Coverage
of the Middle East Crisis
in
the Opinion Pages of
The Washington Post
October
6, 2000 – July 6, 2001
A
Palestine Media Watch Report
www.pmwatch.org
I.
Introduction
This report details the findings of an analysis conducted by Palestine
Media Watch examining how the Middle East crisis has been covered in the
opinion pages of The Washington Post
between October 6, 2000 and May 18, 2001.
Our aim in preparing this report is
to raise The Post's awareness of its
own editorial and op-ed coverage of the Middle East crisis. Our aim is not to characterize or label The
Post, but to examine its product and the quality and variety of what it is
offering its readership.
Questions or comments about this report may be
directed to PMWatchDC@mediamonitors.org
Questions or comments to The Washington Post may be directed to letters@washpost.com
II.
About Palestine Media Watch
Palestine Media Watch (http://www.pmwatch.org) is a grassroots media watch group that monitors the American media's coverage of the Middle East. To fulfill its mission of closely monitoring news and editorial coverage by major US media outlets and pushing for a more balanced and informed portrayal of the Middle East conflict, Palestine Media Watch has officers across the United States, in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, and boasts an active and growing membership of over four hundred people.
Palestine Media Watch’s Advisory Board consists of:
§
Dr.
Hanan Ashrawi, Member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Secretary
General of Miftah (Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue
and Democracy) in Jerusalem. Former
Spokeswoman for the Palestinian Delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference.
§
Prof.
Noam Chomsky, Professor of linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
§
Prof.
Norman G. Finkelstein, Political Science Professor, Hunter College, City
University of New York
§
Prof.
Edward S. Herman, Professor Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania
§
Prof.
Tanya Reinhart, Professor, Tel Aviv University
§
Dr. Salman Abu Sitta,
Palestinian refugee expert and author.
Former member of the Palestine National Council.
§
Dr. Mustapha Barghouti,
President of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees.
III.
Editorial Board
Members
of The Washington Post’s editorial
board are:
§
Mr.
Fred Hiatt – Editorial page editor
§
Mr.
Colbert I. King – Editorial page deputy editor
§
Mr. Jackson Diehl –
Editorial page deputy editor
IV.
Definitions
Three key terms will be used throughout this report to classify
editorials and columns: “pro-Israeli,” “pro-Palestinian,” and “balanced.” This section spells out how these terms are
defined.
By and large, it has been remarkably easy to qualify any given column as belonging in one of the three
categories. Pro-Israeli columns are
readily identifiable, since they reflect a well-defined worldview from which
similar columns rarely deviate:
§
Palestinians
are primarily to blame for the violence;
§
Israel
has offered major concessions;
§
Palestinians
should have accepted Israel's Camp David concessions; and
§
Palestinian
refugees should have no right of return.
Beyond that, pro-Israeli columns are striking in their
omission of extremely critical issues such as U.N. resolutions pertaining to
the occupation and the findings of human rights organizations.
Pro-Palestinian columns tend to stress the basic realities that
pro-Israeli columns ignore; they mainly highlight the illegal nature of Israeli
actions (e.g., settlements) and policies (e.g., political assassinations),
relying heavily on internationally-recognized agreements and standards.
Balanced columns usually avoid faulting either side; but when faulting,
both sides are taken to task. Balanced
columns tend to stress the morally obvious, the legally sound, and some very
basic, factual realities.
Below are the stands taken by the three points of view on some key
issues. (Note that the key issues vary
from one category to another).
Pro-Israeli:
§
Arafat…
- Is
responsible for the violence and can stop it at will.
- Is using
the violence to pressure Israel.
§
Israel…
- Is using
reasonable, not excessive, force.
- Is under
great danger and must defend itself.
- Should not
cede more land to the Palestinians.
§
Peace process…
- Is a
failure. It is dead.
- Has shown
that Palestinians are not serious about long-term peace.
- Has been
a ruse used by Palestinians.
§
Barak…
- Has been
very flexible, even too flexible.
- Has been courageous.
- Should
rethink his strategy.
- Has been
politically immature.
§
United States…
- Should
always side, unconditionally, with Israel.
§
Intifada…
- Was not
spontaneous.
- Is being
orchestrated by Arafat.
§
Sharon’s visit to the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount:
- Was an
opportunity the Palestinians were waiting for.
§
Palestinians’ right of return…
- Spells
the extinction of Israel.
- Is being
used by Arabs to destroy Israel.
- Is not
Israel’s problem. Arab states should
take in the refugees.
