THE NATIONALIST DIMENSION OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN PALESTINIAN POLITICS

(Journal of Palestine studies. Vol 24. No.3. Spring 1995)

H.H.Ahmad. HAMAS, From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society. PASSIA. Jerusalem. April 1994. 172 pages.

Z.Abu Amer. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Indiana University Press. 1994. 169 pages.

A.Rashad. Hamas: Palestinian Politics With An Islamic Hue. United Association For Studies and Research. Springfield, VA. Dec. 1993. Occasional Paper Series No. 2. 45 pages.

Prior to the outbreak of the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza in December 1987, the existence and activities of an Islamic movement in the occupied territories did not arouse a large amount of interest. In the few years that have elapsed since then, a tremendous amount has been written about Hamas, Islamic Fundamentalism, and the ascendent role of the Islamic trend in Palestinian politics and society. A major part of this, whether journalistic or academic, has been based on a limited amount of information, constantly recycled, repackaged and highlighted in order to reinforce a seemingly global fixation with the need for a new evil empire. Now that the Communist order is little more than a distant memory, something had to be conjured up, to take its place.

The evident interest in the Islamic trend in the West Bank and Gaza a term which encompasses the Islamic Resistance Movement(HAMAS), the Islamic Jihad(IJ), and the Islamic Liberation Party, is not an indication of an enhanced awareness of the workings of the occupation and the resistance to it, nor is it part of the search for ways and means to realise Palestinian statehood. It is primarily a manifestation of a heightened Western pre occupation with a perceived global threat posing as an all encompassing Islamic Fundamentalist upheaval challenging its victory in the recently concluded global contest. The sub text is the small matter of energy resources. To be sure Islam has not always been perceived in this fashion. Not so long ago the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan was seen as a friend and an ally in the struggle to contain and subvert communist rule. There was nothing sinister about the term mujahedeen. Their leaders were received in the White House by the President of the United States himself. Islam was not perceived as an enemy and Islamic Governments in West Asia were regarded as valued assets. It was perhaps the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran that, in retrospect proved to be a turning point. Until then, Islamic movements were themselves pre occupied with combating indigenous nationalist and left wing movements. At numerous junctures both Western strategists and the Islamic Movements themselves held to a common belief in a community of interests which bound Western and Islamic nations together. At a minimum, both shared a belief in a divine god, and in the sanctity of private property. Consequently it is imperative not to allow the current alarm at the rise of Islamic fundamentalism to obscure the fact that it was the traditional and pro western governments of the Arab world, the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Jordanians, the Kuwaitis, (and the Israelis) which supported nearly every fundamentalist group which we are now asked to believe threaten the stability of the region, perhaps even the Globe. The Saudis and others, thought that by supporting those fundamentalist groups against radical Arab nationalist and leftist parties and movements, they would be able to accomplish two tasks; first, gain a measure of popular legitimacy, second, mobilise traditional and conservative forces to bolster their regimes.

It goes without saying that the existing status quo in the Arab world is highly unstable and lacks any popular legitimacy. All governments without exception are under assault from within. The demise of the Soviet Union, the traditional bogey man, has robbed the ruling elites of a long serving alibi. It has been suggested that one of the basic means by which democracies come into being is the need ruling elites have, in their attempts to hang on to power, to broaden the basis of their rule, by sharing the blame. This is the experiment in democracy currently being implemented in Jordan. In nearly every other instance however, the ruling elites are staunchly unwilling to contemplate even mere window dressing, to overcome the reality of political enfeeblement and economic desperation. This is exacerbated by the unremitting pressure of international financial agencies to cut public spending, remove subsidies on basic necessities, and surrender their economies to market mechanisms.

In the long winter of the cold war years, the absence of democracy we are told, was the price, that the West had to pay in order to avoid the destabilisation of friendly regimes and the ascendancy of Soviet proxies. The entrenched elites that concentrated power and wealth in their hands owed their existence to this reluctance to support or, in many instances, even allow change. Although this reasoning no longer holds, fears of universal destabilisation if and when democracy comes, persist. It would appear that it is the nature of change itself and the direction this might take that is the real danger. The implementation of democratic forms of government could pose a threat not only to the material interests of the minorities currently entrenched in power, but to the existing economic and political structures which bind the international order together. The threat is contained in the needs, wants, and expectations of the multitudes who form a major part of the population of the planet, and who despite the end of history, are unable to secure their economic livelihood, let alone participate in the consumerist feast taking place in front of their very own eyes. The advent of irrationalist movements of which religious fundamentalism is a visible part, is the outcome of this existing reality. Spreading the blame is a palliative which might buy time as in the case of Jordan, or it might lead to a breakdown of the fragile state order as has happened in Algeria.

The Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, appeared on the scene on the heels of the mass upheaval which swept the occupied territories in December 1987. Ostensibly created by the Moslem Brotherhood movement as a vehicle to mobilise support and to compete with the nationalist and left wing groups with which they had long entertained an antagonistic relationship, the real motives for its establishment probably lie in the threat to its mass base posed by fringe Islamic groups like IJ. An early split from the Moslem Brotherhood movement in the Gaza Strip, the Islamic Jihad's founders were influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the prowess of the Afghan Mujahedeen. These were the new role models which replaced the Moslem Brother's movement in Egypt. This was a new kind of Islam, militant, radical and combative. An Islam which distanced itself from the oil rich conservative Arab states who posed as the public defenders of Islam. Radical Islam evinced contempt for those regimes, combined with a degree of envy at their fabulous wealth. Unlike the Moslem Brothers, IJ was a conspiracy. Its militants engaged in armed resistance to the occupation, taking over from the constituent groups of the PLO since the latter's demise in 1982, as the torch bearers of the armed struggle. In the pre 1988 period, the violent actions carried out by members of the IJ, which bore precious little resemblance to the armed struggle nevertheless served to create sympathy for the Islamic Movement as a whole, a fact which spurred the Moslem Brothers to follow suit. Hamas rapidly developed into a fully fledged political movement overshadowing its parent organisation and finding it expedient to establish its own underground wing, the Al Kassam Brigades, to participate in the armed struggle.

The transformation of the public image of the Islamists has been remarkable. Traditionally they had been viewed as part and parcel of the pro Jordanian camp in the occupied territories. The Moslem Brotherhood movement had attached itself to the Hashemites early in the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank. Initially, this was the natural response of traditional and conservative elements to authority, but was soon augmented by hostility to the nationalist camp and animosity to Nasser. With the banning of all political activity in Jordan after the royal coup of 1957, the regime came to rely increasingly on the Moslem Brotherhood movement, the only organised political group to extend it recognition and support. Throughout this period the leadership of the movement tended to come from within the religious establishment and was made up of religious functionaries who were serving Jordanian officials.

In the post 1967 period the Movement was viewed favourably by both Jordanians and Israelis. In the battle over Palestinian representation between Jordan and the PLO, the Movement's support went to Jordan, and helped maintain Jordanian influence in the territories. As far as the occupation itself was concerned, the Islamic Movement adopted an aloof attitude towards overt political involvement and shied away from anti occupation activity. Its members pre occupied themselves with calls to reform Palestinian society from within, to combat the secularism of the PLO, and to curtail the strength of the left, the purveyor of atheism, immorality, and imported ideas. They perceived their main task to be educational and social work, and the raising of religious consciousness. Resistance to the occupation was not on their agenda. This explains the more or less consistent policy of toleration (some would say encouragement) exhibited by the Israeli authorities, in contrast to the iron fist policy directed at IJ. It was only well into the Intifada that the Israeli security services turned their attention to the militants of Hamas, proscribing the organisation in June 1989, despite indications from the mid 1980's that a new type of younger and more activist membership was developing within its ranks.

Despite its origins in the Moslem Brotherhood, Hamas is a new movement. It is perhaps more accurate to characterise it, born as it was during the Intifada, as a child of the Occupation. The condition for its birth, growth and expansion was its new found patriotism and attachment to the Palestinian national cause. This is reflected in its membership. Members of the Moslem Brotherhood and members of Hamas are two different types. Members and supporters of the former were primarily religious functionaries, conservative, quietest, subservient to authority, inward looking, and generally shied away from political involvement or commitment. Hamas active members and supporters are primarily street activists; youthful nationalists searching for an organisational framework to pursue anti occupation activities, having become disenchanted with what they regard as the PLO's abandonment of the commitment to Independent Statehood, and the armed struggle. At the same time they differ from an older generation of Islamists, in that they are more highly educated with a fair sprinkling of professionals, do not regard themselves bound by an alliance with the Hashemites, are ready and willing to cooperate with other Palestinian factions, and give priority to the nationalist cause. Some observers have gone so far as to comment on the non Islamic character of people attracted to the ranks of the movement.

It is abundantly clear that Hamas has a nationalist rather than an Islamic agenda. It is virtually impossible to come to grips with a substantive Islamic program that it is striving to implement. What must be stressed is that involvement in the Intifada aimed at, and succeeded in, gaining recognition for Hamas as a legitimate Palestinian faction. Unlike other Palestinian factions, the Islamic trend lacked national legitimacy prior to the Intifada. It was only the latter which enabled Hamas to create a presence for itself, one which undoubtedly will carry over into a non Intifada future. Without Hamas, it is unlikely that the Islamic trend would have been able to gain national legitimacy. But this legitimacy was gained as a result of nationalist activity, and not because of a greater receptiveness among a more militant and desperate, Palestinian generation to its religious message. Hamas's political program is essentially the old PLO program of liberation from the river to the sea. Yet while it took the PLO twenty five years, and numerous way stations to submit to an Israeli imposed plan of limited self rule, Hamas, which has only been around since 1988, has exhibited a political pragmatism which has enabled it to traverse a much larger distance. Its approach to the current peace process has been deliberately ambiguous, with its leaders taking a conciliatory and flexible position after Arafat's entry into Gaza. Recent statements by its leaders have indicated a willingness to abide by the rules of international legality thus granting Israel de facto recognition, while at the same time taking a few tentative steps in the direction of the diplomatic process by talking of the possibility of a truce. Meanwhile its alliance with the Damascus based opposition groups is indicative of its continued opposition to the unfolding peace settlement. Hamas as a political movement has become an integral part of the Palestinian political landscape.

