureau; and
8. Reorganization of the public service sectors.
The Early Empowerment Accord (EEA) initialed in Cairo on 24 August 1994 by Palestinian negotiator Dr. Nabil Sha'ath and Israeli negotiator Danny Rothschild expanded the PA's authority in five key "spheres" to cover all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The five spheres of "early empowerment", for which PA authority extended beyond the autonomous areas of Jericho and the Gaza Strip included education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism, and direct taxation/Value Added Tax (VAT). According to the Early Empowerment Accord, Israel would continue to control the remaining civilian administrative functions until after the Palestinian elections. The Israeli Cabinet on 28 August 1994 approved the EEA, but stated that it was conditional on Palestinian efforts to halt violence and terrorism.
Issues that were to be delayed until the permanent status negotiations included Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and military locations. It was agreed that the transfer of authority would take place when the PA Chairman informs Israel of the names of the authorized Palestinians who would assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and other authorities agreed upon. Each of those spheres was to continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon.
The Early Empowerment Agreement signed in Gaza on 29 August 1994 by Israel and the PA, transferred to the PA from the Israeli Military Government and its Civil Administration in the West Bank the powers and responsibilities in the following spheres: education and culture, health social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and VAT. According to this Agreement, Israel was to provide the PA to enable free access to all information that is necessary for an effective and smooth transfer. The PA became fully responsible for the proper functioning of the offices included in the spheres and for the management of their personnel in all aspects, including employment and placement of employment, payment of their salaries and pensions and ensuring other employee rights. The PA was to continue employing Palestinian employees of the Civil Administration currently in the offices included in each sphere and to maintain their rights. Article VII of the Agreement transferred legislative powers also to the PA. It authorized the PA to promulgate secondary legislation regarding the powers and responsibilities transferred to it. Such legislation included amendments and changes to the existing laws, regulations and military orders. Israel, however, was to have no reservations concerning any proposed legislation, for such legislation to enter into force. Article XI of the Agreement stipulated that the PA will do its utmost to establish its revenue collection system immediately with the intent of collecting direct taxes and VAT.
On 28 September 1995 Israel and the PLO signed the landmark Interim Autonomy
Agreement ("Oslo II Accord") at the White House in Washington, paving the
way for an Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The "Oslo II Accord" provides for two elections: one for the head of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) ; and another to elect an 82-member self-governing authority -
the Palestinian Council - which have legislative and executive powers ( Both elections
were held in January 1996.) It also provides that legislative power will be exercised by
the Palestinian Council as a whole, while its executive power will be exercised by
a committee of the Council called the Executive Authority. This committee shall
comprise of Council members together with a small number of appointed officials. The
powers of the Council will extend to all matters within its jurisdiction. It will not have
powers in the sphere of foreign relations. The agreement does, however, provide for a
number of areas in which the PLO may, on behalf of the Council, conduct negotiations and
sign agreements.
With regard to security and redeployment, the agreement establishes the following
arrangements for three types of areas:
* Area A comprises the six cities listed above. In these areas, the Palestinian
Council will have full responsibility for internal security and public order, as well as
full civil responsibilities.
* Area B comprises the Palestinian towns and villages of the West Bank.
In these areas, which contain some 68 percent of the Palestinian population, the
Council will be granted full civil authority, as in Area A. The Council will be charged
with maintaining public order, while Israel will have overall security authority to
safeguard citizens and combat terrorism. The Israeli responsibility shall take precedence
over the Palestinian responsibility for public order. Twenty-five Palestinian police
stations will be established in specified towns and villages to enable the Palestinian
Police to exercise its responsibility for public order. The agreement contains provisions
requiring that the movement of Palestinian police be coordinated and confirmed with
Israel.
* In Area C, which comprises the unpopulated areas, areas of strategic
importance to Israel, and the Jewish settlements, Israel will retain full responsibility
for security and public order. The Council will assume all those civil responsibilities
not related to territory, such as economics, health, education, etc.
Though Israel still controls some 70% of the land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Oslo II Accord allowed the Palestinians to conduct their internal affairs, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians and open a new era of cooperation and coexistence based on common interest, dignity and mutual respect. At the same time it protected Israel's vital interests, and in particular its security interests, both with regard to exsecurity and the personal security of its citizens in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Negotiations on the final disposition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were due to begin no later than May 1996. During the first stage of the Accord, Palestinians were expected to gain full control of the municipal areas and to have administrative control over an estimated 460 villages.
The 400-pages of the Interim Autonomy Agreement contain three undertakings from the PLO
to Israel:
1. A commitment to annul the Palestinian Covenant (i.e. Palestinian Charter) clauses calling for the destruction of Israel;
2. A commitment to put a stop to hostile propaganda; and
3. A commitment to wage war against terrorism.
To the main body of the Agreement are appended six annexes dealing with security arrangements, elections, civil affairs (transfer of powers), legal matters, economic relations, and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. The permanent status negotiations are expected to deal with the remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations, cooperation with neighboring countries, etc.
Since May 1994, the day-to-day administration of public affairs in the Palestinian Self-Rule Territories is in the hands of the 29-member Palestinian Authority (PA) headed by President Yasser Arafat. PLO Chairman Arafat delayed his return to Gaza for almost two months as he sought funding for self-rule before he finally returned on 1 July 1994.
