Coverage of the Middle East Crisis

In The Op-ed Pages of

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer

 

 

10/6/2000 – 04/09/2001

 

 

 
A Palestine Media Watch Report

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Palestine Media Watch

http://www.pmwatch.org/pmw

 

 

 

 

© Copyright April 9, 2001

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Palestine Media Watch is a grass-roots media watch group that monitors the American media's coverage of the Middle East.  Our web site is at: http://www.pmwatch.org. 

 

Palestine Media Watch’s mission is to closely monitor news and editorial coverage by major US media outlets.

 

Palestine Media Watch has officers across the United States, in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, and boasts an active and growing media gadfly membership of more than four hundred people.

 

Our Advisory Board consists of:

 

·         Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, former Spokeswoman for the    Palestinian Delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference. Currently, Secretary General of Miftah, the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, Jerusalem
 
·         Prof. Noam Chomsky, Professor of linguistics, MIT
 
·         Prof. Norman G. Finkelstein, teaches Political Science at Hunter College, City University of New York.
 
·         Prof. Edward S. Herman, Professor Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania
 
·         Prof. Tanya Reinhart, professor at Tel Aviv University.  
 
 

You may contact Palestine Media Watch by sending an email to: pmwatch@zworg.com

 

 

Table of contents

 

Introduction.............................................................................................................................................. 5

1.0     Definitions..................................................................................................................................... 5

Pro-Israeli............................................................................................................................................... 6

Balanced...................................................................................................................................................... 7

Pro-Palestinian...................................................................................................................................... 8

2.0       Letters to the editor........................................................................................................ 9

2.2     Analysis.......................................................................................................................................... 9

2.3     Staff accessibility and responsiveness..................................................................... 10

2.4     Conclusions................................................................................................................................. 10

3.0     Editorials..................................................................................................................................... 11

3.1     Editors and the editorial board.................................................................................... 11

3.2     Analysis........................................................................................................................................ 11

3.2.1     Portraying the victims................................................................................................. 11

3.2.2     Adopting the official Israeli line...................................................................... 12

3.2.3     Mentions................................................................................................................................ 14

3.3 Updates............................................................................................................................................. 15

3.4 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................... 15

4.0     Columns............................................................................................................................................. 16

4.1     The Editors and the editorial board........................................................................... 16

4.2     The columns................................................................................................................................. 16

4.4     Column breakdown...................................................................................................................... 17

4.5     Analysis........................................................................................................................................ 18

4.6     Staff accessibility and responsiveness..................................................................... 18

4.7     Other Issues............................................................................................................................... 19

Pro-Palestinian piece.................................................................................................................................. 19

Pro-Israeli piece......................................................................................................................................... 20

4.8     Conclusions and recommendations.................................................................................... 20

5.0       Tony Auth Cartoons............................................................................................................. 21

5.1     Tony Auth...................................................................................................................................... 21

5.2     The Cartoons............................................................................................................................... 22

October 12, 2000.............................................................................................................................. 22

October 15, 2000.............................................................................................................................. 22

October 26, 2000.............................................................................................................................. 23

December 29, 2000............................................................................................................................ 23

December 31, 2000............................................................................................................................ 24

January 7, 2001................................................................................................................................ 24

February 8, 2001.............................................................................................................................. 25

February 20, 2001............................................................................................................................ 25

5.3     Analysis........................................................................................................................................ 25

6.0     Trudy Rubin Columns............................................................................................................... 26

6.1 Trudy Rubin.................................................................................................................................... 27

6.2 Overall stand................................................................................................................................ 27

6.3 Analysis........................................................................................................................................... 27

The victims......................................................................................................................................... 27

Responsibility for crisis/violence...................................................................................... 30

Ariel Sharon....................................................................................................................................... 33

The crackdown on uprising.......................................................................................................... 33

The Settlements................................................................................................................................ 34

The International community..................................................................................................... 35

Peace Proposals................................................................................................................................ 36

Assassination Policy..................................................................................................................... 37

Non-violence Palestinian movement........................................................................................ 37

6.4 Mentions........................................................................................................................................... 37

UN resolutions/findings.............................................................................................................. 37

Findings and reports by human right organizations.................................................... 37

Palestinian casualties................................................................................................................. 38

That Israel is an occupying force........................................................................................ 38

6.5 Updates............................................................................................................................................. 38

6.6 Summary and conclusions......................................................................................................... 39

7.0 Summary and conclusions....................................................................................................... 40

 

 

 

 

Introduction

 

 

This report details the findings of an analysis conducted by Palestine Media Watch of how the Middle East crisis has been covered by the opinion pages of the Philadelphia Inquirer between October 6, 2000 and April 9, 2001.

 

Our aim in writing this report is to raise the Philadelphia Inquirer’s awareness of its own editorial coverage of the Middle East crisis.  Our aim is not to characterize or label the Inquirer, but to examine its product and the quality and variety of what it is offering its readership.

 

If you wish to contact Palestine Media Watch, please send email to:

 

pmwatch@zworg.com

 

If you wish to contact The Philadelphia Inquirer, please send email to:

 

Inquirer.letters@phillynews.com

 

1.0 Definitions

 

Three key terms will be used throughout this report to qualify editorials, columns, and cartoons: “pro-Israeli,” “pro-Palestinian,” and “balanced.”  This section spells out what we mean by the three terms.

 

By and large, it has been remarkably easy to classify any given column to one of the three categories.  “Pro-Israeli” columns are readily identifiable, since they reflect a well-defined worldview from which “pro-Israeli” columns very rarely deviate: (1) Palestinians are primarily to blame for the violence; (2) Barak has offered major concessions; (3) Palestinians should accept Barak’s concessions; (4) Palestinians have no right of return, etc.  Beyond that, “pro-Israeli” columns are striking in how they neglect mention of important issues, such as the killing of children; the forced expulsion of civilians from their homes; the use of live ammunition against civilians; the strain of Palestinian hospitals; the economic hardship endured by Palestinians, etc.

 

What is remarkable is how very little that is new, informative or original can be found in a  “pro-Israeli” column.  This is the more remarkable since more than 80% of opinion print space has been given to “pro-Israeli” expressions.  That is, the same narrow story has been told, again and again, throughout these thirteen (16) weeks, with little variation on the message, tone, the facts or the nature of the discourse.

 

“Pro-Palestinian” columns tend to stress some basic realities that “pro-Israeli” columns ignore: mainly, they highlight the illegal character of Israeli actions, the reality on the ground, and characterize Israel as the aggressor rather than the victim.

 

“Balanced” columns by and large avoid faulting either side, or when finding fault both sides are taken to task.  “Balanced” columns tend to stress the morally obvious, legally sound arguments, and factually given realities

 

Below are the stands taken by the three camps on some key issues.  Note that the “key issues” vary from one category to the other.

Pro-Israeli

 

Arafat:

·         Responsible for violence and can stop it

·         Is using the violence to pressure Israel

 

Israel:

·         Is not using excessive force

·         Is under great danger

·         Should not cede more land

 

Peace Process:

·         It is a failure.

·         It is dead.

·         It has shown that Palestinians are not serious about long-term peace.

·         It has been a ruse used by Palestinians.

 

Barak:

·         Has been very flexible, even too flexible

·         He has been brave

·         He should now rethink his strategy

·         He has been politically immature

 

The US:

·         Should always side unconditionally with Israel

 

The Intifada:

·         Was not spontaneous

·         Is being orchestrated by Arafat

 

Sharon's visit:

·         Simply an opportunity for which the Palestinians have waited

 

The Palestinians’ “Right of return”:

·         Spells the death of Israel

·         Arabs are using it to destroy Israel

·         Arabs states should take in the refugees

·         Palestinians never cared about their refugees

 

Jerusalem:

·         Should be the undivided capital of Israel

·         Is not that important to Muslims

·         Is being used by Palestinians to stall

 

The subtext

 

·         Conflation of Palestinian people and their leadership

·         Whole Palestinian leadership is reduced to a few men – often to one: Arafat

·         Absence of expression of regret/sorrow over the killing of Palestinian children

·         Rare mention of Israeli Arabs

·         Rare mention of Israeli extremists

·         No mention of human right reports

·         No mention of UN findings/calls – except to express outrage over the couple of US abstentions

·         Extremely rare mention of UN 242

·         Lack of any explanation WHY the US must stand unconditionally with Israel

Balanced

 

Palestinian suffering:

·         Palestinian people have suffered under Israeli occupation

·         Palestinians seek peace with Israelis

·         The uprising was spontaneous although the PA has used it for political advantage

·         Killing of children is a tragedy

 

Violence:

·         Neither side can win with guns

 

UN:

·         Resolution 242 must be the basis of conflict resolution

 

Arafat:

·         Is afraid to let the uprising get out of hand

·         He is afraid of losing power.

·         Is corrupt and has abused his own people

 

Settlements:

·         Israel has built illegal settlements

·         Israel should stop confiscating Palestinian land

·         Settlements were built precisely to compromise full Palestinian sovereignty.

