By-Pass Road Construction in the West Bank
The End of the Dreamof Palestinian Sovereignty
28 February 1996
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Settlements: Here to Stay |
Israel has recently embarked upon a multi-million dollar road construction plan in the West Bank, providing dramatic proof of the permanence of the Jewish settlements and Israeli military presence in the West Bank. The construction of these 20 new roads, which adds 400 kilometers to the road network, has required the confiscation of over 16,000 dunums1 of some of the West Bank's most fertile agricultural land and effectively surrounds and isolates West Bank towns from their outlying villages. Examination of these roads portrays a chilling policy of confiscation, fragmentation and ongoing settlement expansion that essentially precludes the possibility of a Palestinian state.
For the Israeli authorities, these roads serve several practical purposes:
they connect Israeli settlements to each other and to the modern highway
transportation system inside Israel; further provide for the security and
safety of the settlers and allow for a reduced military presence in Areas
C, and further restrict Palestinians to isolated areas served by an aging
road network scarcely improved since 1967. Israeli government officials,
Israeli army personnel, and settlement leaders have consistently maintained
that such a by-pass road system comprises the most important element in
ensuring the permanence of the settlements in the West Bank. The historical
struggle in this region, however, the struggle over land, is fundamentally
at odds with this increasingly accepted view of settlements remaining in
the West Bank.
While former Prime Minister Rabin did not take any great pains to hide his animosity towards the settlements, he likewise provided massive financial aid to provide for the expansion of settlements and added his approval of the by-pass road plan currently under construction throughout the West Bank. The construction of Israeli controlled corridors throughout the West Bank fit with his vision of territorial separation but continued military domination.
Indeed it was clear that former Prime Minister Rabin saw the by-pass roads as an essential tool for maintaining ultimate military control over the West Bank. Rabin repeatedly confirmed his support for the by-pass roads and, thus, the permanence of the settlements. In late September 1994 he held a meeting with several settlement leaders; Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun of Ofra settlement and Pinhas Wallerstein, chair of the Mateh Binyamin local council of settlements. During this meeting, Rabin reiterated his support of the by-pass road plan to circumvent Ramallah and link area settlements (Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, AIC, June 1995). Bin Nun, on commenting on the meeting, stated: "The most reasonable way to preserve Jewish settlements is by increasing their daily security, and creating settlement blocs, and joining them with roads" (Ha'aretz, 9/10/94).
Settlements in turn provided Rabin with the necessary catalyst for the construction of the roads. He consistently took no action to dismantle any of the settlements in the West Bank or Gaza. Rabin's failure to capitalize on wide-spread revulsion of extremist settlers after the Hebron massacre in February 1994 demonstrates that he did not intend to remove a single settler.
As Oslo II was being signed, Yossi Beilin, minister in Rabin's government and one of the main architects of the current peace process, reassured the settlers that the government had not abandoned them. He asserted, "The most ridiculous accusation is that of abandoning the settlers. The agreement was delayed for months in order to guarantee that all of the settlements would remain intact and that the settlers would have maximum security, entailing an immense financial outlay. The situation in the settlements was never better than that which has been created following the Oslo agreement." (Ma'ariv, 27 September 1995).
Prime Minister Peres in fact has continued the policies of Rabin, pursuing an even more sympathetic policy towards the settlements. His intention seems to be more along the lines of a functional compromise as outlined in Oslo II, in which settlements and their expansion could be seen as compatible with eventual Palestinian autonomy. While Rabin explored plans to build fences and security perimeters around the West Bank to separate the two populations, Peres seeks to find some middle ground in which he would retain areas of the West Bank (Area C, which includes most of the settlements) and maintain military control over the area. The signing of Oslo II, and the changes that have taken place on the ground since its signing, solidifies the current direction toward a solution in which the settlements remain and military control is effectively maintained from the outside by the by-pass roads.
Peres has done far more in accommodating the religious right, the National Religious Party (NRP), and their pro-settlement views, than his predecessor ever did. In his attempts to win over the NRP, Minister Yossi Beilin, in the context of a government - NRP dialogue, stated that "Israel can attain a permanent arrangement in which most of the settlers would remain in their settlements and the areas they live in would be annexed to Israel and become part of sovereign Israel (Report on Israeli Settlement, January 1996)."