The PA Ministerial Council structure is composed of 20 ministries (executive departments) which deal with specific areas of national and international affairs, while the others are members without portfolio ( Annex 2 ). A number of those PA Ministries have been transferred from Israel and thus have operational capacity while the rest are new ministries at the very early stages of institution building struggling to establish themselves.
The PA Ministerial Council takes the form of a cabinet. President Arafat convenes it irregularly to discuss major political issues and at times to seek opinions and advice from each member on any subject in his area of responsibility. Though the purpose of such meetings would be to secure advice, announce policy, and coordinate the works of the various PA Ministries, priority in the Ministerial Council meetings is given to the peace process itself and the peace negotiations.
On 20 January 1996 elections for the Palestinian National Legislative Council took place in accordance to the Taba Agreement (Oslo 2). The electorate in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank voted at the same time for both the President of the Council and for 88 Legislative Council members, making a total of 89 Council members. The mandate of the Council is for only 3 years, while the mandate for the President is 5 years.
A statement published by the PA Ministry of Information asserted that, "As an inevitable result, these elections signal the starting point of exercising the right of self-determination by all segments of the Palestinian society". In its introduction, the Election Law states that the aim of the elections is "to assert the unity of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from those territories and to establish a democratic parliamentary system based on free expression, the freedom to organize, the acceptance of minority to decisions of majority, the respect of majority to minority views, human rights, social justice and equality among all citizens." Article (3), paragraph (2) of the Election Law specifies that the first mission entrusted to the Council will be to formulate a constitution as the Law of the Land for the transitional period; the second would be to exercise its mandate as a legislative body within its proposed jurisdiction (paragraph 4).
On 21-23 June 1996 the twenty fourth Arab Summit was held in Cairo. The Arab
leaders pledged strong support for the Palestinian cause. The Summit's final statement
endorsed the peace process and announced the Arab's commitment of the implementation of
the Oslo Accords. It declared official support for establishing an independent Palestinian
state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
On 3-4 October 1996, the Washington Summit was held to revive the peace process. It was attended by U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Benjain Netanyahu, Jordan's King Hussein, and PA Chairman Yasser Arafat. At the end of the meeting, the leaders asserted their commitment to the pursuit of peace in the Middle East and vowed to do their best to end violence in the region.
The preceding discussion has focused on the separate threads of the complex
Palestinian-Israeli relationships, which now need to be pulled together so as to
understand their impact on Palestinian life and politics.
Who is a Palestinian ?
The word "Palestine" was applied by the Greeks to the Philistine
coastland on the Mediterranean Sea. The Romans used the term "Palestina" to
refer to the biblical land of the Philistines. The Byzantines used the term
"Palestina Prima" to refer to the same territories. However, for centuries the
name fell into disuse until it was officially revived by the British when the territories
between the Mediterranean Sea and the River Jordan came under the British Mandate in 1922.
The term Palestinians applied to all inhabitants living east of the Jordan River whether
Moslems, Christians, or Jews. When the British mandate was terminated on 14 May 1948 and
the State of Israel was established on 15 May 1948, the official name of Palestine was
dropped, and furthermore the term Palestinians began to refer only to Moslems and
Christians living in the territories occupied by the State of Israel, the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. The Political Dictionary of the State of Israel defines
Palestinians as "Arabs who resided in the territory of mandatory Palestine until the
end of the British mandate in 1948."(6)
Gains of Citizenship
There is no common code of citizenship in the Palestinian Territories. Laws and usages
governing the acquisition and renunciation of Palestinian citizenship are not clear. The
Palestinian citizenship question concerns the status of the following groups:
a. The present refugees inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel agreed in the DoP to defer the subject of refugees until the final status negotiations. The DoP stipulates that the issue of displaced persons will be settled within the framework of a quadrilateral committee comprised of Jordan, the Palestinians, Egypt, and Israel.
b. The present non-refugees inhabitants of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem; in the Palestinian Territories, national citizenship is conferred directly upon all persons born and residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although returning expatriate Palestinians are subject to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, they are considered in a special category and the Oslo Agreement delayed dealing with their status.
c. Palestinians residing outside the Palestinian Territories; Israel and the PLO agreed
that a final agreement on the fate of the Palestinian refugees and on the arrangements
pertaining to the return of the displaced persons will be postponed till the final status
negotiations. Article 8 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty stipulates that the parties will
seek to resolve the problem of refugees and displaced persons:
.. through the implementation of agreed United Nations programs and other agreed international economic programs concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement and their rehabilitation.
Palestinians living abroad are not yet considered part of thesovereign people of the Palestinian Territories and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the Palestinian Authority. Jordan declared on a number of occasions that it will give its citizens of Palestinian origins the choice of determining their own future. In a televised speech delivered on 18 September 1993, King Hussein of Jordan affirmed:
As for our brethren here, they are in their country and among their brothers and kinfolk. They have the same rights as we have and they have the same duties and responsibilities as we have until any of them decides on a different course or a new situation. Our position is crystal clear. Whoever opts to leave us and go to his original motherland, he is free to do so; whoever opts to stay here and to have all his rights, he is most welcome, and will stay with us as part and parcel of one nation;(7)
d. Palestinians residing within pre-1967 Israel (the Arab-Israelis).