§
Jerusalem…
- Is the
indivisible capital of Israel.
- Is not
the most important Muslim city.
- Is being
used by Palestinians to stall final negotiations.
§
Subtext:
-
Conflation of the
Palestinian people and their leadership.
-
Reduction of the
entire Palestinian leadership to a few individuals – often only one: Arafat.
-
No expression of
sorrow over the deaths of Palestinian children – only Israelis.
-
Rare mention of Arab
citizens of Israel.
-
Rare mention of
Israeli extremists.
-
No mention of human
rights reports’ findings.
-
No mention of U.N.
resolutions relevant to the occupation.
-
No explanation of why
the U.S. must stand unconditionally with Israel.
-
No explanation of the
potential underlying reasons for the Intifada from the Palestinian point of
view.
Pro-Palestinian:
§
Right of return…
-
Is a legitimate right
of all refugees supported by the U.N. and international community.
-
Should be recognized
as a right, and is distinct from its
actual implementation.
§
Settlements…
- Are
illegal facts on the ground that exist in contravention of international law.
- Should be
evacuated by Israel.
- Continue
to be constructed and funded by the Israeli government.
§
Peace process…
- Negotiations
should continue, using U.N. SCR 242 as their basis.
- Negotiations have collapsed because of Israeli
intransigence on key issues such as Jerusalem and refugees.
- Is
hindered by the U.S., which is not the “honest broker” many claim it to be.
- Fell
through at Camp David because Barak did not offer far-reaching concessions.
§
Sharon’s visit to the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount…
- Was an
intentional, premeditated provocation.
§
Palestinian suffering…
- Is due to Israel’s 35-year military occupation of the West Bank,
Gaza, and East Jerusalem.
- Is
exacerbated by curfews, closures, and other movement-limiting policies.
§
Israel’s response to the Intifada…
- Has been
disproportionate.
- Warrants
an independent inquiry into the violence, preferably international monitors.
- Will only
strengthen Palestinian resistance.
§
International law…
- Deems
Israeli assassination of Palestinian political figures illegal.
-
Deems Israeli
settlements illegal.
-
U.N. Resolution 242
should be the basis for peace negotiations.
§
Jerusalem…
- Should be
an open city.
- Al-Aqsa
is important for Muslims.
- Should
not be used to transform a political conflict into a religious war.
Balanced:
§
Intifada…
- Was
spontaneous, but has been used by the PA for political advantage.
§
Violence…
- Cannot be
condoned from either side.
- Will not
lead to victory for either side.
- Causing
the death of anyone – Palestinian or Israeli – is condemnable.
§
Settlements…
-
Are illegal, and
construction should be halted.
-
Were built as facts on
the ground to compromise full Palestinian sovereignty.
§
Israel’s response to the Intifada…
-
Has been excessive.
-
Violence only fuels
more violence.
§
Peace process…
-
Offered Palestinians a
homeland crisscrossed by Israeli settlements and Jewish-only bypass roads.
-
Has failed due to
Israel’s failure to implement many of its Oslo obligations.
-
Has failed due to the
PA’s failure to implement many of its Oslo obligations.
-
Negotiations should
resume.
V. Detailed Analysis of Middle East
Editorials published in
The Washington
Post between October 6, 2000 and July 6, 2001
A. Introduction
The Washington Post published eighteen (18) editorials on the Middle East crisis between October 6, 2000 and July 6, 2001:
|
Date |
Editorial Title |
Type |
|
|
|
|
|
October 7, 2000 |
“The Clashes Continue” |
Pro-Isr |
|
October 11, 2000 |
“No Peace, No Process” |
Pro-Isr |
|
October 14, 2000 |
“Peace Partners” |
Pro-Isr |
|
October 18, 2000 |
“Cease Fire?” |
Balanced |
|
October 20, 2000 |
“Mr. Arafat’s Silence” |
Pro-Isr |
|
October 24, 2000 |
“Timeout From Peace” |
Pro-Isr |
|
December 2, 2000 |
“New Elections in Israel” |
Pro-Isr |
|
December 10, 2000 |
“Mr. Barak’s Gambit” |
Pro-Isr |
|
December 11, 2000 |
“Shortchanging Democracy In Israel” |
Pro-Isr |
|
December 23, 2000 |
“Middle East Replay” |
Pro-Isr |
|
December 31, 2000 |
“Mr. Arafat’s Waffle |
Pro-Isr |
|
January 7, 2001 |
“Israeli-Palestinian Endgame” |
Pro-Isr |
|
February 5, 2001 |
“Awaiting an Israeli Leader” |
Pro-Isr |
|
February 7, 2001 |
“Mr. Barak’s Defeat” |
Pro-Isr |
|
February 18, 2001 |
“Mideast Powder Keg” |
Pro-Isr |
|
April 19, 2001 |
“Mideast Escalation” |
Balanced |
|
May 22, 2001 |
“Heeding the Mitchell Report” |
Balanced |
|
June 15, 2001 |
“The Arab-Israeli Cease Fire” |
Balanced |
This
report examines in detail the content of these editorials.