This concept of territorial compromise, which includes annexing large parts of the West Bank to Israel, prompted Meretz minister Yossi Sarid to say: "To my dismay, a cantonization plan for the West Bank is taking shape in the Labor Party today that returns us to the old and terrible idea of a functional compromise. I can only describe this plan as a policy of annexation-in-the-making, little different from the enclave plan of Ariel Sharon" (ibid.).
Thus settlements have never been in a more protected position than following the signing of the Oslo accords. Over 6,000 units have already been approved and are in various stages of construction in the settlements around Jerusalem alone, not including the delayed (but approved) construction of 6500 units for the new settlement of Har Homa, located on a wooded hill just outside of Bethlehem. Construction is in fact continuing all over the West Bank, and the interministerial committee, established in 1995 to monitor settlement expansion, has not even met in the last nine months to restrict this latest building boom (Jerusalem Post, 15 February 1996). Along with this continuing rapid expansion of settlements throughout the West Bank, the construction of the by-pass roads will prove the primary instrument to realizing the functional compromise vision of Prime Minister Peres.
BACKGROUND ON THE BY-PASS ROADS
The idea of constructing Jewish only roads in the West Bank is not a new one. Since the early 1970's, highway and road construction in Jerusalem and the West Bank was seen as critical to the expansion of settlements and the continuation of the Israeli military presence in these areas.
In February of 1984 the Road Plan 50 was unveiled, presenting a national road system that encompassed the entire West Bank. Settlers played an important part in crafting this plan, which withstood a Supreme Court challenge in Israel. At this time the plan was seen as an important element in allowing for the quick development of settlements in the West Bank. Meron Benvenisti commented that this road plan was part of the declared intention on the part of the government to "produce conditions that would enable the quick development of blocs of settlements in the West Bank (Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, May 1995)."
Later, the Shamir government made further proposals for the construction of a road system to connect the settlements to each other and to Israel. In 1991, the Israeli group "Peace Now" criticized these roads in a report, stating: "The purpose of these roads is to create for their users the illusion that the green line has disappeared and that there is no Arab population in the area (Ibid.)."
In April 1992, the Ministry of Construction of Yitzhak Shamir approved the "Great Roads Plan". Under this plan, 400 kilometers of roads were to be constructed throughout the West Bank and that would by-pass Hebron, Halhoul, lead to Jerusalem and go on to circumvent Ramallah and Nablus. When the leadership passed to Yitzhak Rabin later that year, he canceled a symbolic 10 projects to demonstrate his change in the order of national priorities regarding settlements, but resumed some of them, confiscating the necessary Palestinian land for their construction.
Such a "Jewish only" road system would allow for an indirect method of control of the West Bank, create the infrastructure for continued settlement expansion, allow for a reduced military presence patrolling roads which would span the entire West Bank, and leave the semi-autonomous Palestinian enclaves to be controlled from the inside by the Palestinian Authority.
By the end of 1994, the Israeli army officially announced the development of 400 km of new roads, mostly Jewish-only by-pass roads, to be constructed in the West Bank, requiring an investment of 330 million dollars and reflecting Rabin's own determination to provide an easy method to control militarily the West Bank. Rabin consistently linked the completion of the roads to progress in the peace process, saying "without (the roads) Israel will not agree to any advancement in the negotiations (Ha'aretz, 17/1/95)."
The Oslo II accord signed in September of '95, and the agreements which followed, in fact made into reality this vision of indirect control by legitimizing this by-pass road system and providing for the continuing protected existence of the settlements. While this by-pass road plan had been in the books for years, until recently it had been seen as a Likud plan to prepare the West Bank for eventual annexation. Under the stewardship of Rabin, by-pass roads took on a more legitimized stand. Rabin did not favor annexation, but he did demand overriding military control over the West Bank, and saw these roads as the best means to this end. Allowing settlements to remain provided the best rationale to justify their construction.
But by the time Oslo II was signed in September of 1995, the logic, although not the aim, was shifted dramatically. Oslo II called for elections in the Occupied Territories, but elections would not take place until the Israeli military redeployed from Palestinian population centers. In addition to this stipulation, the Palestinian negotiators had already agreed to postpone discussion on the settlements until the final status negotiations, due to begin in May 1996. How to effectuate redeployment and provide for the security of the settlers, and therefore open the way to Palestinian elections? The by-pass roads, agreed to after the signing of Oslo II. Making the roads an instrument to peace and linking them to elections more or less dissipated the political opposition to them, and shifted the public focus from the tragic loss of Palestinian lands to the mechanism for the implementation of the peace process.