 

Israeli reaction to uprising:

·         Israel has been unduly harsh

·         Violence only fuels more violence

·         Israeli lives are not more precious than Palestinian lives

 

Peace Process:

·         Oslo offered Palestinians land bisected and crisscrossed by roads/settlements

·         Israel has failed to implement many of its Oslo obligations

·         PA has not fulfilled all of its Oslo obligations

·         Both sides should return to negotiations

 

The subtext

 

·         State the morally obvious and the factually given

The subtext [continued]

 

·         Approach the conflict from a humanitarian point of view

·         Approach the conflict rationally

·         Assume that good will and common send will prevail

·         Lack of racist subtext

·         Cite UN resolutions

·         Cite human rights’ reports

Pro-Palestinian

 

Right of return:

·         Palestinians have a legitimate right to return to their homeland

·         Israel should accept responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem

 

Settlements:

·         Israel should evacuate all occupied territories

·         Israel continuously builds settlements in direct violation of Oslo

·         Building of settlements has accelerated under Barak

 

Peace process:

·         Negotiations should continue

·         Negotiations have collapse because of Israeli intransigence

·         The US is not an honest broker; it stands squarely with Israel

·         Barak did not offer “far-reaching” concessions

·         Israel has kept political prisoners in jail in violation of Oslo

 

Sharon/Sharon’s visit:

·         Ariel Sharon’s provocations were intentional

·         Ehud Barak was trying to pressure Arafat when he allowed Sharon’s visit

 

Palestinian suffering:

·         Palestinians are enduring severe economic hardships

·         Palestinians are under military occupation

·         Curfews and movement-limiting actions hurt Palestinians a great deal

·         Palestinians need true sovereignty

 

Israeli crackdown:

·         There is a need for an independent inquiry into the violence

·         Israel has reacted with disproportionate violence

·         Ratio of killings: 10-1

·         The harsh crackdown will only strengthen Palestinian resolve

 

International law/human rights:

·         UN Resolution 242 should be the basis of a peace settlement

·         Israel repeatedly violates international law

·         Frequent mentions of Universal Declaration of Human Rights

·         Israeli sniper assassinations of Palestinian leadership is illegal and immoral

·         Israel repeatedly violates basic human rights’ principles/Geneva convention

·         Frequent mentions of human rights’ reports

 

Jerusalem:

·         Al-Aqsa is important for Muslims

·         Jerusalem should be an open city

·         Barak has pursued a policy of “Judaisation” of Jerusalem

·         The political conflict should not be turned into a religious war

 

 

2.0 Letters to the editor

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer published 64 letters to the editor on the Middle East crisis between October 6, 2000 and April 9, 2001.  This section provides a quantitative analysis of those letters.

 

2.1    The Letters’ Staff

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer’s “Letters” editor is Kevin Ferris. 

 

2.2    Analysis

 

The 64 letters on the Palestinian-Israeli have been classified in this report into one of the following categories: “pro-Israeli”, “pro-Palestinian”, or “balanced”.

 

Each letter’s column length was measured in centimeters to assess approximately the amount of space it occupied. For instance, on October 6, a “pro-Israeli” letter 7.5cm in length was published, while an 8.0 cm “pro-Palestinian” letter was published that same day.  All letters had the same column width.

 

 

Date

Pro-Israeli

Pro-Palestinian

Balanced

Maj.

Oct 6

7.5/8.5/4.5/8.0

8.0/8.5/7.2

-

Isr

Oct 7

10.8

-

-

Isr

Oct 13

5.5/10.5/3.7

9.3/8.0/4.5

14.5/2.8

Pal

Oct 20

24.2

13.2

-

Isr

Oct 25

8.7/8.7

-

-

Isr

Oct 30

-

16.0/5.2

-

Pal

Nov 22

9.0/17.3/10.0

6.0/10.0/2.0

-

Isr

Dec 3

-

-

9.6

Bal

Dec 18

13.1/10.2

-

-

Isr

Dec 23

-

12.8

-

Pal

Jan 5

7.6/9.3/11.7

9.3/5.9/12.3

-

Isr

January 19

8.5

9.2/7.2

3.0

Pal

February 9

6.0/20.2

15.2/1.7/4.2

15.5

Isr

March 12

10.7/8.0

20.5

-

Pal

March 27

13.5/5.2/11.5

12.0/11.7

-

Isr

April 6

9.0/9.0/6.7/5.0/2.5/7.5

13.0

 

Isr

Totals

312.1 (33)

248.4 (26)

45.4 (5)

 

 

51.51%

41.00%

7.49%

 

January 29

53.35%

39.05%

7.60%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1. Quantitative breakdown of letters

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number of times more space given

Pro-Israeli

10

Pro-Palestinian

5

Balanced

1

 

Table 2. Number of times more space given

 

 

Affiliations

 

7 of the 33 “pro-Israeli” letters were published with the writers’ affiliation explicitly stated:

 

·         Oct 6, 2000 – Commission on Israel and International Concerns, Jewish Community Relations Council, Philadelphia

·         Oct 20, 2000 – American Jewish Committee

·         Nov. 22, 2000 – Anti-Defamation League

·         Jan. 5, 2001 – Jewish Community Relations Council

·         February 9, 2001 – Consul General of Israel

·         March 12, 2001 – Anti-Defamation League

·         March 27, 2001 – American Jewish Congress

 

4 of the 26 “pro-Palestinian” letters were published with the writers’ affiliation explicitly stated:

 

·         February 9, 2001 – Palestine Media Watch

·         March 12, 2001 – American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

·         March 27, 2001 – Palestine Media Watch

·         April 6, 2001 - American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

 

We note with satisfaction that the Inquirer has begun to publish pro-Palestinian author affiliations.

 

 

Of the 16 times that letters on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict appeared, more space to the pro-Israeli side was give 10 times.  In 5 instances, more space was given to pro-Palestinian letters.  Only once did the total space given to balanced letters.  

 

2.3    Staff accessibility and responsiveness

 

The letters’ staff continues to be accessible and responsive.  Kevin Ferris has been consistently prompt and professional in his dealings with Palestine Media Watch.

2.4    Conclusions

 

We commend the Inquirer’s letters’ editor and his staff for doing a good job in offering their readers a chance to read letters from both sides of the issue. 

 

We note with satisfaction their inclusion of pro-Palestinian author affiliations.  In our January 29 report, we noted with disappointment that no affiliations of pro-Palestinian authors were published.  The Inquirer has clearly made an effort to rectify this.

 

We express our appreciation for the staff’s continuing accessibility, professionalism, and courtesy.  We also highly appreciate their responsiveness. 

 

We urge the letters staff to continue in their pursuit of parity between the two sides of the issue.

 

3.0 Editorials

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer published 6 editorials about the Middle East crisis since October 3, 2000:

 

October 3, 2000 – “Peace under fire”

October 13, 2000 – “Don’t give in to war”

November 24, 2000 – “Take the chance”

December 12, 2000 – “Turning point in Israel”

January 13, 2001 – “A legacy lost”

February 8, 2001 – “A new Mideast”

 

This section examines in some detail the content of those editorials.

3.1    Editors and the editorial board

 

The editor of the editorial page is Chris Satullo.

 

The members of the Philadelphia Inquirer editorial board, as published in the Philadelphia Inquirer, are:

 

John Timpane – Commentary page editor

Kevin Ferris –    Readers’ editor

Vernon Clark –  Assistant Editorial Page Editor

 

Editorial writers:

 

·         Henry Bryan

·         Russell Cooke

·         Cynthia Henry

·         Douglas Pike

·         Fawn Vrazo

 

3.2    Analysis

 

3.2.1  Portraying the victims

 

Palestinian deaths were mentioned in the editorial without any expression of regret.  The murder of 12-year-old Muhammed Al-Durra, for instance, was mentioned clinically (see 1.b below), with no expressions of outrage or compassion.  By contrast, the murder of the two Israeli soldiers in October 12, 2000, was described as a “brutal murder” (see 2.a).

 

1.  Palestinian victims:

 

·         a.  Oct 3, 2000 – “Dozens of people have been killed, and more than 1000 wounded…”

 

·         b.  Oct 3, 2000 – “TV coverage included live shots of a Palestinian father with his 12-year-old son cowering in the crossfire, which killed the boy and a would-be rescuer, and seriously wounded his father.  While anti-Israeli Palestinians cast him as a martyr, more likely, his death and the other’s will simply help to prolog hostilities that serve no one.”

 

·         c.  Nov. 24, 2000 – “… retaliatory Israeli attacks terrified Gazans and added to Palestinian casualties.”

 

2. Israeli victims:

·         a.  October 13, 2000 – “… yesterday’s brutal Palestinian murder of at least two Israeli reservists…”

 

·         b.  November 24, 2000 – “… an Israeli school bus was bombed in Gaza and another bus blown up in the Israeli town of Hadera.”

NOTES:

 

In 1.b - Note the analytical, cold, indeed clinical description of the 12-year-old’s death (his name is not mentioned).  No expression of regret over the tragic circumstances of his murder.  Contrast to 2.a, where the killing of the soldiers is described as “a brutal murder”.

