The Palestine Problem after the Gulf War and its Illusions

Al-Hayat (London), 21, April 1991 (Arabic)

Re appraisals are never easy. There will always be voices insisting on the inappropriateness of time, circumstances, conditions, or current stage. In the light of this, Ghassan Khattib's article ( Al Quds, 5 March 1991) is a courageous, albeit shy, attempt to open a much needed discussion. While indicating the need for both a re appraisal both of past political performance and the new realities yet to emerge in a post-Gulf war Middle East, Al-Khattib contents himself with hints rather than frank characterisations, and his approach is coloured by an over emphasis of the centrality of the Palestinian- Israeli conflict in the emerging Pax Americana in the region, a fact alas, not borne out by reality. What follows is an attempt to formulate tentative ideas on the agenda he has set , without however, delving into larger issues which merit a separate discussion.

Reappraisal of past performance

Palestinian political activity has been characterised by pragmatism. Since before the Declaration of Independence (Algiers 1988), and increasingly afterwards, the Palestinian leadership has striven to align itself with the "moderate" Arab camp composed of Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, with the aim of gaining American recognition as a responsible party ( to the conflict), interested in " conflict resolution", an of shedding the image of radicalism which it was led to believe stood at the core of American rejectionism.

In partnership with Iraq, it was instrumental in working for the re-admission of Egypt, despite its continued adherence to Camp David, to the Arab fold. Since the ejection from Beirut in 1982, the Palestinian leadership exerted its utmost ( aided by the Syrian regime's efforts to extend its hegemony over the Palestinians) to distance itself from Syria, the symbol of Arab radicalism and the rejection of a "peaceful solution" to the Arab Israeli conflict ( opposition to the Israeli Lebanese Accord, the pursuit of strategic parity, sponsorship of terrorist groups).

The support extended to Iraq in the seven months since August 1990 represents a volte face which though difficult to comprehend, can only be understood as the outcome of impatience, and umbrage at the rejection of its overtures to be accepted as a legitimate negotiating partner, and a pursuit of the same flawed pragmatism which led it to believe that another route to the negotiating table could be found through linkage with the Gulf crisis. The political pay-off would come in the shape of a negotiated settlement between Iraq and the US which would address itself to Palestinian grievances.

In addition to totally misunderstanding the nature of the conflict and the American determination to extend a Pax Americana in which there is no room for more than one regional strategic partner/asset, Israel, the Palestinian leadership also did not understand that, as a weak player striving to be admitted to the game table, it could not afford to play a role approximating even that played by King Hussein of Jordan. Positive neutrality in favour of Kuwait and the US-led alliance was perhaps the most extreme position it could have afforded to adopt in its opposition to the war unleashed on Iraq. In mitigation, it could be argued that after the US severed its dialogue with the Palestinians, and proved unwilling to force PM shamir to honour his own proposals for negotiations about negotiations whose projected end result would be a watered-down version of the autonomy scheme established at Camp David, the Palestinian political leadership felt it had little to lose by hitching its star to the Iraqi regime's adventure in the Gulf. Yet, since 1974, the Palestinian political leadership has been acting out its role with its eyes increasingly fixed on the international gallery (even more so after 1982), while since 1988, its hot pursuit of diplomacy signalled its recognition that the various Arab regimes wanted to make their peace with Israel (Egypt being the trend setter, but also indicated by the decisions adopted at the 1982 Fez Summit), and that the Arab Israeli conflict had been reduced to its Palestinian-Israeli components. The attempt of the Iraqi regime to pose as the champion of Arab rights and its manipulation of the Palestine issue to justify and perpetuate its occupation of Kuwait, seemed to promise a possible way to arriving at the negotiating table. (Syria had attempted the same ploy in Lebanon. This however was partly at the expense of the Palestinians themselves, thus its Arab nationalist rhetoric did not avail it). Nevertheless, it was clear to the majority of Palestinians that linkage was merely a fig leaf used by the Iraqi regime, and that it was little more than a handy expedient. Yet linkage was accepted, more out of desperation than the outcome of trust in the sincerity of the Iraqi claim. This understandable emotional reaction on the part of the Palestinians, became a grave political error when their political leadership fell under the spell of the same illusions entertained by the Iraqi leadership.