Here it is important to note that construction of these roads, closed to Palestinian drivers, does not prevent Palestinian military operations. Their main purpose is to facilitate easy expansion of existing settlements while providing for easier control of smaller sections of the West Bank.
Twenty new roads, $330 million, 400 kilometers. A complex plan to modernize transportation for settlers and military. "The plan is being pursued seriously," explained a senior Israeli army officer. "Its implementation will allow the army to control all the strategic sites and roads (after redeployment). According to the plan, vehicles of Palestinian residents will not be permitted to travel on the strategic routes (Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territory, May 1995)."
Highway 60
Highway 60, the aging highway which bisects the West Bank from north to south, comprises the central artery for the new by-passes which will circumvent the major Palestinian towns of Tulkarem, Nablus, Jericho, Ramallah, and Hebron. The highway begins in the Israeli town of Beersheva, south of the West Bank, and continues all the way north through the center of Hebron, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin to Afula, an Israeli town just over the green line to the north. This highway is open to all traffic, but the new bypasses to be constructed around every major city, and the smaller ancillary roads which will connect the settlements to each other and to Israel, will be closed to Palestinian traffic.
Jerusalem itself is also undergoing a renovation of its infrastructure. A new highway around the city to the east is under construction, highway 60 will feed into this new ring road, and new roads will then link the settlements in the East Jerusalem area to it.
Highway 60 now lies almost entirely in Area C, the area to remain under Israeli control until the final agreement. This provides an Israeli controlled corridor through the entire length of the West Bank. Where the road passes through the center of the Palestinian towns listed above (and therefore through Areas A and B), the Jewish only by-pass roads are under construction, allowing in most cases for settlers to remain in Area C. The following report details 13 of the 20 new roads. Some of the roads not detailed here are the smaller Jewish only roads of a kilometer or less.
Highway 60, in making its way to the north of the West Bank, passes through the center of the main Palestinian towns. The by-pass roads, of course, are meant to allow the Jewish settlers to travel without passing through these Palestinian populated areas. The Hebron-Halhoul by-pass road currently under construction passes around Hebron to the east. Twelve kilometers by 60 meters, this road cuts directly through the most fertile land in the southern West Bank. It passes around Yatta and Hebron to the east, through the lands of Al Shoyoukh, Halhoul, Souir and finally through Beit Omar to reconnect to highway 60 and allow for a complete by-pass of the Hebron-Halhoul area.
This construction has meant the demolition of seven houses already, and the loss of 5000 dunums of agricultural land for this road alone. An additional 16-90 homes remain at risk for the construction of this road, which passes near or parallel to the highway which already exists.
To be built in coordination with the Hebron-Halhoul by-pass road, this extension to highway 35 (the Trans-Judean highway, according to Israeli maps) will connect the Etzion block of settlements to highway 60. Highway 35 at the moment runs from Israel in the west, connects the Telem and Doran settlements west of Hebron and intersects highway 60 just north of Hebron.
The extension will begin at a new interchange to be constructed in the Bet Atut area north of Hebron, where the Hebron-Halhoul by-pass road, highway 60 and the new extension of highway 35 will intersect. The road will then continue north-east through the lands of Halhoul, Souir, Al Shoyoukh, and Bet Fajjar, will connect to the Mezad and Mezad B settlements and proceed north to the Etzion block of settlements west of Bethlehem.
This road will be approximately 14 kilometers by 180 meters, and 3500 dunums of land have already been confiscated for its construction. The economic losses to the farmers of the area for this road, like for the Hebron-Halhoul by-pass, will be enormous, as this land is highly cultivated. An unknown number of houses are at risk as a result of this construction as well.
Jerusalem
In southern Jerusalem, the Bethlehem/Beit Jala by-pass road, which is nearing completion, is perhaps the most elaborate of the by-pass road plans. Two tunnels and a bridge will link the East Jerusalem settlement of Gilo to the Etzion block of settlements west of highway 60, meaning the destruction of three homes and an unspecified number of dunums of agricultural land in Beit Jala.
