Operation morale boost


The crisis sparked by the recent wave of casualties in Lebanon - and the soldiers' reaction to it - caught the army by surprise. This week, the IDF set out to shine up its fighting spirit

Operation morale boost

.In a convoy on its way to the Taibeh outpost in South Lebanon last Sunday evening, the communications officer of a Paratroop battalion asked for the press's consideration. "Every word you write about us is read very carefully at home," he said. "You need to show a little responsibility; your reports are messing up morale over here." One week after a wave of heavy losses, every soldier in Lebanon has become a potential media adviser. Reports of statements by soldiers in favor of a unilateral withdrawal have stirred up a storm that almost equals the shock of the losses themselves. The army is now trying to minimize the damage. The Northern Command is comparing the clash with Hizbullah to an ongoing boxing match "that won't be decided by a knockout." Using the same imagery, it might be said that the "Israel" Defense Forces (IDF)* devoted the past week to recovering from the blow it took, and to convincing itself and the press that it is as clear-headed and imbued as ever with a fighting spirit.
The trip from the border kibbutz Misgav Am to Tayiba, in the central sector of the security zone, takes around 10 minutes. But the rain, mud and fog make the trip a harrowing experience. In the meantime, mortar bombs are being fired on the Tayiba outpost, unlike the missiles being rained on the more northerly Beaufort and Dla'at outposts.
The long waiting period leaves the soldiers plenty of time to read the newspapers - and to get angry. The company commander, Captain Avi Balut, of Neve Tzuf, just returned from a long ambush and had not yet heard about the public uproar in "Israel", but the soldiers were very busy with it. "Just don't cause us any embarrassment like they did in Givati," one soldier whispered as his friends sat down to speak to journalists. The comments from the soldiers at the Tayiba outpost present a totally different outlook from that presented by other soldiers in the media last week. It was no longer just bearing with the situation and crying about it.
The lead company of Battalion 890, the pride of the Paratroop brigade (once simply referred to as "the battalion," a springboard for future chiefs of staff) has decided to restore the army's luster. They will not be caught hesitating. True, soldiers from their battalion in the Galgalit outpost earlier said otherwise. But those were young soldiers, who were perhaps scared after a clash in which three soldiers at the outpost were killed by a missile. "What do they know?"
The paratroopers from the veteran company speak almost unanimously. They radiate determination, and explain that image is more important than anything else. Ofir Buchnik, of Be'er Sheva, says: "Every soldier in Lebanon knows it's not easy, there are difficult moments. But you can't say such things. You have to hang in there. The minute a soldier cracks, he damages the IDF's image." Kobi Petel, of Jerusalem: "The comments that appeared in the press hurt the soldiers here in the outpost and endanger us." Dotan Garbeli, of Be'er Sheva: "It doesn't matter what a soldier thinks, he has to radiate confidence. I tell my mother all the time: Everything's okay. If I say that we should leave here, soldiers who're here with me will start to be scared. All the motivation will drop." Rudy Sa'ar, of Yanoah : "There's nothing to worry about. We're strong. We'll stay here until decisions are made by the government. That's our job."
An experienced officer who has spent many years in Lebanon recommends not making too much of soldiers' declarations one way or the other. Everything depends on where the missile hits and the time that passes, he says. "Whoever endured a missile hit will talk differently from someone who didn't absorb a hit, and things will sound different as time passes after the missile strike, because by then the soldiers have had a chance to recover from it." There is more than a little hypocrisy in the military approach to the soldiers' positions here, he added. "Until a few months ago, when soldiers were more motivated, you could talk about everything. Now that some of them have changed their views, everyone's panicking. Suddenly, you're not allowed to talk politics."

Morning patrol with the commander

Last week's morale crisis caught the army, as usual, by surprise. Urgent consultations took place between the chief of staff and the head of the IDF manpower branch. One senior officer proposed taking away the combat-soldier certificates of the soldiers who had spoken out, but the Northern Command stopped the witch hunt in time. Psychologists and military education officers advised that the matter be handled by the commanders in the field - and so it was. "First of all, it's our problem," said the commander of the Galilee battalion, Brigadier General Moshe Kaplinsky (Kaplan), to troop commanders in his sector. "A soldier whose troop commander goes with him on morning patrol will not talk that way." The regular army brigade commanders went to talk with their soldiers in Lebanon.
In the background are the increasingly worried parents, whose feelings were given new legitimacy after remarks by some of their sons. It would be difficult to find a parent of a soldier in Lebanon who does not support an immediate withdrawal. "At home, they don't want us to be here," acknowledges paratrooper Ayal Katz, of Ra'anana. "The last time I came up to Lebanon, my sister tearfully pleaded with me not to go back there."
The battalion commander responds with a speech, the gist of which is that we must continue fighting. "The situation has always been and still is that some of us, each in due course, bear the burden of defense. Either in Lebanon, Sinai or Jerusalem. It's a matter of how they're sleeping tonight in Metulla. I'm proud that today, while you're here, the pub in Misgav (Am) is full. My parents and your parents did it; now it's our turn, to obtain quiet and enable the political echelons to make the best possible agreements." You have nothing to apologize for, he tells the paratroopers.
The paratroopers' enthusiasm is genuine, but it is difficult to avoid the impression that it is somewhat calculated. "You can think what you want," says Dotan Garbeli, "but think twice, before you tell it to the press." The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Moti Baruch, says that every soldier speaks freely and no one has been told what to say, but also admits that "we briefed them before the visit." Baruch, whose signal operator was killed in the Galgalit clash, does not see a motivation crisis in the battalion. The Golani brigade, which is to replace his soldiers here, will have more difficult psychological preparations to do, say the paratroopers. (Indeed, Golani is preparing its soldiers in the usual way. One day later, its brigade commander, Colonel Shmuel Zakai, caused a stir when he asked his fighters not to pay attention to "Four Mothers, four rags").

