“The Shin Bet, Army Intelligence and the Mossad find themselves facing a formidable challenge in Hizbullah, which has honed itself into a toughened, skilled and highly trained organization. Fifty years from now, perhaps, when the most highly classified intelligence files are unsealed, the true extent of “Israel’s” ignorance about what was happening in Lebanon in the 1990s in general, and within Hizbullah in particular, will become clear. For now, this intelligence void has left “Israel” blind in its efforts to combat Hizbullah, and “Israeli” soldiers are paying for this failure with their lives. Now, for the first time, a veteran of the intelligence corps and his colleagues in the intelligence community have revealed the scope of the problem. “Israel” is unable to recruit agents from within Hizbullah. But Hizbullah - called Moqawama ("Struggle, Resistance") by its own fighters - is recruiting plenty of assistants in southern Lebanon, including members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA)** who supply it with information on the IDF. Hizbullah also monitors IDF radio frequencies and the telephone lines of the “Israeli” General Staff, while maintaining radio silence itself”.
“Without solid intelligence, military offensives cannot be undertaken and enemy plans cannot be effectively subverted. In 1998, the IDF was involved in 1,200 confrontations with Hizbullah in Lebanon; Hizbullah initiated the vast majority of these (from 90 to 95 percent, according to data from the defense establishment). The ongoing delinquency of “Israeli” intelligence has turned IDF soldiers - who are on the job 24 hours a day - into sitting ducks. The enemy, on the other hand, only become soldiers when drafted into action for a specific operation. Between military activities, Hizbullah fighters go back to being citizens "protected by the Grapes of Wrath understandings."
'An extraordinary mess'
“A very senior Army Intelligence officer cites the main reasons for the collapse of the intelligence network in Lebanon and the failure of “Israeli” espionage in the fight against Hizbullah: controversies and infighting among the different intelligence branches, plus a deliberate hands-off policy adopted by the Mossad.”
“Until the start of the Lebanon War, the IDF was in charge of intelligence gathering in Lebanon (apart from the Mossad's misguided fling with the Christian Falange, which led to the invasion of Lebanon in 1982). When “Israeli” troops penetrated deep into Lebanon, Prime Minister Menachem Begin instructed Shin Bet head Avraham Shalom to send agents in after them, in order to counter acts of terrorism against IDF soldiers. But the Shin Bet's entry into Lebanon only complicated things: “Israeli” intelligence sources in Lebanon were now being handled all at once by the Mossad, the Shin Bet and the IDF's military intelligence corps (part of the Army Intelligence Branch)”.
“When Moshe Arens was appointed Defense Minister following Ariel Sharon's resignation, he characterized what was going on in Lebanon as "an extraordinary intelligence mess" and saw a glaring need for all the various “Israeli” agencies working in the area to be coordinated. He selected Uri Lubrani for the job; to this day, Lubrani serves as coordinator of government actions in Lebanon. Lubrani does in fact coordinate actions in many spheres, apart from one: intelligence. All of his efforts through the years to establish a joint system of intelligence operations have run into the refusal of the various branches to cooperate with each other”.
“The disagreements continued to intensify, with senior-level meetings sometimes disintegrating into shouting matches. IDF representatives argued that the Shin Bet had come into unfamiliar territory, and that methods imported from the West Bank and Gaza could not be implemented in Lebanon. Shin Bet representatives responded that IDF intelligence ranks were filled with young, inexperienced officers, lacking a real understanding of the work that must be done”.
“The IDF blamed the Shin Bet's use of aggressive tactics toward the local Lebanese population for planting the seeds of Shi'ite hostility to “Israel”. "We started taking the Shi'ites to task for their ties to Fatah," says MK Gideon Ezra (Likud) who served in the Shin Bet before embarking on his political career. "We forgot that they didn't do it willingly, but rather because they were threatened, or pressured in other ways. Those [Shin Bet] actions were uncalled for."
“In 1985, a central unit was set up to oversee counter-terrorism operations in Lebanon. Called by the Hebrew acronym Aleph-Vav-Samekh (standing for isuf ve-sikul - "intelligence gathering and subversion"), it was run by the Shin Bet under the command of Chaim Boro, and also included Intelligence Branch representatives. The unit lasted two years before being dismantled in the wake of an extremely heated dispute between the IDF - particularly the Intelligence Branch - and the Shin Bet. Apparently, nothing was too big or too small to escape being argued about - all the way from methods of handling operatives to the allocation of parking spaces at the unit's base in Lebanon. Things reached the point where the Shin Bet issued an ultimatum: either it is given sole responsibility for countering terrorism, or it withdraws from the Lebanese quagmire altogether”.
“Boro says, "There were clear differences in mentality between us and the army - with respect to professional ethos, work methods, order of priorities, ways of educating people and assembling personnel. The IDF intelligence people are just built differently. The assignment called for immediate and urgent action, and you can't consolidate a disparate unit within such a short span of time. We got to the stage where we let it be known that we either work alone or we go home."
