Violations against the Objectives of the Intifada
It is time to evaluate the political process in terms of Palestinian aspirations and the objectives of the intifada. In all events during the past few years, it seems that the Palestinian leadership has forgotten the demands made during the intifada, which can be considered as the true aspirations of the Palestinian people.
A close reading of the statements and leaflets issued during the intifada explains what the Palestinians demand and aspire. A political analysis of the dynamics of the intifada; the way the Palestinian popular uprising ended; and the developments in the period after the signing of the Oslo Accords, show that the Palestinian leadership of the PLO and those in positions in the PA effectively violated the objectives of the intifada. This, in particular, is relevant in a period which is characterised by political crisis, lack of Palestinian leadership, vision, and division. Now, especially, it is time to clearly restate the aspirations of the Palestinian people and expose how the Palestinian leadership has dealt with these aspirations. As Edward Said pointed out: "Arafat, who speaks now of the intifada's heroism, did not consult with the intifada's heroes during his secret negotiations in Oslo, nor did he even mention them in his humiliating speech at the White House. This indicates that he can erase or conjure up the intifada as it suits his plan."
The clarity and unity of demands
The objectives of the intifada can be derived from various leaflets issued by the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada (UNL). At a different level, the Palestinian popular uprising has been characterised by a remarkable spirit of unity and a high level of organisation, in particular, in the first few years. PLO institutions and the headquarters of the various factions had no role in the determining of strategy or in leading the struggle; their principal task, as far as the UNL was concerned, was to carry out the will of the Palestinian people, and to represent the Palestinian national movement in the regional and international arena. Later, when the local leadership, through repression and hardship, lost control, and became incapable of referring factional and outside interests, the intifada lost its unifying functioning body.
There is no doubt that international recognition of the PLO and the commencement of talks between the US administration and the PLO were important achievements, but they were the climax, and after that retreat began. The more that eyes were fastened on Orient House and the sitting rooms of the American Colony and National Palace hotels, the less they turned to the street battles in Deir al-Balah and Balata. The intifada thereby lost some of its force, which in turn allowed the US and Israel to renege on the diplomatic positions they had been forced to take. In this sense, the Gulf War was no more than an excuse that provided the US with the opportunity to withdraw their recognition of the PLO, while hoping that the intifada had indeed faded into the past. It is therefore valid to base the objectives and aspirations of the Palestinian people on the leaflets issued during the first two years of the intifada.
In addition there has been no dissonance in the various calls for steps to be taken during the intifada. The common and narrow calculus of special interests, more familiar at other times, has not arisen in discussions and planning pertaining to the uprising. This unity in the field has been reflected in unity of demands.
The demands of the intifada are not only unmistakable; there has been also a consensus around them. This is obvious from the statements issued by the leadership and popular committees. The political content of these declarations has been especially clear, in particular the right to self-determination: freedom and independence. This objective is also the main thrust of the slogans chanted by demonstrators and painted on walls throughout the occupied territories.
Who ended the intifada?
At the completion of the sixth year of the intifada in December 1993, the popular uprising of the Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation and the brutal repression which has accompanied it, Yasir Arafat asked the Palestinians "inside" [the Occupied Territories] to end the intifada and to go back to their routine lives. His demand for an end to the intifada was a natural outcome of the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Authority, by Shimon Peres (for the Israeli government) and Mahmoud Abbas (for the PLO), in Washington on September 13, 1993.
One month later, Fatah, Arafat's political backbone, published a unilateral statement in the name of the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada (UNL), whose content was an expression of its political stance, with no reference to Intifada activity. The leaflet only paid lip service to 'national unity' while calling Israel to implement the agreement by the determined date of December 13, 1999. Meanwhile, Fatah had broken up the UNL. It by the very fact of its leaders' signing the agreement essentially destroyed the UNL as a functioning body and its political, but not its procedural basis. Additionally, Fatah had not been in contact with the rest of the political components of the UNL, so as to ensure its continued existence.
Ever since late 1988 relations between the US and the PLO improved. Protocols of the first official US-PLO meeting were leaked in Israel and Egypt. The US representative stated two preconditions that the PLO would have to accept: (1) abandon all hopes of an international conference (which was one of the immediate demands of the intifada and (2) call off the riots in the occupied territories, which the US perceived as "terrorist acts against Israel".
In short, return to the status quo before the intifada, so that Israel could continue expansion and repression with direct and indirect US support. Moreover, the US position lies in the UNGA resolution on terrorism in 1987, which was vetoed by the US due to the provision which affirmed "the right of self-determination, freedom and independence of people forcibly deprived of that right under colonial racist regime or foreign occupation and the right to struggle to this end and to seek and receive support in accordance with the UN Charter and the international law."
Exposing proposals for "autonomy" as insufficient
The intifada nullified and exposed all proposals for "autonomy" as insufficient. The intifada rejected all attempts at the trivialisation of its stance; temporary and partial solutions and resuscitation of moribund proposals in the guise of "limited self-rule" or "local elections" or "low visibility occupation" are attempts at side-stepping central issues. The intifada has been a simultaneously active statement of rejection and affirmation, an unequivocal rejection of the Israeli occupation with all its implications, norms, and realities; and the affirmation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people including its right of freedom, self-determination, and statehood.
In an open letter, released by the UNL in anticipation of the Arab summit in June 1988, the UNL proclaimed as one of its aims of the intifada "the rejection of all the fraudulent proposals that deny our people's rights, starting with Camp David autonomy and ending with Shultz' proposals". A leaflet issued by the UNL on July 6, 1988 (no. 21) stated: "The uprising has succeeded in burying forever all those plans and 'initiatives' aimed at forcing us to surrender and forgo our legitimate rights.
In short, the uprising has established that there is no alternative to freedom and national independence." Autonomy was a political device having as its aims the marginalization of a national leadership representing the Palestinian people (both inside and outside Palestine) and the legitimisation of the continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. According to this analysis, Israel could claim to be delegating some aspects of governmental authority to the Palestinians while opening direct negotiations with other Arab regimes, beginning with Jordan. The linguistic device of autonomy would allow Israel and its allies to claim that things were moving in the right direction, without any significant change in the existing situation. In practice, the occupation would continue.
