I live three kilometers away from Bou Medienne Street. It was named after Algerian president Huwari Bou Medienne who died in 1978. He was the last pre-independence leader to become president. A few other streets are also named after Algerian figures. There is Ben Bella street, after the first president of Algeria and a famous resistance leader. There is also the Bou Haired street, after Jamila Bou Haired, a popular symbol of resistance, a heroine tortured in French jails before independence who became famous throughout the Arab world mainly because of an Egyptian movie about her life.

I do not recall other streets named after Algerian figures after 1981 or 1982. The heroism associated with Algeria began gradually to fade away, and then very quickly, within a decade or so, heroism turned into horror.

Among Palestinians, the trajectory of Algeria instills fear: from resistance, to liberation, to statehood, to authoritarian government, to control of the state by the military, to the emergence of an Islamic opposition and the absence of a secular opposition, to incomprehensible almost non-rational violence; the horror.

Analogies can always mislead, but there is enough there to be concerned about, and perhaps to fear. Or so is political opinion among Palestinians inclined to think.

What appears particularly troubling in the Algerian case, especially for those looking at it from a distance, is the lack of clarity, the incomprehensibility, of the wanton, seemingly irrational but brutal violence directed mainly at civilians. Some opaque part of Algerian history must have unleashed such a dark and malevolent vortex.

II

It is true, there are immediate and relevant questions whose answers are difficult to get: who actually is involved in the massacres of villagers? Is the army directly involved? Are there groups that the army supports who participate in the atrocities? What Islamic groups are involved? Do they have a mass base or a mass following, and what do they hope to achieve?

No doubt the answers to such questions will help us understand what has been happening in Algeria during the last few years. Yet, it is also important to keep in mind a corrective to a view wide-spread in the media in Europe, and to some degree in the Arab World, concerning Islamism and civil war in Algeria: as Bernard Ravenel argues, there is no civil war, nor is Islamism the central problem in Algeria. There are simply two types of violence: one perpetrated by the institutions of repression of the state, the other perpetrated by armed Islamic groups, and both directed against civilians who are not a party in this conflagration.1

Beyond the immediate questions, one has to look at Algeria's past and the shadow it casts on the present, and the development of Algeria as a society. But ultimately and most importantly, one needs to examine the relation of state to society, and the structure, make-up and role of the national state that was formed after the end of French rule, in order to identify the sources and the seeds of present conflicts. For as Gilbert Meynier reminds us, the popular support the Algerian National Liberation movement enjoyed during the struggle for independence was eventually inherited not by the state, but by the Islamic movement, which also capitalized on the bitterness and the discontentment generated by 130 years of colonial repression.2

Within the compass of my present remarks, there is no need to deal with the history of political and social development in Algeria, since ultimately the case of Algeria raises related questions about the nature of the Arab state after independence, and sources of stability and instability, order and disorder, and implications for both the Middle East and Europe.

What specifically concerns me here are features in the Algerian situation that might be relevant to the Palestinian context, including conclusions and lessons that can be drawn. The following aspects appear to be relevant:

1. The transition from a national liberation movement to independent state, the dissolution of the structures of the National Liberation Front, and the virtual take-over of the state by the military have precluded the possibility of a process of democratization, where political strength would devolve to political parties who in turn would compete for power within an agreed-upon framework.

2. The economic problems of Algeria in the eighties and corruption in government delegitimized the authority of the state.

3. The authoritarianism of the state, unlike Nasserism for instance, was not accompanied by a specific societal project that might possibly balance authoritarian tendencies. This had its roots in the predominant ideology among the main currents in the National Liberation Front preceding independence. The project was national liberation and the establishment of the state. The mechanism was wresting political power from the French. Political power became an end in itself after independence.

4. There is also the question of the Islamic political movement. Both sides appear to have comparable positions in their lack of clear agreement on the principle of rotation in government. But the position of Islamists may well be the result of their denial of peaceful means for sharing in power; they were denied the opportunity "to be socialized into the culture of democracy".4

III

There are parallels between Algeria and Palestine on all of these points, but perhaps the most important of these for the present and future of Palestinian society has to do with the nature and circumstances in which the dominant faction within the PLO made the transition from a national liberation movement to a non-sovereign authority hoping to become a state through a negotiated process that began with the Oslo Agreements. This provides the broad setting which may also help shed light on other points of similarity between the two situations, allowing of course for due limits to analogy.