To exercise the right of residency in the Palestinian Territories, vote in national elections or hold public office, a person must be a Palestinian citizen. To become a Palestinian citizen, a person must meet certain qualifications. To become a citizen, one must file a petition with the Ministry of Interior of the Palestinian Authority. To be allowed to do so, his father must be an Arab Palestinian living in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip and holding an Israeli identification card.
Like most continental European countries and all Arab countries, Palestinian citizenship is governed by the principle of jus sanguine ( Law of Blood/Right of the Blood) - by reason of blood, which gives children the citizenship of their parents. By the Roman civil law of jus sanguine, a native citizenship is acquired through the blood relationship between parent and child.(8) Citizenship is conferred on all persons born in the Palestinian Territories to Palestinian Arab parents who carry Israeli identification cards-- condition imposed by the Oslo Agreement. For example, children born outside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Palestinian citizens are citizens of the Palestinian Authority from birth. A baby is also a Palestinian citizen if he was born abroad of a father holding a Palestinian citizenship provided that he resides in the Palestinian Territories and holds an Israeli identification card. If a baby is born in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, territories under the sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority, he is a Palestinian citizen only if his parents are citizens. Under certain conditions, children born to Palestinian citizens while they are traveling or living outside the Palestinian Territories are also citizens.
Palestinian citizenship is also conferred to the Returnees (Al-A'eden)-- PLO
persons returning to WB/GS and who receive prior approval to return from both PA President
Yasser Arafat and the Israeli authorities.
The rule of jus sanguine is not applied to children born outside the Palestinian Territories. Such children do not automatically have Palestinian citizenship unless the father If only the mother is a Palestinian citizen, the child is not recognized as a Palestinian citizen even if the mother meets the residence qualifications. Married Palestinian women are assigned the citizenship of the husband, a practice in most Arab countries. Palestinian women marrying aliens lose their citizenship, and foreign female acquires Palestinian citizenship automatically upon marrying a Palestinian citizen, unless citizenship is declined before marriage, and she remains a Palestinian citizen unless she voluntarily repudiates Palestinian citizenship. Non-Governmental Organizations seeking equal rights for women were not successful in removing the dependent citizenship status of Palestinian women.(9)
Palestinian citizenship is not conferred on the principle of jus soli
(Law of the Soil / Right of the Soil)-- by reason of place of birth, which is closely
identified with the English legal traditions and followed by Latin American countries.
Under this rule, citizenship is derived primarily from the country where one is born, even
if different from the national allegiance of the parents, i.e. a person automatically
becomes a citizen by being born in the country, regardless of his race, color, creed,
ancestry or the fact that his parents may themselves be aliens.(10) All children born in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not become citizens if their parents are aliens. A
Palestinian born in a foreign country may not become a Palestinian citizen even through
the process of naturalization.
Except under very special cases, Palestinian citizenship may not be acquired by
naturalization, a process of acquiring citizenship by legal means rather than
by blood.
Loss of Citizenship
Citizenship is not an immutable right as it may be revoked. Certain actions may be
deemed to constitute forfeiture of citizenship-- for example, treason or swearing
allegiance to another country. Citizenship may also be voluntarily yielded.
A Palestinian does not have to remain a Palestinian citizen. He may renounce his citizenship simply by declaring that he no longer wishes to be a citizen. Palestinians born in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have the right to keep their citizenship unless it is voluntarily relinquished. Becoming a naturalized citizen of another nation and swearing allegiance to it does not result in relinquishment of Palestinian citizenship.
A great many non-citizens live in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip enjoy the same
freedom of movement, residency and action accorded to Palestinian citizens. They may not
vote; and citizenship is a requirement for applicants who wish to obtain licenses to
practice law or medicine. Persons born in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but not subject
to the jurisdiction thereof of the Palestinian Authority are children of foreign diplomats
and children born of Israelis.
Dual Citizenship
The Palestinian Authority permits its citizens to retain Palestinian citizenship
when they are naturalized in other countries. Palestinian citizen are allowed to hold dual
and multiple nationalities. Dual nationality may occur when a Palestinian citizen has
immigrated abroad and acquired the citizenship of a foreign country either through
marriage or naturalization or when his child is born in a jus soli
country.
A dual citizenship for a Palestinian gives him the advantage of being able to claim the
protection of the other country while abroad, since he can not claim the protection of the
Palestinian Authority. However, dual citizenship may carry with it the disadvantage of
double taxation. Furthermore, dual nationality becomes a problem for a Palestinian holding
an Israeli or a Jordanian citizenship. The rationale is that both countries (Israel and
Jordan) consider that holding a Palestinian citizenship subject the holder to sets of
rights and duties which conflict with their own. For example, the individual's duty to
perform military service, or take an oath of allegiance or to serve in the armed forces.
Palestinian Passports
A prima facie evidence of Palestinian nationality is provided by the
Palestinian Passport, a 48-pages "travel document" valid for 3 years which
allows the bearer to travel to all countries. The Palestinian Authority issues such a
passport to identify its citizens and to attest to their nationality. The passport is
issued pursuant to the Palestinian Self-Government Agreement according to Oslo Agreement
signed in Washington on 13 September 1993.
