Introduction
The Turkish System
Israeli settlement policy
Land Confiscation
Confiscation for state lands
Military Expropriations
Security Reasons
Public use
Absentee Property
Parks
Quarries
Skeleton plans
International Law
Expansion after Madrid and Oslo
Palestinian Protest
Israeli Response

Introduction

The history of land registration in the West Bank helps explain the various and complicated methods used by the Israeli government to annex the Occupied Territories through land confiscation. Land registration laws left over from the Ottoman, British and Jordanian administrations served to regulate land registration in the West Bank. After the occupation of Palestine in 1967, the imposition Israeli military law further complicated its land situation. The conflict over land is at the heart of the current conflict over the future of Palestine.

The Turkish System

The Turkish government, throughout the period of the Ottoman Empire, considered all the lands in Palestine as under the ownership of the Sultan. In the 1860's, the Turkish government instituted legislation to regulate land use and taxation. They began to parcel out the land for private use to those who could prove that they had used the land for 10 consecutive years. If the land was not used continuously, the land could be re-registered to another.

The Ottoman regime rarely enforced this law, preferring instead to concentrate on tax collection on the registered lands. Many Palestinians, therefore, claimed less land than they actually used to escape their tax burden. Some of the poorer Palestinians in the villages, unable to pay the taxes, registered their lands under the names of rich families in Jerusalem or in other big cities. In return for produce or money, these families then would use their influence within the empire to avoid this tax.

In the 1880's, the Turkish government modified land registration laws to reflect the real ownership of the land. These laws stated that if the interested party had used the land for more than 10 years, ownership fell to them automatically. The land claimed under these new regulations also made up less than what was really used, again to escape taxation.

The British Mandate, which was imposed after World War I, did not change the ownership situation in Palestine. British authorities simply recorded the documentation for buying and selling, and continued registering land using the old Turkish law.

Responsibility for modifying land registration laws fell to the Jordanian government after 1948, when this government assumed administrative duties for the West Bank. Legislation was passed on 16 June 1952 and developed in 1953, 1954 and 1955. Article 28(10) of this law canceled all previous land registration regulations. They began registration procedures, similar to the old Ottoman system, based on the principle of ownership for those who actually used the land. The Jordanian Administration considered only 13% of the land in the West Bank as state land for military purposes or government buildings.

While the registration procedures were comprehensive and accurate, these procedures took time. The Jordanian administration was only able to register about one-third of the land in the West Bank up to 1967. The remaining land was divided by old Ottoman law into a combination of unregistered private property, land held by religious interests, common pasture land, and land used for public purposes like roads and cemeteries. Although many landowners paid taxes on these lands, they remained technically unregistered.

When Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, the military commander for the area (General Moshe Dayan) issued a military order by which they immediately stopped all land registration procedures. They did not allow any new registration nor the installation of new procedures to register lands.

Several years after the beginning of the Occupation, the Military Administration allowed some limited registration inside cities in the West Bank. The illegal registration of lands to Israeli settlers and Israeli industrial interests began shortly after 1967. This "registration" did not follow any systematized legal procedure and frequently involved falsified documentation.

Israeli settlement policy

Shortly after Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, the latent Zionist desire to "retake" all of Eretz Israel began to emerge. The longing for a Jewish homeland in all of greater Israel found an unexpected outlet in the taking of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Up until 1974, under the leadership of Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, 11 settlements were established. Settlement policy at this time concentrated on construction in the Jordan Valley and in the Gush Etzion area. 82%, or 9 of these settlements, were established in these two areas, and most of these settlements had a largely secular population. One settlement was begun next to the Latrun Road, and the other Kiryat Arba near Hebron. No settlements were built in Gaza or the northern West Bank.

Until 1977, under the leadership of Rabin, 9 settlements were begun, 66% (6) of which in the Gush Etzion Bloc and in the Jordan Valley. Two additional settlements were begun in what the Israelis have termed the "greater" Jerusalem area and one in the south of the West Bank.

