The Emergence Of The Islamic Movement In The Occupied Territories And The Attitude to the Oslo Settlement
(Der Uberblic - Hamburg, December , 4/1995) (German)

The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin on the 4th of Nov 1995 caught observers unawares. Not so the killing less than ten days previously of Dr Fathi Shqaqi, founder and leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, which seemed to be part of the natural order of things. Those who live by the Gun die by the Gun. The same of course can be said of the late Mr.Rabin. Yet the prevailing discourse of a media drunk on theatre and spectacle, erected barriers which militated against the possibility of such symmetry.

To most observers and commentators, the existence of a vibrant, militant, violent and terroristic Islamic movement among the Palestinians is not something which requires examination or speculation. It is encompassed by a prevailing perception of a world wide Islamic fundamentalist onslaught which first made itself felt with the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and continued to court attention with the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt, the violent activities of myriad groups, like Hizbullah in Lebanon, the various Egyptian fundamentalist factions, and the campaign of terror unleashed by the Islamic Salvation Front in the aftermath of its victory in the Algerian elections and its subsequent suppression. Indeed, the awe with which the imagined strength of Islam is viewed led Saddam Hussein on the one hand, in his farcical challenge to an emerging world order he failed to grasp, to splash the cry Allahu Akbar(God is Great) on his banners, while on the other, the world media spontaneously rushed to search for Islamic fundamentalists in the aftermath of the Oklahoma Bombing which led to the death of more than 160 people in the US.

The demise of the "evil empire" has created the need for a new enemy. The rise of non secular opposition movements in various third world countries at this juncture fits in well with the demands of the moment. They are perceived as the irrational products of other cultures; an all engulfing phenomenon, whose roots are not only cultural and religious but perhaps also racial. The fault lines co-incide happily with the divisions of north and south, the haves and the have nots. Little more needs to be added to explain the ideological baggage carried by fanatical suicide bombers, bent on destroying the fragile peace being nurtured by a firmly entrenched Pax Americana.

Even a close look at the dark brew itself, reveals an undifferentiated movement exhibiting an awesome degree of prowess, (from the ability to recruit an endless supply of suicide bombers, to the possession of an American Green Card by Dr Musa Abu Marzouk one of its leaders recently arrested in the US), able to command unlimited media attention (in itself a measure of its presumed importance), and solely responsible for the obstacles placed in front of the peace process (the violent acts carried out being themselves the reason for the Israeli government's inability to move ahead with its projected withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories).

A closer look at the unfolding of events within the Palestinian national movement since 1982 would lend itself to an explanation of the Islamic movements ascendancy which owes more to local circumstances, indeed to Israeli successes, than to world-wide fundamentalist evangelism. Today, Hamas (The Islamic Resistance Movement,) and to a lesser extent, Al Jihad Al Islami, and Hizb Al Tahreer (The Liberation Party) undoubtedly constitute the main body of opposition within the Palestinian national movement in the Israeli occupied territories, including those under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The secular/radical movements which for long attempted to modify and influence the policies of the mainstream leadership of the PLO have lost their effectiveness. Hamas which appeared on the political scene as recently as 1988 has supplanted them in its successful articulation of a rejection of the peace process, which many Palestinians believe will not lead to empowerment and emancipation, let alone affect a change in their material conditions. To comprehend its success in winning a large measure of popular support it is necessary to attempt an account of its progress.

Despite their existence as two distinctly separate entities ,in many ways Hams and Islamic Jihad's story is one and the same. The origins of the Moslem Brothers movement in the country goes back to the forties, when the Centre in Egypt established a branch in Palestine. This however did not attract a noticeable amount of support. After 1948 and the establishment of Jordanian rule in the West Bank the Moslem Brotherhood were the only charitable cum political movement tolerated by the regime. Their hostility to Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism made them natural allies of the Hashemites. In Gaza the fortunes of the Moslem Brothers were closely tied to those of the centre in Egypt. Initially tolerated by the revolutionary regime established in 1952, their opposition activities soon led to their suppression. The movement in Gaza suffered a similar fate but managed to preserve some semblance of organisation.