It is necessary however not to exaggerate the degree of transformation which has accompanied the reincarnation of the Moslem Brotherhood into the Islamic Resistance Movement. Hamas, as can be seen in its Charter, likes to portray itself as part of a long process stretching back to the Kassam movement in 1935. As far as ideology is concerned, this remains saturated with a vulgar and uninformed anti Semitism which flows directly from 19th century right wing European thought, superimposed on a flawed historical reading of the Prophet Mohammad's antagonistic relationship with the Jewish community in the Arabian peninsula. The Charter betrays a frame of mind which seems to inhabit a different reality while indulging in hallucinations of Munchausian proportions. The Jews are characterised in traditionally Manichaen terms, they are all powerful, "....using their wealth, they (have) unleashed revolutions all over the globe...they are behind the French Revolution and the Communist revolution...through their financial resources they have been able to control the imperialist nations... They were behind the First World War, whereby they destroyed the Islamic Caliphate state...and they are behind the Second World War...they established the United Nations and the Security Council...in order to dominate the world...". (Article 22).

Ahmad's and Abu Amer's study of the Islamic movement provide grist to the mill of Western strategists searching for evidence to bolster up theories of the fast approaching fundamentalist threat. Rashad on the other hand provides a sympathetic account which comes close to advocacy. Of the three studies, Abu Amer"s is the more wide ranging, covering both Hamas and IJ while trying to situate them within the wider Islamic movement. The sections on the Brotherhood and Hamas which make up the bulk of the book confuse rather than illuminate as a result of the inclusion of lengthy references to the history and ideology of the Moslem Brotherhood movement in Egypt and elsewhere. The section on IJ is more self contained and presents a straight forward historical narrative based, with some notable lapses, on what little hard information was available a few years ago. The book is an English translation of a previous work published by the author in Arabic in 1989, to which little has been added. When the book first appeared, it filled a gap by collating the currently available information. Since then, dramatic changes have taken place and in addition to the need to take this into account, it has become necessary to treat the subject more analytically.

Ahmad's volume by contrast is up to date and covers events right up to and including the Hebron massacre. It also contains an English translation of the full text of the Covenant of Hamas. The author however is given to wide exaggerations and the book is full of mistakes and inaccuracies. Yet more glaring for a study published in Jerusalem by a scholar whose native language is Arabic, is the absence of Arabic source material. Disinformation disseminated by the Israeli media is uncritically reproduced. In addition the Author cannot resist the allure of grand theory, thus the assertion that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and by association, the secular left, "Hamas took the stage like a long awaited Messiah"!!

Despite its brevity, Rashad's concise study presents a well thought out account of the Islamic movement. It is balanced, informative and well written. While the author does not disguise his sympathies, he is frank and outspoken in his evaluation of both the Intifada and the Islamic trend. When discussing the establishment of Hamas he states quite openly that the " original leadership... was burdened with the stigma of de facto collaboration with Israel since the Moslem Brothers had postponed till late the liberation of Palestine". When the Intifada started, Hamas members felt an obligation to establish themselves "as revolutionaries on par with the nationalists". He is critical of Hamas's Charter which appeared in August 1988, viewing it as possessing "no real specifics on any issue", and views the public image of Hamas's military prowess as grossly exaggerated. In his view ,operations actually initiated by the "inner circles of Kassam activists are few and far between". While not minimizing the differences between Arafat's PLO faction and the religious nationalists, he characterises the violent clashes which occasionally take place as being often the outcome of " personal grudges... not factional fights", and rightly points out that the rifts between Islamists and nationalists have in the past been often exaggerated. While discussing the Gaza Jericho first agreement, the author stresses that Hamas has been careful to avoid an inter Palestinian conflict, that it will not initiate a confrontation with the nascent Palestinian authority, and that consistent with its pursuit of pragmatic politics, it will probably participate in the coming autonomy council elections. This is the outcome of a finely tuned instinct of self preservation, and casts a shadow on Hamas's claim, supported by the author, that in rejecting participation in the peace process it speaks for the overwhelming majority of Palestinians. In an effort reminiscent of PLO sympathisers in the 1970's and 1980's the author turns his attention to the Western media which has been "exposed to a great deal of misinformed material on Hamas" and attempts to put the record straight. Hamas he informs us has tried to shed its image as a terrorist group, and with this aim in view has sought as early as 1991 a dialogue with Western nations and most importantly with the United States. In this dialogue, it has tried to establish its legitimacy by portraying itself as a militant national movement, but its hostility to the unfolding autonomy project casts it in the role of favoured enemy. In an inflated appraisal of Hamas's strength and popularity Rashad chooses to read the PLO's decision to enter an agreement with Israel as the outcome of a desire to eliminate the Islamic challenge to its authority. He is confident that the projected Palestinian authority will turn out to be a failure. Palestinians will then turn to the Islamic movement, though when they do so this will not be "necessarily out of ideological affinity". If and when that happens this will mark the total transformation of the Islamic movement. The rhetoric might continue to be religious but the politics will be unimpeachably nationalist.