These settlements were for the most part officially founded for security reasons and under the general principle that settlements should not be founded in densely populated Arab areas. In reality, however, these settlements were slowly creating a situation which would set the stage for the possibility of eventual annexation of the West Bank to Israel.

After the election of Likud in 1977, the ideological rationale for the foundation of settlements changed from one of security to a religious and ideological one for the re-conquest of all of "greater Israel". Begin and then Shamir attempted to solidify Israel's control over the Occupied Territories with the aim of eventual annexation. This government-sponsored building boom in the Occupied Territories resulted in the increasing transfer of not only secular Jews but also of a highly religious and radicalized Israeli Jewish population, and the growing displacement of the indigenous Palestinian population. The explicit racist aims were clear - to establish a Jewish state for Jews only.

Land Confiscation

The confiscation of Palestinian lands, therefore, became the leading vehicle by which to transport ever increasing numbers of Israelis and new immigrants to the Occupied Territories. The land came cheap (free, even), and the dispossessed Palestinian population could do little to stop it. Manipulation of the convoluted and complex legal situation in the West Bank regarding land registration by the military authorities in the West Bank enabled them to invent many different justifications to confiscate the Palestinian homeland for Israel.

Confiscation of land takes place by military order issued by Israeli military commanders for the region. The military commanders have the authority to issue military confiscation orders. They also created, by military order and to provide a pseudo-legal framework for their decisions, a new committee called the Military Objections Committee. This committee acts as a court where Palestinians can object to land confiscation orders.

Several different rationales are used to justify land confiscation. All these methods, it must be remembered, are illegal by international law and designed to limit or deny the basic Palestinian right to own and use their land.

These methods are:

• State land
• Military expropriation
• Security reasons
• Public use
• Absentee Property

Confiscation for state lands

Most effective and most often used, the state lands rationale provides the basis for the majority of land confiscation cases. Under Military Order 59, Israel definstate property as "any land which on 6 June 1967 belonged to the enemy state (Jordan or Egypt) or was under its control". A simple statement by the Israeli Lands Authority (the military authority responsible for confiscating land) is all that is necessary to confiscate, unless the Palestinian land owners can prove otherwise. Since, under the Jordanian administration, roughly two-thirds of the non-state lands of the West Bank remained unregistered, the vast majority of land in the West Bank is vulnerable to this type of confiscation.

The Military Objections Committee provides the court of objections to the order of confiscation. This "court" accepts only deeds issued by the Jordanian administration as proof that the land is privately owned. Although all Palestinians owning the two thirds of the unregistered land could produce tax documents proving that they had paid Jordanian land taxes and were currently paying Israeli land taxes, the court through military order did not consider this valid evidence of ownership. In addition, in the early 1980's the Israeli tax authority began writing on the land-tax registration documents (which record how much land tax must be paid) that payment of the tax did not prove private ownership.

In the Objections Committee not a single case was decided in favor of the Palestinian owners. By the mid 1980's, this had become an embarrassment for the court. In order to give an impression that the appeals process is fair, the Military Commander began inflating the amount of land to be confiscated. The court would hear the appeal, and then deflate the amount of land demanded to the area really wanted by the Military Commander.

Palestinian landowners have one right of appeal to the decisions of the Military Objections Committee, directly to the Israeli Supreme Court. Here it must be noted that Palestinian lawyers are barred from practicing law in Israeli courts. Palestinian landowners must have an Israeli lawyer, something too expensive for many Palestinians. There are also not so many Israeli lawyers that Palestinians feel comfortable representing them. In the Supreme court, like the Military Objections Committee, Palestinians lose approximately 99% of the cases.

After the land has been confiscated and after the legal options have been exhausted, the Israeli authorities rent the land to settlers to expand their settlements (although in many cases construction is begun or continues while the cases are still pending in court), or the government itself builds new settlements. The vast majority of settlements were constructed on state lands.

Military Expropriations

Using this rationale, the military authorities could confiscate privately owned land for unknown or unannounced military reasons. In the courts, the orders for confiscation for military reasons issued by the military commander is acceptable without explanation. Usually the excuse, if one is given, is that the land will be used for training or for a camp. Normally they propose compensation, which is refused by the Palestinian owners.