Passports are issued to citizens who wish to carry an identification document or who
wish to travel abroad. As long as it is valid, it will enable its bearer on return from
abroad to enter the area of the Palestinian Authority. However, the Palestinian passport
does not entitle the bearer to the protecof Palestinian diplomatic and consular
representatives, as such missions ought not to exist at this stage according to the Oslo
Agreement.
The passport requests "all those whom it might concern" i.e. foreign
governments, to allow the bearer of this "travel document" to pass freely
"without let or hindrance" within their jurisdiction and to afford him (her)
such lawful assistance and protection as may be necessary. Diplomatic passports are issued
to senior high officials of the Palestinian Authority to identify their official status
and insure their receipt of appropriate official privileges.
Palestinian citizens are required to obtain a passport before traveling abroad to all
nations--no countries are excluded. Nevertheless, the PA could deny passports to its
citizens for travel to certain "off limits" (i.e. politically undesirable)
countries. The Palestinian Authority has the power to issue or deny passports. Such power
is not limited. A citizen's request for a passport may be denied by the PA or by the
Israeli Authorities because of the individual's political beliefs or associations.
IV. Rights and Obligations of
Citizens
The Constitution
At present there is an absence of a written Palestinian Constitution (Basic Law)
that outlines in legal terms the basic principles and laws of the Palestinian political
entity, determines the powers and duties of the PA and guarantees certain rights to
Palestinian people living in the Palestinian Territories. The absence of a written
constitution that would furnish an outline for the government, however, ought not preclude
building of a democratic Palestinian society and the development of a legal system that
would protect the rights of the Palestinian citizens, ensure the development of civil
rights and religious freedom and protect the rights of the minorities.
The presence of a Palestinian Constitution (Basic Law) would definitely make a
statement of differences between legislative, judicial and administrative powers and which
would prevent one branch of government (executive) to encroach upon the powers, functions,
and duties vested in the other two branches of government (legislative and judiciary). As
the first mission of the Palestinian Legislative Council is to formulate a Constitution as
the Law of the Land, PA President Yasser Arafat had appointed a high legal commission to
draft a Basic Law which will serve as an interim constitution and the PLC has approved the
draft of the basic law.
This situation raises particular concerns voiced by many Palestinian citizens and
non-governmental organizations, over the constitutionality and wisdom of legislative and
judicial powers being vested in the executive branch. The absence of other branches of
government that have the right to check up on what kinds of decisions the executive branch
have made on national and international issues complicates the matter further.
Rights of Citizens
The Palestinian Authority treats citizens in general as free and equal individuals,
capable of determining their own best interests. Most Palestinians, however, as result of
long years of occupation, do not yet recognize that freedom and dignity inherent in
citizenship could only function under a democratic government and that the only way in
which such a government could function properly and effectively is for all its citizens to
exercise their rights and duties responsibly.
Reinhard Bendix in his classic Nation-Building and Citizenship (1964) maintains
that "a core element of nation-building is the codification of the rights and duties
of all adults who are classified as citizens".(11) The rights and duties of
Palestinians as citizens are yet to be classified. A threefold typology of rights are
formulated in the study of T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (1964)
as follows:
- Civil rights such as "Liberty of person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice;
- Political rights such as franchise and the right of access to public office;
- Social rights ranging from "the right to a modicum of
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and
to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the
society."(12)
Reinhard Bendix identifies four sets of public institutions which corresponds to these
three types of rights:
1. The courts, for the safeguarding of civil rights;
2. The local and national representative bodies as avenues of access to participation in public decision-making and legislation;
3. The social services, to ensure some minimum of protection against poverty, sickness, and other misfortunes; and
4. The schools, to make it possible for all members of the community to receive at least the basic elements of an education." (13)
Jay Sigler in American Right Policies (1975), comments on the rights of American
citizens:
No one can say with finality just which rights Americans do possess.
The Constitution and several important amendments to that document provide the best
guide, but ambiguity shrouds the significance of almost every important phrase.
(14)
Palestinians do not yet have a Constitution that would guarantee their rights and civil liberties. Consequently, many rights and privileges of citizenship are by no means clear.
In fact no one can definitely tell what are the privileges, rights, and immunities of
citizens of the Palestinian Authority. No one can say so far with finality just which
rights Palestinian citizens do possess, and there exists no official document to provide a
guide.
Palestinian citizens do enjoy the right to vote in elections for public officials; the right to be a candidate for public office; the right to sue and be sued in Palestinian courts; the right of protection by his government at home, however, he does not enjoy the right to protection of the Palestinian Authority while traveling abroad as the Palestinian Authority according to the Oslo Agreement has no right to have embassies in foreign countries even though the PLO maintains its embassies and diplomatic representatives abroad. Palestinian citizens can refuse to participate in ways the PA may consider desirable and can renounce their citizenship if they object to participate on the terms dictated by the PA.