Officers in the line of fire

Over a year ago, Golani battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Ilan sat in the same room. Last August, he was moderately wounded during a clash with a Hizbullah unit. The commanders in Lebanon pay personally. Moti Baruch himself was seriously wounded in 1997, while serving as commander of the Paratroop reconnaissance unit, during a clash in which his deputy, Eran Shamir, was killed. The most senior officers frequently endanger themselves. Every convoy arriving brings with it endless suspicions and warnings. The Northern Command realizes that Hizbullah is looking for demonstrative accomplishments and that includes striking at a senior officer.
The death of Brigadier General Erez Gerstein last February was a huge blow to morale for the army, and the assumption is that other officers are also in the line of fire. The commander of the area brigade, Colonel Moshe Tamir and battalion commander Baruch were themselves nearly wounded at Galgalit. Tamir has been serving in this sector for almost 18 consecutive years, as a soldier, commander of the Golani reconnaissance unit, commander of the Egoz unit and brigade commander. His wife said last week that she sleeps in a sweat suit in case there is a late-night visit from the local army liaison.

Uncertainty for the SLA

Given the frenetic pace of events, the situation of the South Lebanese Army (SLA)** has been almost forgotten. The "Israeli" losses emphasized the need to deal with the guilty parties, but the defense establishment is very concerned about the SLA's behavior in the coming months. In the meantime, there is no real solution for the militia. Most of its commanders are not willing to move to "Israel" - they want to remain in their own country. An "Israeli" withdrawal without an agreement will force them to deal with the stiff jail terms they were sentenced to in absentia in Beirut (although experience from the withdrawal in Jezzine shows that the Lebanese administration was relatively lenient there).
The big question is how long the SLA will hold on: A new wave of losses could disrupt its operations. "Israel's" difficulty stems from the logistical dependence on the Lebanese contractors developed by the outposts: All convoys to IDF outposts are today arranged through them. Such convoys also risk the infiltration of explosive devices into the outposts.
Meanwhile, the security zone is gradually shrinking. First, the Huna outpost was moved southward. Two weeks ago, Sujoud was also abandoned in a panic under pressure from the shelling. The IDF outposts in Reihan and Aishiye have become the northernmost front line.
"Senior SLA people are quietly approaching me, one by one," claims a veteran officer in the IDF's Lebanon Liaison Unit. "They ask, 'What's happening? Are you really going to run away from here without an agreement?'"
This week, senior SLA officials warned that their soldiers may stop obeying orders and start worrying about themselves. ""Israel" is abandoning us," they claimed. The killing of Deputy SLA Commander Colonel Akl Hachem created a leadership vacuum in the militia. Its commander, General Antoine Lahad, is again in Paris. As usual, he spends a few weeks in France after every month spent in Marjayoun. Habits do not change, not even in tough times.

Dreaming of an offensive

This week, everywhere the chief of staff went, he heard firm demands for action. Officers and fighters told him they felt as if their hands were tied. The paratroopers in Tayiba feel the same way. Ofir Buchnik says that "it's not the Lebanon we wanted. I didn't plan on sitting and absorbing missile strikes. Let us respond." His company commander, Avi Balut, thinks that "if Hizbullah has changed its pattern of operation, we have to change ours. I thought even beforehand that in a situation where we're doing bunker warfare, eventually they'll get a goal in."
In light of this situation, Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz told the Knesset that he would propose firing on villages from which Hizbullah was attacking, in violation of understandings. The ministers did not like his appeal to the press a day before the cabinet meeting, but this is exactly the sort of thing that makes the chief of staff popular with his subordinates.
Apart from dreaming of an offensive response, the IDF was engaged this week primarily in finding ways to improve defenses against anti-tank missiles. "Missiles being fired at Tayiba is not a fictional scenario," said Commander Tamir to the paratrooper commanders. "The last time I said something like that was in Galgalit, a minute before the boom. They have no problem getting to the village of Kantara with a donkey and launching a missile against us from there. Hizbullah's success will lead to more attempts. It's a lot easier to fire a missile than to infiltrate a group of explosive devices." Hizbullah's next operating method is likely to be close-range attacks against the outposts. The natural reaction to absorbing missile strikes is a reduction of the above-ground presence, which creates an ideal opportunity for raising a Hizbullah flag over a battery in an IDF outpost. The last time the organization did so (in Dla'at in 1994), the "Israeli" press discussed it for a long time.


1- Ha'aretz,  18-2-2000.

* It is an "Israeli" nomination we absolutely reject for it contradicts with Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. This army is not but an "Israeli" agent working for realizing "Israel's" goals in Lebanon.

* This term is absolutely unacceptable. "Israel's" Army is that of war and aggression for it protects land gained by force, confiscation and war in contradiction with the simplest rights of human confessed by the international laws and conventions.