In the northern Jerusalem area, the Jerusalem-Ramallah 9 kilometer by-pass road has taken a heavy toll as well on the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Beit Hanina, located to the north of Jerusalem near the main Jerusalem-Ramallah road (where the northern extension of highway 60 begins). This by-pass road, beginning in Jerusalem, will pass west of Ramallah and through the lands of Birnaballah, Jdeireh and Rafat villages and connect Ramot and surrounding settlements to Jerusalem.
This road will connect settlements to the east and west of Ramallah to each other and highway 60. The road will begin east of Ramallah in Mikhmas settlement, run north around El Bireh and Ramallah, pass through Bet El, intersect highway 60, and continue south down the west side of Ramallah through Beitunia, Jdarah, and Rabat villages to link Givat Ze'ev settlement west of Ramallah and Calandia airport to a military installation. These Palestinian villages, because of their proximity to the settlement clusters in this region, have already lost over 75% of their agricultural lands to the settlements, the industrial site, and the Jerusalem Calandia airport.
Nablus
Nablus, because of its strategic location in the center of the northern West Bank, is surrounded by Jewish settlements. Kadumim, Kadumim Tzafon, Givat Hamerkazi to the east, Shavei Shomron to the north-west, the Mt. Ibal military installation and Alon More to the north and north east, Tel Hayim and Itamar to the south-east and south, Barakha directly south and Yitzhar south west. These settlements, and the Jewish-only by-pass roads that are planned to link them, will entirely surround Nablus and isolate it from the rest of the West Bank.
2400 dunums from Der Sharaf, Naqoora, Beit Iba, Zawata and Ibelia, located to the west-northwest of Nablus, have been confiscated to build an 8 kilometer road surrounding Nablus to the north, crossing highway 60, which will link Shavei Shomron to the military installation on Mt. Ibal. There is a strong doubt that the road will end at the military installation, as Alon More lies just to the east of the military installation. The area through which this road will pass is considered the bread basket of the area, and over 100 people are affected by these confiscations.
The largest of the Nablus by-pass roads is the 24 kilometer road meant to link Alon More settlement located northeast of Nablus with settlements to the east and south. This road will begin at Alon More and move south on the lands of Der Khattab, and then south east through Salem village lands until it reaches the Beit Dajan plains. There the road will branch into two parts: the first will pass Beit Dajan to the east until it reaches the Hamra settlement and continue south until the Mukhara settlement. The second road will move west at Beit Dajan, intersect with the borders of the Nablus municipality before turning south again to the entrance of Itamar settlement. From there it passes west until Barakha settlement, located just south of Nablus proper.
Road number 477 will be built ostensibly to connect the Palestinian villages of Salfit, Farkha and Burkin, although paved roads already exist between these three villages. The confiscations (and the road) were ordered by the Israeli Civil Administration in February of 1994, and a highly restrictive skeleton plan was introduced at this time. Although announced as a road serving these Palestinian villages, the area lies in Area B and therefore cannot be considered the responsibility of the Civil Administration. But what also seems obvious from the trajectory of this road is that it will eventually enhance the infrastructure in the future for transportation between Ariel settlement and settlements south of the main Ariel-Israel highway.
The construction of this road will not only severely restrict the growth of these villages (according to the skeleton plans introduced) and limit the ability of the Palestinian municipalities to expand municipal services in this area, but also destroy thousands of olive trees. According to Mr. Khamis el Hamad, an activist in the field of land defense and spokesperson of the Land Defense Committee for this area, the villages will lose the production of about 80 tons of olive oil a year.
The people of the affected villages came to LAWE in April of 1994, to take the case against this road. LAWE presented the objection on 17 April 1994, but until today no hearing has been held concerning this road.
These roads, along with the settlements that surround Nablus on all sides, will totally isolate Nablus from its surrounding villages and the agricultural lands for this area. The lands of Der Khattab and Salem are cultivated with thousands of olive trees, and three other villages rely on agriculture in the Bet Dajan plains. The damage and agricultural losses for the region have not begun to be calculated, but it will critically damage agriculture as a source of income for this area.
Qalqilya
Qalqilya, because of its location on the green line at the western most point of highway 55, remains one of the most isolated of Palestinian towns. Highway 55 between Nablus and Qalqilya serves a long line of settlements: Kadumim, Kadumim Tzafon, Jit, Givat Hamerkazi, Qarnieh Shomron and its industrial site, Ginot Shomron, Ma'aleh Shomron, Tzofim, and Alphe Manashe. Qalqilya is surrounded by Israel to the west, Alphe Manashe to the south and Tzofim to the north. Highway 55 enters Qalqilya from the east.