The new situation created as a result of the Arab defeat of 1967 did not cause the movement to alter its path. If anything it became more introverted, quietest, and inward looking. In the struggle between the PLO and the Jordanian regime for the hearts and minds of the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories, the Moslem Brothers were seen to constitute an integral part of the pro Jordanian camp. As such they were tolerated by the occupation authorities who regarded them as a bulwark against the secular leftist radical organisations of a Guevarist bent which were spawned in the post 1967 period.

The official conversion of the Moslem Brothers to militant political activity came with the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987, and the appearance of Hamas on the scene as a combative grass roots organisation competing with groups within the PLO umbrella,(eg. Fath, the Popular Front and the Democratic Front, the Communist party). For the first time in the history of the occupied territories, the Islamic trend came to posses a nationalist legitimacy. The establishment of Hamas was however the culmination of a transformation which has been brewing within the ranks of the Islamic movement for the past decade. For far too long the Moslem Brothers had the Islamic field to themselves. There was indeed another Islamic party, Hizb Al Tahreer which was established in the fifties in the West Bank and sprouted offshoots in the neighbouring Arab countries. It was a secretive and more inward looking organisation than the brotherhood itself. This was a highly ideological movement whose activities centred on the need to re-establish the Islamic Khilafa (the Caliphate had been abolished by Attaturk in the early Twenties), and which perceived its primary task to be the religious and moral preparation of the Moslem community. This did not prevent its leaders from dabbling in unsavoury political dealings involving giving their support to feuding political officers in the coup ridden environment of the fifties and early sixties. During the long years of occupation they were conspicuous by the absence of their participation in any form of confrontation with the Israelis. As such they did not constitute a threat to the Moslem Brothers claim, when this was eventually made, to embody the Islamic voice of Palestinian nationalism.

The real challenge came from within the ranks of the Moslem Brothers themselves and took shape in the form of a split carried out in the early 1980's by a small radical group which assumed the name of Islamic Jihad. This group of young activists centred round Fathi Shqaqi saw their role models in the combative radical Islamic groups which took centre stage in the seventies and early eighties. The Afghan Mujahedeen, the Islamic resistance in Southern Lebanon, the Egyptian Islamic groups, and not least in the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Not aspiring to became a mass party, they established a small and effective secret organisation which carried out daring attacks on the Israeli army, and themselves became an inspiration and a role model both for the Brotherhood and for the members of the more radical Palestinian groups. Their very success lay in radicalising the traditional Islamic movement and in forcing the Brotherhood to itself engage in the anti occupation struggle. Thus the split of the Jihad radicalised the Moslem Brothers, while the outbreak of the Intifada presented them with the choice of enrolling in the struggle as a nationalist political force or being consigned to political oblivion.

Paradoxically they threw themselves into the fight at about the same time that the PLO, recognising its increasing impotence, was becoming convinced of the need to salvage whatever could be pried out of the hands of a creeping Israeli annexation. The intifada culminated in the PLO's public espousal of a two state solution, which the Madrid process, culminating in the Oslo agreement, reduced to a limited application of self rule, with all the central issues, like Jerusalem, settlements, and final solution, pushed to a future date.

Hamas aligned itself with ten other Palestinian organisations in opposing the Oslo accord signed in Sept 1993. While most of the groups exhibited verbal apposition, Hamas and the Jihad have translated their words into action. Official figures give the number of Israelis killed since the signing at Oslo, at 149. Jihad and Hamas have followed divergent strategies. The former has exhibited little interest in conducting a political struggle which involves the use of violent means. Violent methods are themselves the means to bring about an Israelis withdrawal. The organisation had carried out a spectacular attack in January 1995 in which 21 Israeli soldiers were killed, while another suicide bombing in April resulted in eight deaths. Since then little has been heard of it until the recent suicide attacks in the Gaza strip(2nd Nov) in the aftermath of the killing of its leader. Not aspiring to play a political role, it has little to say about Arafat's Palestinian authority in Gaza. Recently however, one of its leaders in the strip, after a stint in Arafat's jails, came out with a call to reassess the use of violence, and to avoid confrontation with the self rule authority. For their part, officials in Arafat's authority have stated that a verbal agreement exists with Jihad whereby it will not carry out attacks from within the areas controlled by the Palestinian authority in order to forestall any Israeli attempt to postpone redeployment.