B. Analysis
In
fourteen (14) of the eighteen (18) editorials published over the seven month
period examined by this report, the writer adopts the standard pro-Israeli
perspective on the Mideast conflict, reiterating the Israeli perspective of how
events occurred, the Israeli notion of who was to blame, and the Israeli
position on how to best resolve the conflict.
The
following is a detailed breakdown of exactly how WP editorials represented the
Mideast conflict.
"Now it is being driven
chiefly by Yasser Arafat's failure to stop it" (10/7).
"...he inflexibly
rejected a deal at Camp David" (10/7).
"And the violence
serves as a crude reminder of the havoc Mr. Arafat can wreak in the absence of
an agreement" (10/7).
"...we are seeing a
tactical use of violence by a leader who has always retained for himself the
option of playing that card" (10/7).
"It is less clear than
ever that Yasser Arafat is a partner with whom Israel can reach an
understanding" (10/11).
"Mr. Arafat's walking
away from a deal at Camp David, his stoking of the recent violence and his
persistent refusal to call that violence off force Israel to begin contemplating
alternative futures, no matter how dismaying" (10/11).
"Mr. Arafat's failure
to protect Joseph's Tomb" (10/11).
"The Clinton
administration has been reluctant to acknowledge that one side is sabotaging
the process" (10/11).
"Since Israel and the Palestinian
movement began moving toward peace in 1993, Mr. Arafat has never made a
concerted effort to prepare his people for the compromises peace would require;
he has never spoken about peace as a goal or an aspiration, rather as a
grudging concession to be traded for land and independence" (10/20).
"Mr. Arafat's original
unwillingness to stand up for peace..."
(10/20)
"Mr. Arafat does not
want peace -- at least not a peace that falls short of his maximalist
demands" (10/20).
"...he remains an unchallenged
leader and a hero in the Arab world" (10/20).
"...their
[Palestinians'] chief victimizer would be their leader" (10/20).
"...it was Mr. Arafat's
own moves that forced Mr. Barak's hand [to declare a timeout from the peace
process]" (10/24).
"Palestinian leader
Yasser Arafat had not prepared Palestinian public opinion for the compromises
necessary to bring about a final status deal" (12/23).
"Mr. Arafat made no
compromises" (12/23).
"Mr. Arafat's
unwillingness to advocate publicly the principle of compromise raises doubts
about whether he accepts it himself"
(12/23).
"Once again, Yasser
Arafat is hesitating. Before him,
virtually for the taking, is an independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip
and 95 percent of the West Bank, with East Jerusalem as its capital, with
sovereignty over the surface of the Temple Mount and with the right of refugees
to return to Palestinian-controlled territory" (12/31).
“Yasser Arafat had the
chance to make both long-term and interim deals with Mr. Barak, but he rejected
both, preferring the irrational gamble that violence and rejectionism would
gain him a better deal.” (2/18)
NOTES:
§
Not
a single mention is made of Israel's own failure to implement its side of
signed agreements, or its refusal to honor U.N. resolutions pertaining to the
occupation.
§
All
the editorials blaming Arafat miss the opportunity to probe his marginalization
and the weakness of his grip on the crumbling situation from the point of view
of an increasing number of Palestinians.
§
Israel’s
military response to the Intifada is justified in several instances, with the
argument being that Arafat actually “forced” Barak to come down with brutal
force on the Palestinians, and “force[d] Israel to begin contemplating
alternative futures, no matter how dismaying.”
§
Broad,
sweeping statements are made of Arafat’s “unwillingness,” his “inflexibility,”
his “maximalist demands,” and his many “failures” with no attempt at all to
clarify what the Palestinian demands actually are. Readers are expected to take the writer’s word that these demands
are unreasonable.
2. Arafat
Amasses Worldwide Support by Encouraging Violence
"He has used the deadly
riots to improve his international position, which has eroded since he
inflexibly rejected a deal at Camp David" (10/7).
