DEMOCRACY AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN JORDAN

M.Jayyusi (ed), Liberation, Democratization, and Transitions to Statehood in The Third World. Muwatin,The Palestinian Institute for The Study of Democracy, Ramallah, Palestine, 1998

PREHISTORY

Jordan's 1989 parliamentary elections seemed to be a bold departure from past political practice and the harbingers of a democratic transition which appeared to confirm that the winds of change, tempestuous, in the aftermath of the changes taking place in Eastern Europe, were blowing world wide. The regional effects of the second Gulf War, and the subsequent unfolding of the Arab Israeli peace process, served to accentuate the belief that the birth of the new world order, at least in this one particular corner of the world, was beginning to manifest itself. It is perhaps necessary to cast a quick glance back to ascertain whether this indeed is a new beginning and represents a clean break with previous political practice.

The unification/annexation of the West Bank in the aftermath of 1948 transformed the political scene in Jordan. Although the 1928 constitution established a legislative council, this was a powerless and ineffectual body(1) and we have to look to the fifties for the real beginnings of a broad based political involvement in the parliamentary process. The 1950 and 1951 elections were characterised by a strong presence of radical political parties which among them managed to win fourteen and eighteen seats respectively out of a forty seat parliament. The new Constitution introduced during the short reign of King Talal in 1952, made the government responsible to parliament and limited the monarch's authority, both in foreign affairs and in legislative matters.(2)

The appointment of Fawzi Mulqi as Prime Minister in May 1953 shortly after the accession of King Hussein to the throne, heralded Jordan's first genuine experiment with Parliamentary democracy.(3) Although Mulqi himself was unable to retain the confidence of the King in the face of mounting pressure from conservative elements, and was forced to submit his government's resignation a year later, the experiment itself , continued till early 1957 when the King decided to terminate it, by forcing the resignation of Suliman Nabulsi's government and mounting a royal coup which drove political parties underground and led to the arrest and exile of political opponents. The primary characteristic of the fifties was that the political process was taking shape as a result of the interaction of contending political forces based in a grass roots movement and reflecting the mood of a regional environment in which the ideas of Arab nationalism, anti imperialism, positive neutrality, and the rest of a hotch potch of ideas which later came to be associated with the label Nasserism , were becoming dominant. For a period which stretched over thirty five years political parties were banned in Jordan, with the sole exception of the Moslem Brotherhood Movement. There were however other false starts, though, strictly controlled and hesitantly applied only to be hastily terminated. The assumption of Wasfi al Tel of the Premiership in January 1962 seemed to herald such a promise. He promised (and carried out ) free elections, announced that political parties would be allowed to operate and declared his intention of giving women the vote. (4) This was perhaps the first attempt at "guided democracy" and soon fizzled out when the regime became embroiled in a clash with Nasser over the Yemen. The absence of legally functioning political parties, and the repression waged against those that went underground created a vacuum, which eventually came to be filled by professional associations, of doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, journalists, etc. (5) The absence of parties transformed these associations into proxies, and the elections for leadership posts within them became measuring posts for the power and influence of the illegal political parties. In the aftermath of the defeat of June 1967 and the regime's loss of legitimacy, a political grouping made up of well known political figures and representatives of the professional associations made its presence felt on the scene (Al Tajamu Al Watani). In 1977 the Council of Professional Unions was established; this body to some extent became a platform for the expression of political concerns, and being the only public bodies which held internal elections , became in the absence of legally functioning political parties and due to the suspension of Parliament the only representative forums. The regime tried to fill the political vacume by creating in 1978 a seventy five member National Consultative Council which it was hoped would substitute for Parliament. It was only in 1984 however that Parliament was reconvened. This was essentially a rump of the representatives who had been elected in April 1967. Fourteen vacant seats had to be filled, but only eight by elections were held in the East Bank. Members for the West Bank were selected by parliament itself. Women participated in elections for the first time.(6) The elections however, were followed by a period of political repression, and did not appear to herald any internal changes. If anything, they were perceived as a manifestation of the regime's continued claim to speak on behalf of the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, and as such, they were a function of Jordan's regional policies.

