By far the most important problem George W. Bush will initially face as president of the United States is the crisis in Middle East. A stable Middle East is one of the basic linchpins of a stable US economy, and in these nervous times of sagging consumer confidence and slowing growth, the last thing Mr. Bush needs is a stock market nervous about the world's energy supply.

Indeed, the two longest recessions America endured since 1929 were the 16 month contractions from November 1973 to March 1975 and from July 1981 to November 1982. Both were largely ignited by an oil crisis on the world market. Back in 1990, George Bush Senior had this well in mind when he mobilized the US armada to protect American oil interests in the Gulf region. Once president, George W. Bush faces a much more intractable problem that no smart bomb can take out: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

If matters follow their expected course, Ariel Sharon will be elected Prime Minister of Israel barely two weeks after George W. Bush is sworn in. Mr. Sharon's accession to the leadership of the Israeli government will mark not only the final collapse of the Oslo peace process, but the undoing of the first Camp David accords, signed back in September 1978, between Anwar Sadat and Manachem Begin. Ariel Sharon is held directly responsible throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds for the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians in Sabra and Shatilla during Israel's 1982 Lebanon invasion. He elicits from Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims in general deep, visceral loathing comparable in intensity to the loathing Jews have for Hitler. With Sharon at the helm of the Israeli government, no Palestinian, Arab or Muslim leader would dare engage his government in any official talks or negotiations, public or otherwise. And the last person who would entertain being seen in Mr. Sharon's company, let alone be seen shaking hands with him, is Yasser Arafat.

With no prospects for a peaceful resolution, the Palestinian Intifadha will have no choice but to press on, its passions and energies further fueled by the ominously promised harsh crackdown from the unyielding Sharon. The escalation in violence will then put enormous pressure on all Arab countries, from Morocco to Jordan, to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, along with non-Arab Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Malaysia, to react with something more than mere words. Arab public opinion is already distraught over their leadership's inaction during this three-month old uprising. With Ariel Sharon -- in their eyes the "Butcher of Sabra and Shatilla" -- ordering and supervising the crackdown on the Intifadha, Arab and Muslim public opinion will no longer be content with fiery speeches of solidarity with Palestinians: they will want action.

Chances are that an all out crack down on Palestinians from a Sharon government would first result in the collapse of the remaining diplomatic relations that have been established and nurtured between Israel and some Arab states for the past decade -- and in the case of Egypt, for the last two decades. Morocco has drastically reduced its contact with Israel since the outbreak of the uprising, and would be the first to completely sever them at all levels. Jordan would probably be the next to follow, reluctant as King Abdallah may be to take that step, while Egypt's Mubarak -- forever battling his 'fundamentalist demons' -- would have no choice but to fold his Tel Aviv tent, bite the bullet, and give up the two billion American dollars for the sake of his political survival.

Beyond that point, a further continued assault on the Palestinians -- especially now that the Arab masses have joined the satellite-knit globe and are intimately in the know about what is taking place to the Palestinians on an hourly basis -- will place huge pressures on the Arab leadership to act with more than toothless diplomatic measures. And their leadership will have no choice but to act: either by militarily mobilizing against Israel or by cracking down on the popular challenge that would undoubtedly surge if they decide not to mobilize.