Huge amounts of land can be confiscated using this method, as witnessed recently in Yatta village. Over 20,000 dunums were confiscated for military reasons, over an area stretching from Yatta village in the south to the Dead Sea.

Significantly, Military Order 59 provides that "state land" also includes any lands seized by military expropriation orders. For example Ma'aleh Adumim was founded on land which was originally "military closed" land.

Security Reasons

Here, land is confiscated without any rationale needing to be given at all, a practice accepted by the court.

Public use

In this case private lands may be confiscated for construction of new roads for the settlers (or "security roads" - a term frequently used by Rabin) or for Jewish schools, hospitals, administrative buildings and the like. These lands are never allocated for Palestinian use. Israeli Military Order 108 and 321 transferred the Jordanian regulations for confiscation of land for public use to a military authority appointed by the Israeli Army Commander for the area. There is no civil forum for appeals.

Here there are different regulations for Jerusalem. For example, the Israeli government recently confiscated 2000 dunums of land in Mt. Abu Ghnem, between Bethlehem and East Jerusalem, using the "public use" rationale. The land, however, has been allocated to Jewish Israelis to build a new settlement called Har Homa. This area is located near the Arab villages Umm Tuba, Sour Baher, and Beit Sahur. Umm Tuba is in extreme need to expand their municipal boundaries. Their petitions to expand their village have been consistently refused. This area also represents the only forested area in East Jerusalem. On part of the land, there is an athletic area serving the villages.

Absentee Property

Israeli Military Order 58 defining "abandoned land" is modeled after the "Absentee Property Law" used inside Israel. The Absentee Property Law considers all Palestinians forced to leave the country in 1967, and who are living in neighboring Arab countries who are considered in a state of war with Israel, as absentee. Even more comprehensive, Military Order 58 states that "abandoned land" is any land belonging to any Palestinian from the West Bank, Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem who left their land before, during or after the 1967 war. This land is transferred exclusively for Jewish use through a "Custodian of Absentee Property" (an appointed position), who operates as a function of the Israeli Lands Authority.

After 1967 Israeli government began confiscating the property inside Israel belonging to Palestinians living in "belligerent states", also giving it over to a Custodian whose function it is to rent it to settlers or Jewish industrial interests. In the Occupied Territories it is the "Custodian" who can expel occupants who, in their opinion, had no right to occupy the property of a person deemed absentee.

A provision of the Absentee Property Law, valid for annexed East Jerusalem, states that priority for renting confiscated land using the absentee rationale must be given to family members. In fact, priority is given to Jewish interests.

The most famous case concerning this law took place in Silwan village. About 60% of a house owned by the Al Abassi family, most of whom live in the house, was confiscated by the Custodian. It was immediately put up for rent by a settler's real estate company called Al Ad. Settlers rented this 60% and moved in by force, refusing access to the rest of the house to the owners and effectively confiscating the owner's property located in the rooms taken by them. They have since destroyed the owners' property, and they live there under the protection of privately hired guards and border police. In this case they violated Israeli law by not following the legal procedures in confiscating the house, and because the Custodian must by Israeli law offer the house for rent to those already living there.

The Al Abassi family, however, knew nothing about the confiscation orders until the settlers moved into the house. After the case went to court, it was discovered that only 25% of the house was owned by an absentee interest. The court case continues and the settlers continue living in 60% of this house in direct contravention of this law.

True to the ingenuity of the occupation authorities, a new strategy emerged to facilitate confiscation of property of Palestinians who own land in East Jerusalem but who live in the West Bank. They considered East Jerusalem as part of Israel, and the West Bank residents as Jordanian citizens. They used the rationale that, since these Palestinians are residents of Jordan, their lands are open for confiscation (as residents of a state "at war" with Israel).

After the peace agreement with Jordan, a new argument was introduced for the Al Abassi cases. Their lawyer argued that the 25% which was owned by Palestinians in Jordan and who are Jordanian citizens, cannot be considered "absentee" since Jordan has signed a peace agreement with Israel ethe state of war which had existed between them.