The Schultz initiative was rejected because of its neglect of the principle of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state. The initiative was seen as an extension of the Camp David Accords and was consequently rejected. Baring this in mind, Oslo is logically another extension of the Camp David Accords.
The Oslo agreements, at least, define the relation between an occupying power and an occupied people without this fact being explicitly recognised in the text. Israel did not commit itself to the end of military occupation nor to the end of colonisation in the Occupied Territories. These matters were explicitly left out of the Declaration of Principles, which only provided for the five years transitional period, awaiting the permanent status negotiations. These permanent status issues were to include Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours. In other words, the central issues of the conflict and the issues that would inhibit Israel's colonialist endeavour were left out.
The Fourth Geneva Convention strictly delineates between the territory and population of the Occupying Power, the Occupied Territory and Protected Persons. Israel has crossed this line with policies of economic dependency, de-development and infrastructure integration as well as placing restrictions on the free flow of labour. Additionally, military control of the population, exercised through armed forces and formalised through military legislation, contributes to the facilitation of such objectives.
It must also be stressed that the US position on final status has been that it is to be based solely on UNSC 242, not on 242 and other relevant UN resolutions calling for Palestinian rights. As to the withdrawal itself, the US and Israel have been clear and explicit that withdrawal will be partial, as they unilaterally determine. This outcome is fully in accord with the invariant US position on withdrawal since 1971. The US has always barred this, even recently.
On October 11, 1999, the US urged the UN General Assembly to wind up its special committee on the human rights of Palestinians and other Arabs living under Israeli occupation. US Area Advisor Doug Keene told the Assembly that the US government agreed that the Geneva Convention applied to territories occupied by Israel since 1967, but added: "We oppose the specific references to Jerusalem." The Sharm el-Sheikh interim peace accord, signed on September 4, was "the latest of a long line of agreements leading to permanent status negotiations," Keene said. He urged the Assembly "to delete the standard call for the committee to continue its work and report next year."
The UNGA's decolonisation committee began debating the annual report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices and was due to vote on it on it the next day. The 51-page report contains 354 items quoting Israeli press reports on official policy and events in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Another 12 paragraphs are devoted to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The preamble to the report refers to "Israeli lack of compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War."
Belligerent military occupation still exists after Oslo throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including Jerusalem. This has no legal legitimacy, as a temporary state wartime state of affairs. It is certainly unlawful when undertaken or continued for territorial expansion.
Israeli practices following the signing of the Oslo Accords have made the end of occupation and the attainment of self-determination more remote of possibility for the Palestinians. Under these agreements, the Israeli military occupation forces were merely redeployed to strategic posts in the Occupied Territories. This permits Israeli occupation forces to disengage from direct control of the Palestinian population - left in the hands of the Palestinian 'security' forces to a strategic control.
The Israeli policy of (if any) strategic redeployment (not withdrawal) means that it is possible for the Israeli regime to focus on the colonisation of the Occupied Territories unhindered by the burden of managing a rebellious population. From its strategic positioning, the Israeli occupation retains control of the majority of land in the Occupied Territories, allowing land confiscation, house demolition and other policies seeking to limit or remove the Palestinian population in areas Israel wishes to retain. It controls trade and other economic activity, thereby maintaining the economic colonialism and Palestinian dependence.
Following the Israeli elections of 1996, the highest priority of the Palestinian Authority became to make sure that the Likud would live up to the Oslo Agreement. However, the calamity could lie precisely in the Likud's adherence, not only to the agreements, but also to what was kept out of the agreements. The Likud government was bound not to the spirit of Oslo, nor to the aspirations of the Palestinian side, nor the verbal promises made by the previous government, but rather to its own interpretations of the text of the agreement.
In the view of the Likud, the Labour government gave too much power in the hands of the Palestinian Authority, and therefore, Likud tried to weaken it by closures, the building and expansion of Jewish colonies, delays in the implementation of the agreements, and ignoring the fact that according to Oslo, it had to redeploy from the remaining areas. In sum, Israel has been able to utilise the Oslo agreements within the frameworks of its own strategic aims.
Nonetheless, one should not overestimate the difference between Likud and Labour. In early 1997, an agreement titled the "National [Labour-Likud] Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians", was signed between former (Labour) minister Yossi Beilin and Likud's parliamentary faction head Michael Eitan, showed the Israeli consensus in the so-called 'final status negotiations' with the Palestinian Authority. This agreement was based on the bottom-line: no to withdrawal to the borders of June 1967; no to division of Jerusalem or sharing sovereignty over the city; no to dismantling the settlements; and no to the return of the refugees. Based on this, nothing remains open for negotiation in the so-called 'final status' talks except for a modification of the agreements already reached at the interim phase.
Normalisation of the occupation
Through the intifada the Palestinians challenged the violations of their basic liberties and rights by the occupation with a disruption of its processes at the political, economic, and administrative levels. It reflected the Palestinians' total rejection of the disruptive and abusive policies of the occupation. An UNL-leaflet of May 28, 1988 (no.18) stated:
"In short we must work hard to lay the groundwork for achieving the demands of the uprising: the necessity of observing the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention by the posting of an international observer force for the protection of the population; the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the cities, villages and refugee camps; the lifting of sieges on Palestinian communities; the release of detainees; the return of deportees; the rescinding of Israeli legislation regarding taxation and related matters; the holding of democratic elections for municipal and village councils; and the lifting of economic constraints stifling the development of the industrial, agricultural and service sectors in Palestinian society."
A peace plan should not become a rescue mission to save the oppressor from the consequences of his actions, nor should a nation's sovereignty be held hostage to the political manipulations and priorities of its oppressor. Attempts to "normalise" the occupation are "abnormal" and totally unacceptable.
