Palestinian Discourse On The Intifada
(Al-Quds, 3 July 1991 - Arabic)
A distinctive feature of the Palestinian discourse on the Intifada is an exaggerated triumphalism and self admiration, linked to the absence of any critical evaluation which can answer the central question: where has the intifada arrived at and in what direction is it evolving ? Nothing else can explain the negative features which have become rampant inside the occupied territories ( this is not the place to review the negative features of the outside). These express themselves through a practice which refuses to discuss negative features, or to review past failures ( the tax issue, absence of organisation, boycott of civil administration, civil disobedience, retreat of democratic concepts, growth of fundamentalist forces), the adoption of contradictory policies, and the progressive lowering of the ceiling of political demands, as a result of the exaggerated importance given to the imperative of winning the media battle and appearing "moderate", according to western diplomatic and media standards, especially American ones.
The time has come to answer two central questions:
Since the beginning of the Intifada, and due to the feeling of despondency within the Palestinian national movement as a result of the expulsion from Lebanon and the consequent dispersal, in addition to the state of division and internal fighting, plus the realisation that the Arab regimes gave priority to the Iraq-Iran War, (while for others the cause of the "mujahedeen" in Afghanistan was of greater import), there was a general attitude both inside and outside the occupied territories which saw the Intifada as the midwife which will lead to the expulsion of the occupation and the realisation of independence. A celebratory atmosphere prevailed similar to that which obtained in Amman prior to the war of September 1970, and in the immediate aftermath of the October war in 1973. The absolute belief in the ability of subjective factors to transform the balance of forces was the basis which led to the appearance of this trend, and to the consequent feeling of despondency. It is an undeniable fact that the Intifada has played an important role in transforming the balance of forces in the international arena and among the Israelis themselves, but this change was not and could not by itself be sufficient to effect a radical transformation which would allow the realisation of the minimum level of Palestinian demands as these have been expressed in the decisions of the Palestinian National Council meeting in 1988.
The prevailing feeling now, that the Intifada is unable to realise independence, leads to a readiness to treat seriously with the various autonomy schemes, while creating new innovations in the shape of transitional arrangements, like the calls for the imposition of an "international mandate" on the occupied territories, or the calls for the formulation of a new "Balfour Declaration" for the Palestinians. The other side of the coin expresses itself in the inward turn and the spread of internal violence as a result of the feeling of impotence vis a vis the dead end which has been arrived at.
The Intifada has achieved a number of aims, despite the fact that these aims are not on par with the exaggerated expectations which did not take into account the actual potential of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and the effect of two main factors on their ability to continue and to escalate the struggle. First, the measures taken by the occupation authorities to arrest the Intifada and to contain it.
Second, the political initiatives of the Palestinian leadership (PLO) which all along insisted on directing the daily battle against the occupation from thousands of miles away via the telephone and the fax machine, and did not allow the organisational development of the frameworks and structures of the Intifada.
The outbreak and continuation of the Intifada for nearly four years has led to a number of achievements; strengthening the Arab and International standing of the PLO, abolition of Jordanian claims, attraction of the media, the creation of a positive attitude internationally to the demand for ending the occupation and setting up an independent state, and strengthening the Palestinian peoples identity and self confidence inside the occupied territories. At the same time it has forced the US to deal with the PLO in an attempt to forestall the spread of the contagion to neighbouring Arab states, and to show the seriousness of its claims of working for a peaceful resolution of the problem. Among large sections of the Israeli public it has re opened the issue of the future of the occupied territories, and created the recognition, that the Palestinian problem is not merely "the Arab Israeli conflict", and that the Palestinians are the main partner with whom a political solution is to be achieved; it has in addition, given legitimacy to the borders of June 1967 between Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories and abolished the state of normalisation which had been in existence for the past twenty years.
The continuation of the Intifada for nearly four years without realising the expected gains has led to the appearance of negative features. A new political reality now obtains, organically linked not merely to the event of the Intifada itself, but also to the global changes represented by the end of the cold war and the advent of a new uni polar world order, and the regional changes exemplified by the Gulf War which has shown the extent of the dependency of all the Arab regimes on American power on the one hand, and their readiness to acquiesce in the reality of American hegemony in the region. The result is the absence of an Arab role in the current situation, which is the main basis internationally for the Palestinian national movement (though some continue to have illusions about a European role) without which nothing can be achieved.
Israeli political and military polices have succeeded, as a result of the transformation in the international scene, in addition to Palestinian inability to create the appropriate organisational frameworks and the local leadership able to lead the daily struggle (this continues to have a spontaneous nature), all these have led to the arrest of the Intifada and its containment, by re imposing Israel's authority on the course of every day life and renewing the hegemony of the bureaucratic institutions of the occupation, arriving at a level of co existence with the remaining manifestations of the Intifada which is acceptable to it. The Intifada has now retreated to two main features, the commercial strike and internal violence, whether in its "legitimate" form, the attacks on collaborators, or its illegitimate form, the absence of security, the spread of thefts, and clashes between the various components of the national movement and the religious groups. A new feature worthy of note, and which is regarded by some as a fundamental part of the Intifada in its "mature" stage, is embodied in the building of institutions, which in reality are a deformed duplication of the Palestinian institutions which filled Lebanon during the period of the Palestinian presence there, (with the obvious differences,) and among which is the increasing attention paid to economic development schemes, and the growing appetite among certain social strata as a result of the activities of the donor states.