The court's response was that a new law needs to be drafted stating specifically that Jordanian citizens were no longer considered absentee. The court cited the case of Palestinians living in Egypt - the state of war ended in 1979 but they are still considered absent. The Knesset never passed a new law redefining these Palestinians as non-absentee.

In addition to the above methods, in 1993 the Israeli authorities began confiscating lands using other rationales. These methods were as follows:

• For public park areas
• For industrial areas usually used for quarries
• Defining skeleton plans to restrict Arab villages and promote growth of settlements.

Parks

Israeli authorities began in 1993 confiscating large areas of land near the green line for park reserves. One case involves land belonging to people from the village of Al Nabi Samuel between Jerusalem and Ramallah. This confiscated land was predominantly cultivated land.

In the Hebron area, near the villages of Halhoul and Tarkumye, 6-8000 dunums of land were confiscated for a "green area".

Until January 1 1995, 11,400 dunums of land have been confiscated for this purpose.

Quarries

This type of confiscation began late in 1993 along the green line in both the north and south of the West Bank. There are several significant examples.

One quarry, owned by Jewish settlers from Kawkab al Sabah and under license from Israeli authorities, operates in the Ramallah area, near Kufur Malik village. 2523 dunums of land were confiscated for this quarry. They have been crushing stone only 1200 meters from Kufur Malik.

Another quarry was authorized in the Tulkarim area, for which 9200 dunums of land were confiscated belonging to Shoqa, Sefarin, Al Ras, Kufur Sor, Kufur Kur and Kur villages.

Another quarry, to be built between Dura and Dahariye, has been allocated 2100 dunums of confiscated lands.

The health and environmental consequences of quarries, especially located so close to villages, are serious. Inadequate waste disposal and shock waves from the crushing are among the most serious side effects.

These two methods of confiscation are intended to alter the location of the green line. These confiscation cases also did not take into consideration if the land was private or not.

Skeleton plans

The 420 Arab villages in the West Bank currently are forced to use old village plans which predate 1948. These village plans, or skeleton plans, remained unmodified under the Jordanian, British and Israeli administrations. The Israeli authorities used these old village plans to restrict building or village expansion, and demolished houses that were not authorized by these old plans. When the housing shortage became too acute to ignore, many villages proposed skeleton plans in the 1980's to develop and expand their municipalities. The Civil Administration systematically refused these plans for Palestinian village expansion.

In 1993, the special committee in the Israeli Civil Administration called the Civil Administration Planning Section was authorized to review modifications to village plans. Most of the members of this committee, including the chair, are Jewish settlers, with a token Palestinian participant. This committee prepared skeleton plans for most of the Arab villages in the West Bank and for the Jewish settlements. They claim that these plans are drawn up according to Jordanian law of 1966, which states that research and population studies must be carried out, as well as a study of the kind of lands and the history and future needs of the village. The results must be village expansion.

This committee never carried out any research. The committee claimed that since its skeleton plans represented only temporary solutions, these studies were not necessary. The results were, of course, the restriction of the expansion of Arab villages.

At the same time, this committee has been drawing up plans for the settlements of the Occupied Territories. By "rezoning" the outlying areas of Palestinian villages, they allotted this land to the settlements for their expansion, effectively encircling Arab villages.

In an additional twist, the Civil Administration gave to the Planning Section the power to hear the objections of the Palestinian villagers against these plans. In the beginning of each session in which the committee was to hear objections, the chair of this committee told the Palestinian lawyers and the villagers they represent that they should not think of going to the Supreme Court since the plans are technically temporary. This holds up in court and is, in fact, what happened in several cases.

These policies have resulted in a peculiar situation in which the most of the Palestinian land in the Occupied Territories recognized as privately owned by Israeli authorities is the land on which their houses are actually located. This private land makes up approximately one-third of the West Bank.