"...we are seeing a
tactical use of violence by a leader who has always retained for himself the
option of playing that card" (10/7).
"...in Europe, the
Palestinians garner new sympathy" (10/7).
"Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Barak was said yesterday to be meeting with advisors to consider a plan to
contain violence by essentially quarantining much of the Palestinian
population...This would be a dreadful outcome, impoverishing many
Palestinians. Most of the world all the
more would see the Palestinians as the victims..." (10/20)
NOTES:
§
The
last statement makes two glaring omissions: (1) the fact that collective
punishment is illegal under the Geneva Convention; and (2) the fact that
closure practices (a form of collective punishment) are routinely imposed by
Israel on Palestinian-controlled cities and villages, and have been imposed
numerous times since the start of this latest round of violence.
§
No
mention is made that international support for the Palestinians is due to Israel’s
rejection of international laws that apply to all other states.
"…Israel's reasonable
negotiating position…" (10/7).
"We have supported the
Palestinian-Israeli peace process since its inception...But implicit in our
support has been the assumption, or at least the hope, that Israel had someone
to negotiate with” (10/11).
"[Clinton
administration's] chances of persuading the Palestinians to tamp down the
violence…"
(10/11).
"The
[peace] process has withstood violence before: Hamas bombings, massive riots
following the opening of an archaeological tunnel in Jerusalem's Old City
during the Likud government that preceded Mr. Barak's, the assassination of
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin" (10/11).
"[The
Palestinians] will not renounce violence or negotiate in good faith" (10/11).
"Serious
Palestinian violations in the past few days gravely undermine their claim to
trustworthiness" (10/14).
"No
wonder Israelis are asking whether there is anyone on the other side they can
trust" (10/14).
"The
principal obstacle to peace, of course, resides in the Palestinian
leadership" (12/10).
"...[Barak’s]
courageous efforts to make peace..." (12/11).
“...strenuous peace efforts of Mr. Barak...assure him a deserved
victory" (12/11).
"But
if Mr. Arafat chooses not to make peace with Mr. Barak..." (12/11).
"The
rhetoric from the Palestinian side has not merely failed to acknowledge that
painful compromises are necessary, it has hardened notably in the weeks since
the violence broke out" (12/23).
“…the
peace process so persistently pursued by the Clinton administration – and so
courageously embraced by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak…” (1/7)
“To a
great extent he [Barak] sketched out the contours of a deal that could have
ended the conflict, had the Palestinian leadership been willing to do
business.” (2/7)
“Mr.
Barak may simply have revealed that the Palestinian vision of peace is one that
doesn’t accommodate Israel’s existence as a Jewish state.” (2/7)
“…against
the backdrop of continued violence and in the virtual absence of Palestinian
concessions.” (2/7)
“By
focusing on Mr. Sharon’s past, the Palestinian leaders attempt to blur the real
issue: that they were unwilling to do business with even Mr. Barak’s most
accommodating of Israeli governments.” (2/18)
NOTES:
§
Note the congratulatory tone consistently used to
describe Barak’s “courageous” concessions.
§
Note the accusatory tone toward Palestinians,
particularly the statement that the “principle obstacle to peace, of course,
lies with the Palestinian leadership.”
The idea is perpetuated that Palestinians are being made “generous”
offers, but that they are a stubborn lot who reject anything that comes their
way. No attempt is ever made to clarify
exactly what it is they want.
§
One editorial states that some of the obstacles in the
peace process have been “Hamas bombings” and “massive riots” by the
Palestinians, in addition to Rabin’s assassination. The false impression is given that the gravest obstacle to peace
from the Israeli side has been the assassination of a prime minister, rather
than the continuing illegal occupation of Palestinian land and ongoing land
expropriation and settlement practices on Palestinian territories.
§
The reference to “persuading the Palestinians to tamp
down the violence" fails to also call on Israel to tone down what the U.N.
and human rights organizations have labeled a brutal, exaggerated response to
the Intifada.
§
Absolutely no mention is made of Israeli violations of
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 194, despite their obvious relevance
to the current crisis and the issues that sparked the Intifada – namely, the
ongoing Israeli occupation and the plight of millions of Palestinian refugees
who were uprooted from their homes during the establishment of the Israeli
state.
§
No mention is made of the fact that West Bank and Gaza
settlements have increased 50 percent since the signing of the Oslo Accords, a
blatant Israeli violation of that agreement that is consistently overlooked in
favor of pointing to Palestinian violations only.