Palestinian citizens do not enjoy rights and privileges similar to citizens of other nations. Palestinians do not enjoy the right of freedom to move from place to place in the Palestinian Territories, a matter strictly limited by the Israeli Government. Palestinians living in the West Bank do not enjoy the right to move among the cities freely or to go to the Gaza Strip without being issued Israeli permits. Palestinians caught in Israel without permits are handed over to the PA, supposedly to be imprisoned, and their penalty by the Israeli authorities is not to issue them ever a permit to enter Israel. Israelis employing Palestinians who do not have permits face severe punitive measures and an Israeli caught transporting Palestinians in Israel without permits would be penalized by having his car impounded and transferred to government ownership.(15)
Palestinians are not allowed to use by-pass roads built in the West Bank on confiscated Palestinian land to connect Jewish settlements with each other which are very wide and well-maintained compared to old roads. Furthermore, Palestinians living in West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not enjoy the right to reside in, or even to visit Jerusalem freely and pray in its holy places. Palestinians residing in the Gaza Strip need Israeli permission to cross Israel into the West Bank and need another Israeli permit to reside, even temporarily, in the West Bank. Both permits are extremely difficult to obtain.
Arab Palestinians inhabitants of Jerusalem face a different type of violation to their
national rights - the Israeli policof revoking their residency right in Jerusalem. For
quite some time, the Israeli Ministry of Interior has been confiscating the Israeli
identity cards from Palestinian Jerusalemites for a variety of reasons: if they live
outside the city's municipal boundaries, or if they travel abroad for long periods of
time, or if they marry West Bank and Gaza Strip residents, if they are associated with the
PA or if they participated in the Palestinian elections of 20 January 1996. Israel
authorities have confirmed that the Residency Law in Israel has not been amended. However,
"any Arab resident from East Jerusalem who has left Israel, and spent seven years or
more living outside the country, will automatically lose both his identity cards and right
of residence in Israel".(16) In addition to losing his residency rights in the city,
a Palestinian inhabitant of Jerusalem who has his Israeli "blue identity card"
taken away stands to lose along with it a whole package of other privileges such as
Permanent residency in Israel which means, traveling freely in Israeli territories, health
insurance retirement pension, social security, and municipal voting rights. The aim of
this policy as a statement issued by the Palestinian Ministry of Information charged back
in July 1996 is "to vacate the city of Jerusalem of its Arab inhabitants in order to
fully control the city's historical and cultural features."(17)
The right of Palestinian citizens to journey beyond the borders of the Palestinian
Territories is limited by the Palestinian Authority and neighboring countries, namely,
Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. The Palestinian Authority enjoys limited power to
restrict where Palestinian citizens can travel as they may hold other nationalities.
Furthermore, even when a Palestinian holds a valid Palestinian, or Jordanian or foreign
passport, she/he may be denied exit to Jordan or Egypt by the Israeli authorities, or may
be denied entry to Jordan or Egypt by the Jordanian or Egyptian authorities for a variety
of reasons. A Palestinian traveling from Egypt to Gaza or from Jordan to the West Bank has
to be checked by the Israeli security and Israeli customs before arriving to the PA
checkpoint.
In accordance to international law, the PA protects its nationals whether they are citizens or not. Accordingly, the basic rights of life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness are extended to non-citizens who enjoy the freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of religious worship. Moreover, they possess equal protection of the laws, but do not participate in elections nor hold public office. They also share burdens of citizenship,such as paying tax and conformity to law. To become President or Vice-President or a member of the National legislative Council one need not be a natural-born citizen. Employers may hire non-citizens, and they are not required by law to hire only citizens
Under international law, an individual may claim protection only through the government
of his state. Since no Palestinian state exists so far, a Palestinian citizen lacks
protection, may be arbitrarily expelled, and may be deprived of the right to travel, since
not all countries recognize the Palestinian passport ( Annex 3).
Obligations of Citizens
A democratic government requires institutional mechanisms, established procedures and
organizations as well as good legislation to translate the public will into public policy.
Creating a Palestinian political system is a Sisyphean task, given the Palestinian
territories crumbling infrastructure, high unemployment (63 percent in Gaza), lack of
revenues and violent underground political opposition. Crippled by economic crisis, and
locked in tough negotiations with Israel which places high priorities on its security
needs, the PA can hardly spare the energy to tackle this crucial problem. Nevertheless,
this task is being performed and a viable political system structure is being created.
In doing so, the Palestine Authority (PA) is starting from scratch. Thus the bureaucratic argument "the reason we should do it this way is that we have always done it this way and it has worked" will not hold ground in this particular case. The aim is not to reform an existing political system but to create a new one. It is the same task that faced the newly-established State of Israel back in 1948.(18)
Policy is normally made by the legislature in the form of laws and is carried out by the executive branch. In this conception, administration is executed, that is, carrying out the laws passed by the legislature, and a clear distinction exists between legislative and administrative powers. In the Palestinian context, since there is no clear distinction between legislative and administrative powers the legislative and executive branches are a mixed entity and not two completely separate entities. Complicating the matter further, is the absence of a judiciary branch that stands apart from administration, restraining senior civil servants from unconstitutional, illegal, and arbitrary acts.