 

In 1.b - Note the wholesale adoption of “crossfire,” in compliance with official Israeli terminology.

 

In 1.b - Note how at the end of the paragraph in 1.b, where the boy’s death is mentioned, Palestinians are placed in a position of blame!

 

In 2.a – Again, complying with official Israeli terminology, the soldiers are described as “reservists,” notwithstanding the loud protests to the contrary on the Palestinian side.

 

In 1.c - Attacks on Gazans are described as “retaliatory” – again, in compliance with official the Israeli accounts.

 

In 1.c - Contrast to 2.b, where we are told that school buses were attacked, along with the name of a town where one of the buses was bombed.

 

3.2.2  Adopting the official Israeli line

 

The Inquirer rarely expressed any opinions that deviated from the official Israeli line.  On item after item, the Inquirer faithfully echoed the official rendering of the crisis, i.e., who is to blame, and how the conflict should be resolved.

 

a.     Ariel Sharon’s culpability in the 1982 Sabra and Shatilla massacres:

 

Oct. 3, 200 -- “Palestinians despise Mr. Sharon, who notoriously failed to protect Palestinians from being killed in Lebanese refugee camps in 1982.”

 

April 6, 2001 – “Mr. Sharon, a retired general, has a grievous record of brutality toward Arab civilians, culminating in his dismissal as defense minister in 1982 after an Israeli commission found him indirectly responsible for the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian refugees.”

 

 

NOTES:

 

·         An important step forward in mentioning Mr. Sharon’s culpability in the Sabra and Shatilla massacres.

 

b.     The Soldiers killed were merely army reservists:

 

Oct. 13, 2000 – “…yesterday’s brutal Palestinian murder of at least two Israeli reservists….”

 

 

 

NOTES:

·         This editorial was written the day after the killings – i.e., no investigation had been conducted yet to determine whether or not Palestinian claims that the “reservists” were members of an assassination squad were correct.

 

c.     Palestinians should not think that Israel is weak:

 

October 13, 2000 – “Many Palestinians drew false hope from Israeli’s decision this year to withdraw from Southern Lebanon after years of guerilla attacks on their troops.”

 

NOTES:

·         Israel “withdrew,” out of generosity as it were, rather than was defeated and forced to give up occupied land.

 

·         Israel was the victim, enduring “years of guerrilla attacks on their troops,” even though it was an occupying force.

 

d.     The International community has nothing to offer:

 

Oct. 13, 2000 – “Mr. Arafat must be told firmly that the international community will not endorse a unilateral declaration of independence.”

 

November 24, 2000 – “Neither the Europeans nor the United Nations – the current preferred choices of the Palestinians – have much to offer.”

 

December 12, 2000 – “Palestinian demands that responsibility for the bloodshed be assigned wholly to Israel.”

 

NOTES:

·         Palestinians want an impartial investigation, not assignment of blame.

 

·         We were never given anything resembling even a partial explanation why the international community should have no say.

 

e.     Israel is merely retaliating against aggression:

 

Nov. 24, 2000 – “… retaliatory Israeli attacks terrified Gazans and added to Palestinian casualties.”

 

f.     Barak has been generous

 

Oct. 3, 2000 – “… the peace-seeking flexibility that Mr. Barak showed at Camp David.”

 

Oct. 13, 2000 – “Mr. Barak, whose courageous peace proposals at camp David were rebuffed by Mr. Arafat….”

 

January 13, 2001 – “[The] violence of the Palestinian uprising… has soured Israeli voters on the concessions offered by Mr. Barak.”

 

April 6, 2001 – “Such restraint is not unwarranted, since the new intifada and the Palestinian rejection of far-reaching Israeli proposals had frozen the peace process…”

 

g.     The Proposal offered the Palestinians is wonderful

 

January 13, 2001 – “The proposals, much of which Israeli leader Ehud Barak seemed prepared to accept – proposed a Palestinian state on 95% of the West Bank and Gaza…”

 

January 13, 2001 – “[Palestinians] refuse to recognize the magnitude of the Clinton proposals.”

 

h.     Arafat is to blame for the conflict:

 

Oct. 3, 2000 -- “… the peace-talk impasse is primarily due to the rigidity of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat.”

 

Oct. 3, 2000 – “… Arafat should have exerted himself against the growing violence.”

 

Oct. 13, 2000 --- “Mr. Barak, whose courageous peace proposals at Camp David were rebuffed by Mr. Arafat.”

 

Oct. 13, 2000 – “There is plenty of blame to go around.  Much – but not all – lies with Mr. Arafat.”

 

January 13, 2000 – “And Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat is unwilling to confront his emotional public with harsh realities.  This is tragically shortsighted”

 

3.2.3  Mentions

 

The following table summarizes the number of times some key points and issues were raised in the five editorials.

 

Description

Mentions

UN resolutions mentioned

0

Human rights’ report findings mentioned

0

Arafat blamed

6

Barak blamed

0

Barak praised

4

Arafat praised

0

Sharon Praised

0

Sharon Blamed

0

Disproportionally high Palestinian death toll

0

242 and 338

0

 

 

Noteworthy is a total absence of any mention of the various United Nations Resolutions passed by the General Assembly condemning Israel’s use of military force against civilian populations.

 

Equally noteworthy is the total absence of any mention of reports issued by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Peace Now, B’Tselem, and others, squarely place the blame on Israeli forces for using excessive military force on civilians.  These organizations uniformly condemn the killing of children, decry the economic blockade by Israel on the Palestinians, denounce the practice of assassination, condemn Israeli violence against journalists, and strongly challenge the official Israeli line.

 

3.3 Updates

 

The additional editorial since our January 29, changed only two parameters in the mentions table: Arafat was once more blamed while Barak was once more praised.

 

Epitomizing the Inquirer’s deference to the official line from the State Department, in its first, and only so far, Bush administration editorial on the conflict (Feb. 8, 2001), the Inquirer noted with approval President Bush’s reluctance to pursue President Clinton’s hands-on involvement: “Such restraint is not unwarranted,” wrote the Inquirer.

 

This stands in stark contrast to the Inquirer’s opinion on intervention during the Clinton administration.  In its November 24, 2000 editorial (“Take the chance”), for instance, the Inquirer wrote:

 

However slim the chances that another U.S. intervention

would work, the alternative is a cycle of violence that

will lead to war

 

3.4 Conclusions

 

The six editorials written by the Philadelphia Inquirer between October 3, 2000 and April 9, 2001, dutifully reflect the official State Department stand on the Middle crisis, whether under the Clinton or the Bush administrations.

 

A clear indication of deference to the official State Department line is are the editorials’ abstention from urging the United States to pressure Israel. 

 

The editorials were consistently faithful to the official Israeli position in what they mentioned and in what they failed to mention. 

 

I addition, the editorials displayed very little original thinking on what are the root causes of the crisis, why the violence has persisted, and what may be done to bring the conflict to an end.  The proposition that Mr. Barak was generous and far-reaching in his proposal was taken as a given, as was the proposition that the Palestinians are irrationally demanding what they cannot obtain.  This proposition was maintained by the editorial board in their post Barak opinion where again Mr. Barak’s proposals were described as “far-reaching”.

 

Since the outbreak of the conflict in September, 200, the editorials have completely ignored a wealth of facts, readily available, from the United Nations, independent journalists, and dozens of respected human rights groups that have published detailed reports on the crisis, reports that consider its various social, political, economical, and humanitarian dimensions.  Not once were such findings explicitly or implicitly mentioned.

 

4.0 Columns

 

This section provides a breakdown of columns on the Middle East crisis published by the Philadelphia Inquirer between October 6, 2000 and April 9th, 2001.

 

4.1    The Editors and the editorial board

 

The editor of the editorial page is Chris Satullo.

 

The members of the Philadelphia Inquirer editorial board during this period of analysis are:

 

John Timpane -- Commentary page editor

Kevin Ferris --    Readers’ editor

Vernon Clark --  Assistant editorial page editor

 

Editorial writers:

 

·         Henry Bryan

·         Russell Cooke

·         Cynthia Henry

·         Douglas Pike

·         Fawn Vrazo

4.2    The columns

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer published twenty-two (22) columns on the Middle East from Oct. 6, 2000 to February 6, 2001, the first of which was published on October 10, 2000.