The Israeli authorities have never given state lands for Palestinian needs. In every case, the State allotted state lands to the settlements for expansion or for the establishment of new settlements. There has been only one instance in which the authorities claimed they would consider giving state lands to an Arab village to ease severe housing shortages. On 25 January 1995, Housing Minister Ben Eliezer said that Israel would begin considering allocating state lands to Arab villages for their expansion. This statement, however, represents little more than a hollow promise made for the international media.

The Palestinian people and their leadership have not had a clear strategy to protest against these settlement and land confiscation policies. Palestinian owners of the land were forced to work individually using Israeli legal procedures which (as we have shown) have usually been doomed to failure from the beginning.

Now, between 60-70% of the land in the West Bank has fallen under direct Israeli control. The international community has condemned these policies as illegal in recognition that population transfer precludes a peaceful solution to the conflict. In light of the recent Oslo and Cairo accords, this 60-70%, these "facts on the ground", strengthens the Israeli negotiating position and prejudices the location of the green line - the future border between Israel and Palestine.

International Law

The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly called for an end to the occupation, reaffirming the UN Charter prohibition against the use of force except in self-defense. Resolution 242, passed on 22 November 1967, condemned the occupation and provided the basis for the Israeli-Arab negotiations. Its provisions include "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied in the war of 1967.

In 1979, the Security Council passed resolution 452, explicitly condemning settlement construction in the Occupied Territories. Since this time, five resolutions by the Security Council and fifteen by the General Assembly have condemned Jewish settlement in the Territories and called for their withdrawal.

Israeli settlement policy also violates several provisions of the Hague and Geneva conventions, to which it is a signatory. International law has been used selectively at best in this region, but rarely violated so systematically and with such contempt as Israeli settlement policy.

Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva convention states that the occupying power must protect civilians and cannot deprive them of their rights by changing the local government, physical structures or demographic composition of the occupied territory. It states: "Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the ior government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory."

Private property is also protected:

"Private property cannot be confiscated." The Hague Conventions, article 46(2).

"Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations." Fourth Geneva Convention, article 53.

"The Occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied territory." The Hague Conventions, article 55.

Finally, population transfer into occupied territory is forbidden. "The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 49(6).

Israeli military policy generally, and its settlement policies specifically, make no attempt to satisfy the conditions outlined in the Hague or Geneva Conventions. Their own blatant disregard for their international responsibilities reinforces the perception of Israel as a renegade nation, unwilling to answer to the international community. They have exempted themselves from the international covenants which helped create the State of Israel, and have made no attempt to change occupation policies so reminiscent of the Nazi regime that so many came here to escape.

Expansion after Madrid and Oslo

The Madrid Conference, held in October 1991, raised the hopes of the Palestinian people for some kind of concrete change in their situation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conference reflected more a desire to establish a new economic order in the Middle East than to address the thorny Palestinian/Israeli problem. Israel, as the regional economic superpower, needed to normalize its relations with its hostile but pro-American Arab neighbors, and to subdue the restive Palestinian population.

Despite public statements in Madrid and later in Oslo, no effort has been made to freeze settlement expansion. In fact, the crucial provision in the Oslo accord on settlements agreed to put off consideration of the settlements and of Jerusalem for a maximum of another five years - the five years necessary for Israel to change irreversibly the demography of the West bank as a whole and of Jerusalem in particular.

No explicit statement against settlements and settlement expansion can be found in the Declaration of Principles, although Rabin has made repeated promises to this effect. This ambiguity in the DOP, and the disingenuity on the part of Rabin and his administration, has camouflaged the fact that settlement construction and population expansion has continued unabated since the Accords. In reality, the situation in the Occupied Territories, especially concerning the loss of Palestinian lands to Jewish settlers, has only changed for the worst.

Statistics, compiled by the Central Bureau for Statistics, showed that 490 new units were authorized in the last months of 1992, 2240 units were authorized in 1993, and 620 new units during the first nine months of 1994. In addition, the CBS estimates that the settler population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased by 10.4 percent in 1993. In October of 1994, Yesha (the settlement's governing council) estimated a settler population of 140,000. Between the period after the signing of the Oslo Accord until 1 January 1995, an outstanding 17,180 dunums of land has been confiscated specifically for settlement expansion; 19,936 dunums for road construction; and 105,528 dunums declared closed military zones. Despite Rabin's stated change in priorities, construction activities and the transfer of Jewish settlers to Occupied Territory has been actually increasing.