The Oslo process from an Israeli point of view is all about normalising Israel's existence in the ('New') Middle East. For Israel, the strategic aim was normalisation of relations with surrounding Arab regimes without giving up control of the Occupied Territories. This was and still is the main thrust of Israel's conception of the peace process. The purpose of Palestinian limited self-rule, from this perspective, will remain to unburden Israel of the role of direct occupation. It therefore needed a loyal Palestinian leadership with enough authority to be accepted by the Palestinian population. Israel might have thought or still thinks that the Palestinians can be convinced that this is the best they can achieve.
The Israelis and their American patrons insisted that by improving the "quality of life" under occupation they would be able to impose law and order on "the inhabitants of the territories". In Oslo the term "quality of life" has been replaced by "peace dividend".
All illusions of improving the "quality of life" or in what Oslo became known as "changes on the ground" of Palestinians under occupation are inherently unrealistic and in direct contradiction to the aspirations of the Palestinians and the objectives of the Intifada. The "quality" argument is just another attempt to "sugar-coat" the occupation for both world consumption and for local consumption as the means of making an abhorrent situation of oppression palatable to the oppressed. The intifada has delegitimised the occupation, by exposing its true nature, by disengaging it from its enforced institutions.
Questions like autonomy and issues of improving the conditions of life under occupation have all been exposed as false and ineffective. In legal and political terms autonomy and self-determination are not identical and embody conflicting ideas. The right of self-determination derives from the general principle that the people determine the destiny of the territory. Autonomy derives the destiny of the people in it.
Autonomy in the modern sense is a question of degree. The right of self-determination of peoples arises independently of grant and confers upon them the international (human) right to determine their political destiny without subjection to the control of any state. This right was supplemented by UNGA 3236 of November 22, 1974 specifying self-determination for the Palestinian people.
In Oslo, the degree of autonomy exercised by the Palestinian Authority is dependent upon concession or denial by Israel. The latter can grant and revoke such degrees of autonomy as are thought desirable by them at any particular time (i.e. the closure policy; non-co-operation). Its content is at the discretion of Israel. Such precarious and limited autonomy is inconsistent with the rights and obligations of a belligerent occupant.
"Local elections" and side-stepping central issues
"Local elections" under occupation were during the Intifada referred to an attempt at side-stepping central issues. Israel was not seen as a trustworthy body to supervise any such elections. In 1976, elections were held for the West Bank municipalities in which pro-PLO mayors were returned in almost every town. Israel showed its "respect" for the democratic process by systematically dismissing all pro-PLO mayors, some of whom were subsequently deported or arrested, while others survived assassination attempts. Such behaviour did not inspire confidence that Israel would adhere to democratic principles in any future elections.
The mutually exclusive terms "free democratic elections" and "occupation" have for Palestinians a concrete and tangible reality in the prolonged and painful experience of the occupation. The sad fate of their elected mayors in the early 1980s and all emerging popular leadership is a constant reminder and proof of Israeli "democracy" at work. Occupation is very clearly malign and brutal. It has exposed the nature of Israeli democracy, which is selective in its application, and it can be fragmented depending on the people who are the recipients of the benefits of this democracy.
While the principle of elections was accepted by the Palestinians, the order of events that would lead to such elections was disputed: Israel should first withdraw its forces from the territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, to be replaced by a UN force, as demanded in several leaflets, which could then supervise free and democratic elections. The intifada was a response to the occupation, and it was not practical to propose a halt to the intifada while the occupation continued.
Under UN supervision the Palestinians would democratically choose their representatives. The election proposals, presented by former Israeli Prime Minister Shamir in 1988, fall within the general framework of the Camp David Accords with the Israeli aim to promote some vague form of "autonomy" which does not amount to independence. In this way, Israel tried to claim that they had a credible peace plan, and that the Palestinians were to blame for not negotiating.
According to the Oslo Accords, elections were to be held for the Palestinian Council and for the President of the PA. Having deprived the Palestinians of their most basic rights, it is ironic that Israel claimed to itself the self-appointed role of guardian of Palestinian democratic rights. The intifada did demand the right to shape and practise Palestinians' own democracy in its entirety as one aspect of their right to self-determination and sovereignty, but certainly not under the "patronage" of an occupying authority which has constantly practised an anti-democratic punitive policy of intimidation and subjugation.
The electoral system had to meet the requirements of satisfying the specifications of the Israel-PLO agreements and providing a functional electoral mechanism, which obviously had to serve the Oslo process on the whole. The Palestinian elections did not result in a complete transfer of power from one administration to another. Rather, it served to formalise the already empowered administration led by Yasser Arafat and Fatah. Palestinians were never in doubt about which party would win the elections: Fatah. Opinion polls had been predicting it consistently since 1993.
It is one of the peculiarities of the Palestinian electoral system that small parties or factions had no chance at all. Political parties or factions opposed to Fatah decided to boycott the elections. The reason they gave was that they did not want to participate in elections that served to legitimise the Oslo Accords. However, the fact that they also demanded a system of strictly proportional representation in which Palestine would be treated as a single constituency -the system used for the Palestinian presidential elections- indicates that the chosen electoral system was at least at a secondary reason for their boycott.
Additionally, in the 1996 elections, only those Palestinians, who qualified, according to the Israeli criteria, for residency status in the West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, were eligible to take part in the elections. More than four million Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora were excluded from participation in these elections.
In addition, the elections were designed to enable Palestinians under occupation to choose their own representatives and president, who would administer the Gaza Strip and West Bank during the interim period only to the extent powers and responsibilities were transferred to the Palestinian Authority by Israel. Furthermore, Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons and military detention centres were denied the right to participate in the elections.
More importantly, the 1996 Palestinian elections were far from being competitive between parties. There was competition but due to the electoral system, and the boycott by opposition parties, this competition was mainly between individual candidates from the predominant party Fatah and not between contending political parties. Due to the boycott of the elections by the opposition parties, the elections lacked the participation of a wide range of parties and lacked an important aspect of pluralism.
Pluralism has been obstructed by a number of regulations, such as the ban on demonstrations and directives concerning political meetings, it also has been enforced by the crisis among a number of political factions, the lack of press freedom and the almost absence of parliamentary opposition. The institutional choice of a district-system in combination of a majority system made it virtually impossible for candidates of the smaller factions, who decided to participate in the elections, to be elected.