 

10/09/00 – “As bad as we imagine” by Helen Schary Motro

10/10/00 – “Peace or Bloodshed in Mideast?” by Daniel Pipes

10/14/00 – “Arafat stoking trouble in push for statehood” by Galina Vromen

10/14/00 – “Barak should show he really wants peace” by Michael Tarazi

10/18/00 – “Passion and peace in the Middle East” by Trudy Rubin

10/18/00 -- "The way a settlement might look” by Mubarak Awad/Abdul Aziz Said

10/25/00 –- “The Children’s crusade” By Trudy Rubin

10/27/00 – “Facing a hard reality” by Trudy Rubin

10/29/00 – “How can there be peace” by Morton A. Klein

10/29/00 – “Facing a hard reality” by Trudy Rubin

11/01/00 – “Spiraling toward a war” by Trudy Rubin

11/03/00 – “Another bombing in Israel” by Trudy Rubin

11/05/00 – “In a Jerusalem market, views are hardened” by Trudy Rubin

11/06/00 – “Dodging bullets” by Lillian Swanson

11/12/00 – “Despair at a new level” by Trudy Rubin

11/17/00 – “Palestinians deserve U.S. support” by Susan Abulhawa

11/26/00 – “Two paths Middle East mustn't taken” by Trudy Rubin

12/03/00 – “Choice for Barak to adopt peace plan” by Gershon Baskin

12/11/00 – “Be My Guest” by Daniel Pipes

12/15/00 – “Arafat hoping a new lineup creates support” by Trudy Rubin

12/29/00 – “Clinton Plan - last chance for Arafat” by Trudy Rubin

01/08/01 – “Stumbling steps toward the end” by Gwynne Dyer

02/03/-1 – “Caught in the Web of love and murder in Mideast” by Helen Schary Motro

02/05/01 – “An Arav grandma’s bequest” by Samah Jabr

02/07/01 – “Fear, anger lifted Sharon” by Trudy Rubin

02/11/01 – FROM THE WORLD’S PAGES - “Yes to peace no to the peace process” – Yossi Ben-Ahron

02/15/01 – “Get out of the way” – Leon Hadar

03/05/01 – “Israel earned its right to exist” – Barbara Amiel

03/06/01 – “Israel is blind to its own legacy” – Ali Abunimah

03/21/01 – “Unlikely pair for peace” – Trudy Rubin

04/03/01 – “Why some strap on bombs” – Mouin Rabbani

 

4.3    The columnists

 

Trudy Rubin

12

Helen Schary Moto

2

Daniel Pipes

2

Ali Abunimah

1

Susan Abulhawa

1

Barbara Amiel

1

Gershon Baskin

1

Gwynne Dyer

1

Leon Hadar

1

Samah Jabr

1

Morton A. Klein

1

Mouin Rabbani

1

Mubarak Awad/Aziz Said

1

Lillian Swanson

1

Michael Tarazi

1

Galina Vromen

1

4.4    Column breakdown

 

Pro-Isr = “Pro-Israeli”

Pro-Pal = “Pro-Palestinian”

 

Date

Type

10/09/2000

Pro-Isr

10/10/2000

Pro-Isr

10/14/2000

Pro-Pal

10/14/2000

Pro-Isr

10/18/2000

Pro-Pal

10/18/2000

Pro-Isr

10/25/2000

Pro-Isr

10/27/2000

Pro-Isr

10/29/2000 (Rubin)

Balanced

10/29/2000 (Klein)

Pro-Isr

11/01/2000

Pro-Isr

11/03/2000

Pro-Isr

11/05/2000

Pro-Isr

11/06/2000

Balanced

11/12/2000

Pro-Isr

11/17/2000

Pro-Pal

11/26/2000

Pro-Isr

12/03/2000

Pro-Isr

12/11/2000

Pro-Isr

12/15/2000

Pro-Isr

12/29/2000

Pro-Isr

01/08/2001

Pro-Isr

02/03/2001

Pro-Isr

02/05/2001

Pro-Pal

02/07/2001

Pro-Isr

02/15/2001

Balanced

03/05/2001

Pro-Isr

03/06/2001

Pro-Pal

03/21/2001

Balanced

04/03/2001

Pro-Pal

Space

 

 

No. of columns

%

Pro-Israeli

20

66.67%

Pro-Palestinian

6

20.00%

Balanced

4

13.33%

Gaps

 

 

Weeks

Longest gap between pro-Israeli columns

5

Longest gap between pro-Palestinian columns

10

 

 

 

 

4.5    Analysis

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer provided more than 3 times more space for “pro-Israeli” columns than it did for “pro-Palestinian” columns.  It published a total of three 6 “pro-Palestinian” columns since October 6, 2000.  During that same period, it has published 20 pro-Israeli columns.

 

It is important to note, however, that since our meeting of January 29th with the Philadelphia Inquirer, a significant shift has occurred in the balance of space provided by the Philadelphia Inquirer.

 

Indeed, a total of 8 opinion pieces were published during the period.  The breakdown is as follows:

 

 

No. of columns

%

Pro-Israeli

3

37.50%

Pro-Palestinian

3

37.50%

Balanced

2

25.00%

 

4.6    Staff accessibility and responsiveness

 

Palestine Media Watch notes with satisfaction a marked improvement in the accessibility and responsiveness of the Philadelphia Inquirer’s columns staff.  Open lines of communication have been established between PMWatch and John Timpane and a healthy working relationship is developing.

 

4.7  Other Issues

 

A point of concern that Palestine Media Watch wishes to bring up regards the criteria with which columns are evaluated to establish whether or not they are worthy of publication.

 

It is the opinion of Palestine Media Watch that the criteria required of pro-Palestinian columns are more stringent than those applied to pro-Israeli columns.  We provide as an illustration of our point two cases where it is obvious that the criterion of factuality was applied more strictly to the pro-Palestinian piece than it was to the pro-Israeli piece.

 

Pro-Palestinian piece

 

Palestine Media Watch submitted an important statement from Hanan Shrawi (“The Unholy Alliance: Labor in a Likud-Led Government, March 1, 2001) released in the aftermath of Ariel Sharon’s election. 

 

In reaction to our submission of the piece, John Timpane, explaining the editorial board’s decision to reject the piece, wrote the following back to PMWatch:

 

my editors objected, pointing out (rightly) that the piece is strident, calls names, is inaccurate (for example, I know of no case so far in which Sharon has pursued war, so the phrase "warmongering present" is simply not factual, unless one is using it in a partisan fashion, in which case the word becomes meaningless, or at the very best, inaccessible to my readers), and very redundant. [March 1, 2001]

 

 

In particular, the board objected to the following passage:

 

Having accepted a "junior partner" role in Sharon's right-wing

government, Labor has abandoned any claims to a "higher moral ground"

and has become complicit in Sharon's blood-drenched past and

warmongering present. [March 1, 2001]

 

First, while we fully understand that the piece may have been rejected for other additional reasons, we are concerned that the board felt that it was beyond the pale for a long-time activist such as Dr. Ashrawi, well known to be a fully partisan promoter of the Palestinian cause, to use strong language against an already highly controversial figure such as Ariel Sharon.

 

As to the factuality of the statement on Ariel Sharon’s  “warmongering present”, it is our belief that it is not at all obvious that one can dismiss it as “simply not factual”.  The following quotes from Ariel Sharon, said only a few days before Dr. Ashrawi’s piece, indicate that it is well within reason to use the phrase “war-mongering present”.

 

 

Barak assigned secondary importance to military operations, giving instead top priority to agreements that could never be implemented. Whoever said that the first item on Israel's national agenda should be peace?

 

We must force the other side to contend with constantly changing situations and, to that end, we must search out unconventional methods.

 

We need to initiate strikes at Hizbullah on Mount Dov, and not just react when they attack. If there are attacks on [Israeli] civilians or soldiers [there should be] strikes on targets deep in Lebanon.

 

From Ariel Sharon’s February 22, 2001 address to The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/feb2001/isra-f24.shtml

 

 

Pro-Israeli piece

 

Only a few days after Dr. Ashrawi’s piece was rejected, a piece by Barbara Amiel was published.  As the quotes below illustrate, the piece was not factual on many key points:

 

within one hour of the crescent going up on the Jewish flag, Israel as a Jewish state would end

 

An Islamic state is not an inclusive state and has no room for full citizenship for practicing Jews.

 

Without Israel, it is hard to see how all Jews in the Diaspora could avoid assimilation.

 

If, this time, Israel is destroyed and the Jews leave, whether through progressive absorption into an Islamic state or bloody warfare, there seems little chance of a Third Temple and a return. [03/05/2001]

 

We submit that claming that an “Islamic state is not an inclusive state” has much less grounding on fact than the statement that Ariel Sharon is a “war-monger”.

 

We hope that in the future, when a piece is considered for publication, whenever doubt arises over the question of factuality, the author be contacted and asked to back their statement.

 

We also hope that the exact same criteria and constraints are applied to both pro-Israeli piece and pro-Palestinian pieces.

 

4.8    Conclusions and recommendations

 

In our first report, we wrote the following:

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer should provide its readers with as many varied opinions on the crisis as it can spare in its opinion pages.  The readership should be given an opportunity to hear all sides of the conflict.  The Inquirer should provide equal access to its pages for "pro-Israeli,” “pro-Palestinian,” and “balanced” opinion pieces.

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer’s opinion staff should be more responsive to queries and suggestions. 

 

The data strongly suggests that the Inquirer is making a good faith effort to rectify the imbalance noted in our first report.  We are satisfied with the encouraging progress.  We hope the Inquirer perseveres in this path.