The Qalqilya by-pass road will run from Tzofim in the north, through Qalqilya's agricultural lands which are heavily planted with guava and citrus fruit, to the Israeli villages of Eyal and Kokhav Yair just over the green line. It will mean the confiscation of 192 dunums of land, and will further isolate Qalqilya from its prime agricultural area to the north.
Jenin
Jenin is one of the Palestinian towns least affected by settlement activity. The closest settlements to Jenin are Ganim and Kadim settlements to the west, and Ginnat to the north-west. Further away, encircling Jenin but at some distance, are Shaked, Hinnanit, Site, Reihan, Mevo Dotan, Sanur, and Hermesh to the west and south-west, and Irit to the south-east. All of these settlements are small, with fewer than 500 settlers each. Therefore in order to maintain a military presence in the area, and to facilitate control around Jenin, a new military installation and by-pass road were proposed and begun in 1995.
The military installation will be located near Qabatia village, south of Jenin, for which 20 dunums of land were confiscated. The 7 kilometer by-pass road, requiring the confiscation of lands from Jenin, Der Abu Daif, Bet Qad, Der Ghazzalah, Arranah, Jalamah, and Burkin villages, will begin at the military installation, proceed north, pass Jenin to the east and intersect the road of Kadim and Ganim settlements, and will then continue north through the lands of Jenin, Der Ghazzalah, Arranah and Jalamah, bisect highway 60 and continue west until reaching the main Jenin-Nazareth road.
350 land-owners will be affected by these confiscations, and the road bisects the fertile agricultural areas to the east of Jenin. Large areas of land are currently cultivated with olive trees, wheat, irrigated and non-irrigated vegetables. In the course of the construction, 1500 olive trees have been uprooted and large areas of land cultivated with irrigated vegetables like pepper, eggplant, tomatoes and cucumbers were destroyed, along with the water pipes that fed them. Farmers believe that they will lose between $1142 - $1428 per dunum yearly as a result of this construction, added to the fact that their land will now be divided into two parts, making the more distant part over the road very difficult to access.
Land and Water Establishment took on many of the cases against these by-pass roads, understanding the catastrophic consequences of the roads and their explicitly racist nature. LAWE accepted these cases despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority had agreed to the roads (contrary to their first statements) and that the roads were linked to the redeployment from the Palestinian populated areas.
Most of the land was taken through seizure orders, a thinly veiled legalism for confiscation and the preliminary step toward permanent confiscation. These orders, issued by the General Commander of the West Bank Ilan Biran, are meant to reflect the supposed "temporary" nature of the roads. How the destruction of thousands of dunums of agricultural land, the demolition of over a hundred homes in the West Bank, and the paving of roads constitutes a temporary measure is not clear. The seizure orders, in these cases of a "temporary" period of three or five years, allows the General Commander to circumvent the normal, more complicated legal requirements relating to confiscation, and take much less to time to effectuate. Legally, objections can be made only to the Israeli Civil Administration.2 If this objection fails, the affected land owners have a brief 48 hours to submit a petition to the Supreme Court.
The fact that the first court of appeals is also the confiscating authority, and the inadequate 48-hour petition period makes a seizure order much more destructive to the more time-consuming confiscation order. This legal "trick" has allowed for this latest massive confiscation campaign. The additional irony lies in the fact that the justification listed on most of the seizure orders is security and military necessity - a rationale that cannot be argued against or challenged by any Palestinian landowner.
These confiscations are illegal and constitute a violation of both international law and Israeli legal precedent. First, international law states that it is illegal to effectuate permanent changes to an occupied area, unless there is a need to modernize aging infrastructure. These by-pass roads constitute a permanent change on the Palestinian countryside, and are unrelated to the infrastructure needs of the local population.
Second, the roads are built for the exclusive use of the illegal and supposedly temporary Jewish settler population in the West Bank. Although Palestinians own the lands used for these roads, and the road network for the local population has hardly been improved since 1967, this ultra-modern road network is designed for the maximum convenience of the "temporary" settler population, and built in such a way as to permanently exclude the local population from their use. Many of the roads run parallel to already existing aging roads, and others are located in such a way as to prevent their eventual use by nearby Palestinian villages.