Furthermore, the number of seats for each district was disproportional to the population. The basis for allocating seats to each district was a political consideration. Moreover, the elections as such could not be a means of (vertical) accountability since in Palestine, elections are not periodical. This results in the lack of legislators' incentives to act responsible to their constituencies. Moreover, the high expectations of the Palestinian public, as expressed on Election Day are clearly not met. The expectations were high but the capacity of the PLC to meet them has been extremely low.
Finally, elections were until now a one-time event, which does not institutionalise elections in the emerging political system and which obstructs the possibility of citizens to hold their political representatives accountable. This is especially critical in a period, which might determine the fate of the Palestinian people and their legitimate and inalienable rights.
Arbitrary "trial and error" policy
The intifada established that peace could never be the outcome of an arbitrary "trial and error" policy, or the result of a negative, partial selection of incomplete components, which form only part of a total and coherent plan. A necessary prerequisite to any peace process is the commitment to clear and final objectives (self-determination and statehood). Concrete, transitional steps are then pursued provided they contain within them the dynamic of logical coherence, which is capable of achieving these objectives.
Since Oslo, Israel has succeeded in imposing, and getting, PLO and international covenant for a definition of 'peace' that rests on unconditional security for Israel but extremely conditional security for the Palestinians, both under occupation and in the Diaspora. All movement on issues relating to the interim period - Israel's military redeployment, elections, or even the relaxation of collective punishments (like closure)- hinged on the Palestinian Authority taking care of 'terror'. With this, human rights are of secondary concern to guaranteeing Israeli security.
The question regarding this is the preservation of Israeli security compatible with ending the occupation of a people, but incompatible with ending, even only in part, the occupation of territory. Occupation does not need troops in "populated Arab areas" to maintain control over the lives of the Palestinian inhabitants. Although the establishment of the limited self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been perceived as a process of creating an embryonic state, there has been no prior agreement about state-building, institution-building remains more or less open-ended, interim and uncertain.
Since the Palestinian Authority has to make Oslo succeed, if only for its own survival, the Palestinian Authority tried to secure its hold on power. Because of the open-ended character of the interim period, it is considered as a test-phase for the interim government. With this the outcome of the Oslo process became dependent on the 'success' of the Palestinian Authority in being subservient to the will of Israel. Another implication of this open-ended character is the political instability with which it is attended. Before anything else this concerns the performance of the PA in 'defending' the peace process against 'outside threats' and with the agreements the PA obliged itself, and under pressure from Israel, the US and the donor countries to 'fight against terrorism'.
The Palestinian Authority has sought legitimacy through the results it has obtained, or claims to have obtained. Without the legitimacy given by the respect for rules, procedures, and due process that characterise genuine democracies, the Palestinian Authority appealed to the results produced by the authoritarian exercise of power: it substituted the "rule of law" for "the rule of outcomes". Since the outcome of the Oslo process is dependent on the "success" or performance of the PA in view of Israel and its American patron, it did not resulted in achieving the objectives and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
Because of the almost impossibility of producing satisfactory results on a permanent basis, since we are dealing with an interim-government, the PA substituted the promise of results for a series of actions or movements, which acquire value on their own. It is important to note here, that those who govern the interim-government and the way they govern, determine the outcome of the transitional period. If the interim-government has to rely on coercion and force to get a hold on the situation, it will have a major impact on the way future governments will govern because the policies adopted by the interim-government determine essentially the eventual shape and character of the political structure.
There are certain political complications imposed by the Oslo Accords and the "interim self-government arrangements" and the transitional and interim nature of the period specified by these accords. Most important, the framework is not stable. Until now, it is uncertain what will happen when the interim period ends. This uncertainty is paramount. Its effects should not be underestimated. In this case, limited self-governance could be a start but not an end in itself. In general, agreements about statebuilding are logically prior to the creation of democratic institutions. The classic theoretical statement of this problem is by Robert A. Dahl:
"We cannot solve the problems of the proper scope and domain of democratic units from within democratic theory. Like the majority principle, the democratic process presupposes a unit. The criteria of the democratic process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself. If the unit itself is not [considered] proper or rightful -if its scope or domain is not justifiable- then it cannot be made rightful simply by democratic purposes".5
In other words, if the political system is based on the Oslo Accords which has created an unit which is not justifiable, and hence acceptable to Palestinians, it cannot be made or considered proper or rightful by democratic purposes. Accompanying this, modern democratic governance is inevitably linked to the state. Without a state, there can be no citizenship; without citizenship, there can be no democracy. There can be no complex modern democracy without voting, no voting without citizenship, and no official membership in the community of citizens without a state to certify membership.
Democracy is characterised not by subjects but by citizens. It leaves key aspects of sovereignty open, that is, issues, which touch heavily on democratic transition. With autonomy transcending the administrative or the municipal and meaning genuine self-government, the discussion is merely about the potential for normalising Palestinian life under Israeli occupation.
Alternative leadership
The intifada called for a rejection of all attempts at creating an "alternative" Palestinian leadership from the Occupied Territories and exposing such attempts as an effort to undermine unity and the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinians, the PLO. It can be maintained that a democratic solution to the Palestinian Question is almost inevitable, or, in other words, that the solution to the Palestinian Question must include the establishment of Palestinian democracy.
The right to represent the Palestinian people, which was taken up in the 1974 Arab summit, reflects special conditions in which the Palestinian people found themselves under Israeli occupation, their right to self-determination being denied. Since then, the PLO in fact developed as a provisional government-in-exile or even endorsed state-functions. However, this qualification turned into a complex problem when the Oslo Accords installed limited self-government. This partially eliminated the exceptional conditions that turned the PLO into the people's deputy, without public, free, unbiased and periodical elections. The original legal terms of representation should be restored. The Palestinian people have been plundered of its right to free choice in the selection of its political representatives. The Palestinian Authority and its leading figures viewed elections as just a procedure to start the implementation of the Oslo process.