STATE AND SOCIETY

Various interpretations have been put forward to explain the reasons for the sudden decision to hold elections in 1989 and the subsequent liberalisation. Although the November 1989 elections took place while the ban on political activity and organisation was still in place, there was a marked and gradual relaxation of the application of the martial law regime, and of controls on the press. This culminated in the legalisation of political parties in September 1992.(7) There is no denying the importance of the outbreak of demonstrations and disturbances in Southern Jordan in April 1989. This landmark event which constitutes something of a watershed in the relationship between the Monarchy and indigenous transjordanians, has been put forward by the King himself as the spur which caused him to proceed on the path of democratisation. (8) Some writers, profess to see prior indications "showing that the King and the government had decided to rekindle the democratic experiment which Jordan knew in the fifties", and do not accept that the evens of Ma'an and Karak were the main factor in making for a return to democratic life and political pluralism.(9). Others blame the inability to understand the underlying motives of Jordanian internal politics on a dominant vision of Jordanian politics which tends to explain internal political development as a function of regional conflict.(10) This privileges a narrative which see the democratic opening as primarily the product of Jordanian disengagement from the occupied Palestinian territories announced by the King in July 1988. Since the occupation of the West Bank by Israel in 1967, the regime has maintained that it was impossible to hold elections while a large part of the country was under foreign occupation , and the inhabitants unable to exercise their right to vote. Even after the Rabat summit decision in 1974 and Jordan's seeming acceptance of an Arab consensus which recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, successive Jordanian governments continued to maintain official links with the West Bank and the King's diplomatic activity maintained a viable Jordanian option. The King's declaration on disengagement, itself a response to the Intifada, rendered "caduc"(11) the official excuse of the regime for not holding parliamentary elections.

A myth which has long held sway in Jordan related studies is that the mainstay of the monarchy in Jordan has been and continues to be tribal support.(12) At the same time, it was also held that the Palestinians in Jordan constitute an urban modern middle class, as opposed to tribal Trans Jordanians a group which is traditional and largely passive. Two things preoccupied Jordanian loyalists. The numbers game in relation to the proportion of Palestinians to Jordanians on the East Bank, and the struggle with the PLO over the loyalty of the inhabitants of the occupied west bank. At the same time the official attitude of the regime to Jordanians of Palestinian origin wavered according to the ebb and flow of the relationship with the PLO. Wasfi al Tel, was one of the early proponents of the "East Bank first school" , and despite his early death in 1971, Transjordanian particularism has continued to grow, and can be found among other places in the ranks of functionaries in the Jordanian administration.(13) A narrative which holds to the primacy of internal, local Jordanian factors as the prime cause of the democratic transformation that Jordan has embarked on, must find its explanation in the relationship between state and society in Jordan. And this perforce leads us to examine Jordan's role as a rentier state.

Lane asserts that the relationship between state and society in Jordan has been largely shaped by external factors; Jordan was established as a "security state" and this gave early predominance to the state.(14) The relationship is further complicated by the virtual identification of one communal group with the state and the problematic relationship between the state and its Palestinian citizenry on the one hand, and the latters relationship with the PLO. The state as the largest employer in the country, with nearly 50% of the active labour force on its payroll has played a highly interventionist role. Through its dependence on foreign grants and aid, the state developed a strong allocative role. It distributes money collected from outside donors through expanding the bureaucracy, developing the military and security service, and building an extensive infrastructure. By focusing on cultivating the tribes through state employment, it has appropriated to itself one half of the population and in the process reinforced tribal ties as the key lines to state influence and support.(15) Likewise the small public sector, predominantly Palestinian, was subordinate to, if not parasitic upon the state. Public contracts were a major source of its income, and its prosperity was dependent on the success of the state in soliciting foreign aids and grants.

The proponents of rentier state theory hold that the very nature of the rentier state allows it a degree of autonomy from society, and observe a direct link between sources of revenue, forms of government and the prevalence of democratic demands. Without taxation, there is unlikely to be a demand for representation.(16) Yet as Pool argues, what is discounted here is the political consequences of the inequality of the allocation of resources, the resulting inequality in income and wealth, and the consciousness of this inequality. Social and political protest is a function of these inequalities and is directed against state structures which themselves are responsible for unequal allocation. A distinguishing feature of the events of April 1989 in the south of Jordan has been the physical destruction caused to banks, financial and commercial institutions, and symbols of state authority such as government offices and police stations. (17)

THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

The prolonged political stability that Jordan has enjoyed has been a function of its sustained economic growth which is exclusively based on a high level of foreign grants and aid. Except for phosphate, potash, and other dead sea mineral resources and limited agricultural resources, the country suffers from a scarcity of natural and financial resources, in addition to water. A high rate of population growth, estimated at 3.4% annually (18) has been further compounded by the return of three hundred thousand expatriates (nearly 10% of the population) in the aftermath of the second Gulf War , resulting in added pressure on its limited resources and causing a rapid rise in the rate of unemployment estimated at 20% of the active labour force. (19) This was coupled with the stoppage of aid flows, a disruption of trade, and the loss of remittances.

From the early seventies Jordan's strategy was to develop itself into a provider of skilled manpower and trade related services for the neighboring Arab countries and Jordan’s private and public institutions appeared to function as training centers catering for the gulf labour market.(20) The wealth generated by the high level of aid was utilised to build a comprehensive system of education which allowed Jordan to benefit from the growing oil economies of the gulf, (additionally this has taken the form of remittances from expatriate workers,) and to meet the demand for skilled technical and professional manpower in the oil exporting countries of the gulf, particularly during the period 1974-1982 when oil prices and revenues skyrocketed. Remittances and aid from abroad allowed Jordan to maintain income and consumption at levels that exceeded those that could be expected from the available production capacity of the domestic economy( 21). According to one observer, the opening up of the door to labour migration and employment opportunities abroad helped in avoiding political instability and socially tensions which would necessarily have followed from high rates of unemployment and poverty.(22) Consequently Jordan has been described by some observers as being "an oil economy without oil". By the mid eighties about one third of Jordan's labour force was working abroad, and Jordan achieved full employment. Paradoxically this led to a demand for foreign workers and Jordan was forced to host increasing numbers of expatriate manpower which at times came to represent at least one fourth of the domestic labour force.(23)

By the mid eighties however the picture began to change. The flow of grants from regional countries and the inflows of remittances from expatriates started to decline in the aftermath of the oil price collapse and the authorities in Jordan turned to external commercial and domestic bank borrowing to finance the prevailing level of domestic demand and maintained domestic price stability by a policy of subsidies. There was a drop in the demand for Jordanian agricultural products, the Iran Iraq war began to divert aid to the Iraqi war effort, and Iraq was finding it difficult to pay for its imports. Consequently it became increasingly difficult to pay for the abundant consumer goods and food subsidies which Jordan had enjoyed during the more prosperous years. The outcome was a rapid acceleration in the external debt and in the debt service burden. By 1988 access to external borrowing had virtually ceased. By then, Jordan had become one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world (24).

In response to this impasse Jordan turned to the IMF for help in solving its economic problems. In addition to the application of austerity measures such as the removal of subsidies, the IMF pushed for greater liberalisation in the economy, privatisation, and a reform of the tax system. Policy induced structural weaknesses were seen as contributing to low level of economic performance. Most importantly the tax system was singled as being inefficient(widespread exemptions); demands were made to curtail the high level of military expenditure; to cancel the extensive subsidy program covering basic foodstuffs, energy agricultural production and transportation. It was also pointed out that the agricultural sector with its subsidised water and domestic producer price support contributed to inefficient use of scarce water resources, while production controls on major vegetable crops prevented higher food production and exports. (25) In 1991 Jordan concluded a seven year agreement with the IMF for economic adjustment and recovery. The agreement set annual targets for growth, inflation, the reduction of the budget deficit and control of public spending.(26)

The results have been mixed. Its submission to IMF recommendations has gained Jordan a respite, and it was able to successfully reschedule its debt and its debt servicing payments with its major creditors. (27) In the wake of its enrollment in the peace process $800 million of debt forgiveness was granted , mostly by the United States. But domestically the price has not been inconsiderable. While there has been a recovery in expatriate remittances ($1.5 billion in 1996) and in receipts from tourism, the weight of the IMF induced reforms have hit the poor sections of the population particularly hard. It is estimated that during the period 1986-1992 food prices increased by 78% as a result of the devaluation of the Jordanian Dinar and the reduction or elimination of many food subsidies. Income inequalities increased, especially in the rural areas, while the decline in real expenditure for the poorest 20% of the population is estimated at 36%. At the same time, the share of the population below the poverty line, which in 1980 was estimated at 3% rose to over 20% in 1992.(28)

DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT

The five days of demonstrations and riots which took place in April 1989 were a spontaneous reaction to the austerity measures introduced to try and halt the economic slide to bankruptcy. The demands of the rioters however were not purely economic. The public meetings, letters of protest, and lists of demands submitted to the King focused on what was perceived as a corrupt and irresponsible power elite in Amman. There was no questioning of the role of the Palace or of members of the royal family, an indication that the King’s efforts over the years to create the illusion of distance from domestic political issues were a success.(29) He was seen as an arbiter "above the state". Responsibility for mistaken policies was laid at the door of the Prime Minister and his governing team. Despite initial claims that the disturbances were instigated by the opposition, there was no mistaking the fact that the regime was faced with a new situation. Those very same segments of society which traditionally constituted the pillars of the regime had become disaffected, while at the same time, the traditional trouble spots, the large urban concentrations largely made up of Palestinians, remained quiet. For long reliant on the state sector for their livelihood, and at the same time marginalised economically and politically as inhabitants of rural areas, those were the sectors most vulnerable to cuts in public spending and to the devaluation of the Jordanian Dinar. Some observers would argue that they were probably encouraged by part of the Jordanian establishment, those who were the main beneficiaries of the state’s bounty during the past decade of plentiful and easy money.(30)

Although the Martial Law regime was still operative, the regime felt that in order to ensure stability, a new formula was needed, one which would guarantee the survival of the Monarchy. No longer able to hide behind the argument that parliamentary elections could not be held because of the situation of the Palestinians on the West Bank since the official declaration of Disengagement in July 1988 , it was announced that elections would be held that very same year after an absence of twenty two years. It was further announced that a process of democratisation would be gradually implemented with the aim of legalising political parties and allowing freedom of the press. Elections were held in November 1989 while the ban on political parties was still in force and martial law was still in operation.(31) The results of the elections, touted as the freest since 1956 were a resounding victory for the Islamic trend. Although election turnout was low(32) they managed to win thirty four seats in the eighty seat lower house. For long regarded as an ally of the regime, the Moslem Brotherhood movement unleashed a hostile campaign against the incumbent government of Zaid Rifai accusing it of corruption and holding it responsible for the country’s economic woes. It forged an alliance with one of his successors ,Prime Minister Mudar Badran, who held office in the latter part of 1989, and in January 1991 it formally joined his cabinet and was given seven portfolios.(33) This was in fact a successful move on the part of the regime to coopt the Islamic movement by brining it into the highest levels of the political system.

The King came up with the idea of a National Charter with the aim of defining the relationship between the state and its citizen. It was hoped that this would be the appropriate framework for arriving at a national consensus achieving a re organisation between state institutions and the Jordanian people. In fact this was a deft political move which gave the King the means to balance the power of the Islamic Movement.(34) The left and nationalist parties, though achieving some success at the polls were not an electoral match for the Islamicists. The King appointed a sixty member preparatory committee made up of all the existing political shades in the country and appointed an ex prime minister, Ahmad E’bedat to chair it. By agreeing to participate in the process the members of the committee made an implicit concession: the acceptance of the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy. The Charter was approved in June 1991 and it was understood that it would serve as a supplement to the constitution. Although it was assumed at the time, that the aim of the charter was to set the limits for what is permissible and what is not, it soon became evident that it had served its purpose and was no longer an operative document. Belatedly even members of the preparatory committee themselves arrived at the conclusion that the decision to formulate the Charter was a stop gap measure and was one of many steps taken by the regime to overcome its current difficulties.(35)

The April 1989 uprising created a crisis of legitimacy which appeared to be rapidly overcome as a result of the unfolding of events in the region. The beginning of the peace process, which was facilitated by the King`s support for the establishment of a joint Palestinian Jordanian delegation to attend the Madrid peace talks enabled the King to achieve a large measure of support from among his Palestinian subjects, and according to some observers, allowed him to consolidate an alternative base of support, this time largely urban and Palestinian. Likewise, the position adopted during the Gulf crisis when the state and both nationalists and Islamicists found themselves , perhaps for the first time ever, on the same side of the barricades , enabled the regime to circumvent the reform program demanded in the popular outburst of April 1989.(36)