 

We are also heartened by the openness and accessibility of the staff.  We look forward to maintaining and further nurturing this relationship in our mutual effort to present Inquirer readers with insightful and informative opinion pieces that collectively present both sides of the issue.

 

We are somewhat concerned that the criteria applied by the Inquirer to determine whether an opinion piece is publishable are more stringent when the opinion is pro-Palestinian rather than pro-Israeli.  We hope and trust that the Inquirer will be more even-handed in the future.

 

 

5.0 Tony Auth Cartoons

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer published 8 cartoons on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by Tony Auth.

5.1    Tony Auth

 

The following is a short biographical summary on Tony Auth found at: http://www.ucomics.com/tonyauth/bio.htm

 

 

Tony Auth, born in Akron, Ohio, and raised in Southern California, has been drawing since the age of five.

He graduated from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1965 and worked for six years as chief medical illustrator at Rancho Los Amigos Hospital, a large teaching hospital affiliated with the medical school of The University of Southern California.

In 1967, while still working as a medical illustrator, Auth began doing political cartoons. He first drew a single cartoon each week for Open City, a Los Angeles weekly. After a year, he began creating three drawings weekly for the UCLA Daily Bruin. Those cartoons were used widely in other college newspapers. In 1971, The Philadelphia Inquirer hired him as staff editorial cartoonist, and he is currently a member of its editorial board.

Auth has won several awards, including the Pulitzer Prize for editorial cartooning and the Sigma Delta Chi Award for distinguished service in journalism.

Auth's work appears five times a week in The Philadelphia Inquirer. He and his wife, Eliza, have two children.

 

5.2  The Cartoons

October 12, 2000

 

October 15, 2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

October 26, 2000

 

December 29, 2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

December 31, 2000

January 7, 2001

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

February 8, 2001

 

 

 

February 20, 2001

 

 

5.3    Analysis

 

Except the last cartoon of February 20, 2001, the cartoons are clearly sympathetic to the official Israeli point of view.

 

The cartoons clearly portray a bloodthirsty (Oct. 15), heartless and manipulative (Oct. 26), irrational (Dec. 31), and peace rejecting (Jan. 7), Yasir Arafat.

 

Arafat is shown with blood on his hands (Oct. 15): that is, he is held directly responsible for the killing of Israelis (in this case two Israeli soldiers).

 

Arafat is shown as heartless and manipulative (Oct. 26): he is luring children to their deaths.

 

Arafat is shown as irrational (De. 31): he has a clear choice between heaven and hell, and yet he hesitates.

 

The January 7 cartoon shows Arafat as the last one to hit the peace dove with his racket, while Mr. Barak helplessly tries to run after it.

 

Yasir Arafat appeared in four (4) of the six (6) cartoons.  Bill Clinton appeared 3 times.  Ehud Barak once.

 

Arafat is portrayed as responsible for both Israeli deaths (Oct. 15) and Palestinians deaths (Oct. 26).

 

President Clinton is shown as exerting himself haplessly (Dec. 29, Dec. 31, Jan. 7) for the sake of peace.  He is shown as a neutral arbiter (Jan. 7) trying to lead the way to peace (Dec. 29, 31).

 

 

Palestinians are portrayed as irrational (Oct. 12, 26), destroying their own homes and throwing themselves from a cliff, and (Feb. 8) strengthening their enemy.

 

Notable is the near total absence of Israeli military forces.  For example, the October 12 cartoon does not show at whom the Palestinians are throwing stones.  The October 26 cartoon shows Palestinians throwing themselves over a cliff into literally nothingness, rather than confronting tanks and lives ammunition.  The impression given is that Palestinians are inflicting pain on themselves.

 

Only twice were Israeli guns shown: first on the February 8 cartoon, where a series of rock throwing panels ends with a large panel showing a Sharon-stone-wall built by the stones thrown by the Palestinians; the guns are shown, but the implication is that the Palestinians brought the guns upon themselves.

 

The second cartoon (Feb. 20) at long last shows the Israeli army: a tank confronting a lone stone thrower.  As much as the cartoon is a long-overdue recognition of the imbalance in power between the Palestinians and the Israelis, it still fails to adequately depict the horror: the tank is shown to be merely wagging a finger at the Palestinian, rather than inflicting injury and death.

 

Also notable is the absence of any depiction of Palestinian suffering.  On the contrary, the impression is given that Palestinians are the aggressors.

 

 

6.0 Trudy Rubin Columns

 

The Philadelphia Inquirer published 13 opinion pieces by their one columnist, Trudy Rubin, between October 6, 2000 and April 9, 2001 -- the first of which on October 18, 2000.

·         October 18, 2000 – “Passion and peace in the Middle East”

·         October 25, 2000 – “The Children’s crusade”

·         October 27, 2000 – “Facing a hard reality”

·         October 29, 2000 – “Key mistakes on both sides fueled Mideast disaster”

·         November 1, 2000 – “Spiraling toward a war”

·         December 3, 2000 – “Another bombing in Israel could shatter chance of  renewing talks”                                                                     

·         November 5, 2000 – “In a Jerusalem Market, views are hardening toward Palestinians”

·         November 12, 2000 – “In Mideast, despair at a new level as tensions rise and hope fades”

·         November 26, 2000 – “Two paths Middle East mustn’t take”

·         December 15, 2000 – “Arafat hoping a new lineup creates support”

·         December 29, 2000 – “Clinton Plan: Last Chance for Arafat."

·         February 7, 2001 -  “Fear, anger lifted Sharon”

·         March 21, 2001 -  “Unlikely pair for peace”

 

This report examines in some detail the content of those columns.

6.1 Trudy Rubin

Foreign Affairs Columnist
From: http://home.phillynews.com/inquirer/opinion/WHOWEARE.ASP

“My father started discussing foreign affairs with me at the dinner table when I was in elementary school in Boston, and so the twig was bent. Then came Smith College and the London School of Economics. My worldview got a shaping during the Prague Spring of 1968, during a stint as guest staffer on Radio Prague's English news, where I learned firsthand about what it meant to live under/rebel against communism.

Annual visits to the Mideast since 1968, and seven years based there as a foreign correspondent, have hooked me on the region. Yearly trips to Russia (a.k.a. the Soviet Union) since 1985 and periodic visits to China have taught me about the pains of exiting communism.

Living in Philly lets me roam the Bowash corridor to talk to foreign affairs experts, with time off for old movies, collecting folk art and tending to family and friends. As globalization remolds the world, it's a pretty exciting time to be writing a twice-weekly column (called Worldview) and unsigned editorials on international affairs.

 

6.2 Overall stand

 

Out of the 13 opinion pieces published by Ms. Rubin, ten 11 can be classified as on balance more sympathetic to Israelis than to Palestinians.

 

Only 2 columns, “Key Mistakes on both sides fueled the Mideast disaster” (Oct. 29) and “Unlikely pair for peace” (Mar. 21) can be considered relatively balanced in their analysis.

6.3 Analysis

 

The victims

 

Israelis

 

Ms. Rubin extensively quoted a wide range of Israeli voices: government officials, writers, intellectuals, activists, as well as regular civilians.  Indeed, three of her columns (Oct. 27, Nov. 3, Nov. 5) focused primarily on how Israeli civilians were coping with the crisis.

 

Time and again, Ms. Rubin gave ample space for quotes from regular Israeli civilians.  Non-activist Palestinian civilians were given no quote space.

 

Israeli feelings were described compassionately and in vividly human terms: words such as “soul,” “dream,” “confusion,” etc., are used. 

 

Israeli civilians were by and large portrayed as feeling confused, betrayed, afraid, and understandably angry.

 

Full, specific names -- sometimes friendly nick names -- were used to describe Israeli civilians, with physical descriptions and background information spelled out in detail, drawing vivid portraits that bring their humanity to life. 

 

On several occasions, Ms. Rubin frequently used “my friend” to refer to some Israeli civilians she quoted.  We could find only 1 instance of “my friend” in reference to a Palestinian. (Oct. 29)

 

Also notable is the total absence of “scare” quotes when describing Israeli feelings.  Ms. Rubin frequently used scare quotes when describing the Palestinian perspective.

 

 

February 7, 2001 – Out of frustration, comes the yearning for a tough guy who can somehow teach the Palestinians a lesson.  This kind of thinking was reflected last November in the whispers of an Israeli schoolteacher named Rachel, in the heart of Jerusalem’s Barak-land – the secular, middle class neighborhood known as the German Colony.  Rachel told me something she was ashamed to admit out loud.

 

Nov. 12, 2000 – “On the Israeli side, doves thought they were close to a final peace deal, so its total collapse has upended their worldview.  One Israeli architect friend who fought in three wars told me, ‘I feel like everything I worked my whole life has collapsed, and I haven’t got the strength to start over.”  Many centrists, who came reluctantly to accept the idea of a Palestinian state over the last five year, now feel equally duped.”

 

November 5, 2000 – “When we stopped into the Levy brothers’ tiny storefront sweets and wine store, their buddy Lenny, whose father escaped to Israel from Iraq, exploded at the idea of continuing negotiations with Yasir Arafat.”