The PLO is no longer functioning as the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinians, that is, all Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority is not the legitimate leadership of all Palestinians, that is, whether residing in the Occupied Territories, including under limited self-rule, as well as, in 1948-Palestine, and in the Diaspora. A free elected body representing all Palestinians has not ratified the agreements. An Authority which does not represent the Palestinian people as such, and a PLO which stopped functioning as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, is illegal and has no mandate to relinquish the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.
Since before the signing of the Oslo Accords, none of the PLO's institutions has been discharging its functions in a constitutional way. The PLO changed of being an umbrella organisation where virtually all shades of Palestinian political opinion were represented. The Palestinian National Council (PNC) has not convened to approve the Oslo Accords, despite the fact that this has wide implications for its program and demands a change in the PLO's Charter.
The PNC has only met in 1996 to approve changes in the PLO Charter as a necessary condition imbedded in the Oslo Accords. There was of course no real PNC meeting, since in effect that body lost its legitimacy and independence when Arafat returned to Gaza in l994. Arafat brought a number of his loyalists together in l996 to change the PLO-Charter, but this time only made a perfunctory effort to round up officials, businessmen, and some hangers-on for the great occasion. The agreements signed are not subject to ratification by an elected body such as the PLC.
Second, elections in Palestine are not periodical, in that way, the political representatives cannot be hold accountable by their constituencies. Only less than 24% of the Palestinian people could vote, which leaves 76% of the Palestinians underrepresented.
The Palestinian Authority does not want to be held accountable for its actions, certainly not, on issues, which could question its legitimacy. In the final analysis, any Palestinian leadership must depend for its reservation upon the support of society at large -its major forces, groups and institutions. It depends, therefore, on a public consensus, which recognises as legitimate authority only that power which is acquired through lawful and democratic means. It depends also on the ability of their leaders to govern, to inspire trust, to respect the limits of their power, and to reach an adequate degree of consensus. Until now this has only been deteriorating.
The inalienable rights of the Palestinians (including self-determination and right of return) solidly anchored in a wide range of international laws, will remain a right and legitimate claim, until surrendered by the Palestinian people themselves. Moreover, given the strong Palestinian public demand of their inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination and right of return, its explicit denouncement by the PLO delegitimizes the Palestinian leadership.
In sum, as Edward Said once stated "[The Palestinian Authority] does not seem [...] to consider the majority of the Palestinians as its principal charge".6 Fourth, if elections are to be a mechanism of accountability, of holding "representatives" responsible, the first condition is that these elections have to be periodical. Only once elections occurred, in Palestine, people are still awaiting local elections. The Palestinian Authority does not want to be held accountable for its actions, certainly not, on issues, which could question its legitimacy.
This is completely relevant for the democratic content of the Palestinian struggle, a struggle that is based on the idea that rights, all rights, not just ones own, should never be made subject to any higher principle (like 'national unity' or Israeli "security"). This is the moral claim upon not only the conscience of the rulers but also of the conscience of the ruled. This also has everything related to what Walid Khalidi once said: "the failure of the Arab political order [..] to approximate in any of its constituent sovereign states to minimal levels of genuine power sharing or accountability in government, much less to self-governing parliamentary institutions operating within democratic forms and constraints".7 The responsibility for that failure can no longer be placed on the West or Israel. It cannot even be placed only, or primarily, on the shoulders of the Palestinian Authority itself.
Moreover, Oslo and subsequent agreements are not legitimate and illegal. According to standards of international law - existing international law and UN resolutions can be replaced only by a political agreement whose provisions grant rights equal to or beyond those defined by international law. Any political agreement that relinquishes Palestinian rights will be unreliable and will have no legal status. Provisions in the Oslo and subsequent agreements that impose changes on the ground and changes in status which effectively deny the occupied population certain protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention are illegal.
The Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly protects the occupied population from such cosmetic changes by declaring in Article 47 the inviolability of the rights safeguarded by the Convention:
"Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, not by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole part of the occupied territory".
All practices prohibited by international humanitarian law continue to be violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Rather than these political agreements superseding existing international humanitarian law, under Article 47 the agreements themselves must come into question where their terms are contrary to humanitarian law. Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention means that the Israel-PLO agreements could not legally do what they purported to do, and therefore their international legality should be questioned. So if the Oslo agreements are illegal, what does this mean to the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, a product of the Oslo agreement, and an established alternative leadership.
Additional demands
In a number of UNL leaflets the intifada additionally demanded (1) the nullification of the emergency laws and an immediate end to Israel's application of them; (2) the dismantling of Israeli detention camps and centres and the release of all Palestinian prisoners; (3) the cessation of all Israeli measures aimed at creating new geopolitical and demographic facts in the Occupied Territories, such as the confiscation of land, the erection of colonies, the exploitation of resources, the deportation of Palestinians, and the demolition of houses; (4) unmasking the occupation and Israel's constant direct defiance of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Intifada demanded an immediate end to the occupation; (5) international intervention in the form of a neutral interim caretakership (the UN, EU or other) of the West Bank and Gaza to safeguard Palestinian rights and to prevent Israel from more "facts" and thereby change the demographic reality of the area; and (6) the safeguarding of the right of return of Palestinian refugees.
(1) Nullification of the emergency laws
Not only is Israel still applying these emergency regulations, also the Palestinian Authority has been using the emergency regulations for its own 'benefits'. The establishment of State Security Courts and the obstruction of justice they create, including the denial, in some instances, of the right to freedom of assembly and the political arrests which have been undertaken by the Palestinian Authority from time to time, are features of a de facto state of emergency.
Emergency powers allowed the Palestinian Authority to suspend civil liberties and take direct command. On 20 May 1994, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, who by this date was also ra'ees of the Palestinian Authority, issued Order 1 from Tunis. This order decreed that the existing judicial system would remain in place, with the same judges and procedures, but using only the laws in place before the Israeli occupation began. However, declaring that military orders would no longer be valid was a hollow gesture in practice, since the judicial system depends on many military orders as part of the judicial system in Palestine.