§
No mention is made that even the most “generous” of
Barak’s proposals have offered to relocate no more than 20 percent of the
existing settlements in the West Bank.
§
Once
again, there is no attempt to clarify exactly what the Palestinians are being
offered and to explain why they may be rejecting Barak’s supposed “generosity.”
Readers are expected to take the writer’s word that these concessions are
indeed “generous” and that Palestinians’ rejection of them is unreasonable and
the cause of all the peace process’s failures.
4. Toning Down Sharon’s History
"...he [Barak] will run
against a less popular figure, most likely the hard-line leader of the Likud
party, Ariel Sharon. Mr. Sharon, the architect of Israel's disastrous invasion
of Lebanon, is a hard sell to many Israelis" (12/10).
"...has been
responsible during his career for some of Israeli history's greatest
errors" (12/10).
"Ariel
Sharon -- Mr. Barak's right-wing opponent in the coming election..." (12/31).
“Ariel
Sharon, an architect of every hardline policy Israel has pursued against the
Palestinians in the last 30 years…” (1/7)
NOTES:
§
There is a clear attempt on the part of the writers to
avoid speaking in specifics of Sharon’s blood-stained record in the Middle
East, his reputation even among Israelis, and the U.N. references to him as a
genocidal war criminal. There is
scarcely a mention of the death toll incurred by his invasion of Beirut and his
command of a massacre of Palestinian refugees in the camps of Sabra and
Shatilla.
§
There is no attempt to even touch on the subject of why
Sharon’s election to the Israeli premiership would be disastrous to the peace
process. Given all the ink spent on
scolding Arafat, this would not have been an irrelevant issue to address.
"...just
as Palestinian police failed to protect the Israeli soldiers who were murdered
in Ramallah on Thursday, they did not stop a mob from setting the synagogue [in
Jericho] aflame in response to the Israeli rocket attacks that followed the
Ramallah killings" (10/14).
"...there
is no talk of the Palestinian concessions that would be needed to reach a deal,
especially those dealing with the right of refugees who fled Israel during the
1948 war to return..." (12/23)
"...the
right would obliterate Israel as a Jewish state" (12/23).
“…his
[Arafat’s] continued insistence on a ‘right of return’ to Israel by 4 million
Palestinian refugees – a condition that…will never be part of a negotiated
peace settlement” (1/7).
NOTES:
§
The first statement has absolutely no factual
basis. There is no stable ground on
which to claim that the Palestinian police stood by and allowed the Israelis to
be killed and the synagogue to be destroyed.
§
The second and third statements are in agreement, word
for word, with the standard Israeli argument for denying the right of return to
Palestinians only because they are not Jewish.
The editorials are also in consensus with the pro-Israeli notion that
allowing refugees their internationally-recognized right to repatriation would
be tantamount to demographic suicide for Israel. Once again, there is no attempt to present the Palestinian
perspective on this.
§
The second statement also pushes the Israeli version of
history: that the Palestinian exodus of 1948 was a self-imposed one, not at all
related to Israel’s militant occupation and exile activities. The notion that Israel was not at all
responsible for the Palestinian refugee situation has been strongly contested
by countless Israeli historians.
§
The last statement contains a glaring error: the total
number of Palestinian refugees all over the world is 4 million. The WP makes the mistaken assumption that
all of these refugees originate from territories now considered part of Israel,
and all are seeking return to their original homes within Israel.
§
The editorials never offer an alternative to
repatriating the Palestinian refugees; they simply declare that they should not
be allowed to return.
6. Palestinians Should
Accept Israel’s Terms for Peace
"Whatever
points such a strategy scores Mr. Arafat in Europe aren't worth the price he'll
pay with those who will have to give him the land on which to build his state" (10/7).
"The
deal [Oslo] rested on two premises: first, that Israel would be prepared to
relinquish its control over Palestinian land and lives...The deep compromises
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered at the Camp David summit proved the
first assumption correct" (10/11).
"In the wake of his election
announcement, Mr. Barak proposed an interim deal that would allow the
Palestinians to declare a state. The
Palestinians quickly rejected any such arrangement, but Palestinian independence
remains on the table. It won't stay
there long if Mr. Arafat lacks the courage to compromise..." (12/2)
"If
Mr. Arafat does not reach an understanding with Mr. Barak before Israelis go to
the polls, the dream of an independent Palestine could be put off for years" (12/3).
"Now
talks are again underway, amid reports of new Israel's flexibility on land and
Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount" (12/23).