One striking political feature of the post-Oslo reality in Palestine is the seeming polarization between the Palestinian Authority established in 1994 and the Islamic Resistance Movement known by its acronym, Hamas. Hamas was founded in 1987 with the beginning of the Intifada as the "fighting arm" of the Muslim Brothers movement, long in existence in Jordan and Palestine, as well as in other Arab countries including Egypt, it place of birth.5 Since the end of the Intifada, Hamas has gradually begun to return to the former role of the Muslim Brothers, of being an "opposition" working to a considerable degree within the system, focusing largely on the Islamization of culture with a major interest in issues related to women, a favourite cause of most Islamists.6

Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, a clearer division of roles has emerged between Hamas and its "fighting arm," now named "The Brigades of Izzul Din Al-Qassam," after a heroic resistance figure killed by the British in 1935. Hamas's self-definition has now become that of a "political movement", as opposed to a resistance movement engaged in armed struggle against Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. The latter role has now been consigned to its "armed wing" thought responsible for "suicide" bombings against Israeli military and civilian targets.

This specific division of roles is an important part of the picture purveyed by Hamas leaders, and by much superficial coverage in the media in Israel, the Arab World, Europe, and the United States. The problem is that it takes at face value that Hamas indeed has a "military wing" and that it has a clear organizational link with that "wing," at least at some level. Yet in reality there is no evidence that such a link exists. This, however, has not prevented an increasing political polarization between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, a result brought about in no small measure through direct pressure on the Palestinian Authority by Israel, and encoded officially most recently in the Wye River Memorandum.

The Wye River agreement calls on the Palestinian Authority to work to insure the "security" of Israel in various ways, including the "effective combat of terrorist organizations and their infrastructure." In addition, the Palestinian Authority is required to "outlaw all organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist, or violent character, and their support structure...," and to ban all forms of "incitement" to violence in the media and elsewhere including school curricula. The words "terrorism," "violence," and "incitement" are left undefined. Thus "incitement" theoretically can include the work of human rights organizations documenting and protesting land confiscation by Israel, or protest against the torture of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.7

The Palestinian Authority is therefore led more closely to the obliteration of the distinction between Hamas as a political movement and "its military wing." The recipe is indeed self-fulfilling since it leaves little space in which Hamas can operate politically and is pushed in the direction of closer identification with "its military wing." The ultimate result will be a setback to the process of socialization in tolerance and political pluralism for Hamas and for other parties in the opposition, thus recalling the relation between the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Algerian state.

In contrast to the picture current in the media, Hamas itself is not a political party with a clear organizational structure and a chain of command. It is an amorphous movement with different centers of power, with a broad, loosely organized mass following. No organizational link has been shown to exist between Hamas and a specific military wing since the Palestinian Authority was established, in the same way no organizational link has been shown to exist between FIS and groups engaged in the murder of civilians in Algeria.

IV

Important as it is, the role of Israel in furthering authoritarianism and repressive government in Palestinian society is not the only factor retarding democratization under the Palestinian Authority. Other factors are equally important, including the structure and ideology of the PLO, the weakness of secular political parties, wide-spread corruption in the Palestinian Authority and its abject inefficiency, the role of the various security forces operating outside the framework of any law, and the emergence of a new elite with a vested interest in the status quo having as a power base what might be called the military-political-commercial complex still in the process of formation. All of these factors de-legitimize the Palestinian Authority, hence an increasing need for unmediated power in order to rule.8

Still, it does not necessarily follow from all of this that Palestinian society is heading in an Algerian direction. Several factors stand in the way of this trajectory, of which the two most important are the following:

First, there is the modus operandi of Yasser Arafat, who throughout his political career has sought to lead by consensus whenever possible. This applies in particular to his PLO period preceding the establishment of a Palestinian Authority. The Oslo agreements precipitated a virtual breakdown of PLO structures and political processes. The consensus and cohesiveness of the Palestinian body politic were no longer possible in view of divergent views among PLO factions along with Hamas, on the terms of settlement after the acceptance of defeat by the Palestinian leadership. Nevertheless, Arafat continued a policy of rapprochement with the opposition whenever possible, and largely on his own terms, using the old and tried methods of containment and co-optation, among others.