In the Palestinian scheme of government, all law-making, law-implementing and law-interpreting entities are in the executive branch, and "administration" is all contained within that branch. No other branches that exist so far are responsible for maintaining a close watch on what goes on in the administrative sector. This is very crucial, particularly with the growing structure of the Palestinian authority and the expansion of its sovereignty to all Palestinian Territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Legal Obligations
The historical experience of domination and occupation has left strong residues on the
Palestinian society which are hard to erase. There is a strong urge for national
independence and individual liberties which sees any attempt to enforce laws and
regulations with doubt and suspicion and views it as a return to subjugation and
suffocation.
The rule of law (l'état de droit), equality before the law, legal certainty and effective law enforcement are pillars of a democratic society and enable citizens to mobilize, organize and manage themselves for their advancement and for the common good. Moreover, a fair consistent legal structure enables a society to function effectively. Facilitating the movement of products and services, attending to the public good, and protecting individual rights and freedoms, is always a difficult balancing act for any government. Much of this is supported through a sound legal structure.
Ever since the PA took power in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank there has been a legal and judicial vacuum and a rudimentary legal framework exist so far to protect citizens. An estimated 1,500 Israeli military orders which had the force of law regulated all aspects of Palestinian life in the WB\GS under the Israeli occupation (1967-1994). These orders amended existing Jordanian laws in the West Bank and Egyptian laws in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli Military Area Commander was endowed with all legislative, executive and judicial powers in the Palestinian Territories. (19)
One of the main problems of citizenship in the Palestinian Territories is the absence of a secure legal system that would solve the problem of social organization and lead to the development of rights and liberties.
The first responsibility of a citizen is to "obey the law". He may not like a certain legal obligation, but until it is changed a citizen's duty is to obey it. Most Palestinian are law-abiding citizens. Palestinian citizens do not recognize the various laws as burdensome and most of them do not feel the direct coercive effect of the laws. Yet, of the laws affecting the entire population are the tax laws. Palestinian under the Palestinian Authority find it hard to accept the inevitability of taxes. The homeowner does not feel that when he pays his property taxes he is helping to build schools or highways or parks, or pay the salaries of public servants such as officials, policemen, teachers, to make life decent.
Normally in many countries an essential legal obligation of the is military service.
The Oslo Agreement however, does not stipulate the presence of a regular professional army
making the drafting of young, adult Palestinians for compulsory military service
unnecessary.
Civil Obligations
One particular obligation of citizenship is for the citizen to be reasonably informed on
important public issues, particularly those who have had the advantages of higher
education since this group tends to move into leadership roles and help shape public
opinion. The sources of information for Palestinian citizen are many: newspapers,
television, radio, and news magazines. News or information not published in Palestinian
newspapers are often published in Israeli newspapers.
Palestinian newspapers devote much space to news about the Peace Process, the Palestinian Authority, local political events and pending policy issues. Some local newspapers give only one side of an issue and attempts to dig more deeply into a particular issue, governmental activity through other available sources of reliable information, for example the international media. Two of the more general sources of information about the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian politics are Al-Quds daily newspaper (Palestinian/Arabic language) and The Jerusalem Post (Israeli /English language). Together they constitute indispensable up-to-date sources of information about important Palestinian-Israeli public issues and provide reliable information about the activities about the activities and policy-concerns of both the Israeli and Palestinian Governments. They publish, among other things, special features on political issues, prepared for the benefit of the general public. Al-Quds is privately owned and it prides itself on its objectivity.
One important PA publication dealing with presidential official public appointments is Al-Waqa'a al-Phalestinia (Palestinian Actualities), published irregularly by the PA Ministry of Justice, providing basic data about senior official appointments.
The information which the Palestinian Authority gathers is decentralized--they are held in the files of the various agencies. Palestinian citizen has limited access to information the Palestinian Authority holds, and he can not appeal to the courts if public institutions and agencies refuse to open their records.
In reality, the tragedy in the Palestinian democracy is that there are few sources of
reliable information about public affairs, and this tragedy is exasperated by the fact
that Palestinian use only a fraction of the limited sources available to them.
Political Obligations
As a legacy of occupation, Palestinian citizens have come to profess a strong
belief in such traditional liberal values as personal freedom and political equality and a
weak belief in religious tolerance. However, one can say that a general interest in
democracy among Palestinians "is growing".(20)
In democracies, the most commonly shared functions of political parties are: a) to propagate the party's ideas and programs; b) to mobilize voters behind candidates for public office; and c) to organize the policy-making machinery of their governments.(21) Indeed, those are not the dominant concerns of the Palestinian political parties. Their sole concern is to exist in a one-party system. They survive on handovers from the dominant party - FATAH. As a result, many Palestinians take a dim view of partisan politics and are lukewarm to political parties. Engrained tradition is the belief that parties are enemies of legitimate government and democracy. Neither parties nor interest groups do play a significant role in Palestinian political or social life. Pressure groups have failed so far to mobilize minorities for special privilege, and similarly, Palestinian political parties do not have the potential to mobilize a majority of the voting population. Parties are viewed critically because they are not viewed to be working to win mass support nor would they permit mass participation in important party decisions. Their sole aim is seen to gain control and not to serve the people. Palestinian political parties are run by a few people and are run from the top down. Palestinians feel that parties are in the hands of persons who are in politics only for selfish gain. The choices which political parties provided for the electorate in the elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council held on 20 January 1996 failed to win the majority, or even a minority, to their platforms. Consequently, major Palestinian political parties are disappearing while minor parties continue to exist.