"Barak's
government is contemplating compromises that would have been unthinkable a year
ago" (12/23).
"Moreover,
the deal will not get better for Palestinians with time. The more Jewish settlements in the occupied
territories grow, the less flexible Israel will be with the land...At some
point, the Palestinian position will have to accept the best deal it can get
and sell that deal to its people" (12/31).
"...remarkable
compromise on the part of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak" (12/31).
NOTES:
§
All the editorials – whether implicitly or explicitly –
maintain that any land concessions made to the Palestinians will be a
“donation” of sorts made out of Israel’s goodwill and generosity. The fact is completely ignored that these
land “concessions” are actually illegally-occupied territories to which Israel
has no claim whatsoever under international law. U.N. Resolution 242, which is curiously missing from the
editorials’ discussion of land concessions, demands that every single Israeli
settlement in the Gaza and West Bank be dismantled, and 100 percent of the land
be returned to Palestinian control, not 90 or 95 percent.
§
The impression given by the editorials is that the only
way for the Palestinians to prove they are a “partner to peace” with the
Israelis is to capitulate to Israel’s ultimatums.
Additionally, in one particular editorial, the writer
referred to negotiations between Israel and “the
Palestinian movement” when it was clear s/he was referring to the
Palestinian people: “Since Israel and the Palestinian movement
began moving toward peace in 1993…” (10/20). This terminology is derogatory to the Palestinians, whose
identity is reduced to a mere “movement,” while the Israelis are identified
with a nation, Israel.
8. Mentions of Key Points
The
following tables summarize the number of times some key points and issues were
raised in the editorials:
|
Description |
Number of mentions |
|
|
|
|
U.N. Resolutions mentioned |
0 |
|
Human rights reports’ findings mentioned |
0 |
|
Palestinian failure to honor agreements mentioned |
2 |
|
Israeli failure to honor agreements mentioned |
0 |
|
Arafat blamed |
7 |
|
Barak blamed |
0 |
|
Arafat praised |
0 |
|
Barak praised |
4 |
|
Palestinian death toll is an order of magnitude larger than the Israeli toll mentioned |
0 |
|
Specific incident of Palestinian death mentioned |
0 |
|
Specific incident of Israeli death mentioned |
1 |
|
Softened image of Sharon presented |
3 |
|
Sharon criticized |
1 |
|
Sharon’s human rights record mentioned |
0 |
Noteworthy
is the total absence of any mention of the various U.N. Resolutions condemning
Israel’s use of military force against civilian populations. Equally noteworthy is the total absence of
any mention of reports issued by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
Peace Now, B’tselem, and others that fault Israeli forces for using excessive
military force on civilians, condemn the killing of children and violence
against journalists, decry the economic blockade by Israel on the Palestinians,
and strongly challenge the official Israeli line that was unequivocally adopted
by the WP’s editorial writers.
C. Conclusions
Fourteen
(14) of the eighteen (18) editorials published in The Washington Post between October 6, 2000 and July 6, 2001,
strongly reflect the official pro-Israeli position on the Mideast crisis. In what they mention, how they mention it,
and what they fail to mention, the editorials remain faithful to the official
pro-Israeli position and present very little that is original on what the root
causes of the crisis are, why the violence has persisted, and what may be done
to bring the conflict to an end.
In
a significant majority of the editorials, the tone that is consistently adopted
is an accusatory one against the Palestinians, promoting an image of
Palestinian leadership that rejects every “generous” offer thrown its way. This claim is never once supported by any
objective evidence. There is also never
an attempt to present the Palestinian perspective, to provide some sort of
explanation for why Israel’s offers have been so objectionable to date. In contrast, there is an active attempt to
overlook Israel’s role in helping to thwart the peace process (the most obvious
of which is its ongoing illegal settlement activities, which have accelerated
since Oslo).
The
WP’s editorials also completely ignore a wealth of facts, readily available,
from the U.N., independent journalists, and dozens of respected human rights
groups who have published detailed reactions to the crisis considering its
various social, political, economic, and humanitarian dimensions.
VI. Analysis of Middle East Op-Eds
published in
The Washington
Post between October 6, 2000 and July 6, 2001
A. Introduction
This
report provides a breakdown of opinion columns on the Middle East crisis
published in The Washington Post
between October 6, 2000 and July 6, 2001.
B. Column Analysis
During the period that is the focus of this report, The Post published fifty-nine (59) opinion articles, the first of which was published on October 9, 2000. In the table below, pro-Israeli articles are identified as “pro-Isr,” pro-Palestinian articles as “pro-Pal,” and balanced articles as such. These terms are used according to definitions appearing earlier in this report.