 

Oct. 27, 2000 – “At Omer Golan’s high school, a handsome white stone and glass building, principal Hanich Greenberg has taken a pistol out of a gun locker and now wears it tucked into the back of his belt.  The 60’ish Greenberg, a bear of a man with a thick shock of white hair, is trying to figure out how hackers got into the school’s Web site and left an English message: ‘Two words for you Israeli pigs – ‘Allah akhbar’” (Arabic for God is great).

  

The vivid impression created is of threatening Arabs invading the peaceful lives of peace-loving Israelis with whom we are encouraged to identify on a basic, human level.

 

Palestinians

 

Ms. Rubin seemed to be aware of the fact that hardships on Palestinians are the main cause behind their uprising.  (Oct. 29, 2000; March 21, 2001)

 

However, Ms. Rubin by and large neglected to stress this reality as the main factor fueling the unrest. 

 

Ms. Rubin gave very scant details about the actual day-to-day hardships suffered by Palestinians. 

 

Very few mentions were made of closures or curfews.

 

Ms. Rubin did quote Palestinian voices.  However, virtually all of her quotes came from Palestinian officials and leaders. 

 

The couple of quotes we were able to find from civilians were from youngsters throwing stones or frantic adults trying to stop them.  

 

We could not find any quotes from the  “man-in-the-street” Palestinian civilian going about his/her daily life.

 

Ms. Rubin very rarely mentions the various civilian Palestinian groups, human rights organizations, and other political voices.

 

Palestinian suffering was by and large described in clinical, general terms, en masse, rather than at a personal-human level. 

 

“Scare” quotes were used many times to distance the writer/reader from the Palestinians.

 

In the one instance where Ms. Rubin focused on Palestinian civilians (Oct. 25, 2000), she chose to write about stone-throwing Palestinians in the heat of a funeral, followed by an account on stone-throwing teenagers.

 

 

March 21, 2001 - Under these conditions, Palestinians can't conduct normal travel and commerce

 

March 21, 2001 - But [Sharon] offers ordinary Palestinians little incentive to press their leaders to accede to these conditions. His proposed interim arrangements would leave the Palestinians with the limited amount of land they now control, which is divided into chunks by Israeli settlements and roads.

 

March 21, 2001 -- With no hope of a cohesive state and the prospects of more settlements, ordinary Palestinians may be inspired to join the intifada rather than press their leaders to bring it to an end.

 

Nov. 12, 2000 – “The Oslo process – which held out the prospect for a Palestinian state as its endgame – actually left the Palestinians worse off during its interim stages.”

 

Nov. 12, 2000 – “On the Palestinian side, moderates who believed in a two-state solution now feel marginalized and are quick to lay blame on “bad faith” by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.  Much more disturbing, one hears ugly rhetoric on the Palestinian street about killing Jews that is worse than anything I have heard in decades, even in the refugee camps of Lebanon in the 1980.”

 

Oct. 29, 2000 – “Palestinian rage: Both sides underestimated it.  Drive around the West Bank and it’s easy to understand why things were boiling.”

 

Oct. 18, 2000 – “Those powerful religious emotions have now fused with nationalism in an elixir that excites Palestinian crowds.  It is the ‘threat’ to Al-Aqsa, magnified by Arab cable TV stations across the region… challenging moderate Arab leaders who fear the power of these passions.”

 

Oct. 18, 2000 – “Yet Islamic groups on the West Bank and within Israel have fanned these fears with campaigns to ‘save Al-Aqsa’.  (Every archeological dig, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s 1996 opening of an underground tunnel exit, fueled their paranoia.)”

 

October 18, 2000 – “This fed historic Muslim conspiracy theories about Israeli government plots to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque.  But such canards are simply untrue, as Arafat must know.”

 

October 18, 2000 – “Every archaeological dig, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s 1996 opening of an underground tunned exit, fueled their paranoia.”

 

 

 

 

 

Responsibility for crisis/violence

 

Palestinians

 

Ms. Rubin blames mainly Yasir Arafat for the uprising.

 

Mr. Arafat is portrayed as greedy, manipulative, irrational, and cowardly.

 

Mr. Arafat is portrayed as able to bring a stop to the violence if and when he wishes.  The continuation of the uprising is attributed to his strategy of “trying to ride the violence to a better deal“ (Nov. 12, 2000)

 

Mr. Arafat’s political realities are acknowledged.  However, they are reduced to a clash between Fatah and radical terrorist groups. (Nov. 3, 2000) 

 

Mr. Arafat’s complex political realities, moreover, are never presented as evidence of Mr. Arafat’s limited room to maneuver.  Instead, Ms. Rubin points them out only to call on Mr. Arafat to clamp down on his opponents.

 

On several occasions, Ms. Rubin places the burden of “choosing” war or peace squarely on Mr. Arafat’s shoulders. By contrast, Israeli aggressions are depicted as unfortunate tactical blunders at worst.

 

Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian leadership are portrayed as irrational, while the Israeli leadership is portrayed as rational.  We are never given a coherent, rational thesis explaining why Palestinians refuse to accept Mr. Barak’s offer. 

 

Stone-throwers are portrayed as instigators, going out of their way to provoke the Israeli Defense Forces, IDF.

  

 

March 21, 2001 - Only Yasir Arafat's epic errors - and the Palestinian violence that made the peace process moot - could have propelled Sharon to a landslide win last month and new respectability in Washington.

 

March 21, 2001 - Only Arafat has the power to shorten Sharon's tenure.

 

March 21, 2001 - Sharon and his policies won't change unless Palestinians do press Arafat to end the violence. Sharon's election is the direct product of Arafat's mistakes.

 

February 7, 2001 – Palestinians didn’t vote in yesterday’s Israeli elections.  But they can take credit for the astonishing win by Ariel Sharon.

 

February 7, 2001 – But even a dove can’t sell Israelis on a broader deal if the Palestinians prefer to bargain with the gun.  That kind of thinking brought Ariel Sharon to power.

 

February 7, 2001 – How could Israeli voters have undergone such a sea of change? Chalk it up to anger, fear – and Yasir Arafat.

 

December 29, 2000 – “The biggest obstacle to an Israeli-Palestinian settlement is not what you think….  The gap is psychological.  It’s about whether the Palestinians are ready to make a realistic compromise and get on with building a new future.”

 

December 15, 2000 – “None of this will work unless the Bush team can persuade moderate Arab leaders to disabuse Arafat of illusions that he can win Israeli concessions without making his own – and tamping down the violence.”

 

November 12, 200 – “The impatience exploded shortly after Arafat rejected Barak’s proposals for final status at Camp David summit in July.”

 

November 12, 2000 – “The Palestinian leader bears responsibility for failing to inform his people that pos-Camp David talks still had potential – even after violence erupted.  And he bears much blame for trying to ride the violence to a better deal than he could get at the table.”

 

November 3, 2000 - “This time only two people were killed.  But one more bomb will blow up any illusions about restarting peace talks.  If that’s what Yasir Arafat wants, he’d better redefine his new and dangerous relationship with radical Islamist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.”

 

Nov. 1, 2000 – “So why embark on guerilla war? Why make it almost impossible for Barak to renew talks before his government falls, and Bill Clinton leaves office.”

 

October 29, 2000 – “Arafat’s sin was to offer no counterproposal at Camp David, and give the impression it was a total failure.”

 

October 29, 2000 – “But by heating up the Jerusalem issue, he made more likely the upheaval sparked by Ariel Sharon several weeks later.”

 

October 29, 2000 – “Arafat has chosen to ride a wave of violence that started the day after Sharon’s visit, to stoke it, and to try to use it to pressure Israel for more favorable terms.”

 

October 25, 2000 – “The Ayosh junction is way out of town; youths have to hike to the soldiers.  Yes, Israeli soldiers should be using tear gas more often than live fire or rubber bullets, but it’s ludicrous for Palestinian officials to call these ‘peaceful demonstrations’.”

 

October 18, 2000 – “Instead, the Palestinian leader fanned, or failed to calm, religious and national passions until these passions destroyed the Oslo negotiating process and may even devour Arafat himself.”

 

Oct. 18, 2000 – “Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon ignited these fears with his disastrous visit to the Temple Mount that sparked the current violence. Again, Arafat has a choice: play up these religious passions as a negotiating tool, or try to damp them down.”

 

Oct. 18, 2000 – “Rabin and Barak made strategic decisions, in Israel’s self-interest, so Israel wouldn’t have to rule over three million angry Palestinians.  Where they went wrong us to think that Arafat and his public leaders would react equally rationally.”

 

Israelis

 

Ehud Barak

 

Prime Minister Ehud Barak is by and large portrayed as having done the maximum that he can do.  He is portrayed as generous, trustworthy, rational, and courageous.

 

Mr. Barak’s political realities are acknowledged and discussed.  Those realities are presented to explain Mr. Barak’s limited room to maneuver and to highlight Mr. Barak’s “political courage.”

 

The failings of Israelis are presented as understandable, or sometimes even as virtues.  Mr. Barak and the Israelis, for example, are presented as having been impatient, but bold.