The period stretching between the elections of November 1989 and those of November 1993 did not noticeably reduce the freedom of action of the state despite the existence of the freely elected parliament and the large number of opposition members within it. Neither the peace talks with Israel nor the economic adjustment agreement with IMF became the main issue, and the Government took advantage of the dissolution of Parliament to change the electoral law without benefit of Parliamentary debate. The change to the one person one vote system was instituted according to the regime, after consultations were held with the broad base of opinion which itself was responsible for the formulation of the National Charter.(37) It became abundantly clear that the continuation of the process of liberalisation and its direction was very much dependent on the will of the King and his close circle of advisors. This was a liberalisation process managed from above with the aim of renewing the social base of the regime and extending it beyond the traditional framework which had for long been its mainstay. Although declaratory statements about greater popular participation continue to be made, the gradual relinquishment of power by the King is not on the agenda. Liberalisation is to be carried out in the context of a continually powerful central authority. Indeed as one prominent member of the Charter's preparatory committee put it the political and economic reform has not weakened the regime but endowed it with additional strength.(38)

THE NATURE OF DEMOCRTATIC TRANSITIONS

The liberalisation process in Jordan has not departed from similar experiences elsewhere. It is based on the readiness of the regime to grant certain freedoms; the freedom to organise, to vote and express opinion and to engage in electoral competition , but it would be a mistake to assume that a great deal of power has been gained by parliaments and by political parties. Governments remain accountable to non accountable forces and centers of power. In Jordan as elsewhere, electoral laws have been designed and constituencies drawn up to ensure that the rulers and the factions associated with them are not marginalised. The King has not lost his position as a result of the elections and indeed has retained the power to forms governments and to direct government policy. Liberalisation has served him well by enabling him to spread the burden of responsibility for the unpopular economic measures which had to be adopted at the behest of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. An elected Parliament, in addition to a Prime Minister and a Government, theoretically accountable to the peoples elected representatives, is now responsible for shouldering the blame for mistaken policies and the unpopular measures which must be adopted to rectify them. Likewise the opening up of the political process to opposition parties has enabled the King to withstand the opposition engendered from within the highest ranks of the former system by the introduction of austerity measures and economic reform. Groups which have been accustomed to economic privilege, high status, and much influence and power have been in the forefront of opposition to the reforms. The appeal to a wider popular constituency has served to fragment the political repercussions of political discontent from the highest echelons of the regime itself. At the same time, the move to a multi party system has provided a mechanism for directing popular opposition to austerity measures into organised ,visible and potentially manageable organisations.

It is perhaps too early to ask whether the regime in Jordan has succeeded in achieving its aims. It is clear nevertheless that the introduction of parliamentary elections and a multi party system has not resulted in a devolution of royal power. The very weakness of the left and nationalist parties and their inability to build a mass membership and create supportive popular trends has convinced the regime of their harmlesness. The politics of containment have proved more successful than the politics of repression. The Islamic Movement, for long associated with the regime, has shown that it recognises the limits imposed by the regime on what is politically permissible, and though vocal, it has not dared to openly challenge the King on fundamental issues. Its recent move in boycotting the Parliamentary elections of November 1997 shows the furthest limit to which it is prepared to go. The uncomfortable coexistence of Jordanians of Palestinian origin and indigenous TransJordanians which to a large extent coincides with the urban rural division, and with the persistence of a strong sense of tribal cohesion which in the past has served Transjordanians well as the privileged wards of a bountiful state, has also given a particular twist to the Jordanian electoral process, which serves to endow the democratisation process with the necessary credentials of legitimacy without in any way diminishing the authority of the King/state. Transitions by their very nature can and do lead to different destinations. The current experiment of guided democracy in Jordan remains firmly in the hands of the King and totally dependent on his pleasure. As the recent amendment to the press laws makes clear(39), the limits of what is permissible and the narrowing or widening of the democratic margin remains a prerogative of a highly interventionist State which is determined not to relinquish its right to manage the democratic process in its very own interests with the sole aim of self preservation.