Outlining The Features Of The Coming Stage In The Light of Post-War Reality

This has been a war of victors and vanquished. No amount of rhetoric or bravado can hide this fact. By aligning itself with the Iraqi regime the Palestinian cause has undoubtedly suffered a public relations setback, and a loss in the international standing of its political leadership. Yet it is important to remember that this war was fought against Iraq and its Baathist regime, not against the Palestinians, and that it is the Iraqi regime which has been defeated and the Iraqi people who have been made to pay the price, not the Palestinian people.

The approaching stage is one of open collaboration between a number of key Arab states to facilitate American hegemony in the region. This has been the trend since before August 1990. The policies pursued by Sadat and his successors were unashamedly premised on this as a desired end, as was the close collaboration which grew during the years of the Iran-Iraq war between Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. Iraq itself was instrumental in bringing to a halt the spreading march of the Islamic Revolution, an endeavour which earned it the support of the US and its allies( this took the form of financial support from the Gulf states and the Saudis, and the transfer of weapons and weapons technology from the West).

The internal turmoil in the USSR has brought about its demise as a superpower and forced its withdrawal from the region, a fact quickly recognised by the Syrian regime, which accounts for "the new political thinking" in Damascus. Another novel feature is the collapse of the thin veneer of Arab consensus as symbolised by the Arab League and the never-ending rounds of Arab summitry, coupled with the open admission of the ruling social and political strata in Egypt, Saudia, and the Gulf statelets that their continued hold on power depends on direct American military intervention and support. It is only to be expected, however, that sooner rather than later, the framework of the Arab League will be re-activated (with American blessings) in the hope that the new axis formed by America's dependants and allies will set the tone for its future course.

As for the Palestinians, their strengths and weaknesses will not differ greatly. Their main strength lies in Israel's rejection of any compromise requiring the surrender of territory, and its insistence on an Arab surrender Sadat style. In addition, there is the existence of five million Palestinians, 1.7 million of whom live under Israeli occupation. They will not go away. The continuation of the uprising and the support extended to its political leadership, however unwelcome this might be to others, will force itself on even those Arab regimes who would like to wash their hands of the whole problem. Yet no single Arab ruler can afford to come out openly against the rights of the Palestinians and the justness of their struggle to achieve national independence (witness the increasing number of statements to this affect in recent days by Kuwaiti officials). The Palestinian's weakness as always, lies mainly in the Arab regimes, and the Herculean task of impelling them in their now overt dependence on the US for their physical survival, to put pressure on the American administration to rein its most important client state in the region, and use its pronounced leverage (increased as a result of the Gulf war) to make Israel comply with UN resolutions and international legitimacy. Thus the main weakness of the Palestinians remains where it has always been; in the Arab dimension. The mobilisation of the Arab regimes has always been the necessary pre-condition for the realisation of Palestinian political aims.

There is another threat which has been accentuated by the outcome of the Gulf War. Even before Aug 1990, both Israeli and American policy makers were adamant about reducing the Palestine problem to a resolution of the status of the West Bank & Gaza Strip and their inhabitants. Thus the emphasis on "authentic Palestinians", "local leadership" , and the holding of elections to select a group acceptable to Israel to negotiate whatever agenda Israel and American find agreeable. It is only to be expected that more feverish attempts will now be made to fashion such an "alternative leadership". In all probability the search will prove fruitless, but extra care is necessary to thwart the driving of a wedge between the "inside" and the "outside". This is not to deny the necessity of a political leadership within the occupied territories to give concrete expression to the on-going struggle against the occupation, while taking into account the larger picture and remaining cognisant of the fact that the task is not merely one of ending the occupation, but of realising national rights and achieving statehood. The absence of such a leadership has created a vacuum which has been specially noticeable during the last couple of months. Some form of electoral process must be found to give expression to the vibrant mass movement which for the last 3 years has been able to sustain itself, despite the absence of an organised leadership. (This is not to denigrate the various spokespersons that the media has deemed fit to appoint as leaders, but their activities are mostly of the diplomatic type and are predominantly media oriented. What is required is something completely different).