Military orders establishing Israeli authority became irrelevant, while those fulfilling a need in the legal system remained in force. However, later in April 1995, the Palestinian Authority issued another Order which clearly stated, in contradiction of the 1994 Order 1, that the laws to be utilised by the judicial organs and all those who were implementing the laws were those that had been in place and in use up till May 1994.
Included in this revision were those Israeli military orders and emergency regulations that had been in use in occupied territories, and are still in use today. To give 'legality' to repressive measures (such as administrative detention, deportation of political leaders or activists, and punishments like the demolition of homes, without the need for a suspect to be charged, let alone tried, and without regard to a suspect's family) Israel resuscitated the defunct Emergency Regulations of 1945 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In fact these regulations were revoked by the British on the eve of their departure from Palestine in 1948, but it suited Israel to consider them still in force.
Apart from the fact that these regulations were rescinded for all Palestine in May 1948, they never formed part of Jordanian law and therefore contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention that circumscribes Israel's occupation of Palestinian land. Israel was alone in interpreting the Regulations as valid. The Israeli authorities have claimed that certain laws that were revoked or lapsed into obsolescence prior to the occupation do in fact constitute local law.
The 1945 British Emergency Regulations also contravene the Convention by the inhumanity of their provisions. These regulations effectively strip individuals of all their basic freedoms without any need either to bring them to court, or for explanation. By issuing the order to include all laws and regulations that were in use up until May 1994, the Palestinian Authority included these regulations as a body of law.
Although some officials in the Palestinian Authority believe that exceptional circumstances exist, they tend not to be willing to declare a state of emergency. However, states of emergency or exception exist not only when they are declared, but also when measures taken are of an exceptional nature.
The establishment of State Security Courts and the obstruction of justice they create, including the denial of the right of freedom of assembly and the political arrests which are undertaken by the Palestinian Authority from time to time, are features of a de facto state of emergency. It should be emphasised that even under a state of emergency there are rights that cannot be suspended in the name of defending the Authority's "national" interest or any other justification (i.e. ensure the continuation of the Oslo process). This category of rights includes, inter alia, freedom from torture, the right to life and the right to freedom of conscience and belief.
(2) The dismantling of Israeli detention camps and centres and the release of all Palestinian prisoners
At the end of 1998 2200 Palestinian detainees of which 97 are administrative detainees, still incarcerated in 12 Israeli prisons. In PA-prisons, 1100 Palestinians were being held without charge or trial, of whom 300 are political prisoners. The PA has conducted several arbitrary arrest campaigns. Despite the bilateral agreements that stipulated the release of these prisoners, Israel continues to hold them in its custody. Israeli authorities prefer to keep these prisoners to use as a trump card in political negotiations. Israel has established a new prison in the south of Gaza, which is used as a temporary detention centre before the transfer of prisoners to detention centres inside Israel.
Security arrangements in Oslo II distinctly preserve Israeli prerogatives to arrest, try and imprison Palestinians in Areas B and C of the West Bank. The Oslo Accords also allow Israel to continue to administratively detain Palestinians, even those from areas now under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA).[1] Conditions of detention and interrogation have deteriorated since Oslo II, with setbacks in standards for hygiene and food and severe limitations on family visits--rights which were won through a series of hunger strikes in the '80s and early '90s.
Since Oslo, Israel is no longer the only authority in Palestine to systematically abuse prisoners. The Palestinian Authority has conducted several mass arbitrary arrests, usually in response to attacks on Israel, and following pressure from Israel and the US to "crackdown" on the Palestinian opposition. These arrests were conducted without warrants and charge, and in most cases, detainees were released after a certain period of time. Still, a great number of political prisoners remained in prolonged detention without charge or trial.
Palestinian and international organisations provided credible reports of torture and other kinds of abuse by the Palestinian security forces, which began to surface soon after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. At first, the practice of torture was inflicted primarily on those suspected of collaboration with Israel. Today, the practice has become endemic and widespread, a testimony to the danger of conditional human rights.
Methods of torture vary widely and may possibly depend on the background of those who are in charge of torturing. These methods include beatings, prolonged sleep deprivation and position abuse, and show striking similarities with Israeli torture methods recorded for many years. Reportedly, in some cases, detainees have been burned with lit cigarettes, plastic or heating elements. Mahmud Jumayel, who died on 31 July 1996, after being tortured, was tortured by the use of electric elements, whilst being suspended and beaten.8
The Palestinian Authority's suppression of any opposition or criticism stems in part from Israeli demands encoded in the Oslo process. Oslo II, for example, charges the PA with quelling any threat to Israeli security, from armed attacks to "anticipated incitement," (Art. II; 2). Since the Palestinian Authority's survival depends on Israel's consent, it must meet an unofficial Israeli quota system for arrests. As one PA prison guard commented, "We have to maintain a certain number of detainees for the Israeli press."9
The factors that have allowed human rights violations to deteriorate in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority are many. The failure of the Palestinian Authority to end the practice of torture and the virtual exemption afforded to those responsible for such abuses has led to the general belief that such abuses are condoned at the highest level. The international community's desire for peace, but moreover, stability, has led to an international readiness to subordinate human rights concerns and an unwillingness by many countries to raise human rights violations committed whether by Israel or the Palestinian Authority.
By virtue of the Oslo Accords, guaranteeing "Israeli security", which implies the containment of dissent and prevention of attacks on Israel, has become the primary function of the Palestinian Authority and the guarantee for its survival. The continuity of the Oslo process, American and European financial aid, the extent and severity of Israeli restrictions all hinge on the Palestinian Authority's ability to fulfil what is defined as its "security responsibilities".
(3) The cessation of all Israeli measures aimed at creating new geopolitical and demographic facts in the Occupied Territories
Since Oslo the Israeli authorities continued their policy of house demolitions despite the many condemnation campaigns organised by Palestinian human rights organisations and Israeli peace groups. This policy is a violation of basic universal criteria and principles of human rights. The total number of houses that have been demolished by the Israeli authorities from the signing of Oslo until the end of 1998 was 702.
