Report of the Monitoring Unit on the Elections
for the Palestinian Legislative Council
January 23, 1996
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Table of Contents The Role of the Electoral Monitoring Unit |
In coordination with its work in human rights and in response to the elections
for the Palestinian Council, held on 20 January 1996, Land and Water Establishment
for Studies and Legal Services established a Palestinian monitoring team
to observe the elections from a human rights perspective.
LAWE sees this work as the natural extension of its work as a legal advocacy NGO. LAWE continues to fulfill its role as a human rights watchdog and provider of legal services to the Palestinian people, and saw a role for itself in terms of both monitoring the attention paid to human rights by the candidates and in ensuring that the elections were free and fair. LAWE has made it clear that it will accept cases from candidates who choose to exercise their option to bring complaints before the Central Election Commission.
The development of an active, vital civil society has become more important in the light of these elections, and therefore LAWE has applied its extensive experience in providing services to Palestinians to its monitoring activities during the recent elections.
The following semi-final summary pending the final election results of LAWE's Electoral Monitoring Unit is divided into 4 parts:
I. the role of the Monitoring Unit
II. the observations of the Unit during the campaign period
III. the observations of the Unit of election day and the results
IV. the recommendations submitted by the Unit.
I. The Role of the Electoral Monitoring Unit
a. The team observed and verified the equitable use of public space for the posting of politically related information and posters.
b. The team monitored the use of public meeting areas and its equitable use by all parties.
c. The team surveyed the press releases/communiqués and propaganda issued by the political parties and candidates in reference to the elections. They sought to verify that the Palestinian Authority maintained its neutrality and did not favor certain candidates. They also wanted to verify if members of the current Palestinian Authority used their positions to forward their electoral campaign. The group reviewed the speeches, communiqués and propaganda of candidates and their parties in this light.
d. The team monitored the respect and attention paid to human rights issues in the speeches and propaganda of the candidates. The team recorded if the debate remained on the public level, and did not descend to personal attack and name-calling. They recorded references and respect paid to the establishment of a real civil society, respect of personal freedoms, and other democratic values.
e. During the elections, the team designed and distributed a questionnaire dealing with the electoral proceedings themselves. The questionnaire asked about intimidation and voting, the use of coercion or pressure tactics, or if representatives of candidates were present in the voting area. The questionnaire was distributed to the public after voting at the voting site.
a) Posting Areas
According to the electoral law, the Authority designated areas for the posting of campaign material, and to ensure that the use of the space was equitable. The observers noted more than one instance in which children tore down posters and replaced them with other candidates' material. In addition, some campaign materials were posted in areas not designated for this purpose (like in storefronts, cafes and the like).
b) Use of Meeting Halls
The team noticed no favoritism or bias in the use of public meeting areas.
c) Communiqués, press releases and campaign activity
As this was, for most, the first chance to participate in an election, the importance of voter education, distribution of campaign materials, and campaign time took on a critical importance. Here LAWE's team noted a number of grave concerns.
The team observed that the information disseminated by the candidates themselves were useful, and generally tended to reach the public. On the other hand, the media, particularly TV, did not cover the elections very thoroughly. The Palestinian TV conducted no interviews with candidates, and only aired a series on general issues relating to voting.
The campaign period of two weeks was severely limiting, a point which was put to the attention of now President Arafat. Several organizations charged that the two-week campaign period was inadequate and, particularly for a first election, couldn't possibly guarantee an equitable campaign period. Changes were not made. Many candidates violated the electoral law which required campaign activities to end one day before the elections, and continued to campaign the day of and during the voting.
Samiha Khalil, candidate for President, received very little press coverage. The Paris-based Reporters without Borders stated that by the end of December, Samiha's campaign had not been mentioned once on Palestinian TV or radio. The limited campaign time forced her to restrict her campaigning to only 8 cities and no villages in the West Bank. In addition, she had trouble with the Israeli authorities as well. On her trip to Gaza, she was delayed at the checkpoint and did not receive her permit to enter Gaza immediately.
The closure of the West Bank and Gaza further restricted campaign activity. This closure restricted the movement of candidates and campaign material between the West Bank and Gaza, and blocked the movement of the candidates of Jerusalem. In addition, Israeli authorities imposed a closure on Bethlehem for two days just prior to the elections, effectively sealing the only access routes to Jerusalem and the north of the West Bank.
The press was censured by the Palestinian Authority. The detention by the Palestinian police of Maher Al Alami, editor of Al Quds newspaper, and Bassam Eid, noted human rights activist, reflected an intolerance of those not toeing the party line or to those critical or in opposition to Authority policy.
The Palestinian press chose not to publish several criticisms made public by LAWE concerning intimidation tactics before election day.
Some ministers used the perks of their job to help in their campaigns, like their mobile phones and automobiles.
The Palestinian Security Service detained in Jericho the People's Party campaign manager from Salfit for several days.
d) Human Rights campaigning by candidates
The team noted that the candidates' stand in this area is particularly important, given that the final status negotiation will be approved by the elected body. In the end, there was not much said about human rights generally, although many of the candidates addressed the issues of settlements, Jerusalem and refugees.
The candidates asserted their right to run independently.
III. Observations on Election Day
The following questions were put to those who had finished voting:
1. What circumstances were encountered by the voters in the polling station: did they feel comfortable or were there intimidating elements.