Notes

1. L.Lane. "Tribesmen as Citizens:"Primordial Ties" and Democracy in Jordan". In L.Lane(ed) Elections in the Middle East:Implications of Recent trends.Boulder, 1987. P.114.
2. Ibid. pp.115-116
3. N.Aruri. Jordan: A Study in Political Development. The Hague. 1972. P.111.
4. Annual Review of 1962. British Embassy, Amman, 9 Jan. 1963; British Embassy, Amman, 20 November, 1962. PRO. FO 371/64085.
5. L.Brand "In the Beginning was the State: The Quest for Civil Society in Jordan" In A.Richard Norton (ed) Civil Society in the Middle East. Vol.1, N.Y. 1995. P.165.
6. Lane. op.cit. p.117.
7. J.Cooper & J.Till. The Road to Democracy in Jordan 1952-1993. Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, London. March 1994. P.18.
8. King Hussein's speech to preparatory committee of the National Charter, 10 April 1990. Reproduced in S.Darweesh, The Democratic Stage in Jordan. Amman. 1990. P.251.
9. M.N.Ajlani. The Democratic Experience in Jordan. Amman. 1995. P.61.
10. T.Tel. "Les Origine Sociales De La Glasnost Jordanienne"/ in R.Bocco & M.R.Djalili. Moyen Orient: Migrations, Democratisation, Mediations. Paris, 1994. P.201.
11. ibid.
12. M.Budeiri. "Poor Kid on the Bloc: The Importance of Being Jordan." Die Welt Des Islam. 1996.
13. Tel, op.cit. p.210.
14. Brand, op.cit. p.152.
15. ibid. p.156.
16. D.Pool "Staying at Home with the Wife:Democratisation and its Limits in the Middle East". In G.Parry & M.Morgan. Democracy and Democratisation in the Third World.London,1994. P.5.
17. H.Abu Rumman. "The Events of the Jordanian Spring Uprising". Al Urdun Al Jaddid. No.14. 1989. Pp.34-46.
18. T.Abu Jaber. Labour Migration in Jordan and its Social, Political & Economic Effects. Amman. August 1997. P.4.
19.Cooper & Till, op.cit. p. 23. Abu Jaber gives the figure of 18.8% for 1991-1993 and 14.2% for 1995, but admits that the real figure is probably higher. P.7.
20. E.Maciejewski & A.Mansur(eds) Jordan: Strategy for Adjustment and Growth. International Monetary fund, Washington, May 1995, p.5; Abu Jaber, p.13.
21. ibid. p.5.
22. Abu Jaber, op.cit. p.20.
23. Abu Jaber, p.3. In 1985 there were 267,000 Jordanian workers employed in the oil exporting countries. Abu Jaber, p.5. In 1994, expatriate workers in Jordan averaged 285,528. These were from Egypt, Syria, and Sri Lanka. 25,000 SriLankan workers were employed as domestic workers. Abu Jaber, p. 16.
24. Maciejewski & Mansur, op.cot. p.7. In 1988, the external debt rose to $8 billion, while scheduled sebt service payments rose to $1.4 billion in 1989. P. 49.
25. ibid. p.8.
26. Cooper & Till. op.cit. p.37.
27. Maciejewski & Mansur. op.cit. pp. 50-52.
28. ibid. p.60.
29. Brand, op.cit. p.180.
30. Tell, op.cit. p.213.
31. Martial Law was lifted in December 1989, while political parties were legalised in Sept. 1992.
32. There are varying figures for the rate of participation. It must be remembered that the army is not allowed to vote, and that expatriates do not vote. Cooper & Till for example, give a figure of 41%.
33. B.Milton-Edwards. A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan. pp. 94, 100.
34. ibid. p.106.
35. H.Dabbas (ed), The National Charter and the Democratic Transition in Jordan. Amman,1997. p.76.
36. Tell, op.cit. p.216.
37. Cooper & Till, op.cit. p.21.
38. Fahd el-Fanek, quoted in Dabbas, op.cit. p.57.
39. A new press law was announced in May 1997 that heavily curtailed press freedoms by requiring newspapers to posses large financial assets. At th same time it introduced the concept of collective responsibility for anything published in a nwespaper. See Al-Quds, 18 May 1997. See also, A.Abu-oudeh, "The Jordanian-Palestinian Relationship". Al-Siyassah Al-Filastiniya. No.14. Spring 1997. Pp. 75-88.