The Israeli government continued with its policy of ethnic cleansing in occupied Jerusalem. The number of ID card confiscations increased dramatically in the last quarter of 1998. The number of Palestinian Jerusalemites evicted by ID card confiscation between 1996-1998 stands at 2083 families, i.e. roughly 8,332 individuals. The Israeli policy of ethnic cleansing, based on increased sophistication and co-ordination among Israeli governmental institutions, thus has come to combine deprival of public health and welfare services with ID card confiscation. This combined policy effects almost every sphere of life of Palestinian Jerusalemites, even before their ID cards are actually and physically confiscated by the Israeli Interior Ministry. The Israeli policy of ethnic cleansing in Jerusalem, is a gross violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Additionally, the Israeli government strengthened its grip over the Occupied Territories by seizing and establishing Jewish colonies on the largest possible areas of the Occupied Territories. It is clear that the unilateral actions taken by the Israeli Government will not lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and will not cause the agreement's deadlines to be met, but will rather perpetuate the occupation.
These activities increased significantly as large areas of land in the Occupied Territories were confiscated after the signature of the Wye Plantation Agreement on 23 October 1998, and especially in the running up to the Israeli elections. Since the signing of the Wye Accord, an estimated 27385 dunums have been so far confiscated, of which 15147 have been confiscated in the first three months of the current year 1999, and a further 12238 dunums of land has been expropriated since the signing of the accord to the end of 1998. The expropriated land will be used for amongst other purposes, the construction of by-pass roads, settlement expansion, and construction of industrial zones.
(4) Unmasking the occupation and Israel's constant direct defiance of the Fourth Geneva Convention
Grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention including extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings, systematic torture and unfair trials are being committed by the Israeli authorities against Palestinians. These grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention are accepted and encouraged at the highest level of the Israeli Government.
Since 1967, Israel has systematically violated significant provisions of the convention. These violations have been directed against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and civilians in the Golan Heights and occupied South Lebanon. The Israeli violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention include, in part, the following: systematic torture, in violation of articles 27, 31, 32, and 147; collective punishment, like demolition and sealing of houses and restrictions on movement, in violation of articles 33 and 53; prolonged closures that lead, for example, to loss of income from employment, without providing alternative sources of income for the residents in violation of article 39; massive establishment of settlements and the transfer of Israeli settlers to occupied territory, in violation of articles 49 and 53; detention and imprisonment of residents of the occupied territory in detention centres located within Israel, in violation of article 76; administrative detention of thousands of Palestinians for prolonged periods, grossly exceeding the provisions of article 78, in violation of article 49; revocation of residency rights in the occupied territory comprising East Jerusalem, in violation of article 47; and expropriation and exploitation of the natural resources, including water, in the occupied territory to meet the needs of the occupying power, in violation of article 55.
With regard to the Palestinian Authority and its limited self-rule, the provisions of the convention bind the occupying power "for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such power exercises the functions of government in such territory". Additionally,
"Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present convention by any change introduced, as a result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the occupying power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory".
Virtually every government in the world holds that this important convention applies to Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (as well as the Golan Heights and the south of Lebanon). In fact, Israel alone makes the claim that it administers the occupied territories and not occupies. Moreover, it claims that since neither Egypt or Jordan had recognised sovereignty over these territories, they could not be considered "occupied". However, this argument has been universally rejected. The world has been consistent in supporting the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied territories. This has been annually reaffirmed since 1967.
(5) International intervention in the form of a neutral interim care-taker-ship
In its leaflet of 26 February 1989, the UNL urged "the world community to intervene to stop the inhumane practices carried out against our people, and to provide international protection for our unarmed population. This intervention will allow our people the opportunity to determine their future in freedom." A leaflet issued on the day of the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre stated: "we request the international community and the United Nations uphold their responsibility and ensure international protection for our people in the shadow of the occupation; and that they act to implement the decisions of international legitimacy and compel Israel to withdraw from our occupied land".
International discussion of protection measures intensified at the beginning of the intifada. Certain international protection activities already in place were strengthened, and key third party states took under consideration proposals for state action in their capacities as parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. At the beginning of the intifada in 1987, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was asked by the UN Security Council to provide "recommendations on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation". The Secretary-General noted requests by the Palestinians that UN forces be deployed in the occupied territories "either to protect the inhabitants against the Israeli security forces or to replace the latter completely in the populated areas". Similar requests were voiced in the aftermath of the Hebron massacre in 1994.
However, with the Madrid launch of the Middle East Peace Talks at the end of 1991, these discussions were suspended pending the progress of the negotiations. The UN Security Council's approach to calls for "international protection" in the wake of the Hebron massacre stands in stark contrast to its positions prior to the Oslo process. In its previous resolutions calling for Israel's compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention, and particularly in its call in UNSC resolution 681 (1990) on other states to respect for the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Security Council was mandating law-based action to implement the full range of protection guaranteed by international humanitarian law.
In UNSC 904 (1994), however, the Security Council appeared to predicate the implementation of an "international presence" on further specific agreements reached between the Occupying Power and the PLO, and on the efforts of the co-sponsors of the peace process. Third-party involvement in the "international presence" and indeed other "measures to be taken to guarantee the safety and protection" of the Palestinians appear to be utilised as the two parties themselves deem appropriate.
In particular, the reference to the Oslo Accords might be read as referring the terms of reference of any such presence to that document, which in its turn postpones discussions of key issues such as settlements and Jerusalem. There has been no sufficiant political will to press for implementation of UNSC resolution 904 (1994) beyond the short-lived experiment of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH); and third-party states have not acted on their own obligations in securing a protection mandate within the framework of international humanitarian law.
In July 1999 a meeting was convened between the High Contracting Parties, that is, those countries who are signatories of the IV Geneva Convention, in Geneva. Because these grave breaches and abuses of Palestinian rights are still continuing, it was appropriate that the meeting that was called for by the United Nations to discuss enforcement of the Fourth Geneva Convention was convened in July 1999. However, instead of studying ways to enforce compliance with the obligations of international humanitarian law, the meeting was simple procedural one and was concluded after 10 minutes. Even worse, the meeting will be reconvened only in the light of the developments in the humanitarian situation in the field.