The wrong man
“The disbanding of the Isuf ve-Sikul unit more or less coincided with a dramatic rise in Hizbullah's power in southern Lebanon. In 1986, then Chief of Army Intelligence Amnon Lipkin-Shahak ordered intelligence officers "to give Hizbullah first priority and do everything possible to crack them." Following Shahak's directives, the IDF launched far-ranging intelligence operations in Lebanon. The information that was brought in helped thwart numerous actions against IDF soldiers and American citizens in Lebanon”.
“In February 1988, however, a controversial appointment was made: Colonel F. was named to a high position in the intelligence corps, with responsibility for gathering information about Lebanon in general and Hizbullah in particular. High ranking officers in Army Intelligence had professional misgivings about F., and attempted to block the appointment”.
“A senior Army Intelligence officer who supervised intelligence activity in Lebanon at the time says: "The most grievous aspect of this whole episode is the fact that this man was appointed to that position despite the warnings heard from everyone, and that they left him in the position even afterward. He severely harmed our intelligence-gathering capability, greatly reducing - for years - what we knew and could learn about Hizbullah."
“For years, a veteran intelligence officer flooded the military establishment with letters detailing F.'s screw-ups. He never received a serious answer from Army Intelligence, the Chief of General Staff or the Defense Minister. "F. had no concept of intelligence work," says the veteran officer. "He gave us operational orders that any experienced intelligence person would know were foolish and endangered lives. And it was impossible to argue with him."
“The senior intelligence officer who oversaw these operations says, "F. would deliberately distort the data from the field in order to get his proposals for specific operations approved. There were times when men from the unit came to me to inform me of the true situation before decision-making meetings were to start - so that he wouldn't be able to dupe us with false facts."
“Suspicions that F. wasn't telling the truth to his superiors reached the point that in a meeting with then chief intelligence officer Brigadier General Oren Shahor, one officer lost his cool and began screaming at F., accusing him of lies and cover-ups. F. didn't sit by impassively, and Shahor's office turned into a verbal war zone. Senior intelligence officers who were present relate that the officer unleashed a laundry list of complaints against F., finally requesting a comprehensive investigation of all his claims and promising to resign from the army if his charges were found to be untrue. Oren Shahor stood by F. The officer slammed the door and left the room; F., who continues to hold a position in the defense establishment, refused to be interviewed”.
Under his nose
“In late 1988, a senior Army Intelligence officer, Jean Pierre Elraz, was arrested on suspicion of running a smuggling ring from Lebanon to “Israel”. Colonel F. came in for sharp criticism when the Elraz affair came to light. "It's a mark of disgrace for any commander to have a man like that carrying out illegal operations right under his nose," says a former senior Army Intelligence officer. "Elraz's arrest exemplifies perhaps better than anything else the professional and moral breakdown of intelligence in Lebanon."
“Elraz confessed to smuggling. An expert psychiatrist testified in court that, among other things, "The accused possesses narcissistic and psychotic personality traits ... He has a perverted conscience and a need to constantly prove his greatness through fantasies." The court convicted him on all charges and sentenced him to five years at hard labor. The sentence was subsequently reduced by one-third, and the parole board decided to release him after he had served two and a half years. He now works in the moving business in the north”.
“Other units and other commanders have not been immune to agents going bad (Yehuda Gil from the Mossad is a notorious case). But senior Army Intelligence people say that the fact that an extensive smuggling network functioned in the midst of sensitive military operations points to a lack of professional oversight regarding control of agent handlers and their operatives at the command level.
In early 1991, a group of veteran reserve officers from the unit felt that they could stand it no more. One of them wrote a lengthy, harshly-worded letter to Chief of Army Intelligence Uri Saguy, laying out his arguments concerning F.'s job performance. The phrases "conceptual failure" and "professional failure" appear repeatedly in the letter. One of Saguy's assistants told Ha'aretz at the time: "It's very rare for a reservist to write such a letter. Uri decided to treat it quite seriously."
“F. was just about to finish serving out his position. His request to extend his service by a year did not receive a positive response, and he retired from the IDF in August 1991. Uri Saguy invited the letter-writer to a long meeting with him and senior intelligence officer Doron Tamir. Following this meeting, a special panel (that included the letter-writer) was convened and given the task of carrying out reforms that would rehabilitate the unit”.
“The letter-writer declined to respond to this reporter's questions. Uri Saguy also refused to comment on the episode”.
“Saguy decided to appoint a new commander in the hope of mending the ruptures within the intelligence branch. Not long after his appointment, the new commander was inspecting his personal firearm (contrary to procedure) during a unit command meeting, when the gun went off, injuring his deputy. He's been referred to as Ha'Sholef ("Quick Draw") ever since”.