Over the last month of 1994 and during the beginning of 1995, settlement expansion has been approved at a rate not seen since before the Accords were signed. Settlements began expanding on lands that had been confiscated in past years, and on newly confiscated lands. Construction on "security roads", which effectively divides the West Bank into Bantustans and allows for the confiscation of privately owned land, continues unabated. Settlement expansion and aggressive activities became so intense in the last month of 1994 that protests began to spread throughout the West Bank. Rabin's cabinet was thrown into disarray, and he abdicated decision making concerning settlements to a new ministerial committee, formed on 22 January, 1995.

A brief list of aggressive actions prior to this date is as follows:

The settlement of Efrat began construction on 500 dunums of land on a hill belonging to the village of El Khader. The hill is some two kilometers away from Efrat itself. This blatant attempt to found a new settlement only meters away from El Khader sparked the protests that spread throughout the West Bank. After a series of sometimes brutally repressed protests, the settlement agreed to move its expansion to other confiscated lands closer to the settlement.

On 26 December, in Kufur Labad village, the Evny Hevitz settlement began expansion activities on 300 dunums of village lands.

On 29 December, the settlements of Kiryat Sefer and Matatiaho, near the villages of Deir Keddis and Saffa respectively, began construction on 5000 dunums of land.

On 2 January, the Telmond settlement began road construction on 54 dunums of land from Al Janiyah village.

Betar Illit settlement began constructing a road on lands from Hussam and Nahalin villages, for which they demolished two houses and confiscated 1000 dunums of land.

Ariel settlement, near Skaka and Marda villages, began expansion activities on 5000 dunums of land belonging to these villages.

On 2 January, construction activities began on 1000 dunums of land belonging to the village of Kufur Deik

Settlers from Al Canaa settlement began construction on new units for the expansion of their settlement on land belonging to Palestinians from El Zawyeh village.

New roads were begun in the town of El Bireh to link Pisgot settlement with Beit El in the north and Ma'aleh Adumim in the south. Another road was begun between the settlement of Hagai and the green line.

3000 dunums of land were confiscated from Hebron to build a "settler's road" between Hagai and Kiryat Arba.

Thirty families in Yatta village near Hebron were summarily evicted without notice on 17 January. The military claimed the land had been confiscated for military purposes. The confiscated area is about 20,000 dunums. The military used tractors to move the villagers and their belongings to the road.

On 24 January, two bulldozers began working to expand the settlement of Adam on 3000 dunums of land belonging to people from the village of Jaba'a.

These expansion activities sparked a Palestinian protest movement which forced Rabin to reconsider his settlement policy and to establish the new ministerial committee.

Palestinian Protest

Land and Water Establishment, as part of its advocacy work against land confiscation and settlement activities, organized a conference in August 1994 to organize the owners of confiscated lands in the north of the West Bank. During this conference, a Land Defense Committee was established for this region. LAWE organized a second conference in September of 1994 in the south of the West Bank and established a Land Defense Committee for this region. These two committees founded a central Land Defense Committee for the West Bank in October 1994. This central committee established local Land Defense Committees in communities facing land confiscation.

The work of these committees began by compiling statistics concerning land confiscation in the West Bank. They also contthe Palestinian National Authority to pressure it to strengthen its opposition to settlement expansion and land confiscation, and to express their opinion that peace will not be accepted if the lands are not returned to their rightful Palestinian owners.

When the Israelis began increasing their settlement activities in December, the situation had already become clear to most of the Palestinian people. The peace process had failed even in its most basic premises. President Arafat had become unable to deliver on the most basic protections demanded by the people and in the spirit of the Declaration of Principles - namely the protection of Palestinian land.