The development of an enforcement mechanism to protect human rights would have strengthened the resolve of peacemakers and create a firm and just foundation for the resolution of the long-standing conflict. Final status negotiations between Israelis and the Palestinians should be based on recognition of and implementation of international human rights law. At the meeting of the High Contracting Parties, the international community failed to demonstrate a serious commitment to ensure protection for people in the territories occupied by Israel in particular, and to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law in general.
According to article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, each signatory of the Convention has the duty not only to respect, but perhaps more importantly, to ensure the respect of the convention's provisions by other parties at all times. The High Contracting Parties to the Convention are urged to take all measures collectively and individually, to ensure that Israel's policies and activities, including any agreement it may arrive at with the Palestinian Authority, are brought into line with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Failing to enforce compliance with the Convention's provisions, the High Contracting Parties are themselves committing a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
(6) The safeguarding of the right of return of Palestinian refugees
There are presently an estimated 4,210,000 Palestinian refugees living outside occupied Palestine. An additional 1,200,972 Palestinians are UNRWA registered refugees in the Occupied Territories, of whom some 491,915 live in refugee camps. In a number of countries, these Palestinians are without citizenship and are denied basic rights. These refuge states have limited obligations in relation to refugees and do not have an obligation to provide permanent residence.
However, Israel has an obligation to permit the return of Palestinians to their homes. In the case of Palestinian refugees, their right to return and compensation is supported explicitly by UN resolution 194, which has since been reaffirmed 110 times by the United Nations. Additionally, repatriation is the favoured solution for refugees exiled in the course of military conflict. The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international legal instruments and conventions relating to the rights of indigenous peoples affirm the right of every individual to leave and return to his country.
For many years, the right of return was the Palestinian national goal, not establishing a state and certainly not a quasi-state in the form of limited autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank. However, the demand to establish a Palestinian state has in recent years replaced the demand to obtain the right of return. The Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority have created widespread confusion, both locally and internationally, about the meaning of the right to return in this new context. However, negotiations and agreements between Israel and the PLO, do not invalidate international law and UN resolutions.
Any peace agreement cannot delegitimize the refugee claim, because - according to legal standards - existing international law and UN resolutions can be replaced only by a political agreement whose provisions grant rights equal or beyond those defined by international law. Moreover, given the fact that for more than 50 years, Palestinian refugees continue their demand their rights of return, its explicit denouncement by the PLO would delegitimize the Palestinian leadership. Secondly, UN resolution 194 is not invalidated by a declaration of a Palestinian state on whatever territory. This resolution provides for the refugees' right to return to their homes. These homes are located in what has become the state of Israel.
Finally, although UN resolution 194 can be technically abolished by its repeal by the UN General Assembly, the right of return, solidly anchored in a wide range of international laws, will remain a right and legitimate claim, until surrendered by Palestinian refugees themselves.
Conclusion
The choice to de-escalate the struggle occurred through a political program encompassing parts of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories in order to ensure that: the intifada would be finished and devoid of content; it would lose popular support; and people would feel that they had no choice other than to support peace talks. However, the Palestinian Authority thought of itself as the outcome of the intifada. At this point in time, there is a need to remember that the intifada carried the slogans of freedom and independence, and not those of autonomy or the re-deployment of Israeli occupation forces.
The slogans were those of independence for all of the Occupied Territories and not of the reorganisation of the Israeli occupation in the form of scattered Bantustans over which there will be Israeli sovereignty, de facto, if not de jure. Nothing is yet determined. The nature of the relationship created between Israel and the Palestinian Authority can be compared to that of agency, with Israel as principal and the Palestinian Authority as agent. This indicates the political, and possibly legal, reality.
As long as Israel retains power at the negotiation-table, the Palestinian Authority will have to acquiesce to Israeli demands for tighter security in order to win concessions. The Palestinian Authority is beleaguered. It has to make Oslo succeed, if only for its own survival. In doing so, it must compromise at the negotiation table. Whilst it has little autonomy, all the concessions are flowing one way - from the Palestinian Authority to Israel. Israel continues to make its security the number one issue. In fact, by the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Israel gave some "colour of legality and independence" to one part of the PLO, that is, those in the PA. It is obvious from a number of facts that the Palestinian Authority is subservient to the will of Israel.
Moreover, Oslo and subsequent agreements are not legitimate and illegal. According to standards of international law - existing international law and UN resolutions can be replaced only by a political agreement whose provisions grant rights equal to or beyond those defined by international law. Any political agreement that relinquishes Palestinian rights will be unreliable and will have no legal status. Provisions in the Oslo and subsequent agreements that impose changes on the ground and changes in status which effectively deny the occupied population certain protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention are illegal.
The Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly protects the occupied population from such cosmetic changes by declaring in Article 47 the inviolability of the rights safeguarded by the Convention:
"Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, not by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole part of the occupied territory".
All practices prohibited by international humanitarian law continue to be violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Rather than these political agreements superseding existing international humanitarian law, under Article 47 the agreements themselves must come into question where their terms are contrary to humanitarian law. Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention means that the Israel-PLO agreements could not legally do what they purported to do, and therefore their international legality should be questioned.
The Palestinian Authority does not want to be held accountable for its actions, certainly not, on issues that could question its legitimacy. Still, the Palestinian people should take into their own hand their ability to stop further relinquishing of their rights and declare the agreements invalid and illegal. However, this would mean also the illegality, and invalidity of the Palestinian Authority.
Through the intifada the Palestinians challenged the violations of their basic liberties and rights by the occupation with a disruption of its processes at the political, economic, and administrative levels. It reflected the Palestinians' total rejection of the disruptive and abusive policies of the occupation. Oslo and final status negotiations should not become a rescue mission to save the oppressor from the consequences of his actions, nor should a nation's sovereignty be held hostage to the political manipulations and priorities of its oppressor. Any final agreement that relinquishes the inalienable and legitimate rights of the Palestinians will be unreliable and will have no legal status.