Part of Arafat's problem in dealing with Hamas in particular lay in the fact that he was under constant Israeli pressure to arrest Hamas leaders or activists, especially after bombing incidents. Pressure on him increased after the Netanyahu government came to power, and he was often accused of using a "revolving door" policy, of arrest and release after a few weeks or months.

The second factor has to do with the position of Hamas vis-a-vis the Palestinian Authority. After an initial period of testing strengths and limits, Hamas leaders followed a largely accommodationist policy especially after the election of a right-wing government in Israel. During the past few years in particular, it has been clear from the various public pronouncements made by several Hamas figures that they have no interest in exacerbating relations with the Palestinian Authority. Relations were fraught with tension in any case, and their degeneration into open conflict would carry with it a price they were not wiling to pay, in so far as they could help it.

The Wye River agreement is the new factor introduced into this situation, with more stringent "security" conditions placed on the Palestinian Authority, and as defined by the Israeli government. The danger of an Algerian type scenario is there. It takes one "suicide" bomber, this time blowing up a Palestinian police station, or some other symbol, to start the process.

V

Order and disorder in the Middle East has implications for the Middle East and for Europe. It may be that states can live with a certain degree of tension, and peace, whatever it may mean, may be difficult to achieve. The Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts have proved to be especially intractable. After a hundred years of conflict, since the beginning of Zionist colonization of Palestine in the 1880's, the Oslo process does not appear to promise stability let alone peace. Europe has invested more funds than active diplomacy at every turn in the Oslo process, including after the Wye River agreement. Since the establishment of a Palestinian authority, European countries have taken a back-seat leaving political initiative in the hands of the United States.

Typically, the two poles of European attitudes have been those of the United Kingdom and France. The United Kingdom has been quickest in aligning itself with American policy in the region. France has taken the lead in Europe in expressing both French and wider European interests. This applies both to Palestine and to Iraq.

An Algerian-type conflict in Palestine is in no way a certainty, but at the same time it is not an extremely remote possibility. In the event it happens, it will have wider repercussions, both in neighbouring Jordan, and for the "peace process" as a whole. Much is at stake and too much depends on Israel and the United States, especially in view of the weakness of the Clinton Administration in relation to Israel. It is clear that Europe has a role which it has yet to play.

Notes

1. Bernard Ravenel, "Pouvoir Reel et Pouvoir Formel: La Contradiction du Systeme Politique Algerien," in M.Jayyusi, ed., Liberation, Democratization, and Transitions to Statehood in the Third World, (Ramallah: Muwatin, The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy), 1998, p. 190.

2. Gilbert Meynier, "Le Poids du Passe sur L'Algerie D'aujourd'hui", op.cit. p. 182.

3. Bernard Ravenel, op.cit. p. 192 and following.

4. Amine Tehamy, "Ta'addudiyya and Islamism: Lessons from Algeria," op.cit. p. 157.

5. For an analysis of Hamas's "charter" announcing its foundation, see Lisa Taraki, "The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising," in Z. Lockman and J. Beinen, eds., Intifada, (Boston: South End Press), 1989.

6. See Lisa Taraki, "Islam is the Solution: Jordanian Islamists and the Dilemma of the `Modern Woman'," The British Journal of Sociology, December 1995; and Lisa Taraki, "Jordanian Islamists and the Agenda for Women: Between Discourse and Practice," Middle Eastern Studies, January 1996.

7. Full text of Memorandum in Ha'aretz (English Edition), October 25, 1998.

8. For an analysis of some of the changes in Palestinian politics and society after Oslo, see George Giacaman and Dag J. Lonning, eds., After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems, (London: Pluto Press), 1998.