2. Were observers and campaign managers present in the polling station, and did they move freely.
3. How well did those running the polling stations respect the electoral law; specifically, did they allow people who were not voting to enter the polling stations.
4. Was the voting done by the person identified on the voter registration card and did the polling station workers confirm that the person voting was the same as the name on the card.
5. Did those working at the polling stations do a good job, did they consider complaints, and were they neutral?
6. Was the voting secret.
7. Did those counting the ballots respect the law and conditions detailed there.
Responses:
1. Circumstances and atmosphere of polling stations:
The team found a heavy Palestinian Security Service (PSS) presence outside of many voting stations, and recorded many instances of intimidation.
In Hebron, the PSS had a list of voters. They were seen going to the voting stations, finding those on the list and threatening them to vote for Fatah. They also entered polling stations to intimidate voters to vote for Fatah. One woman who refused to vote for the Fatah list was threatened with a pistol.
In Nablus, campaigning took place at the polling station in violation of the law. The PSS also confiscated ID cards of opposition voters in Salfit, and prevented them from voting.
In Jerusalem, the heavy military presence discouraged many from voting, and many were turned away, arrested, or photographed in their attempts to vote.
2. Presence of Candidates' Representatives and Campaign Managers in Polling Stations.
The team found that on average there were considerable difficulties for representatives of candidates and campaign managers to enter polling stations as allowed for under the electoral law. The PSS obstructed many from entering polling stations. The campaign managers and candidate representatives in Marda and Yassouf in the Salfit electoral district were prevented from wearing their identifying badges stating they were observers. This was repeated in Naqoora, Burka, Deir Sharaf and other villages in the Nablus district.
3. The Presence of Unofficial People in the Polling Stations
Palestinian security forces were present at many polling stations, notably in Kira village near Salfit where the PSS chief entered the polling station. In Halhoul the PSS entered a station, removed a campaign manager and put unknown envelopes into the ballot box.
4. Voting, and Voter Registration ID
It was difficult in many cases to verify that the person voting was actually the person on the voter registration card. The team found that it was not difficult for someone to use the voter registration card of another to vote for them.
The electoral commission decided on the day of elections that security personnel would be allowed to vote at the polling station nearest them, although their names would not appear on those voting lists. In this way many military people could vote twice, once in the station nearest them and one at the station at which their name appeared in their home districts.
In Jerusalem there were also discrepancies between the voter lists as they appeared outside the voting station, and the lists inside. Some found their names appeared on the list outside, but either was not listed inside or found that their name appeared in another station entirely. These people were turned away.
5. Workers at the Polling Stations
There were many problems for those working in the polling stations. In many cases, the sheer volume of voters caused the officials to lose control of the voting process. In Kufur Deeq, so many voters surrounded the ballot boxes that it was impossible to keep them back, creating the fear that some of the boxes may have been tampered with.
6. If the Balloting was Secret
Because secret balloting fulfilled such a critical role in these elections, the monitors took special note of the conditions while voting. The most widespread problem lay with proxy voters who voted for the blind or for the illiterate. There were no guarantees that those voting for others were neutral, or respected the wishes of those for whom they voted. In fact in Ta'amera, one man came with over 20 people, saying he was authorized to case votes for all of them. There were also no provisions for voters who were handicapped.
Also in many instances the voters were not alone. Voters would speak between themselves or have their spouses present. In many cases unauthorized people entered polling stations and attempted to influence those who were voting.
The cramped conditions of many polling stations, moreover, made voting secretly nearly impossible. The seats at the voting table in many stations were located very close together, and it was easy to see the votes of others and for campaign representatives or security personnel to look at the votes.
7. Ballot Counting
The team observed many significant lapses in ballot counting procedure.
a) Should separate the elections for President and Council, to better secure conditions for fair balloting and counting.
b) Put photograph and signature on the voter registration card, to eliminate the possibility of the misuse of voter identification.
c) Establish separate centers for blind or handicapped people, and to provide neutral helpers for those who need voting assistance.
d) Give greater role to local observers.
e) The Authority (and now the Council members) and the security forces should stay neutral and not interfere unless requested.
The LAWE monitoring team believes that in some problem areas the discrepancies could have been significant enough to have altered the final outcome. Specifically, given the number of examples of widespread voter fraud in the Hebron, Ramallah and Jericho regions, LAWE's team recommends a re-vote in these areas.
LAWE's team would also like to point out that the Central Elections Committee was not neutral, with three of its members from Fatah.
In addition, LAWE feels that the campaign period was too short for a first-time election. The two week period was inadequate to educate the voters and to give time to the candidates to express their views, particularly in light of repeated closures during the campaign period (one general closure and one two-day closure of Bethlehem).
The team also offered some criticism of the international election observers. The observers only performed some technical functions, many left the polling stations early, were unresponsive to problems, and often displayed a general disregard for the local population (in one instance in Nablus, observers from the European Community stayed in the hotel in Ariel settlement).
These problems, coupled with manipulation of the electoral law by President Arafat, the gerrymandering of electoral districts, and the systematic intimidation of independent candidates to pull out of the race presents serious difficulties in accepting some of the election results. At the very least, LAWE's observers call for a re-vote in the three areas mentioned above.