Hamas on the other hand is open about its bid for power within Palestinian society. Even since before Arafat's arrival in Gaza it has engaged in a dialogue with Fath, the dominant political force within the PLO, in pursuit of an accommodation which will allow it to translate popular support into meaningful political gain. At the same time it persists in its campaign of periodic suicide bombing which it likes to think, is holding the peace settlement to ransom. One thing is beyond doubt however, its popularity and support are based not so much on its militant program, but on its militant activism and perceived military prowess. Arafat has used the various weapons available to him to bring the movement to heel. He has arrested its top leaders, banned its publications, arrested its activists (estimates speak of 600 members in jail), created rival Islamic organisations in an effort to split the Islamic movement. More recently, he has released its top leaders from his jails, persuaded the Israeli authorities to grant some of its leaders permits to travel abroad to consult with the external leadership of the movement, met with its leaders repeatedly in Gaza, Malta and Amman, and expressed readiness to accept a pluralism of parties. In return he has certain conditions: first and foremost, there can be no pluralism of authority; in other words Hamas has to recognise the legitimacy of his authority, and has to abide by the provisions of the agreements he has signed with the Israelis, i.e. to refrain from carrying out violent activities.

The inability of Hamas and the other opposition organisations to halt the process ushered in by Oslo has led to a change in tactics. Hamas has in the last couple of months been extremely conciliatory in its public pronouncements and has been pressuring Arafat to conduct a dialogue which will lead to the creation of a framework of co-operation between it and the Palestinian authority. At the centre of this is the recognition of the legitimacy of Arafat's rule, the readiness to participate in elections, and the cessation of armed activities. Various spokes persons have been making statements to the effect that if the Movements aims can be realised without violence, then violence will cease as it is merely a means and not an aim. At the same time, Dr. Mahmoud Al Zahar the Movements main spokesperson in Gaza, has recently stated that while peace with Israel is not acceptable, a truce is possible. This he opined can last for days, months, or years !!

It is clear that Hamas pursues a policy of not engaging in confrontation with the military and bureaucratic apparatus established by the Palestinian Authority. Even when they have been subjected to military attack (the shooting of 13 of their supporters outside a Mosque and the wounding of more than 150 in Nov 1994,) they have chosen not to respond. The current implementation of redeployment, with Arafat projected to extend his authority to nearly 30% of the territory of the West Bank gives added urgency to Hamas's attempts to come to an understanding with the Palestine Authority. All attempts to wreck the peace process have floundered. Indeed, Hamas, which has exhibited a keen sensitivity to public opinion, has publicly welcomed the achievements of the peace process. It could not act otherwise. Its objection has been to the price exacted. Pragmatic as it is, it realises that its patent failure to influence the unfolding peace process by confronting the Palestinian Authority, necessitates a change in tactics. It will be forced into the political wilderness if it does not arrive at an accommodation with Arafat. With the elections for the Autonomy Council coming in the spring of 1996, possibly even in January, Hamas will have to make up its mind soon what kind of accommodation it is prepared to engage in. Time however is running out and it is not dealing from a position of strength. In the aftermath of the assassination of Rabin, the internal workings of the Israeli political system might afford it a breathing space, but it is becoming increasingly clear that Arafat is now setting the pace and Hamas has a choice of falling in line or being driven to the margins of Palestinian politics, a fate which has already befallen the Damascus based Palestinian groups which have stood opposed to the emerging new regional order.