 

December 15, 2000 – “Barak failed – thanks to a lack of political skills and the shortsightedness of Yasir Arafat.”

 

October 29, 2000 – “The Israeli prime minister, who most wanted the summit, underestimated the need to prepare the ground.”

 

October 29, 2000 – “Barak’s worst sin was hubris – the expectation that the toughest issues could be solved in two weeks.”

 

October 18, 2000 – “True, the Israeli ideas came very late, after innumerable broken negotiating deadlines.  They were introduced too abruptly before either side has prepared its own public for compromise.  But they broke taboos and opened the door for further negotiations – even if they weren’t the final word.”

 

October 18, 2000 – “Israel was ready to discuss compromise formulas – even some form of UN Security Council control over the site.   But Arafat insisted on Palestinian Sovereignty – full stop…”

 

Ariel Sharon

 

Prime Minister Sharon is portrayed as a leader with a penchant for “brutal force”.  His involvement in the 1982 massacres in Sabra and Shatilla were mentioned twice (Feb 7, 2001, and March 21, 2001).

 

Prospect for peace resulting from his tough policies are considered unlikely by Ms. Rubin.

 

Interestingly, however, Ms. Rubin never urges the US administration to put any pressure on Ariel Sharon.  Ms. Rubin, by contrast, repeatedly calls on the US, the Arab world, and the international community at large to put pressure on Yasir Arafat and the Palestinians.

 

March 21, 2001 - Sharon has been a lightning rod at home and abroad for decades - for good reason. Nearly 20 years ago he alienated the Reaganites when he engineered the war in Lebanon and was indirectly responsible for the massacre of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila.

 

March 21, 2001 - Sharon was elected on a promise that he would get tough with the Palestinians and stop the Al Aqsa intifada (uprising). But he has a record of not knowing when to lay off the sticks, nor having much generosity with carrots. Nicknamed the "Bulldozer," he has a military history of using brutal force against Palestinian civilians.

March 21, 2001 - Sharon believes no long-term peace settlement is possible with the Palestinians, and that the two sides must talk instead about interim arrangements. He also says no talks can begin, or severe economic pressures on the Palestinians cease, before the violence ends.


March 21, 2001 - But [Sharon] offers ordinary Palestinians little incentive to press their leaders to accede to these conditions. His proposed interim arrangements would leave the Palestinians with the limited amount of land they now control, which is divided into chunks by Israeli settlements and roads.

 

February 7, 2001 – Sharon was the architect of the 1982 war in Lebanon and was held culpable for a massacre of Palestinians.

 

 

The crackdown on uprising

 

Ms. Trudy Rubin recognizes that the Israeli crackdown on civilians is fueling the unrest. 

 

Ms. Rubin only rarely refers to Israeli use of firepower against civilians.

 

Details about Palestinian victims are never given. 

 

No account was given of the effect of so many casualties on Palestinian hospitals and their personnel.

 

No mention of the scores of children killed.

 

No mention was made of the civilians killed in their homes.

 

No mention was made of the journalists killed.

 

No mention was made of the medics killed.

 

No mention was made of a sniper policy used by the IDF against stone-throwers above the age of 12! (Ha’arezt, November 20, 2000).

 

Ms. Rubin never condemned the crackdown on moral or legal terms.  At worst, the crackdown was described as merely “strategically counterproductive.”

 

Dec. 15, 2000 – “a tougher crackdown on the Palestinians is insufficient and will only beget more guerrilla war.”

  

The Settlements

 

Ms. Rubin recognizes that settlements are an obstacle to peace.

 

However, she never mentions that they are built on occupied, or illegally confiscated land. 

 

The settlements, when criticized, are merely described as a strategic obstacle and a logistical complication.

 

March 21, 2001 -- The settlement grid also prevents Israelis from physically disengaging from the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza - even though many Israelis think this is the best short-term solution. So long as Jewish settlements crisscross Palestinian areas, settlers must traverse them, too, and Israeli soldiers must protect the settlers, leading to constant Israeli-Palestinian clashes.

 

March 21, 2001 - There have been rumors that Sharon might dismantle some settlements to reduce this friction. But I heard Sharon deny this vehemently at a breakfast in Jerusalem, in November. "No," he said sharply, when asked if he would close down any settlements should he be elected prime minister. "Those communities were built according to a plan in those areas which would be . . . security areas Israel had to keep."

 

March 21, 2001 - West Bank road-and-settlement building is likely to continue under Sharon, even in Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. This could lead to explosive clashes in the current climate.

 

Dec. 15, 2000 – “So Bibi may have to contemplate things his Likud Party never imagined, like dismantling Israeli settlements that are lodged in the middle of Gaza and the West Bank.  Otherwise, there is no way to separate hostile Palestinian and Israeli populations.”

 

Nov. 26, 2000 – “Last week’s roadside attack by Palestinian gunmen on a settler school bus in Gaza showed just how vulnerable the 180,000 settlers in the West Bank are.”

 

Nov. 26, 2000 – “The claim that dismantling settlements would put Israel proper at risk has got it backward.”

 

Nov. 26, 2000 – “Even Israeli doves believe it would be too dangerous to dismantle settlements unilaterally; it must be part of a negotiated package.”

 

 The Right of Return

 

“Scare” quotes were always used to refer to the consequences to Israel of the Palestinians’ “Right of Return.”

 

Palestinian refugees were described as having merely “left” rather than fled in terror or fled because of coercion.

 

Ms. Rubin reiterates the official Israeli line that Palestinians are all of a sudden bringing up the issue of “Right of Return.”

 

Ms. Rubin holds, in full agreement with the official Israeli line that Israel cannot possibly take in Palestinian refugees.

 

The refugee problem primarily is blamed on the Palestinians for bringing it upon themselves.

 

December 29, 2000 – “In return, Palestinians would have to give up the ‘right of return’ for refugees who left Israel during the 1948 war, and their descendents.”

 

December 29, 2000 – “One reason is the ‘right of return’, which Palestinians long claimed was less important than control of Jerusalem.  Now, suddenly, Palestinian officials say any compromise of that right could precipitate civil war within the Palestinian community.”

 

December 29, 2000 – “But even the most ardent Israeli doves rightly reject the idea of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees… returning to Israel proper.”

 

December 29, 2000 – “Had [Palestinians] swallowed their anger and said ‘yes’, the Palestinian refugee problem never would have arisen and their state would be 52 years old.”

  

The International community

 

Ms. Rubin by and large sees no mediating role for the international community, fully in agreement with the official Israeli stand.

 

The only role for the international community that Ms. Rubin cites is one of pressuring Arafat to make more concessions.

 

Ms. Rubin gave no explanation why international involvement is unlikely or unwelcome.

 

Ms. Rubin never mentions United Nations’ condemnations and other international denunciations of Israeli policies.

 

The American double standard in its reaction to the Kosovo crisis contrasted with the Palestinian crisis is not only lost on Ms. Rubin, but she in fact points out Kosovo as evidence that the international community will not and should not intervene similarly!

 

March 21, 2001 – [Arafat would] have to give up the dream that Arab and international pressure will force the Israelis to agree to his terms.

 

February 7, 2001 – Both Arafat and his public appear to have given up on a negotiated solution and opted for the losing strategy of violence plus appeals to the international community for rescue.

 

December 29, 2000 – “Israelis will unite behind Sharon, and the international community will reject a Palestinian leadership that shies from a negotiated solution.”

 

Dec. 15, 2000 - “None of this will work unless the Bush team can persuade moderate Arab leaders to disabuse Arafat of illusions that he can win Israeli concessions without making his own and tamping down on the violence.”

 

Nov. 1, 2000 – “Clearly, [Marwan Barghouti] is hoping the international community will save the Palestinians from sliding toward all-out war – by pressing Israel to return to negotiations on terms more favorable to Palestinians.  Unlikely.”

 

Nov. 1, 2000 – “Some Palestinians even hope that an international force will arrive on the West Bank to protect them, the way NATO sent troops into Kosovo.  But this is a pipe dream.  No international force will intervene in the middle of a guerrilla conflict.  Not to mention that the Kosovo force was led by – the Americans.”

 

Peace Proposals

 

Ms. Rubin often wrote about the proposals and peace offers on the table as though their substance were known and uncontroversial.  The remaining question simply being whether or not Arafat was willing to accept them.

 

Very little content was given to specific Palestinian demands.

 

Very little content was given to specific Palestinian objections to the proposals.

 

Ms. Rubin totally ignored Mr. Barak’s repeated statements that he will never compromise on sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram Al-Sharif.  On the contrary, she writes as though Mr. Barak unambiguously offered such sovereignty.

 

Any shortcomings in the plans offered by Clinton and Barak, Ms. Rubin identified as stylistic rather than substantive.  In Ms. Rubin’s view, it is the manner in which Mr. Barak and Mr. Clinton have proceeded rather than what they have offered that is the heart of the problem.

 

March 21, 2001 - Barak offered the Palestinians an end to occupation in nearly all of the West Bank and Gaza and was met with rebuff and intifada.