To Take The Initiative

There are three possible frameworks through which the Palestinians can act to redress the existing imbalance of power. First, the Soviets. Now and for the foreseeable future the Soviets are not major league players. We no longer live in a bipolar world with two superpowers locked in mortal combat (thus the idea of an international conference which was predicated on Soviet leverage is no longer very meaningful). Second, the Europeans. If past performance is a guide to the future, the Europeans, despite verbal declarations which attest to a position more amenable to a just settlement based on the balancing of Israel's security needs with Palestinian rights, will not deviate from the line prescribed by the US. Within the European camp, there are the extremes of Britain and France- the first playing the role of American Trojan Horse (and not only vis a vis the Palestinian issue), the other consistently supporting Palestinian rights, yet unable to carry with it a Europe which has its own independent political agenda. The Gulf War has shown that the Middle East is primarily an American show, both in terms of the insignificant forces that the various European countries contributed to the military campaign, and of the share allocated to European firms in the coming bonanza of lucrative contracts to rebuild what modern military technology has destroyed. The Third framework is the Arab regimes. Their willingness and ability to act is directly proportional to the strength of the various popular movements within their respective countries and the ability to of organised social and political forces to bear pressure. It is in this field that the Palestinians can exert the most pressure, but only if there is a change in the policies which they have traditionally pursued. What is required is a two-track policy, not one which ignores grassroots political forces and concentrates, to the exclusion of all else, on cultivating relations with the various ruling cliques(necessary though this is).

The Algiers PNC produced a "vibrant initiative" which must be adhered to, but Palestinians cannot don the robes of magicians, producing at will an infinite number of white rabbits from a hat. More importantly the time has perhaps arrived when it is necessary to review the idea of an international conference predicated on two super powers acting out their own rivalries by supporting two minor contenders. The US in its pursuit of its strategic interests in the Gulf has seen fit to shroud itself in the mantle of the UN and international legitimacy. The Palestinians should seize on this and turn to the UN as the forum responsible for bringing about a resolution of the conflict in the spirit of its own decisions and resolutions. Rather than waiting for the US to broker an agreement in line with Israel's own agenda, the struggle should be shift to the UN where the US and Israel are increasingly isolated as rejectionist powers refusing to abide by the decisions of the international community and its organised expression, the UN, which is being heralded as the foundation of the as yet unborn "New World Order".

Clarity And The Abandonment of Generalities/Ambiguities

The clarity and precision that is required pertains to what has already been agreed to at Algiers, (which remains vague and open to numerous interpretations; this is not only what the Israelis claims, but applies to the Palestinians themselves). Constructive ambiguity may have its uses in diplomacy, but not when it comes to putting forth national demands and trying to mobilise international support for a just settlement. The Algiers Declaration of Statehood laid down a framework based on the concept of partition and signalled a coming to terms with the existence of Israel. What is required now, is to give credibility to this political option by dealing with specifics (e.g. the right of return, Israeli settlements in the projected state, relations with Israel, the political and economic nature of the link with Jordan, the issue of de militarisation and security guarantees, projections for the repatriation and absorption of returnees, to name only a few). The seriousness of the Palestinians commitment to a two state solution needs to be continuously re-affirmed in the face of Israel's attempts to cast doubts on its sincerity, and to instil into Palestinian national consciousness the finality of this historic compromise. One way to do this is by endowing the skeleton with flesh.