One of the elementary duties of citizenship is voting in national elections. Voting is
not compulsory in the Palestinian Territories. In fact, it was for the first time in
recent history that Palestinian citizens were called on 20 January 1996 to vote for the
National Legislative Council and the PA President.(22) One sadly observes that most
candidates running for membership in the Palestinian Legislative Council held 20 January
1996 were poorly informed about government affairs; while most voters participating in
those elections were ignorant of the vast variety of political platforms and agendas of
the candidates. Is pessimism in order?
The Palestinian Authority so far has shown indifference to the way its citizens develop
their political beliefs, and future citizens are not instructed about the fundamental
values and beliefs of their political system. Palestinian formal civic education has
failed miserably in teaching its citizens which legitimate alternatives they can pursue in
Palestinian political life or how to proceed in achieving political goals.
Interestingly enough, as a result of long years of occupation, this generation of
Palestinian citizens had not been extensively instructed in civic activities. Their
political actions which focused on resisting the Israeli occupier have ranged from the
most passive individual responses to the highly active mass activities. The most profound
and costly experience the Palestinians had as a people was the Palestinian resistance and
the intifada. Here, ordinary citizens chose to engage in illegitimate,
violent and dramatic politics. They opted for this choice because they lacked alternative
options. Some Palestinians chose to take radical measures even against their own political
leaders assassinating a good number of them such as Zafer Masri, Abdel Wahab Kayyali,
Salah Khalaf, Hayel Abdel Hamid, Said Hamameh, Majed Abu-Shararah, among others. The
recent decades have been violent and the peace process is hoped to usher more peaceful
years.
Moral Obligations
Palestinian citizens do practice, to some extent, free discussion and they
insist upon expanding the limits of debate. They do criticize openly public officials who
are corrupt. They respect the laws and institutions. They participate as time and ability
permit, in the common life of the local, regional and international communities of which
they feel are a part. In public and in private life, most Palestinians tend to act in
accordance with principles of human brotherhood without regard to race, color or creed.
Palestinians feel that they do fulfill their obligations as citizens-- to each other
and to their heritage. Moreover, they do feel that they have made their supreme
contribution to the establishment of a state in Palestine.
V. Citizen Participation
In comparison to the citizens of ancient Athens who could hold public office and
play an active role in formulating laws and policies, Palestinian citizens may hold public
office but do not play an active, meaningful and effective role in formulating laws and
policies. Participation in the formulation and execution of public life in Palestine
means, ipso facto, involvement in politics; it is a political act when the
President appoints a Minister, Deputy Minister, General Director or any other public
senior official. When the Palestinian security forces in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank
take strong action against political groupings or individuals opposed to the peace
process, they are angrily denby some groups and praised by others and each side mobilized
their political strength in the confrontation. This example can be multiplied many times
over, everyday's news of Palestinian events may supply new illustrations.
The concept of citizen participation in decision-making is not written into legislation nor is it incorporated in the PA public programs. Consequently, Palestinian public policy-making is not open to citizen influence. Those citizens who try to influence policy-makers find that they exert only a limited, though at times, significant influence.(23) Members of the Palestinian Legislative Council attempt to accommodate citizen's demands, and to listen to a variety of interests before making decisions, but citizen's input is not reflected in the system's output.
There is a growing insulation of public decision-making process from citizens, and despite the existence of channels for direct citizen participation, the individual citizen's influence in decision-making is very limited. This trend came to a peak in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. Palestinian citizens found himself unable to change or influence policies and decisions that reflected accommodations painfully worked out over the months between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Israel and the United States Government. Palestinian citizens felt powerless to influence the thrust of the peace process and had no impact whatsoever on the content of the various agreements reached between the PLO and Israel.
Ordinary citizens unaffiliated with political parties or interest groups have no
influence on any public body that makes policy decisions affecting them. Effective citizen
influence on public policy making continues to drift away from individual Palestinian
citizens. Representative institutions at the local level (municipalities, mayors, village
councils) are loosing power to non-elected bureaucracies. Conventional channels of
citizen's influence (public opinion, elections, political parties and interest groups)
tend to be dominated by government institutions and officials. These channels of citizen
influence is seen to be more capable in communicating citizen's social and economic
concerns to the Palestinian Authority than they are in transmitting concerns related to
important political issues such as the peace negotiations.
VI. Conclusion
The Palestinian political system is working to establish clear communications
between the elite who govern and the people who are governed. The Palestinian Authority as
a governing body is trying to communicate its expectations to the people to influence
their behavior. At the same time, the Palestinian people are trying to communicate their
needs and desires to the Palestinian Authority. Meanwhile, a constant tension exists
between maintaining order and expanding liberty that is present at the founding of any new
state. On balance, though, the short history of the Palestinian self-rule experience has
been one of cautious liberties.
If democracy is going to work in the Palestinian Territories, the Palestinian Authority must continue to be responsive to the needs of the Palestinian citizens on all levels - political, economic and social. Nevertheless, many seriously express doubts as to whether democratic developments are necessarily desirable at this stage of the Palestinian history.