In addition, these confiscations violate an Israeli legal precedent set in 1982, which forbids the confiscation of the local population's property for permanent use. The destruction of homes, and the use of land for road-building constitutes a permanent use, particularly as the roads are now accessible only to the settlements and military installations.
Finally, the construction of these roads will destroy the only source of income for hundreds of families in the West Bank. Compensation cannot begin to redress the permanent loss of income for families that have depended on their lands for their livelihoods for generations. The overall effect of this damage to the Palestinian agricultural economy will be dealt with later in this report.
Because of complicated arrangements made during and after the signing of Oslo II, challenging these roads on a legal level became very difficult. In addition, the plans for many of the roads do not include detailed information on the dimensions and trajectory of the roads. It is impossible to assess the damages or present objections since the information simply is not made available to the affected villages. Despite these restrictions, LAWE has taken legal cases against the Jenin by-pass road (28 owners), the Nablus by-pass road from Shavei Shomron to the military installation, the Ramallah-El Bireh by-pass road, the Skaka-Salfit road south of Nablus, and the Hebron -Halhoul by-pass road. In every case the Civil Administration ruled in favor of the Israeli army, which argued that the confiscations were necessary for military and security reasons. LAWE took one case to the Israeli High Court which, like the Civil Administration, accepted the argument of military and security reasons. The High Court dismissed the objections of LAWE, based on international law, on Israeli legal precedent, and on humanitarian grounds, stating that they were political arguments. It became apparent that there was no effective way of seeking legal redress against the confiscation of these lands, particularly after it became known that the Palestinian Authority had, in fact, agreed to the construction of these roads.
Since there remained very little hope that legal challenges would receive a fair hearing or provide legal relief to this destruction, popular demonstrations became the only method of protesting these hated roads. As the catastrophic consequences on local agricultural became more apparent, area residents turned out in force to try to protect their lands.
Land Defense Committees have played a large role in organizing this anger of the people into protest activity. Throughout 1995, meetings were held all over the West Bank between Palestinian Authority members and the land-owners, who demanded that action be taken to protect their lands. In one meeting in August landowners from Rafat village near Ramallah, who have seen over 70% of their agricultural land confiscated for roads, a military installation and the Jerusalem airport, demanded action from PA minister Yasser Abed Rabbo. Villagers said that these roads will divide the Palestinian lands and prevent the formation of a Palestinian state, and asked why the PNA did not stop the negotiations until this issue was resolved. At this time all Authority members denied that the PA had approved the construction of these roads.
In July of 1995, however, LAWE lost yet another case against the confiscations for the roads. During the arguments, the lawyer for the State of Israel claimed that the Civil Administration was confiscating lands for the by-pass roads on the basis of an agreement between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government. In frustration, LAWE wrote a letter to President Arafat, asking him to clarify this point, and to tell the Palestinian people that this claim was false and the PA had not agreed to the construction of these roads and the confiscations which they necessitated. On August 6, President Arafat responded with a two-line fax, saying "The agreement was that they must not confiscate land (for the by-pass roads) without coordination with us. They have not coordinated with us." This statement reveals an agreement in principle with the Israeli by-pass road plan, and therefore with the confiscations necessary to facilitate them. The fact that there had been no coordination in this case can hardly lay to rest fears that the Palestinian Authority had agreed to the principle of the theft of Palestinian land. It is one of the remarkable developments of this peace process that for the first time the Palestinian leadership has approved of the confiscation of Palestinian lands for Occupation purposes (in this case, Jewish-only roads).
Only several months after Oslo II did this fact become apparent to the Palestinian community, and this weakened popular protest. During the Land Defense Committee meeting held in November 1995, the fax to LAWE from President Arafat was made public, revealing that the roads were a political issue and already resolved by negotiation. Shortly thereafter, the Land Defense Committee in Hebron called off its weekly vigil, recognizing that they were demonstrating against what they came to understand as PA policy (Challenge Magazine, January 1996). President Arafat's agreement to permit Palestinian land to be taken to build the by-pass roads effectively undermined political opposition and popular protest against the confiscations. Left without any recourse, Palestinian landowners are left to stand by and watch as the bulldozers uproot their vineyards, cut down their olive trees, tear down their houses, and end their livelihoods. It is unlikely that the lands taken for these roads will be returned to their original owners, and even if they will be returned, the damage - a paved road in the middle of their fields - is irreparable.