The same applies to the projected negotiating process itself. Authoritative voices must make clear what the Palestinian position is, rather than give free rein to the confusion which abounds each and every time the other side sends up a trial balloon. Likewise, in the selection of negotiators, it is time to stop accepting the division of "inside Palestinians" and "outside Palestinians", as if geography rather than political and organisational affiliation are the necessary prerequisites for representative spokespersons. This will be facilitated by driving home the fact that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are a part of a larger whole, and that legitimate national rights do not only pertain to that section of the Palestinian people living under occupation. The Palestinians have a political leadership, recognised by the UN and the majority of its member states; it is up to the Palestinians to influence, change or transform their leadership, but it must be made absolutely clear that there is no "job vacant" announcement waiting to be filled by applicants sponsored by Arab regime, the United States, or Israel.

Limit Negative Consequences of The Gulf Crisis on Living Conditions

There is no doubt that the economic dimension is an important component of the Palestinians struggle for survival. Material necessity forced over one hundred thousand Palestinians to seek employment in Israel. Despite crass exploitation and the human indignities heaped upon Palestinian workers, this source of livelihood remains imperative. It is also a right. So long as Israel stifles all attempts at independent economic growth, and treats the West Bank & Gaza as captive markets, the Palestinians have the right to seek employment where ever they can find it. The occupation authorities have a responsibility to ensure the economic well being of the inhabitants so long as they maintain their control over the territories. This should be the message carried to the UN and the European Community. The re-imposition of the so called green line is welcome if Israeli authority recedes with it, but so long as the occupation continues then it remains a basic right of Palestinians to seek employment where ever they may find it and to struggle for non discriminatory pay and work conditions. Two things must be crystal clear. First, economic salvation cannot come from outside, second, economic development under occupation is a contradiction in terms. What is imperative is to strive for a level of subsistence commensurate with the West Bank & Gaza's productive capacity, and to fashion living and consumption habits accordingly. The fact of the matter is that this is a Third World country, and one which is under occupation. The sooner this fact is recognised and people adjust their horizons to accommodate it, the better use will be made of their energies and limited resources. For a number of years after 1967 the amount of funds channelled to the inhabitants from the outside were meagre. More recently large funds have been flowing in from a wide variety of sources. Yet there has been little change in the economic infrastructure. Charity has its uses and there always be deserving recipients. But in the absence of meaningful vistas for economic development (and the occupation will ensure that non exist), the proliferation of development agencies can only serve the interests of a narrow social strata feeding of these funds, leading to waste and corruption.

Despite the outcome of the Gulf War, a number of fallacies and illusions, some of which pre date August 1990 still abound, and it is necessary to discard them.

First, in the short term, there are no great powers; there is only one super power which has just passed its baptism of fire. We might be heading towards a multi polar world, with a rejuvenated Soviet Union, a United Europe and Japan as the world's predominant economic powers, but, for the time being this is not so. Despite its numerous internal maladies, America's own self image is that of victor in the global contest with the USSR, and its military foray in the Gulf is a fortaste of the New World Order it will attempt to fashion.

Second, the Gulf War was not a Palestinian war. Despite lingering beliefs to the contrary, it has not resulted in "organic linkage", it has not brought "new urgency to solve the Palestine problem", nor has it "brought great gains" and returned the Palestine question to number one status in the region.

Third, the Palestinians do not exist and act in a power vacuum, nor do they have an unlimited number of options open to them. In the short run, they will have to retrench and wage a defensive struggle. Advocating future action based on "political skill", "speedy action", and "vibrant political initiatives" smacks of voluntarism. There is an objective balance of forces which dictates what is and what is not possible, and like other political actors, the Palestinians suffer from limitations and constraints and an unfavourable balance of forces which in the foreseeable future will be marginally worse. Media coverage should not become the litmus test of success or failure.