“Current and former intelligence officers alike express the same professional criticism of Ha'Sholef as they did of F. in his time. "Maybe he's a much nicer person, and more polite," they say, "but he doesn't understand how real, operational intelligence works. We're talking about very precise actions, where the commander has to personally approve virtually every step. If the commander is not a professional, the entire action is immediately affected."
“Hardly any of the recommendations made in the reserve officer's letter were ever implemented. His suggestion that the Mossad practice of administering periodic polygraph tests to unit officers be emulated was not adopted. The reservist had argued that this was the lesson to be learned from the Elraz episode and other cases of corruption within the unit. A whole inventory of professional recommendations designed to make the IDF better able to penetrate Hizbullah was also rejected. Meanwhile, Hizbullah continued improving itself, as Ha'Sholef's unit stagnated and failed to adapt itself to the newly emerging scenario. IDF soldiers were being killed at an average rate of 2.5 per month”.
“The reform that all agreed was necessary was not carried out under Ha'Sholef's successor either. This man was considered a very experienced intelligence officer with a strong background, but unfortunately, he was badly injured in a car accident shortly before taking over the position. He had to devote long hours to his physical rehabilitation and effectively only served part-time. His successor, the present commander, D., also did not usher in any winds of change”.
The failure of Mabat
“In light of the difficulties the Army Intelligence Branch was having in Lebanon, a decision was made in late 1989 to ratchet Shin Bet involvement in the region up a notch. With visions of creating an efficiently coordinated intelligence network, the Shin Bet set up an intelligence service called "Mabat" (an acronym for mangenon ha'bitachon - "security apparatus") within the SLA, employing SLA men to gather intelligence in the field under the professional tutelage of “Israeli” experts. Mabat men are immediately identifiable. Each is armed with a snub-nosed M-16 rifle outfitted with a screwed-on grenade launcher - the loaded weapon is slung diagonally across the body. Two cellular telephones - one each for the Lebanese and “Israeli” communications networks - hang from their hips. Just to be on the safe side, they also carry a pistol or two, extra grenades and plenty of ammunition. They strike heroic, tough-guy poses wherever possible - preferably before the media's cameras”.
“A Shin Bet man who served in the region for many years says that in fact, Mabat largely failed to fulfill its promise: "We never knew whether to believe the SLA people. They were caught in a thicket of dual loyalties and feared what would happen to them in the event of an “Israeli” withdrawal, so it was impossible to make them a party to vital information. And the results they brought in - in the form of "hot" information that could be used to counter Hizbullah - were very weak."
“Hizbullah then set its sights on the Mabat agents, managing to recruit a number of them from within the organization, and when that failed, attempting to assassinate the organization's commanders. It is widely assumed in the IDF that a huge amount of information "seeped" from Mabat in the direction of Hizbullah, sometimes by way of Druze and Shi'ite Mabat agents with confused loyalties”.
“As the Lebanon intelligence fiasco grew, so did the intensity of the accusations exchanged by the various intelligence agencies. Through the years, some in the Shin Bet have called for a serious reorganization of the Army Intelligence Branch. Chaim Boro still believes this is necessary: "You can't have an intelligence organization made up of young people who receive only brief training and are then thrown into the field with hardly any budget to back them up, and without stable command systems. As a source of information within the overall intelligence system, the intelligence corps is like a small child that's constantly interposing itself between our legs and those of our colleagues. In its present make-up, it's absolutely redundant and unnecessary. Any successes that they've had were due purely to chance. There was simply no one in the IDF with the balls to stand up and say that the intelligence community already has sufficient sources, and that they should shut down this bizarre mess once and for all."
“There is a very simple reason why the Mossad is the only arm of “Israeli” intelligence that did not fail miserably in dealing with Hizbullah: Until last year, “Israel’s” most esteemed intelligence-gathering organization stayed away from the problem, putting Lebanon at the bottom of its list of priorities. “Throughout his tenure as head of the Mossad - during the critical period of Hizbullah's emergence as a force to be reckoned with, Shabtai Shavit declined to define Lebanon as a target area where the Mossad needed to act. The Mossad did address itself to certain Lebanon-related issues, such as captured and missing soldiers and Iran, but it demonstrated pronounced indifference when it came to anything concerning intelligence gathering on Hizbullah activity”.
“The Mossad's entrance into Lebanon last year has not improved the situation in any significant way. With the “Israeli” police now having added two intelligence units ("Yagal" and "Yahalom"), quite a few organizations now have operatives working inside a fairly small area. "This is the biggest problem of all in Lebanon," declares one veteran intelligence man. "Everyone is shooting away in all directions and hurting each other. Friction among the different organizations has caused operational methods to be exposed and has led Hizbullah - an organization that learns its lessons quickly - to seal the cracks through which we could have infiltrated. I hope that it's not too late for us to turn things around."