 

February 7, 2001 – Israelis are angry at Barak, for offering the Palestinians so much and negotiating so badly, but they are angrier still at the Palestinians for violently rejecting his expansive offers.

 

December 29, 2000 – “Palestinians would get their key demand: sovereignty over the Temple Mount, or Noble Sanctuary, site of Islam’s third holiest mosque but also the site of ancient Israel’s temples.”

 

December 29, 2000 – “Clinton precipitated the need to choose by putting forward a last-minute plan only weeks before he leaves office.  It involves extremely painful compromises by both sides.”

 

October 29, 2000 – “Although the Oslo interim agreements gave Yasir Arafat’s Palestinian Authority control over more than 90 percent of Palestinians, most live in handful of large cities and villages.  These are separated from one another by land controlled partially or fully by Israel – the bulk of the total land mass.”

 

Assassination Policy

 

Ms. Rubin wrote once in opposition to calls by right-wing extremists for Israel to assassinate Palestinian leaders. 

 

However, Ms. Rubin never explicitly wrote in condemnation of assassinations that were actually carried out by Israel.  Her two columns since Israel began its assassination policy (Dec. 15, Dec. 29) never mentioned or condemned the practice.

 

Ms. Rubin’s opposition seems motivated by strategic concerns and not moral principles.  No mention is made that such practice is in violation of international law and due process.

  

Nov. 26, 2000 – “The Israeli government should ignore right-wing pressure to assassinate Arafat’s aides, or it will leave the Palestinian leadership field open to Islamist zealots.”

 

Non-violence Palestinian movement

 

Mention of the non-violent resistance movement within the Palestinian camp was not mentioned by Ms. Rubin until the March 21, 2001 column.

 

March 21, 2001 - A few intellectuals have proposed that Palestinians only mount nonviolent demonstrations. Others condemn the corruption inside the Palestinian Authority, and its inability to control gunmen. But this kind of thinking has not reached anywhere near critical mass.
It must be encouraged, by Israelis and U.S. policy. Unfortunately, a draconian Sharon policy may isolate the questioners and push ordinary Palestinians to join the violence.
This puts a burden on the Bush administration. despite its desire to watch the Mideast mess from the sidelines. They need to find ways to prevent Sharon from making things worse, and to disabuse Arafat from delusions of international rescue. For the moment, that may be the best that the administration can do.

6.4 Mentions

 

UN resolutions/findings

 

Ms. Rubin’s columns are noteworthy for their total absence of any mention of the various UN resolutions that condemn Israel’s use of military force against civilian populations. 

 

Findings and reports by human right organizations

 

Equally noteworthy is the total absence of any mention of reports issued by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Peace Now, B’Tselem, and others that blame the Israelis for using excessive military force on civilians.  These reports condemn the killing of children, decry the economic blockade by Israel on the Palestinians, denounce the practice of assassination, condemn Israeli violence against journalists, and strongly challenge the official Israeli line.

 

Palestinian casualties

 

There were only two specific mentions of Palestinian casualty figures. 

  

Oct. 25, 2000 – “Funerals have become the awful symbol of the new unrest on the West Bank, with more than 130 Palestinians shot dead…”

 

Nov. 1, 2000 – “… unless [Arafat] gets some agreement from the Israelis that makes his public believe it was worth 140 or so dead and thousand wounded.”

 

That Israel is an occupying force

 

The word “occupation” was used only once in all eleven (11) columns. (Nov. 12, 2000)

 

Ms. Rubin also failed to describe Israel’s two-decade occupation of Southern Lebanon as an occupation.  Instead, the impression given is that Israel was a passive victim of terrorism.

 

Nov. 12, 2000 – “But neither can Israel maintain an indefinite occupation of over 3 million Palestinians…”

 

Nov. 26, 2000 – “Lebanese guerrillas carried out endless roadside attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli troops.”

 

6.5 Updates

 

 

Since our January 29, 2001, report, Ms. Rubin published two columns on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Feb. 7, 2001; March 21, 2001).

 

The two columns by and large perpetuate the worldview described in our first report. 

 

The basic dynamics of the conflict remain ignored: that a population is under illegal occupation; that the Israeli armed forces are using lethal weapons against a largely unarmed population; that the killing of Palestinians and their desperate economic conditions are fueling the uprising.

 

Arafat continues to be the main villain in this conflict, even with the arrival of Ariel Sharon on the scene.  Mr. Arafat continues to be chastised for “rebuffing” Ehud Barak’s “expansive” offers.  Ariel Sharon, by contrast, although viewed as a non-starter and criticized for past actions, is never urged to follow any particular policy.

 

Ms. Rubin continues to portray Ehud Barak’s offers as “generous”, “far-reaching”, and “expansive”.

 

Ms. Rubin continues to view the settlements as an obstacle to peace, but her objections continue to be pragmatic and not moral.  The illegality of the settlements, along with the confiscation of Arab land, are not an issue for Ms. Rubin.

 

Ms. Rubin continues to hold that the international community has no role to play in resolving the crisis.

 

Ms. Rubin continues to completely avoid advising the US administration to put any kind of pressure on Israel.  On the contrary, Ms. Rubin urges the new Bush administration to pressure the Palestinians.

 

Two positive notes: (1) Ms. Rubin seems to be under no illusions that Ariel Sharon’s policies of “peace through strength” will lead to peace. (2) Ms. Rubin for the first time mentions the existence of a Palestinian non-violent camp.

 

6.6 Summary and conclusions

 

Ms. Rubin’s views on the conflict deviated very little from the official position articulated by the official American and Israeli line:

 

·         Arafat is mainly to blame for the uprising

·         Arafat has the power to stop the uprising at will

·         Arafat is irrational, greedy, and untrustworthy

·         Palestinians must make more concessions

·         Ehud Barak as been generous and brave

·         Settlements are a strategic burden, not an illegal presence

·         Palestinians should abandon their demand for “Right of Return”

·         Israel cannot absorb Palestinian refugees

 

More troubling than the close match between Ms. Rubin’s views and those officially expressed by Israeli spokespeople, is her omission of facts and realities published from various respected organizations.

 

·         Very rare mention of Israeli use of firepower against civilians

·         No condemnation of Israeli use of firepower against civilians

·         No details given about Palestinian victims

·         No account given of the effect on Palestinian hospitals and their personnel

·         No mention of civilians killed in their homes

·         No mention of journalists killed

·         No mention of medics killed

·         No mention of IDF sniper policy against stone-throwers

·         No mention of the scores of children killed

·         No mention of UN findings, reports, and resolutions

·         No mention of findings and reports from human right groups

·         No mention that the uprising is taking place in occupied land

 

7.0 Summary and conclusions

 

This report has provided an analysis of how the Philadelphia Inquirer’s opinions pages have covered the Middle East crisis between Oct. 6, 2000 and April 9, 2001.

 

The picture that emerges is one of a paper that remains in strong proximity to the official State Department and the official Israeli lines.

 

The editorials, cartoons, and regular columns, reflecting the collective opinion of the paper, deviate very little from the official worldview advanced by the State Department, whether under the Clinton administration or the Bush administration.  Both administrations have maintained an explicit policy of never contradicting the official Israeli line.  The Inquirer, through its editorials, its cartoons, and its columnist, has consistently echoed the official government line.

 

We note with satisfaction the relative even-handedness with which the letters to the editor section remain to be handled.

 

We also note with satisfaction that the Inquirer has made important progress in narrowing the great divide we noted in our first report between column space allotted for pro-Israeli columns and space for pro-Palestinian columns.  In our first report, the ratio pro-Israeli columns and pro-Palestinian columns stood at 6:1.  In this report, the ratio is approximately 1:1.  We note this with great satisfaction.

 

We are also hopeful that Tony Auth’s cartoon of February 20 is a harbinger of future cartoons that capture the basic truths of the conflict: an occupied people is fighting to repulse an overbearing occupation and is undertaking something many other nations in history have undertaken: a struggle for independence.

 

We detect slight signs of hope that Ms. Rubin will begin to reflect in her columns reality as it is, and not reality as spun by the State Department and the Israeli Prime Minister’s office.  Ms. Rubin showed a sober assessment of Ariel Sharon and the prospect of peace under his tenure.  Ms. Rubin also began to highlight (March 21, 2001) the need for a viable Palestinian state. However, Ms. Rubin continues to blame the victims and to portray the Israelis as merely defending themselves, continues to perpetrate the myth that Ehud Barak offered “expansive” concessions, and continues to ignore some very basic facts, such as the killing of more than 90 children, the killing of civilians in their own homes, the blockading of whole Palestinian towns, etc.

 

This report was submitted by hand to the Philadelphia Inquirer’s Editorial Board on April 9th, 2001.  A copy also was submitted by hand to John Timpane, Commentary Page editor, and Kevin Ferris, Letters editor. 

 

A follow up meeting will be scheduled with the Philadelphia Inquirer in approximately three months. 

 

A new version of this report will be published once every four weeks.