Some features deserving criticism:
The spread and continuation of the spontaneous nature of mass and individual activities is the main characteristic which was and remains a central feature of the Intifada. This was understandable in the first few months, but its continuation in the fourth year expresses the inability (or unwillingness) of the organised political forces to play a leading role, and expresses the wide gulf between the prevailing mood among the people, and the political calculation of professional politicians. The latter have always pre occupied themselves with looking outside (the Palestinian leadership in Tunis, the Israelis, the international public, decision makers in Europe and the US), and immersing themselves in Media related activities (which have been transformed into diplomatic activity) in the absence of organisational and political educational activity. The main feature of all prevailing activity of this political strata is its lack of seriousness and respect vis a vis the Palestinian public.
Members of the Palestinian Intelligentsia and technocrats have assumed central place as spokespersons of the Intifada. They have been baptised (and indeed have baptised themselves) with the quality of "moderation" by the foreign media which played an important role in elevating them, in opposition to the Palestinian collective (both inside and outside) which is seen to constitute the opposite of "moderation". What unites this group of "moderates" is their attitude to the US as the awaited Messiah and its plans & initiatives, and a program (if any) devoid of any legitimacy as a result of a readiness to engage positively with all suggested political solutions, and their transformation into a "middle man" between the Palestinian leadership abroad and the American negotiators. If this was already clear before the Gulf war, the inability of the local leadership to play any leading role internally ( and its awaiting instructions from the outside), it has become after the Gulf war and Baker's visits to the region, the official spokespersons for all Palestinian under occupation. And ready to carry on a dialogue with all American proposals aiming at creating the suitable conditions to apply Shamir's plan for a kind of autonomy scheme in association with Jordan, and concluding peace with the Arab states.
After four years of the Intifada, there has been no transformation in the internal structure of Palestinian society, and it has become clear that the belief that "the battle for Independence cannot be separated from the struggle to strengthen democratic political and social rights within Palestinian society" has been overthrown. What is now evident is the absence of any political role for those social strata who have suffered most as a result of the economic and political measures of the occupation, and those who constitute the backbone of mass political activity, whether the inhabitants of the refugee camps, or workers and peasants. What has taken place is a consecration of the role of the political bureaucracy and those groups suited to benefit most from the new conditions, whether in the economic, developmental, or media spheres. The intense Media generated atmosphere has led to a preoccupation with meetings , interviews, dialogues, celebratory meetings with foreign delegations, and not least intensive travel abroad.
In the field of economy and the building of institutions, the main preoccupation is the drawing up of all sorts of schemes in an attempt to acquire some of the funds earmarked for the occupied territories, whether by Palestinian bodies abroad, or European and international agencies. The Intifada has created a new and profitable field of activity for a particular social strata whose ranking whether in the productive sphere, or in the struggle for independence is near to zero, and whose dominant feature is best characterised as " parasitic".
The currently prevailing atmosphere is not only devoid of any democratic or progressive content, but has also witnessed a retreat in the role and standing of women, and in the educational process . As for religious intolerance, the power and influence of the religious trend has grown despite the fact that it does not possess any clear political or social program (the little that does exist is diametrically opposed to the aim of Independence, the establishment of a state, and political pluralism) while there is a manifest inability or perhaps "unwillingness" of the nationalist forces to confront it.
What is required is a new attitude to the Intifada which elevates it to a long and continuing project, with the aim of tiring and attritionning the Israeli occupation, and to create the tools enabling it to perform this role. This requires an upgrading of the co ordination framework between all active political forces to more than an agreement to issue a monthly call to action specifying strike days and calling for various activities against the occupation. What is required is a co ordination of a different kind leading to laying the basis and the organisational forms in order to give direction and leadership to the masses of the Intifada in two spheres, the political and the direct daily struggle. What is required is for the Unified National Command to become a real leadership, not merely a symbol on a leaflet which is distributed monthly and whose task is to announce the days of commercial strikes, but a tool for organisation and political education through the activation of inter linked local committees covering the whole of the occupied territories, and working for deepening the conscious actions of the Palestinian people wherever they are, and to avoid falling in the trap of American and Israeli schemes which aim at dealing only with the Palestinians of the occupied territories in isolation from the national problem of the Palestinian people which is not merely one of ending the occupation, but of realising a just solution for the Palestinians in their various disasporas, guaranteeing their right of return to what is left of Palestine, which is the property of all the Palestinian people and not merely the current inhabitants of the occupied territories.
In order to achieve this it is necessary to oppose American strategy which aims at utilising meetings with Palestinians in order to create a split between the inside and the outside, and to produce a leadership for the Palestinians under occupation, or spokespersons, who can be mobilised to realise "half a solution", which will be portrayed as a step leading to a "kind of independence". The continuation of the present state of affairs, the absence of a leadership and a clear political direction, will lead necessarily to self destruction, while the "seasonal" violent outbreaks will only strengthen the position of the "negotiators", irrespective of their inability to direct or control events. Despondency and self exhaustion, will make it possible to produce a political solution - if not acceptable, this will be portrayed as " the only possible solution in the prevailing conditions", and this means in the final analysis the loss of all the gains of the Intifada, and another defeat for the national struggle.