Therefore, the Land Defense Committees, because of their connection with the land, could easily organize protest activities against settler aggression and expansion. Palestinians from all different political parties and different groups participated in these protest activities throughout the month of December, facing increasingly brutal repression and a reinstitution of oppressive policies reminiscent of the days of the intifada. Throughout the protests, the people demanded that the PNA end its negotiations with the Israeli government unless the land confiscation and settlement activities are completely halted. Through these protests, the settlement issue was pushed to forefront and became the indicator if the peace process would be a success or not. The possibility was created for another intifada, a "land intifada", against the Israeli settlement policy.

Israeli Response

These protests caused confusion and disarray in the cabinet of Rabin. Through several policy reversals, Rabin showed himself unable to come to grips with this protest movement and unable to suppress it through usual means. Events at El Khader and the protests which spread throughout the West Bank forced a reevaluation on how decisions were made concerning expansion approval. A new ministerial committee was established to review settlement expansion cases. Despite Rabin's recent declarations promising a settlement freeze, the new ministerial committee approved extensive settlement expansion and road building activities throughout the West Bank that exceeds the expansion activities for the last four months of 1993 and the entire year of 1994 combined.

This new committee, on 25 January, gave its approval for the construction of 1,080 new units in Ma'aleh Adumim in 1995, for 900 additional units in Betar, and 800 new units in Givat Ze'ev.

In the Jordan Valley, the committee also approved 50 government funded housing units.

The committee also approved the continued construction of 1,026 units in Betar that began four months ago, 797 units in "the early stages of construction" in Ma'aleh Adumim, and the completion of 340 units in Givat Ze'ev.

The committee also approved the continued construction of some 7000 units in advanced stages of construction.

On 1 February, the committee approved an entirely new settlement, to be built on 2000 dunums of lands confiscated from Sour Baher, Umm Tuba and Bet Sahur villages. 8000 total units have been approved for the settlement, to be called Har Homa, and construction on the first 6500 will begin immediately.

Settler aggression has also accelerated since these protests began, reading the cabinet's decisions approving expansion as a green-light to accelerate their own expansion activities.

Settlers from Ma'aleh Amos on 27 January moved three trailers onto 650 dunums of land belonging to Palestinians from Al Rashaide, Al Taamreh and Kisan villages. A settler from the area said that the move was "an act of defiance against the government. It is a signal that we are going to build here no matter what." The Israeli Civil Administration has declared the moves illegal.

On 28 January, a Palestinian, Israeli and Western group went to inspect the sight near Ma'aleh Amos, and were fired upon by the settlers. This marks the first time that settlers have fired upon non-Palestinians. After this incident, the hill was declared a closed military zone, and reports state that three water tanks have been installed as a preparatory measure for a new settlement.

A road was completed by settlers linking Kochav Ya'acov, located near Jerusalem, to an adjacent hill. This road too was declared illegal by the Civil Administration. The settlers began bulldozing this hill, and declared a new settlement to be called Givat Atarot.

2000 olive trees were uprooted in Beit Lid in the Tulkarim area by airborne paratroopers. The soldiers parachuted onto the land, surrounded it, and destroyed the trees. They stated that the land had been confiscated as state land in 1985.

These activities on the part of the government, the military and the settlers highlight the continued attempts by Rabin to strengthen his negotiating position. Rabin and his cabinet are continuing to change irrevocably the demography of the West Bank, hoping to put large parts of it permanently under Israeli control.

Settlements, population transfer, and the aim of eventual annexation of the West Bank has never been a hidden policy in the Israeli agenda. Old land laws have been systematically manipulated to confiscate nearly two-thirds of the West Bank area. In direct contravention of international law and conventions, and in total opposition to the stated aims of the Oslo and Cairo accords, settlement policy has continued unabated since 1967.

The failure to address this all important issue can only mean the collapse of the current peace negotiations. The goal of a real peace based on a meaningful land for peace agreement demands a coordinated Palestinian response on all levels. This is the role LAWE has taken upon itself, in order to fulfill its mandate of the protection of fundamental human rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.