1. Detailed Breakdown of Columns by
Type
|
Date |
Title |
Type |
WP columnist |
Guest columnist |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Barak
Era |
|||||||
|
October 9, 2000 |
“Avoiding a War” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 9, 2000 |
“Opting For Violence” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 10, 2000 |
“Joseph’s Tomb” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 10, 2000 |
“Don’t Fear Saddam” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 11, 2000 |
“Who Leads To Peace?” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 11, 2000 |
“A Feast of Retreats” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 11, 2000 |
“Talk To Me, Mr. Barak” |
Pro-Pal |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 12, 2000 |
“Afraid of the Truth” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 13, 2000 |
“Camp David: Bad Idea, Bad Result” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 15, 2000 |
“Be Honest About Evil” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 15, 2000 |
“Breaking the Cycle of Violence” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 17, 2000 |
“…A New Reality” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 18, 2000 |
“Stronger for Having Sought Peace” |
Pro-Isr
|
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 18, 2000 |
“The Talking Cure” |
Pro-Isr
|
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 19, 2000 |
“Talking Peace With Thugs” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 20, 2000 |
“Arafat’s Strategy” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 20, 2000 |
“In the Middle East, Neither Side is Innocent” |
Balanced |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 21, 2000 |
“No Partners for Peace” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 23, 2000 |
“Might Vs. Right” |
Pro-Pal |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 25, 2000 |
“Phony Truce” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 27, 2000 |
“Realities of War” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
October 27, 2000 |
“Israel’s Restraint” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
October 29, 2000 |
“Peace Begins at Home” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
November 7, 2000 |
“The Two Israels” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
November 8, 2000 |
“What We Want” |
Pro-Pal |
|
Ö |
|||
|
November 26, 2000 |
“For Israel, Land or Peace” |
Pro-Pal |
|
Ö |
|||
|
December 3, 2000 |
“Into the Next Mideast Whirlwind” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
December 4, 2000 |
“The Peace Paradox” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
December 13, 2000 |
“Peace With a Tall Fence” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
December 21, 2000 |
“God’s Property” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
December 24, 2000 |
“Racing the Clock on a Mideast Accord” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
December 28, 2000 |
“Or Forever Hold Your Peace” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
January 4, 2001 |
“Say Goodbye and Good Luck” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
|
January 9, 2001 |
“Clinton’s Last Try” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|||
January 12, 2001
|
“Middle East Madness”
|
Pro-Isr
|
Ö
|
|
|||
|
February 3, 2001 |
“Arafat’s Mess” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|||
|
Sharon
Era |
|
||||||
|
February 7, 2001 |
“Poolside Diplomacy” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|
||
|
February 7, 2001 |
“Back to Familiar Territory” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
February 8, 2001 |
“Israel’s Answer to Arafat” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
February 9, 2001 |
“…Sharon the Enforcer” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
February 9, 2001 |
“Meet Barak’s Legacy…” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
February 23, 2001 |
“Israel’s Phony ‘National Unity’” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
March 5, 2001 |
“A Return to Cold War” |
Balanced |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
March 10, 2001 |
“Israel’s Wrong Turn” |
Pro-Pal |
|
Ö |
|
||
|
March 13, 2001 |
“The Ugly Arab Press” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
April 19, 2001 |
“The Undoing of Mideast Diplomacy” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
April 20, 2001 |
“What Happened to the Powell Doctrine?” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
May 3, 2001 |
“Glimmers of Independent Thinking” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|
||
|
May 10, 2001 |
“No Escape, No More to Give” |
Pro-Isr |
|
Ö |
|
||
|
May 15, 2001 |
“Back to the Table” |
Pro-Pal |
|
Ö |
|
||
|
May 18, 2001 |
“Land Without Peace” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