Crippled by economic crisis and locked in tough negotiations with Israel, the Palestinian Authority has serious weaknesses that need to be addressed if it is to survive. Among the important problems to be solved are the absence of a Basic Law, the constitutional powers of the PA, the Ministerial Council, and the Legislative Council, the absence of strong judicial institutions as well as the lack of policies and national strategies for economic and political stability.
In conclusion, the message this paper intends to deliver might seem a contradictory one. On the one hand, it indicates that the newly-born Palestinian political system is moving slowly towards democratization. This trend seems to grow stronger with each passing year. On the other hand, the political system ought to become more accountable to the people. So the final message is one of guarded optimism: the Palestinian political system can be made more democratic and more accountable to the Palestinian citizens. The hope for the future is that for a national dialogue and national unity to be emphasized throughout the WB/GS to overcome geographic and political divisions.
Here, one ought to remain optimistic and keep in mind the saying "Rome was not
built in a day." It is also inspiring for Palestinians to remember in these hard
times the words of the British novelist Charlotte Bronte written back in 1849: "This
is a terrible hour, but it is often the darkest point which precedes the rise of
day".
(1) Edward C. Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1955), p.63. For a valuable discussion of the development and different conceptions of citizenship see Mark H. Roelofs, The Tension of Citizenship (New York: Rinehart, 1957).
(2) Mark Hagopian, Regimes, Movements, and Ideologies (New York: Longman, 1978), p.39.
(3) Ibid
(4) Thomas M. Magstadt and Peter M. Schotten, Understanding Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p.40.
(5) Aristotle, The Politics, translated and edited by Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 101.
(6) Susan Hattis Rolef, Editor of Political Dictionary of the State of Israel (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Publishing House, 1993), p. 241; see also The Middle East, Fifth Edition, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1981),p.33; The Occupied Palestinian Territories (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1993). The Palestinian Territories include the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as the Arab Sector of Jerusalem which is not subject yet to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority.pp. 9-13.
(7) The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, 26 October 1994 ( Amman: Jordan Media Group, Publication No. 8, November 1994), p. 17.
(8) Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, Third Edition Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 1982), p. 277.
(9) For a discussion of how current and future Palestinian political and community leaders are working to improve the legal status of women, see Adrien Katherine King, "Custom, Religion and Rights, The Future Legal Status of Palestinian Women", 35, Harvard Journal of International Law,149, (1994).
(10) Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary, Fifth edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.51.
(11) Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York: John Wiley and Sons,1964), p.74.
(12) T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Garden City, New York:Doubleday, 1964), p. 71
(13) Op. Cit., Bendix, p.75.
(14) Jay A. Sigler, American Rights Policies (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1975), p.1.
(15) Israel closure of the Gaza and the West Bank is causing losses of more than $6 million per day, according to the PA. The number of Palestinians working in Israel fell to an average of 30,000 in 1995 from 120,000 in 1993. Rising unemployment and falling tax revenues are expected to add $100 million to the PA's projected 1996 budget deficit of $183 million, according to the World Bank.
(16) Deputy Israeli Interior Minister, Saleh Tarif, interview with Al-Quds newspaper, quoted in The Jerusalem Times, 26 April 1996, p.2.
(17) Salwa Kanaana, "Jerusalemites Losing Ids", Palestine Report, Vol.2, No.5, 12 July 1996, p.6.
(18) For detailed discussion of the Palestinian State issue see: Marc Heller, A Palestinian State? The Implications for Israel (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1983); M.A. Heller and S. Nusseibah, No Trumpets, No Drums: A Two State Solution of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991); George Abed, The Economic Viability of a Palestinian State (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1990).
(19) Here it is important to note that in comparison to other countries, the law in the Palestinian Territories does not reflect citizens' values, character, behavior, and attitudes but rather the values and moral sensibilities of the countries that controlled those areas in recent history: the Ottomans (1516-1918); the British (1922-1948); the Jordanians (West Bank /1950-1967); the Egyptians (Gaza Strip /1948-1967) and the Israelis (1967-1994).
For a valuable general orientation to the legal environment in the WBGS under the Israeli occupation and the impact of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on the Palestinian Legal System, see: Raja Shehadeh, The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994).
(20) William B. Quandt, "The Palestinian Future: The Urge for Democracy", Foreign Affairs (July/August 1994), p.2.
(21) Murray Stedman, editor Modernizing American Government: The Demands of Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentie Hall, 1968), p.108.
(22) The Palestinian Statistical Bureau quoted 1.2 million eligible voters, including Jerusalem, out of a West Bank population of 2.5 million, as Palestinian registered in 1996 polling stations located throughout the Palestinian Territories for the elections of the PA President and the Palestinian Council. The initial register of voters issued on 10 December 1995 showed that the number of registered voters were 1,014,899 Palestinians distributed as follows: 674,964 voters in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and 340,835 voters in the Gaza Strip. Under the Oslo 2 Agreement, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was required to submit a copy of the electoral register for Israeli review and approval.
(23) Two such examples of citizen's influence is the decision of the PA to rescind its
earlier rule obliging Palestinian women to have their husband's prior approval before they
are allowed to be issued a passport. Pressures from women interest groups also succeeded
in allowing Palestinian women to keep their maiden names on the passport (should they so
desire) instead of exclusively having their husband's family name.
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