AGRICULTURE AND THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY
To date, the Palestinian economy has depended upon its agriculture, the only sector of the economy that has the potential for independent development. Agriculture contributes about 20-25% to the gross domestic product and 25% to employment, and about 50% of the Palestinian population benefit directly from agricultural returns (Developing the Occupied Territories, World Bank, September 1993).
But overriding Israeli control over the infrastructure, borders and exports of Palestinian produce has kept the Palestinian economy crippled. President Yasser Arafat recently claimed, in a presentation to the Amman economic summit held in September 1995, that the Palestinians lost six million dollars a day every time Israel closed off the Palestinian territories. In addition Israel has on two separate occasions closed the borders into Jordan to Palestinian produce, exports that had been approved by the Israeli Minister of Agriculture and the Israeli Plan Protection Department (Roberts, Middle East Economy, IPS, 1/11/95).
The confiscations for the by-pass roads has dealt another crippling blow to the Palestinian agricultural economy. The 16,000 dunums confiscated and destroyed for the roads is largely agricultural, and the roads cut through some of the most fertile land in the north and south of the West Bank. In addition, the vast areas of cultivated land which lie on the far side of the roads will be difficult to impossible to maintain. The amount of land thus bisected and therefore made inaccessible by these roads has not yet even been calculated, although local villages are already feeling the losses.
At this time Israeli occupation forces retain overriding control over 70% of the West Bank (Areas C), the infrastructure, the West Bank and Gazan borders, the rich agricultural lands of the Jordan Valley, water and other natural resources; in short, the military occupation has retained control over the future or demise of the Palestinian economy. Prime Minister Peres' long-touted vision of industrial parks located on the West Bank and Gazan borders is well served by the end of agriculture as a viable means of production. The exceedingly high unemployment found in the territories will provide the labor needed to fully exploit these industrial parks and other industrial projects. President Arafat himself also sees a future of high technology, like the South-East Asian "dragons" - small countries with small populations but with strong economies (Jan de Jong, Le Monde Diplomatique, January 1996). But for Palestine, bordering on an economically powerful country like Israel, such industrial development can only make the Palestinian economy more dependent on it's neighbor, and mean another blow to real sovereignty.
The signing of the Oslo Accords legitimized the various methods used by the Israeli military occupation to retain its control in the West Bank, methods which were facilitated by the construction of the comprehensive by-pass road system. These roads will allow for practical control of all of area C, and control of Area C is at the heart of the future plans to maintain permanent military control over all the West Bank. All main trade and transportation routes will be dependent on the Israeli military, which will continue to control these roads. The by-pass roads will remain for Jewish-only use.
Oslo II essentially allowed Israel to give away the security problem of the Palestinians, relegating the 1.5 million souls under the authority of the new Palestinian Council to 30% of the land-area of the West Bank. Settlements, protected now like they never were before, and which comprise a population 10 times less than the local Palestinians, are now located in areas which comprise over 70% of the lands in the West Bank. The roads constructed between the settlements and to Israel serve to make the vast expanses of Area C more contiguous, and more easily secured.
The changes effectuated since Oslo II, notably in the massive government expenditure to expand the settlements and the multi-million dollar by-pass road plan, make changes in the West Bank that no negotiations can undo. The final demarcation was essentially decided upon in the maps signed by President Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin in September 1995. Indeed, as land becomes a scarcer commodity, the struggle for some kind of real independence will have less relevance.
The long-term plans of Prime Minister Peres will unfold in the coming years, and it will require real strength on the part of the Palestinian negotiators to ensure that all of Area C isn't lost, and that their agricultural economy remains intact. Retaining Palestinian land and economic independence has never been more important, and has never been more tenuous.
2 The Israeli Civil Administration is the authority in the West Bank which handles the administrative aspects of occupation and controls nearly all areas of Palestinian life. The Civil Administration has been artificially designated as such; in fact it is the official branch of Israeli army activity in the West bank. Most employees are Israeli army personnel and the headquarters are located on a military base. General Commander of the West bank Ilan Biran is the highest ranking military officer in the Civil Administration. At this moment the Civil Administration remains responsible for all of Area C and retains overriding control over Area B (about 97% of the West Bank).