May 24, 2001 |
“No Time to Wait in the Mideast” |
Balanced |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
May 29, 2001 |
“Arafat on His Own” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
June 7, 2001 |
“Fresh Out of Sympathy for Arafat” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
June 9, 2001 |
“Advantage Sharon” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
June 25, 2001 |
“Patience Before Peace” |
Balanced |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
June 30, 2001 |
“West Bank Checkpoint” |
Pro-Pal |
|
Ö |
|
||
|
July 4, 2001 |
“Sharon the Blame-Shifter” |
Pro-Isr |
Ö |
|
|
||
|
July 7, 2001 |
“Time for an Accounting” |
Balanced |
|
Ö |
|
||
|
|
Number of columns (of 59 total) |
Percentage of total |
|
|
|
|
Pro-Israeli |
47 |
79% (was 84%) |
|
Pro-Palestinian |
7 |
12 % (no change) |
|
Balanced |
5 |
8% (was 4%) |
|
|
Number
of weeks
|
|
|
|
|
Longest gap between
pro-Israeli columns |
5 |
|
Longest gaps between
pro-Palestinian columns |
15 |
4. Op-Ed Authors
Author
|
Published
op-eds,
10/06/00-07/06/01
|
Post
columnist
|
|
|
|
|
|
Charles Krauthammer |
7 |
Ö |
|
Richard Cohen |
7 |
Ö |
|
Jim Hoagland |
7 |
Ö |
|
Stephen Rosenfeld |
5 |
|
|
George Will |
3 |
Ö |
|
E.J. Dionne, Jr. |
2 |
Ö |
|
Gershom Gorenberg |
2 |
|
|
Michael Kelly |
2 |
Ö |
|
Jackson Diehl |
2 |
Ö |
|
Madeline Albright |
1 |
|
|
Jimmy Carter |
1 |
|
|
Saeb Erakat |
1 |
|
|
Fred Hiatt |
1 |
Ö |
|
Hussein Ibish |
1 |
|
|
David Ivry |
1 |
|
|
Henry Kissinger |
1 |
|
|
Daoud Kuttab |
1 |
|
|
Sherri Lederman Mandell |
1 |
|
|
Mary McGrory |
1 |
Ö |
|
Wendy Pearlman |
1 |
|
|
William Raspberry |
1 |
Ö |
|
Peter Rodman |
1 |
|
|
Dennis Ross |
1 |
|
|
Robert Satloff |
1 |
|
|
Dan Schueftan |
1 |
|
|
Nabeel Sha’ath |
1 |
|
|
Nathan Sharansky |
1 |
|
|
Michael Tarazi |
1 |
|
|
Lally Weymouth |
2 |
|
|
Benjamin Wittes |
1 |
|
C. Conclusions
The
February 27, 2001 edition of The Village
Voice reported that in a meeting between Khalil Jahshan, vice president of
the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, and The Washington Post’s editorial board, Mr. Fred Hiatt, editorial
page editor, stated: "I don't
think it's my job to match opposing political views column for column, but I do
think that we should try to have other points of view represented on the
page."
This
report demonstrates that the WP opinion page has fallen short of representing
“other points of view” in the Mideast conflict, opting instead to publish
forty-seven (47) of fifty-nine (59) opinion columns delivered from a distinctly
pro-Israeli voice.
During
the seven-month period beginning October 6, 2000 and ending July 6, 2001, The Washington Post dedicated seven (7)
times as much space in its op-ed pages for pro-Israeli columns than
pro-Palestinian ones. Furthermore,
pro-Israeli columns were given nine (9) times more space than columns that
qualified as “balanced” in their opinions.
While it is admittedly an impossible task to match opposing arguments
column-for-column, The Post is still
a far cry from achieving at least some sort of reasonable balance between
pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian views.
Particularly
in the first two weeks of the latest Mideast conflict – a time which was
critical to the general public in its formulation of opinions on the issues –
there were two op-ed pieces
sympathetic to the Israeli side published each
day for three consecutive days (October 9- 11). Although the Palestinians are obviously participants the
conflict, there was no pro-Palestinian perspective published at all during
these days. On October 11, the WP
published the first pro-Palestinian column to accompany a pro-Israeli one, but
the subsequent two weeks saw nothing but pro-Israeli columns (October
12-13). It was a whole two weeks until
another Palestinian perspective was published; meanwhile, nine (9) pro-Israeli
pieces appeared.
This
report leaves no question that The
Washington Post has not provided its readers with a balanced offering of
opinions on the Middle East conflict.
The few attempts it has made at providing the other side of the story
(or at providing an objective, balanced perspective) have been drowned in the
overwhelming mass of one-sided commentary it has published on the issue. Overall, a narrow point of view has been
consistently presented to readers with minimal efforts to give voice to the
opposite standpoint.
The Washington
Post should
offer its readers as many diverse opinions on the Middle East crisis as it can
spare in its opinion pages. Readers
have the right – and indeed, the expectation – to hear arguments from all
involved parties. In the future, The Washington Post should work to
provide its readers with more exposure to the pro-Palestinian perspective as well
as the objective, balanced point of view.